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THE NEW RURAL AMERICA

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PREFACE

The almost awesome growth of metropolitan areas in this century has often diverted attention from small towns and rural areas. In the 1960s, for example, the problems associated with rapid urban growth drew significant research attention and discussion in both the professional and the popular media. To the extent that rural areas were examined, they were often done so as the residual of urban studies. Even the title, *The People Left Behind*, of the President's Commission on Rural Poverty conveyed the impression that rural America was an anachronism in a rapidly industrializing and modernizing society. Such a perspective did much to lend credence to one sociologist's comment that rural America "is like a fished out pond, full of bullheads and suckers."

In recent years, however, there has been an increasing recognition among researchers and popular commentators that rural America is alive and generally doing well. Exactly how well, and what we can expect for the future, is the subject of this series of papers.

FRANK CLEMENTE

ANNALS, AAPSS, 429, Jan. 1977

The Place of U.S. Food in Eliminating World Hunger

By G. E. BRANDOW

ABSTRACT: Hunger in the sense of severe malnutrition is a fact for hundreds of millions of people in the less developed countries. Though the countries collectively have made impressive gains in agriculture, potential benefits in the form of more food production per person have been wiped out by rapid population growth. The United States has become by far the world's leading food exporter while providing large quantities of prized foods for its own population. Experts disagree on whether the food situation of the less developed world will worsen, but few expect elimination of hunger in this century. Among the means by which the United States might give assistance are help to poor countries in developing their agriculture and direct food aid. Costs of food aid include higher food prices in the United States, reduced foreign exchange earnings, and higher taxes and, together with dismay about population growth in recipient countries, are likely to limit food aid to much less than is technically possible. Suggestions for policy to provide more food aid than the modest amount now supplied include: enlist cooperation of other advanced nations; direct food aid where it is most needed; avoid piling up unpayable debts for food; encourage expanded production, especially of food grains, in the United States; and maintain reserves of strategic foods.

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HUNGER is a symbolic word for chronic, severe malnutrition and, in the extreme case, starvation. Chronic malnutrition means not only physical distress from lack of food but also high susceptibility to diseases, shortened life span, and general misery. It is estimated that in 1970 one-fourth of the people living in the less developed countries of the world—or nearly half a billion people—had insufficient food to maintain health.[1] In most less developed areas, agricultural production methods are still predominantly primitive, and productivity is low. Productivity in most nonagricultural activities is also low, with the result that comparatively few goods are available for exchange for food in international trade.

In the developed countries, hunger is much less frequent though not absent. Nations produce sufficient food for themselves or are productive enough in other pursuits to be able to buy food abroad. High average incomes, traceable to high productivity, enable people to gratify to some extent their preferences for livestock products (meat, poultry, eggs, and dairy products) and for other relatively expensive foods.

An outstanding fact about the capacity of cropland and related resources to feed people is that a given quantity of grain can feed the maximum number of people when consumed directly as human food. When grain is used as the primary source of feed for livestock, perhaps 70 percent or more of the energy and protein in the grain is not recovered in the form of edible livestock product. Much land, of course, is unsuited to crops—it is too hilly or too dry, for example. Cattle and sheep grazing such land convert forage plants into edible products and add to the food supply. Livestock can also utilize some other materials not suitable for human food. Furthermore, some animal protein in the human diet improves its quality. In general, however, feeding substantial amounts of grain to livestock yields products highly desired by most people but incapable of sustaining nearly as large a population as would the original grain.

The worldwide tendency for populations to upgrade their diets in energy intake (at least up to a point), in nutritional quality (again, up to some point), and in pleasurability as income per person rises is demonstrated by the following estimates of food consumption patterns (see fig. 1).

Income per person is much higher, of course, in the developed than in the less developed countries and higher in the United States than in the developed countries as a whole. The substitution of livestock products for cereal grains and such starchy foods as cassava and sweet potatoes as level of living rises is obvious. The data are United Nations' estimates for the early 1960s and include the Communist countries. Probably the most significant change since then has been an increase in consumption of livestock products in the developed world other than the United States.

Trends over the past decade or two point to major problems that the less developed world (as a whole, not every country) will face in the

1. Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations. The developed countries are usually taken to be the United States, Canada, Europe including Russia, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan. China is not included in the estimate here cited for the less developed world but is included in some other statistics given later.

Economic Group of Countries	Daily Calories per Person	Percentage of Calories from: Cereals and Starchy Foods	Fruits and Vegetables	Meat, Fish, Eggs, Milk
Less developed	2,100	71	3	8
Developed, including U.S.	3,040	43	4	24
United States	3,160	24	6	35

FIGURE 1

future. The less developed countries have done much better in increasing their food production than is commonly believed: between 1961–65 and 1973–75, agricultural production rose by 34 percent in the less developed world (excluding China) compared with 28 percent in the developed countries. But the much faster rate of population growth in the less developed than in the developed countries caused production per person to be virtually stagnant in the less developed world while increasing 15 percent in the already better-off developed countries. Population growth averages 2.3 percent per year in the less developed countries (including China) and poses an enormous difficulty for them as they struggle to improve the diets of their people.

It will be impossible to maintain the pace of production increase in the less developed countries without more advanced agricultural technology and more nonfarm inputs such as fertilizer. The developed countries generally have achieved higher food production over the past two decades by applying new technology and more nonfarm inputs to an approximately stable area of cropland. The less developed countries, collectively, have used both these methods (starting from a low base) and expansion of crop acreage. The option of more cropland is rapidly disappearing in important less developed countries, forcing them to turn more completely to ways of increasing yields per hectare.

Looking to the future, the less developed countries can attempt to deal with hunger in several ways. One of the most important is to increase their own food production, including, conceivably, some unconventional sources of food. Another is to increase their productivity in nonagricultural lines so that higher exports can pay for food imports. The possibility of monopolizing a vital raw material, as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) does petroleum, is tantalizing but not widely available. At least some food aid will be available from the developed nations. Population control is imperative but cannot be quickly achieved.

A complicating factor will be shifts in food consumption patterns if and as levels of living rise. Higher real incomes in the less developed countries will increase demand for food internally; a "food problem" will persist even if hunger diminishes. Still-rising population and further advances in levels of living in the advanced nations will increase their demand for food, especially livestock products. As a result, additional food production in developed countries and even in poor countries will not automatically become available for alleviating hunger where hunger is most prevalent.

The experts disagree on the prob-

able food situation of the less developed countries during the remainder of this century. Some fear that population will so outpace food production that hunger will much increase and that famine will be frequent in years of general crop failure. Such fears are heightened by the possibility that weather will become less favorable to crop production. Some other experts believe that trends of the past decade or two will continue: food production in the less developed world will, on the whole, keep up with population growth, and food from the developed nations will fill the largest gaps in the food supply of developing countries. Virtually no one expects hunger to be eliminated in this century.

THE PLACE OF THE U.S. IN WORLD FOOD SUPPLY

The United States has 5.4 percent of the world's population. In the years 1973–75, the nation's share of world production and consumption of two leading groups of food and feed products was as follows:

	PRODUCTION (%)	CONSUMPTION (%)
All grains	19.7	13.6
Oilseed and fish meal (includes meal equivalent of oilseeds not processed)	45.7	22.4

Grain is a basic food material because of its importance in direct consumption by humans and its place as a livestock feed. The meal component of such oilseeds as soybeans is high in protein, most of it is usable as human food, and though some is so used (for example, whole soybeans), most is used for livestock feed. The United States produces far more than its population share of both basic materials, consumes large but smaller shares, and supplies substantial amounts to other countries. Net exports of grain from the United States amounted to 7.4 percent of the grain consumed elsewhere in the world during 1973–75. For oilseed and fish meal, the figure was 30.7 percent.[2]

Individual grains are classified in the advanced nations as food grains (principally wheat and rice) and feed grains (principally corn, sorghum, barley, and oats). But feed grains are used mainly as human food in areas of the less developed world suited to their production. In tonnage, feed grains are more important than food grains in the United States: feed grains were 75 percent of the nation's grain production and 55 percent of its grain exports in the years 1973–75. Crop acreage could be shifted from feed grains to wheat if high wheat prices in relation to feed grain prices warranted the change. Average grain yield per acre, however, would be reduced by substitution of wheat for feed grains.

The dominant position of the United States as a supplier of food is a comparatively recent development. As table 1 shows, Canada exported as much grain as the United States in the early 1950s. Australia, South Africa, and Southeast Asia (mainly Thailand) together exported about half as much as the United States. Latin America had a small export surplus principally because of large grain exports by Argentina. Russia's modest export surplus about matched the net imports of Eastern Europe, and China had small net exports. Western Europe was the principal importer of grain; Japan imported about one-fifth as much.

2. Calculations of production, consumption, and export percentages were based on data compiled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, including preliminary or partially forecast data for 1975.

TABLE 1

NET EXPORTS OR IMPORTS (−) OF GRAIN, ANNUAL CROP-YEAR AVERAGES 1952–54, 1960–62, AND 1973–75

REGION OR COUNTRY	1952–54 AVERAGE (THOUSAND METRIC TONS)	1960–62 AVERAGE (THOUSAND METRIC TONS)	1973–75 AVERAGE (THOUSAND METRIC TONS)
Developed countries			
United States	10,661	32,756	74,075
Canada	11,868	9,700	13,879
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa	2,595	8,839	14,305
Japan	−3,892	−5,357	−18,856
Western Europe	−20,375	−26,032	−20,148
Russia	1,748	7,299	−10,544
Eastern Europe	−1,072	−6,721	−7,719
Less developed			
China (People's Republic)	364	−3,639	−3,963
Latin America	538	788	−617
Africa, ex. S. Africa	−82	−6,251	−17,639
South Asia	−3,497	−6,117	−8,981
Southeast Asia	3,034	3,938	3,100
Far East and other Asian countries	−1,890	−5,336	−11,869
Statistical discrepancy	—	−3,867	−5,023

SOURCE: *Compiled from data published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Averages for 1973–75 include partial forecasts for 1975.*

Among the less developed areas, only South Asia, including India, was a fairly large net importer of grain.

By 1973–75, no other country was even close to the United States as an exporter of grain (or of oilseed protein). Canada's exports were about the same as in the early 1950s. Though Australia and South Africa had achieved large proportionate increases in grain exports, their combined tonnage was about the same as Canada's. Southeast Asia's exports remained near the level of the early 1950s. Russia, Eastern Europe, and China were net importers and together absorbed more than 20 million tons of other countries' grain production.[3] Western Europe imported about as much grain as in the early 1950s, and Japan's imports nearly matched Western Europe's. Africa, the Far East, and the rest of Asia had become large importers, and South Asia's grain imports were more than double those of the early 1950s. Of the less developed regions listed in table 1, only Southeast Asia still had an export surplus (though Argentina remained an important exporter).

Emphasis on grain and oilseeds obscures the fact that the United States is also a food importer. Coffee and bananas are examples of imported foods not produced in the United States; sugar and beef are examples of imported foods that add to domestic production. For all foods collectively, imports amount to slightly more than half as much as exports; net food exports (exports less imports) are just short of one-tenth of production.

3. Both Russia and the United States suffered one unusually poor grain production year during 1973–75.

As experts consider where larger supplies of food might come from in the future if demands of import countries should continue to grow, their attention again turns to the United States. The nation's demonstrated capacity to increase yields per acre on its vast harvested acreage has not come to an end. More land could be put under the plow, though the productivity of most of it would be well below the current average. Some areas outside the United States—for example, Brazil—seem to have high potential for agricultural expansion. Usually they also have high rates of population growth. The United States, already by far the leading exporter, is a leading potential source of additional exports.

U.S. ALTERNATIVES IN ALLEVIATING HUNGER

Transferring food from the rich and agriculturally productive United States to poor countries short of food is an obvious approach to alleviating hunger. But as has already been suggested, there are other alternatives, and they should at least be recognized in appraising the direct use of U.S. food.

The foremost alternative is assistance by the United States in helping poor countries to develop their own food production. This means, principally, increasing production in agriculture and fisheries, but it can also include development of nonconventional food sources, new foods to make better use of existing materials, and improved methods of handling and storing food to reduce post-harvest losses. The assistance can take two principal forms. First is help in developing and applying new knowledge about superior crops, livestock, cultivation methods, soil management, nutrition, food handling, and the like. Second is assistance in providing physical inputs, such as fertilizer and certain farm equipment, or for developing soil and water resources.

Aid in checking population growth is another approach. The task is enormously difficult even for governments of the poor countries themselves; it is even more difficult for outsiders. Still another alternative is making U.S. markets more accessible to products from poor countries so that the countries can increase their ability to buy food from the United States.

Alternative means exist for transferring food from the United States to the less developed countries. By far the most important method in the first half of the 1970s was the same method used in exporting food to developed countries: commercial sale. The existence of an exportable food surplus in the United States, Australia, Thailand, or other nation is helpful to food-short poor countries even if they have to pay full price for what they get. The problem, of course, is that their opportunity to participate in the commercial market is greatly limited by their lack of purchasing power. Thus another alternative is to supply food to them on concessional terms. These range all the way from outright grants or gifts to long-term loans at less than commercial interest rates.

Though this is not the place to develop the point, it should be noted that all the alternatives to food aid have limitations as means of eliminating hunger, as does food aid itself. The U.S. government has had a substantial program of agricultural development assistance for poor countries since about 1950, and foundations, the United Nations, and some countries other than the United States have also supplied assistance. Success has been mixed, at best;

though some less developed countries have done well, others—including India and Bangladesh—remain in a precarious food situation. Exports of nonfood products from the less developed to the developed countries often are limited by low productivity at the source and may be further limited by resistance in developed countries to admission of competitive imports. Even if birth rates should fall promptly to replacement levels in the less developed world, the high proportion of young people would assure further population growth for years to come.

U.S. FOOD AID, PAST AND PRESENT

Food aid—exports under concessional terms—played a small role in the huge shipments of food from the United States in the early 1970s. Sixty-two percent of all agricultural exports (mostly food) went to developed countries in fiscal year 1975 (approximately the crop year 1974). Of the agricultural exports to less developed countries (excluding China, which received no aid), 14 percent was on concessional terms. There were exceptions to the modest role of food aid: for example, about three-fourths of agricultural exports to Bangladesh and substantially all of agricultural exports to some African countries were concessional. Aid exports were 28 percent of all agricultural exports to India.

A continuing program of food aid began in 1954 under Public Law 480, later called Food for Peace. Originally, the principal or at least crucial incentive for the program was agricultural surpluses accumulating in the hands of the government under farm price supports. Some aid took the form of food grants, but until the late 1960s the principal concessional device was to accept currencies of recipient countries, not convertible to dollars, as payment for agricultural products. The high-water mark for P.L. 480 was reached in fiscal 1965, a year of crop failure in India, when concessional sales accounted for 26 percent of all agricultural exports.

Among the criticisms of the program was the contention that food aid, which usually became additions to market supplies in recipient countries, tended to hold down prices there and thus to discourage local food production. Probably a more important result of food aid was the tendency for a number of recipient countries to rely upon it and to slight their own agriculture in allocating resources for economic development. P.L. 480 terms were made more stringent: sales to be paid for in dollars over 20 to 40 years gradually replaced nonconvertible currency sales, and recipient countries were expected to make progress in developing their own food production. Provision for grants continued. Tighter terms and Green Revolution successes in several developing countries reduced the dollar value of food aid by 30 percent between 1965 and 1972. Further shrinkage occurred in fiscal 1973 and 1974 as commercial markets abroad expanded sharply. Aid exports increased modestly in fiscal 1975 and 1976.

Included in U.S. aid are foods distributed through voluntary relief agencies, such as CARE (15 percent of the total in fiscal 1975), and through the international World Food Program (8 percent).

The principal achievement of food aid has been to increase the food supply in situations where more food was badly needed. To the extent that aid can be targeted on nutritionally vulnerable groups such as children or on particularly impoverished segments of the popula-

tion, the food is effective in alleviating the worst aspects of hunger. When food aid is essentially a general addition to the food supply of the recipient countries, as most of it has been in the past, the benefits are widely diffused. Confining large-scale food aid to those who need it most probably is not possible. There are modest opportunities to use distribution of food aid to stimulate nutrition or community improvement programs, and some funds (in local currency) realized from general sale of food may be useful in supporting economic development. Political stability resulting from more food probably is favorable to sustained economic progress. A common contention is that food aid buys time for a less developed country to slow its population growth and to invigorate its agriculture.

SOME EFFECTS OF LARGE-SCALE FOOD AID

What would a large-scale food aid program involve for the United States, one capable of making a substantial impact on hunger in the less developed world in the future? To avoid excessive generality, let us assume 50 million metric tons of grain as the average annual amount to be transferred to poor countries for little or no payment.[4] This amount of grain is approximately double the grain-equivalent of all aid provided under P.L. 480 at the peak of the program in the mid-1960s. On paper, 50 million tons could correct the food deficiency estimated for non-Communist less developed countries in 1970, but in practice the grain could not be distributed precisely to those who needed it most.

4. Grain is used illustratively because it would make up most of actual food aid, but other foods would displace some grain in a realistic program.

Given time, three sources of food for aid purposes would appear. One would be reduced food consumption in the United States. As the government attempted to purchase grain for aid, grain prices would rise sharply, livestock production would be curtailed, and retail prices of livestock products would increase. Higher prices to consumers would cause voluntary reduction of meat, poultry, egg, and dairy consumption commensurate with reduced production. Problems of providing adequate nutrition for the poor in the United States would intensify, but total food supplies for the nation would still be more than adequate for good nutrition.

A second source of grain for food aid would be reduced commercial exports of grain in response to high prices in the United States. The response might be slight at first but large after foreign countries had time to adjust their own production of livestock and grain.

The third source would be expanded grain production in the United States. Producers could intensify production (for example, use more fertilizer) and shift a little cropland from other crops to grain in a year or two. Given, say, five or more years and assurance of continued high prices, farmers might increase total crop acreage by 5 to 10 percent. This is considerably less than appears possible from an inventory of soil resources made in 1967, but expansion of total harvested acreage faces several economic—and environmental—obstacles.

There is little doubt that 50 million tons of grain could be obtained for aid purposes. The question is how high food prices would have to go to free up 50 million tons and how much grain would come from each of the three sources. As a rough estimate intended only to be illustrative, the difference in overall retail

food prices would perhaps amount to 10 percent—that percentage would be added to the level of retail food prices that would otherwise exist.

Such outcomes suggest the impact of large-scale food aid upon the American people, whose support for the policy would be necessary if the policy endured. Higher food prices for consumers is one obvious impact. A second effect would appear in foreign exchange earnings. In the short run, commercial exports probably would not decline enough to offset higher prices, with the result that foreign exchange earnings would increase; over several years, the loss of commercial exports probably would be great enough to reduce foreign exchange earnings. Foreign exchange, of course, is needed to pay for imports of such products as petroleum and for other international uses. A third effect would be the cost of purchasing grain for aid purposes: possibly the domestic cost of grain and payment for at least part of the ocean transportation would amount to 10 billion dollars (another rough estimate). If the U.S. government paid all the bill, that amount would be added to taxes (or would increase the budget deficit, probably stimulating general inflation). A fourth effect would be sharply higher farm prices for grain (much more in percentage terms than the 10 percent estimated for retail food prices) and higher incomes for grain producers; but producers of hogs, feedlot beef, poultry, eggs, and milk would be in a price-cost squeeze and forced to reduce output.

American citizens would have differing evaluations of these results. Many who strongly favor food aid would be willing to accept the resulting strains upon the economy. Others would be unwilling to accept the costs imposed upon them. It is important to note that satisfactions of giving food aid are not distributed among the people as are the personal costs and (in the case of grain producers) gains of providing it. Also, the satisfactions of giving food aid tend to be abstract, while the costs show up in daily concerns about the cost of living, taxes, and (in the case of many livestock producers) earning a living. An issue like food aid, accordingly, strains the capacity of the American political system to make and execute public policy.

The issue would be further complicated by circumstances abroad. Inevitably, substantial amounts of food aid would go to individuals who want more or better food but do not physiologically require it. Corruption and obvious waste are sure to be associated with distribution of food in some recipient countries. Political turmoil will at times cause setbacks in local food production. Experience shows that receipt of aid is not necessarily accompanied by gratitude toward donor countries. In the past, international policies of the United States have much influenced the choice of countries to which aid was given. There is disagreement, of course, about these policies and the extent to which they should affect the distribution of aid. Obviously, large-scale food aid requires firm resolution on the part of those who provide it to bear many disappointments.

Probably the most inhibiting obstacle to all-out support for food aid is the ultimate inadequacy of this solution to hunger if population growth is not checked and if food production is not much increased in the less developed world. The United States, or the developed countries collectively, cannot alone supply all the food to care for the added population to appear in the less developed countries in this century if there are no restraints on population. Fifty million tons of

grain is not enough to feed for one year the added population to appear in the less developed regions three years from now. To the argument that food aid gives time for recipient countries to curb population increase and to accelerate agricultural development, some opponents of aid reply that food aid in the next decade will only increase the number of people to know famine in following decades.

Thus, the United States finds itself in a situation where (1) humanitarian motives and international policy considerations prompt it to respond to the needs of less developed countries by giving food aid, (2) the United States cannot be sure of the long-term effectiveness of its aid, and (3) the effects of large-scale food aid on U.S. citizens will almost surely mean that food aid will be substantially less than the nation is technically capable of supplying.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Hunger will exist in the world for a long time. Policy to combat hunger should therefore be framed for the long run and made responsive to changing situations as they appear. Food shipments to poor countries will play a part in a balanced policy, but so also will assistance in expanding their food production, help in curbing their population growth, and greater willingness to accept their products in international trade.

U.S. food will and should continue to be exported to the less developed countries both as commercial sales and on concessional or aid terms. Some of the countries can buy enough to meet essential requirements, and others can buy some of the food they need. Reserving food aid to food-short countries that cannot pay for it without seriously impairing their own economic development will help assure that the limited aid likely to be available will go where it will do the most good.

Though the United States is in a unique position with regard to food, the responsibility for alleviating hunger extends to all developed countries. Western Europe, Russia, Japan, and the richest OPEC nations should expect to assume reasonable shares of the financial burden of food aid even if they are net importers of food. Given the political divisions in the world, food aid probably will continue to be provided on an individual country basis as well as through international organizations.

Conditions attached to food aid are a touchy matter for both donor and recipient countries. In light of all the possibilities of misuse of food aid, tough terms by the United States to ensure (so far as that is possible) that aid is properly used seem warranted. But financial terms probably should be relaxed for countries not capable of buying commercially. Food to alleviate hunger is not an investment creating increased production out of which payment can be made. It seems unlikely that long-term dollar loans for food aid can be paid; their extensive use only piles up difficulties for the future. Also, in 1973 Congress provided that the choice of nations to receive aid should be based more on need and less on U.S. political objectives than at times in the past; further shift of policy in this direction may be desirable.

Agricultural production must continue to expand in the United States, especially if food aid is to play a substantial role in alleviating hunger abroad. Experience demonstrates that willingness to supply aid is much influenced by the availability of food that can be exported without increasing domestic prices or forcing

consumers to turn to less preferred, if still nutritional, diets. Agricultural production cannot be greatly accelerated in the short run, for farmers are wary that short-term price increases may not persist, output-increasing investments take time, and research on production methods ordinarily requires years to produce results. In a highly uncertain world where future needs cannot be clearly known, it will probably be better to err on the side of having a little too much food production rather than a little too little. Too much food would mean using more food for aid than targeted and/or programs to support farm incomes; too little would mean less aid than desired and higher food prices, together with the stimulus of higher food prices to general inflation.

Two moderate means of encouraging agricultural production for food aid are favorable income-support assurances to food grain producers and more agricultural research. Research would be aimed at more efficient food production generally and would include work on environmentally acceptable ways of increasing output. More drastic measures might include higher income assurances for food grain producers, low-cost loans for new land development, guarantees of as much natural gas as needed for manufacture of nitrogen fertilizer, and similar methods. The more drastic measures probably should be used only if the United States has a strong determination to give much food aid or if future events show that total demand for food, including some aid, outruns production. Closely related to efforts to expand production of conventional foods is research to develop new foods from conventional and new sources.

Food aid increases the need for reserve stocks, especially of grains; only if reserves exist will food be available as needed. International cooperation is highly desirable in maintaining food reserves, and some combination of international and domestic programs seems likely.

Many Americans are moved by humanitarian and moral reasons to want much more food aid than public policy will provide. They therefore look for private means of alleviating hunger abroad. Even if participated in by fairly large numbers, such actions as eating less meat are not very effective by themselves, for the market response is lower prices, higher consumption by other consumers, more grain exports to developed countries, and, perhaps, less production of grain. Little of the "saved" grain may in fact go to hungry people. An alternative (or supplement) is to use private funds for purchase and shipment of food. It seems possible to revise and expand current provisions of P.L. 480 for food aid through voluntary relief agencies so as to attract more private funds and to give greater assurance that food aid is thereby increased.

The time is at hand, if not overdue, for a reappraisal of food aid policy. Several of the circumstances leading to retrenchment after the mid-1960s no longer apply. Prospective needs for food aid are large and have become an international concern to which the United States must respond. Though the World Food Conference of 1974 was suggested by the United States, no positive food aid policy going beyond ad hoc application of old programs has yet emerged in the United States. In light of the unique position of the nation as a food producer, no international policy on the question of hunger will be formulated until the United States knows what it wants to do and takes leadership in developing effective international arrangements.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 429, Jan. 197

The Changing American Farm

HAROLD F. BREIMYER

ABSTRACT: The American farm has never been as homogeneous or as stable as it appears in nostalgic recollection. Its historic emphasis on fee simple ownership by operating proprietors was nevertheless a marked departure from its feudal antecedent and remains relevant today. Farmers' desires for status and for managerial independence have not mitigated. They are subject to (1) changes, such as increase in size, that have no deep significance; and (2) other changes, such as increased dependence on nonfarm inputs, that bring more specialization of enterprise, including growing detachment of livestock (and poultry) farming from crop farming, and that make farming more sensitive to the terms of relationship with input-supplying as well as market industries. Encroachment of those industries via vertical integration (ownership or contract) along with internal growth of some farms to larger than family size gradually shrink the dominance of the traditional family farm. Even so, the most viable unit may be the part-time or retirement farm, which does not depend heavily on farm income. The ultimate question relates to what national policy is to be. Past policy has been ambivalent, and no clear direction for the future is to be seen.

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POPULAR ideas about the American farm are wreathed in emotion and haloed by nostalgia. Most institutions of our day are viewed and judged more or less rationally. Not so the farm. It carries various affective associations, many of them lodged in memory. Some of them mislead.

It is common, for example, to think of the farm of the past as comparatively uniform and stable. That recollection then contrasts with the variability and insecurity of today. Some difference exists, and the stresses of our time will be noted below. But, significantly, the American farm of the past was less distinguished for stability or homogeneity than for its revolutionary departure from its antecedent, the European feudal system. And although the farm of today is indeed being tugged from various directions and its future is uncertain, the more serious threat does not arise from publicized trends such as larger size, greater technology, or even increased financial capitalization. Of greater import are pressures to fractionate the organizational structure of farming, creating sharp divisions between who owns, manages, and works on American farms.

The place and fate of the farm enter the consciousness of most Americans. Many families had rural forbears. All recognize their dependence on the food and fiber products of the farm. In addition, our citizens hold an almost mystical regard for the life-sustaining biological processes contained in farming. Human beings marvel at the regenerative features of crop and animal husbandry, which, unlike all mechanical processes, yield an increase in substance and not a mere change in form.

DEFINITION OF A FARM

Definition of a farm suffers from both familiarity and obscurity. Everyone knows what a farm is until he tries to define it. Scholarly sources are of little help. The *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* discourses informatively about the plantation but omits the farm. Webster's dictionary tells us only that the verb, to farm, comes from the Old French fermer, to fix or make a contract, which in turn derives from the Latin firmare, to make firm.[1] James Horsfall translates this into the role of the farmer as a renter: "a farmer in the old French was a share cropper, a peasant, a serf."[2]

Our own focus shifts back and forth from the impersonal word, farm, to the personal, farmer. Our concerns properly involve how the identity of the farm affects the place and welfare of the farmer.

Our dual interest is illustrated in the popular notion of a farm as a unit for producing crops and/or livestock (including poultry). Is the unit basically managerial or operational? In other words, is an individual farm defined as a unit coming under a single management, or one that is operated from a single headquarters?

Similar but more important is the consideration of sovereignty. The idea of a farm implies managerial control, that is to say, autonomy in deploying resources and accepting associated risk and return. Sometimes this aspect of definition is put in terms of linkage of a farm with its two adjoining sectors, the sup-

1. *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Company, 1970), p. 302.

2. James G. Horsfall, "Agricultural Strategy in the Tragedy of the Commons," *Agricultural Science Review*, vol. 10, no. 1 (First Quarter 1972), p. 19.

pliers of inputs and marketers of products. If the linkage is via buying and selling, the farm is said to be autonomous, to enjoy sovereignty. If, instead, contractual integration prevails, sovereignty is compromised or even lost.

A sharply different orientation is how the concept of a farm involves the unique resource of farming, the land. How is land to be held, how farmed, and under what terms? In this sense, a farm is viewed in terms of the relation of man to land, or of land to man.

But that does not close the issue. What kinds of enterprises belong on a farm or in farming? To the extent institutions of the land define farming, are livestock and poultry included? The word "agriculture" literally means land culture. We can equivocate on whether it includes grazing of animals on native pasture, but it almost surely excludes feeding harvested crops to animals in confinement. Yet the traditional American farm has included the raising and feeding of livestock and poultry.

Now, though, livestock and poultry operations are increasingly being detached from the source of feed. Some, such as tiering hens in cages, are located on plots of land no larger than a site for manufacturing—which, in fact, the system resembles. Perhaps such operations no longer qualify as a part of farming.

It is not necessary to arrive at definitional purity. It may be sufficient to recognize the uncertainties of definition.

ALTERNATE KINDS OF FARMING

We next consider the alternate organizational forms of farming. These are useful for inventorying the present but even more so for projecting the future. This approach was followed by Extension economists of north central states who addressed the subject.[3] Their selected categories of farms may be expanded to the following:

1. Less than family size
2. Family size, open market
   a. Primarily owner operated
   b. Primarily tenant operated
3. Larger than family size, open market
4. Cooperative
5. Contractually integrated
6. Large corporate

The smallest farms are usually part-time or retirement farms. These are the first category. They are numerous.

Family-size farms that are predominantly operated by their owner, and that buy and sell in the market, are the epitome of the traditional U.S. family farm. These form category 2*a*. A number of farms are similar but are owned by a retired farmer or his widow or a nearby nonfarm investor. These are category 2*b*.

A third category is of farms larger than family size but owned and operated within farming, not by nonfarm people or firms. The dividing line between family- and larger-than-family-size is indistinct. One rule of thumb is that a farm of more than one and a half family workers and an equal number of hired workers no longer classifies as "family." Sometimes two family and two non-family workers are the breaking point.

Although family farmers implicitly assume that the principal threat

3. *Who Will Control U.S. Agriculture? A Series of Six Leaflets*, North Central Regional Extension Publications 32-1 to 6, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Cooperative Extension Service Special Publication 28, March 1973.

to them arises externally, Thomas Stout has long pointed out that farming already has a large contingent of super-size units within it. In 1967 he observed that "we have more severe concentration ratios in agriculture" than in many manufacturing industries.[4]

Cooperative farming (category 4) requires that individual farms, though still modest proprietorships, be bound together by full-contract commitments for cooperative procurement of inputs and marketing of products. Farmers would have a voice in policy-making by their cooperatives, and they would be autonomous over their individual farming operations. Few farms of this kind now exist, but they are a reasonable possibility for the future.

Contractual integration (category 5) is identified by production contracts between the farm and the supplier of inputs, marketer of products, or both. The farmer has relatively little managerial discretion. Integrated production of broilers may be the clearest example.

Corporate farming (category 6) refers to total control by industrial type corporations. The corporation owns and operates the farm. Workers are wage employees.

The six kinds of farming allow further variations. Distinctions among them are not clear-cut. For example, a trend of the 1960s and 1970s has been toward part-owner farming, in which the operator owns a base or "home" farm and rents one or several tracts that he farms. This kind of farm blurs subcategories *2a* and *2b*.

4. Thomas T. Stout, "Effect of Changes in Market Structure on Ownership Patterns of Wealth and on the Distribution of Incomes, Rights and Privileges," *Implications of Changes on Farm Management and Marketing Research* (Iowa State University: CAED Report 29, 1967), p. 362.

FORCES OF CHANGE, 1776

Forces bearing on the American farm today have old antecedents. They begin with the early history of our nation. Then as now, a powerful driving force was farmers' striving for recognition, status, opportunity. That plea was recognized in the colonial period. It has never been silenced since.

Colonizers of America sought to break loose from the restrictive landholding and land tenure rules of medieval Europe. Those clearly pertained to both man and land. According to George Geiger, a distinction can be drawn between the earlier feudalism and the later manorial system. In the former, land was held in a succession of service relationships to higher authorities (nobles and, at the summit, the sovereign). In the latter, the manor was more nearly independent. It was also nearly self-sufficient, and master-servant relationships within it were proprietary rather than fealty.[5]

Don Paarlberg points out that it was our national wish to build a "free and open system of tenure" into our agriculture. Steps were taken to "prevent the development of a hereditary land-owning class." This was done, for example, by laws prohibiting primogeniture—the "bequeathing of the farm, intact, to the eldest male heir"; and entailment—"specifying . . . that a piece of property must stay in the family through subsequent generations."[6]

It would be heroic to say that in the yeasty setting of the time the aspirations of our forefathers them-

5. George Raymond Geiger, *The Theory of the Land Question* (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1936), pp. 156–59.

6. Don Paarlberg, "Providing Capital for Tomorrow's Farms," remarks at Presidents' Council Conference (Springfield, Mass.: U.S., Department of Agriculture 3661–74, December 1974), p. 2.

selves were the controlling force. More accurate is that accessibility to new, virgin, limitless, undefended land made it easy to act. In the words of Louis Hartz, "Where land was abundant and the voyage to the New World itself a claim to independence, the spirit which repudiated peasantry and tenantry flourished with remarkable ease."[7]

Our land laws have provided for ownership in fee simple. Through a combination of law and circumstance, the majority of farms in the United States came to be of the kind usually called the family farm. Only the plantations of the south and the Spanish haciendas of the southwest were notable departures from that basic type.

FORCES OF CHANGE, 1976

Two centuries after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, U.S. farming is still subject to forces that impel change. Those forces, also invite if not impel public decision as to which directions of change are to be accommodated and which restrained.

Early aspirations for status and for managerial independence have not been mitigated. Those hopes and strivings are now expressed in the language of "Who Will Control . . . ?" U.S. farming. They convert to a choice among the six kinds of farming listed above. What is different today is not the goals for farming held by farmers or even by nonfarm people; it is rather the broad and diverse mix of forces that are being brought to bear on the structure of farming.

Some of those forces arise internally. They are usually classed within the broad term "technology." A more exact explanation is that the techniques of farming, the skills required of the farmer, and the kind and source of resources employed have all gone through transformation.

This is not to say that farming is more difficult now, nor that such changes as the increase in size of a typical farm are particularly significant. Farming now requires that the farmer possess more scientific knowledge than his predecessors did. It is a substitution of how to lubricate a tractor for how to fit a collar on a horse; or of application rates and rules for chemical pesticides versus knowing what wood ashes repel potato bugs.

The increase in size of a midwest farm from a pre-tractor 80 acres to a highly mechanized 320 acres means only that big machines till a larger area.[8]

Other inferences are more important. Obviously, the kind of knowledge needed today is more formally acquired. Hence there is a greater role for formal education, both in-school and continuing. The complexity of modern techniques has led to a significant change to more specialization of enterprise on farms and among farmers. This increases a farmer's risk as contrasted with the evening-out of diversification. It in turn can lead to interest in cooperative or governmental measures to reduce risk.

7. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), pp. 17–18.

8. A corroboration comes from Philip M. Raup: "It has been a truism that until this generation the revolution in agriculture had not made any basic change in the functional characteristics of farms; only the size was different. With exceptions in the cotton South, the ranching West, and California, the big farm of the 1930s or even the 1950s was in most cases a large-scale version of the universal peasant farm. . . ." "Urban Threats to Rural Lands: Background and Beginnings," *Journal of American Institute of Planners*, vol. 41, no. 6 (November 1975), p. 372.

Specialization helps to account for the gradual detachment of livestock and poultry enterprises from crop farming. A major consequence of specialization is political. Even though farming has never been politically unified—it has always had its internecine wars—the trend toward specialization of enterprise exacerbates conflicts. It has enhanced the political role of commodity organizations, which threaten to overshadow general farm organizations politically. And insofar as general organizations are incapable of reconciling diverse interests, the conflicting demands of individual commodity groups go forward to the Congress and Executive branch for resolution. Thus does internal structure affect political process.

Still another consequence of technical change comes from the shift to more resources of nonfarm origin. Farmers now obtain many of their resources from off the farm. According to some estimates, the fuel, machinery, chemicals, fertilizers, veterinary services, and other inputs obtained from outside farming amount to almost two-thirds of all resources used. Land and the farmer's labor are now scarcely more than one-third.

As a result, farming is now highly subject to the terms of relationship with the source of nonfarm inputs. The connection with input suppliers is one of the criteria governing the kind of farming that is to prevail.

To be sure, this trend toward more use of nonfarm inputs and sensitivity to the terms of getting them is only the opposite face of the commercialization coin. Several generations have passed since farming became commercial on the selling side. It is now commercial on the procurement side also.

A final development may be ambiguously classed as internal. Due in part to new means of transportation and communication, the farm and farmer have lost not only their isolation but most of their cultural identity. Farmers and their families are now virtually indistinguishable from city and town residents. They have melded with them in cultural, recreational, educational, and religious activities. They even coalesce somewhat politically.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON FARMING

Although it is tempting to say that farming is affected mainly by what happens within it, the opposite is more nearly the truth. Perhaps more than ever before in our history, farming is affected by events arising from outside its borders—outside the borders of farming, but even, it may be added, outside the borders of the nation.

Now that agriculture draws on the nonfarm economy for so many of its resource inputs, as well as for its markets, it is subject to developments in that economy. Most visible there is the ever greater concentration of size and power among firms. The farming sector is notable for its uniquely small-scale organization that contrasts so sharply with the large firms in most farm-related industries.

Those industries have not been static but have been moving toward conglomeration, which centralizes economic power even more, and toward vertical integration. Insofar as firms integrate vertically into farm production, they convert farming to the fifth or sixth types named above (contractual or ownership integration).

But that is not the end of it. Primarily in order to resist the market

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF FARMS BY CENSUS CLASSIFICATION, 1969

	Number of Farms	
Economic Class	Number (Thousands)	Percent of Total
1—$40,000+ sales	211	7.1
2—$20,000–39,999 sales	357	12.0
3—$10,000–19,999 sales	505	16.2
4—$5,000–9,999 sales	389	13.1
5—$2,500–4,999 sales	286	9.6
Less than $2,500 sales		
Part-time	1,223	41.2
Part-retirement		
Abnormal		
Total	2,971	100.0

SOURCE: 1969 Census of Agriculture, U.S., Department of Commerce.

power or vertical encroachment of industrial firms, farmers have instigated collective defensive action. These may take the form of governmental programs to influence production, price, and income; or group action by farmers through marketing orders, large cooperatives, or collective bargaining.

Modern farming has become vulnerable to increasing scarcity and the rising price of its industrial input materials, particularly petroleum and chemical fertilizer. For many years they were highly available and their price trends lagged behind most industrial prices. Not so in the 1970s. At times some materials have been physically scarce. They have continuously been more expensive than before.

Higher priced inputs act to restrain gross productivity of farming. They also have a feedback effect. It is to accentuate the scarcity, and therefore the price, of land. Cheap fertilizer substituted for land and made it more plentiful. Its higher cost now makes land relatively scarcer.


Land has become more dear for another reason, namely, increased competition arising from actual or potential nonfarm use. A growing population draws more land into a myriad of uses ranging from home and industrial sites to highways to recreational areas. Although the three-fourths million acres lost each year probably include no more than one-third million acres of good farmland, the attrition over time helps sustain an uptrend in land prices.

Land price inflation yields a bonanza return to present owners, moves it out of the reach of younger farmers or any would-be farmers of modest means, and attracts speculative buyers and particularly those aided by a tax shelter. And insofar as land is assessed for taxes at higher than its farming value, it is driven out of ownership by operating farmers and perhaps entirely out of farming.

Farming has always been sensitive to fluctuations in demand for its products. When most of the market was domestic, attention focused on it. In the 1970s, domestic demand has been stabilized by unemployment benefits, social security pay-

FIGURE 1

CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN 1969 (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MARKET VALUE OF PRODUCTION FROM FARMS WITH $100,000 OR MORE IN GROSS SALES)



SOURCE: U.S. *Census of Agriculture*, 1969.

ments, and supplemental food programs. In 1976 the food stamp program alone added about $6 billion a year to retail demand for food. Export demand was, instead, the big variable. It became subject to economic and political events worldwide.

Of all the influences felt upon farming in the 1970s, the most newly prominent one was that of environmental concerns. These had the impact of restraining some yield-increasing techniques in farming (for example, application of some chemicals) and of imposing unwelcome regulations on farming practices. The regulations were not merely annoying; their form and application could affect the relative viability of various kinds of farming.

Last of external influences to be named here is financial. Terms of access to capital now exert a powerful influence over the performance of farming and especially the kind of farming that is to prevail. Those terms are no longer expressed solely as loan versus equity capital. New is the role of income tax laws in affecting both the total supply of capital to farming and the competitive advantage of one kind of farming over another. In general, tax regulations have worked to the competitive disadvantage of the traditional family farm. A self-financed family farmer cannot compete with a "tax-loss" nonfarm investor who can absorb an operating loss in farming as a write-off from tax obligations in his other undertakings.

EMERGING STRUCTURE OF FARMING

The Bureau of the Census has classified farms according to value

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF FARMS AND INCOME, BY VALUE OF SALES PER FARM, 1974

		Income per Farm*				Percent of U.S. Total Income*		
		From Farming				From Farming		
Value of Sales	Number of Farms (Thous.)	Cash Receipts	Net	Total	Percent of U.S. Total Number of Farms	Cash Receipts	Net	Total
$100,000 and over	115	$391,600	$83,234	$93,904	4.1	47.4	34.5	20.1
$40,000–99,999	355	63,493	20,192	25,806	12.5	23.7	25.9	17.0
$20,000–39,999	588	30,133	11,234	16,078	20.8	18.7	23.8	17.6
$10,000–19,999	325	15,625	6,015	12,157	11.5	5.3	7.1	7.3
$5,000–9,999	246	7,874	3,341	11,491	8.7	2.0	3.0	5.2
$2,500–4,999	494	3,783	1,745	11,085	17.4	2.0	3.1	10.2
Less than $2,500	707	1,071	1,022	17,209	25.0	0.9	2.6	22.6
Total or average	2,830	33,545	9,789	19,021	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: *Farm Income Statistics*, U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Statistical Bulletin No. 547, July 1975.
* Includes government payments.

of sales, with separate categories for part-time and part-retirement farms. Data for 1969 show a high number of small farms including part-time and part-retirement farms (see table 1).

Class 1 farms in 1969 were only 7 percent of all farms, but they had 51 percent of all sales.

Concentration in the largest farms varies by type of farm and by area. The percent of all sales in 1969 originating in Class 1 farms varied as follows by type of farm. (Data exclude sales from part-time and part-retirement farms, which are usually almost negligible.)[9]

Vegetable	85.0	Cotton	54.4
Poultry	84.6	General	45.7
Misc. field crop	74.6	Dairy	41.1
Livestock ranch	72.8	Cash grain	35.4
Fruit and nut	68.8	Tobacco	18.6
Livestock	61.2		

Concentration differs widely by states. The map in figure 1 is confined to value of production on farms selling more than $100,000 of product per year. In five states—Nevada, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Florida—more than half of all production is on farms of that large size.

The Economic Research Service publishes annual estimates of farm sales and income according to volume of sales per farm. Data in table 2 apply to 1974. These data also show the high concentration in a relatively small number of large farms that Thomas Stout reported a decade ago. The 115,000 largest farms (sales volume of $100,000 or more) in 1974 were only 4 percent of all farms but made 47 percent of all sales and earned 34 percent of all net income from farming. Those selling $40,000 or more accounted for 71 percent of all sales and 60 percent of net income.

The 1.2 million smallest farms contributed only 2.9 percent of sales and 5.7 percent of net income earned in farming. Many of the smallest farms are part time and part retirement. A high proportion have sizable income from other sources. In 1974 the 707,000 farms with least net income from farming had off-farm income averaging more than $16,000.

Off-farm income received by the smallest farms increased rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1960, farms receiving less than $2,500 net income from farming had an average off-farm income of only $2,732. By 1970 the off-farm income was up to $7,433. It more than doubled in the

TABLE 3

PERCENT OF FARM OUTPUT PRODUCED UNDER PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, 1970

Feed grains	0.1
Food grains	2.0
Vegetables for fresh market	21.0
Vegetables for processing	85.0
Potatoes	45.0
Citrus fruits	55.0
Other fruits and nuts	20.0
Sugarbeets	98.0
Sugarcane	40.0
Cotton	11.0
Tobacco	2.0
Oil bearing crops	1.0
Seed crops	80.0
Fed cattle	18.0
Sheep and lambs	7.0
Hogs	1.0
Eggs	20.0
Broilers	90.0
Turkeys	42.0

SOURCE: Ronald L. Mighell and William S. Hoofnagle, *Contract Production and Vertical Integration in Farming, 1960 and 1970*, U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, ERS-479, 1972.

9. U.S., Department of Commerce, *Census of Agriculture, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

next four years.[10] It should be recognized, however, that individual farms moved into and out of the lowest income category according to changes in farm product prices.

Scattered data relate to how much farm production takes place in contractual integration and by large industrial-type corporations. Estimates for 1970 regarding contractual integration are shown in table 3. The proportions are highest for broilers, sugar beets, vegetables for processing, and seed crops.

The extent of direct farming by large corporations is more difficult to measure. The Economic Research Service estimated that in 1970 about 4.8 percent of all crops and likewise 4.8 percent of all livestock were produced under vertical integration, a term referring to direct operations by input-supplying or marketing firms.[11]

A selected and impressive statistic, reported by Donn Reimund, is that "large multiestablishment firms with farming operations" accounted for "7 percent of the total value of U.S. farm production as reported in the 1969 Census of Agriculture."[12] But as these "large multiestablishments" by no means comprise all the large corporate entities engaged in farming, we must conclude that big-scale corporate farming has reached substantial proportion. Certainly more than 10 percent of all farm output must be credited to big corporations.

A summary judgment is that the American farm is devolving into a number of kinds of units. The traditional family farm (type 2*a* in the listing above) has not dominated as much in the past as generally believed, and it is being compromised and displaced persistently. Paradoxically, the farming likely to show the most staying power may be the part-time or retirement farm that does not depend solely on farm income for its viability.

Also encroaching on the owner-operated family farm are nonfarm landlord ownership (category 2*b*), the larger than family farm (category 3), the contractually integrated farm (category 5), and the industrial type corporate farm (category 6). The relative growth rate for each is difficult to predict.

This review must conclude with a note in the realm of policy. What happens to the American farm will depend in large measure on what is done to influence it. Policies in the past have been ambivalent. Many policies ranging from cooperative credit to publicly supported research and education definitely have favored the traditional owner-operated family farm. Some others have worked in the opposite direction. It is generally believed that price and income programs have, on balance, favored larger units. This was most clearly true prior to the imposition of a dollar limit on size of payment going to a single farmer. Working most in favor of larger, nonfamily, farms have been the various income tax rules.

To date, only the most marginal kinds of public action have been taken to redirect trends in the American farm. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. public, farmers and nonfarmers alike, will choose to exercise direction-giving control in the future.

10. *Farm Income Statistics*, U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Statistical Bulletin No. 547, July 1975.

11. Ronald L. Mighell and William S. Hoofnagle, *Contract Production and Vertical Integration in Farming, 1960 and 1970*, U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, ERS-479, 1972.

12. Donn A. Reimund, *Farming and Agribusiness Activities of Large Multiunit Firms*, U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, ERS 591, 1975, p. v.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 429, Jan. 1977

The Price of Farm Products in the Future

By WILLARD W. COCHRANE

ABSTRACT: The central focus of this article is on the behavior of U.S. grain prices in the context of prospective world developments over the next several decades. We first look at the process of farm price determination. We next look at the dramatic movements in farm prices, particularly grain prices, in the period 1970–75. Given this background, we explore in some depth what is likely to be the trend in world grain prices over the next 25 years and the bases of that trend development. The conclusion is reached that world grain prices are likely to trend upward over the period 1975–2000. It is argued, however, that grain prices are not likely to move along a smooth trend; to the contrary, grain prices are likely to fluctuate widely, sharply, and unpredictably around trend. Finally, the policy implications of future grain price behavior are explored and some tentative policy suggestions presented.

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THIS paper focuses on farm product prices in the United States. But because the agricultural sector of the United States is inextricably linked to the world market, the discussion of future U.S. prices will be in the context of expected world developments (about 50 percent of the grain moving in world trade comes from the United States, and about 35 percent of the grain produced in the United States is exported). Further, to an important degree this discussion will be concerned with grain prices. Grains are the basic food and feeding stuff at home and abroad and the leading farm commodity moving in international trade. Through the ubiquitous process of substitution, all farm prices are tied to and move with (after a period of adjustment) grain prices. Thus, the central focus of this article is on U.S. grain prices in the context of world developments over the next several decades.

How Farm Prices Are Determined

Farm prices in the United States are typically determined in markets with many buyers and many sellers; this is particularly the case in the grains. Prices are determined by the interaction of those impersonal forces: supply and demand. The determination of farm prices, particularly in the mid-1970s, probably comes closer to satisfying the conditions of the elementary textbook case of market price determination than is the case in any other sector of the economy. But having made this generalization, we must immediately make some qualifications and additions to the above statement.[1]

For many years, the federal government has exerted an important influence on farm prices. It has exerted this influence in several ways. First, it supported the prices of major commodities (such as wheat, corn, and cotton) at prices above or approaching short-run equilibrium levels. This it did by standing ready to take over the commodities of farmers participating in related programs whenever the market price of the commodity involved fell below the price support level. Second, the government affected the supply of major commodities coming into the market by numerous and varied production control programs. Third, the government affected the demand for a large number of commodities by acquiring those commodities in the market and disposing of them outside commercial channels (for example, through the operation of Public Law 480). By these various devices, the federal government caused the prices of farm commodities to be higher, at least in the short run, than they otherwise would have been. Government played an active role in the determination of farm prices from the end of World War II to 1972.

The markets for all farm commodities do not satisfy the condition of many buyers and many sellers. In the case of certain fruit and vegetable crops for processing and certain livestock products—dairy and poultry products—the markets have become increasingly monopolistic in the twentieth century. In the processing markets, strong monopsonists have emerged. In the dairy markets, a form of bilateral monopoly

1. For a good discussion of farm price behavior in differently structured markets, see William G. Tomek and Kenneth L. Robinson, *Agricultural Product Prices* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), chs. 5, 8, 9, and 10.

has emerged. And in the case of poultry meat, open markets at the farm level have all but disappeared through integration. Thus, various types of monopolistic structures have come to dominate price formation in the markets for fruits, vegetables, dairy products, and poultry.

In the case of the grains, the U.S. market is one segment, albeit a large segment, of an international market. The price of corn or wheat in Chicago reflects growing conditions and demand changes in the Soviet Union almost as readily as it does such conditions in the United States. The supply of and demand for corn, which interact in the Chicago market to determine the price of corn, reflect worldwide supply and demand conditions. Thus, the spatial boundaries of the market for U.S. grain are worldwide.

Because of the growth period of a crop season or longer required in agricultural production, the supply response to price for agricultural commodities is delayed by a period of a crop season or longer. This delayed response gives rise to a price-supply-price sequence which has become known as the "Cobweb Theorem."[2] Price in one period induces a production response in a second period, which gives rise to a new price in the second period; the price determined in the second period once again induces a production response in the third period. this cobweb interaction goes on and on through time. Price movements through time will be sharp, extreme, and explosive where the elasticity of demand is low absolutely and low relative to the elasticity of supply. And price movements through time will be moderate and tend to dampen down where the elasticity of demand is large absolutely and large relative to the elasticity of supply.

Further, because the principal product of agriculture, food, is required by consumers for physiological reasons in reasonably fixed amounts day after day, the demand for food in the aggregate is highly inelastic, and the demand for staple food products is strongly inelastic. This means that for any small change in the supply of food in the aggregate, or any of the staple food products, the prices of those products must move in the opposite direction by a large amount. This tends to give a "feast or famine" aspect to the food-agricultural sector. A little food surplus causes farm product prices to fall drastically; a little shortage causes farm prices to shoot skyward.

Although the basic forces of supply and demand, in markets with many buyers and many sellers, dominate the process of price formation in most agricultural commodities, each of these markets has characteristics which are peculiar to it. Some markets have been or are greatly influenced by government programs, some are becoming increasingly monopolistic in structure, and all, because of the natural growth process in agricultural production and the regular demands of the human stomach, tend to react haltingly through time and often in an extreme fashion. We must understand the unique aspects of farm commodity markets to understand the varied and often extreme behavior of farm product prices.

THE HECTIC 1970s

The international grain market began to tighten and grain prices

2. See, Mordecai Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February 1938, pp. 255–80; and Willard W. Cochrane, *Farm Prices: Myth and Reality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), ch. 3.

began to rise during the period 1970–72. Any number of specific reasons may be given for this market tightening: major production control programs in Canada and the U.S.A.; a leveling off of the "Green Revolution" in South and Southeast Asia; important increases in grain exports from North America to other parts of the developed world. But the basic cause was to be found in the divergent trends in world grain production and consumption.[3] The growth in world grain consumption exceeded the growth in world grain production by about 1 million tons each year from 1961 to 1976, with the result that annual world grain consumption in the period 1970–72 exceeded world grain production, on a trend basis, by about 10 million tons per year. This excess in the world consumption of grains over world production, on a trend basis, was large enough to have a significant impact on world grain stocks. Total world stocks of wheat and coarse grains declined from 187 million tons in 1969–70 to 148 million tons at the beginning of the 1972–3 crop year, and, as a share of the total consumption of wheat and coarse grains, those stocks had declined from 22 percent in 1969–70 to 16 percent at the beginning of 1972–73. In sum, the period 1970–72 set the stage for the dramatic developments in 1972–73.

The world production of grain declined about 2 percent from trend during the crop year 1972–73 and declined between 2 and 3 percent from the level of production realized in 1971–72. The crop in the Soviet Union was particularly poor in 1972–73, declining from 181 million tons in 1971–72 to 168 million tons in 1972–73. As a result of this poor crop, the Soviet Union entered the world market and purchased huge quantities of wheat, corn, and other grains. Its total imports of grain reached 24 million tons in calendar year 1973, as compared with some 2 million tons in 1970. The generally poor crop around the world and Soviet purchases, in the context of the generally tightening international market described above, set off a wave of buying and speculation around the world which drove grain prices to record highs.

The average price of corn received by farmers in the United States increased from $1.19 per bushel in October 1972 to $2.68 per bushel in August 1973. Since August 1973, corn prices received by farmers have fluctuated widely, reaching a high of $3.37 per bushel in August 1974 and falling back to $2.37 per bushel in December 1975. The movement in wheat prices was sharper and even more dramatic. The average price of wheat received by farmers in the United States increased from $1.32 per bushel in July 1972 to $4.62 in September 1973. Since September 1973, wheat prices too have fluctuated widely, reaching a high of $5.52 per bushel in February 1974 and falling back to $3.41 per bushel in December 1975.

World grain crops were well below trend in 1974–75 and 1975–76, causing the world grain situation to remain extremely tight during those years. As a result, the high level of grain prices realized in 1973 was maintained through the crop year 1975–76. Information regarding crop growing conditions around the world, the imposition of informal export controls by the U.S. government, changes in livestock feeding rates, and other supply-demand fac-

3. This phenomenon is fully described and discussed in the *World Agricultural Situation*, Economic Research Service, USDA, December 1975, WAS-9, pp. 33–43.

tors caused grain prices in the United States to fluctuate rather widely over the period 1972–76, as we have observed. But in a trend sense, grain prices in the United States and for the world moved sideward between July 1973 and July 1976.

The very high grain prices realized during the period 1973–76 were pleasantly received by grain producers, but they worked great hardship on certain groups. Livestock producers in the United States caught between skyrocketing feed grain prices and consumer resistance to high meat prices experienced great financial difficulties, and many livestock producers were forced out of business. Less developed countries on a grain import basis also experienced serious difficulties during this period. At times they could not obtain grains at any price; all free supplies were tied up by contracts. And when they could obtain supplies, the high prices which they were forced to pay for those supplies caused them serious balance-of-payment difficulties. For purchasers of grain, the period 1973–76 was a trying time, indeed.

The question posed by supply-demand developments in the grains for the early 1970s is the following. Do the three poor crop years out of four in the period 1972–76 represent some sort of weather aberration? And with the return to a favorable cycle of weather, will adequate supplies of grains become available to world consumers at reasonable prices? Or does the somewhat longer period 1970–76, with its ups and downs in production, and with world grain consumption clearly outdistancing world grain production, represent the true long-run demand and supply balance for grains? If the latter is the correct picture, we may expect the long-run trend in the real price of grains to rise in world markets.

LONG-RUN FUTURE TREND IN PRICES

If food and agricultural policies and investment policies in agriculture in countries around the world in the period 1975–2000 are not greatly different from those of the early 1970s, then, in the judgment of this writer, the trend in the real price of grains will be upward over the long period, 1975–2000.[4] How sharply prices will trend upward it is difficult to say. The slope of the upward trend will depend upon several unknowns and imponderables. An increase in the real price of grain is defined to mean that the share of the average consumer's income spent on grain or grain products will increase.

The argument that the real price of grain will rise over the long period 1975–2000 rests on several strands of thought or sets of factors. Three sets of factors are considered here: supply factors, demand factors, and conjectural factors.

Supply factors. Total cultivated land in the world is a small percentage of the total land mass—some 11 percent. But this does not mean that the arable land in the world can easily or readily be expanded. It is estimated that the total potentially arable land in the world amounts to about 24 percent of the total land mass.[5] But much, if

4. International Food Policy Research Institute, *Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World: The Location and Magnitude of the Task in the Next Decade*, Research Report No. 1, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., February 1976.

5. *The World Food Problem*, a Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee, vol. 2, White House, May 1967, pp. 429–36.

not most, of this land can be made arable only at considerable cost—costs required for draining, clearing, leveling, or terracing to transform nonarable land into arable land. Further, the land so transformed is very likely to be less productive than land already in cultivation. If this were not the case, investments would already have been made in the land to convert it to an arable status. This means that the supply function for arable land has slope, and for most of the developed world and the less developed regions of Asia, it is highly inelastic. It may be that the supply of arable land in Africa and South America is elastic, but even in those areas the supply function must be positively inclined. What the precise elasticity of supply of arable land in the world is may be debated, but not the fact that the supply function is positively inclined. This means, in turn, that at the present state of technology additional land will be brought into cultivation only at higher product prices or, as we have hypothesized here, as the real price of grain in the world market trends upward.

The line of reasoning presented above with respect to land holds with even greater force with respect to water available for irrigation. Water has become an exceedingly scarce resource around the world. This is not to say that water available for irrigation cannot be increased in supply. It can. But only at considerable cost—costs required to pump water from greater depths, to transport water greater distances, to impound water in less efficient ponds and reservoirs, and to move water through or around natural barriers. This means that the supply curve for water for irrigation is positively inclined. It is further argued here that the supply of water for irrigation is inelastic in almost every region of the world where irrigation water is required.

The public recognition of the limited oil reserves in the world relative to demand in the early 1970s, the skyrocketing prices of petroleum products, and the general and significant increase in energy prices had a direct and adverse effect on agricultural production. The prices of all nonfarm-produced inputs that are dependent on energy in their production (for example, machinery, nitrogenous fertilizer) rose significantly, as did the prices of direct energy inputs (electricity, gasoline). This, of course, increased the cost of producing agricultural products in the 1970s. In the long run, the prices of agricultural products must increase sufficiently to cover the higher costs of energy, direct and indirect, to agricultural producers. Further, most signs point to a long-run increase in the cost of energy to users, not a decrease. Thus, the growing scarcity of that easy-to-use source of energy, petroleum, in particular, and the rising cost of energy, generally, must be viewed as additional deterrents to the rate of growth in agricultural production around the world.

But it is the interaction of the growing scarcities of land, water, and energy that operates as an important drag to increased production. Energy is required in ever larger amounts to increase total agricultural production where dwindling supplies of water must be pumped and moved to new lands that have been leveled and diked to produce crops that make heavy use of fertilizer. The whole process is technically feasible, but it can only take place at higher and higher costs. This is the meaning of the increased scarcity of conventional resources

which confronts producers of agricultural products whether in the United States, India, or Brazil.

Demand factors. Short of some demographic miracle or the general onset of Malthusian controls, the population of the world is expected to double by the year 2010. This means that total food production in the world must approximately double by the year 2010. It is sometimes observed that most of this increase in population will occur in the less developed world, with the direct or indirect implication that the surplus-food-producing developed world will not help feed the food-deficit less developed world. This could be the way the tightening food situation in the world is resolved; the developed world holds down the real cost of food to its consumers by restricting food aid shipments while the Malthusian controls of starvation and increased death rates among the very young and very poor take over in the less developed world. But at least in its crudest form, this, in the view of this writer, will not be the course of world developments. Strong, but not always effective, efforts will be made in the less developed world to keep the rate of growth in food production from lagging behind population growth in those areas. And sincere, but not always wise, efforts will be made in the developed world to assist the less developed regions in meeting their increased food requirements. These efforts will include economic assistance, technical assistance, and food aid.

Whether all of these efforts will prove successful in meeting the food requirements of a world population that has doubled in size remains to be seen. But the important point to be made here is that those efforts will exert a strong pull, or a strong demand, on the scarce productive resources described in the previous section. This strong pull will operate to increase the prices of those inputs. It must to induce them to move into the agricultural productive system. And to cover the increased costs of production resulting from the higher input prices, the real price of the product must in the long-run rise. This is the way that a doubling of the world population will operate to create an upward movement in the real price of food.

But this is not the end of the demand story. Developments in the developed world seem likely to create a further upward pressure on food prices. Rising real incomes in Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and in certain newly rich areas have resulted in important increases in the per capita consumption of animal products—particularly meat. But, typically, those areas cannot produce all of the raw products out of which the animal products they require can be produced, namely, feed grains and oil meals. Thus, these regions have turned increasingly to North America for the needed raw materials of animal production.

If the real incomes of peoples in the developed world continue to increase with economic development, we must expect: (1) the per capita consumption of animal products in the developed countries involved to increase and (2) the imports of grain and oil meals into numerous developed countries from North America to continue to increase. This means that developed nations will, in the future, be competing strongly with the nations of the less developed world for surplus grains of North America. This action will further serve to tighten the international grain market and drive

up the price of grain to all those dependent on grain imports.

In sum, the income effect on consumption behavior will cause the per capita consumption of animal products to increase in the developed nations with the further economic growth of those nations.[6] The countries involved must typically go into the international market and purchase much of the raw materials (such as feed grains, oil meal) out of which to produce the increased supplies of animal products. These countries also possess the foreign exchange to purchase those commodities at prevailing market prices and under conventional commercial terms. Thus, they are in a strong position to bid free supplies available for export away from the needy less developed countries that suffer from chronic shortages of foreign exchange. And this element of foreign demand, when added to world population growth, must result in an extraordinarily strong total world demand for grains in the period 1975–2000. This strong total demand interacting with a lagging supply could create a persistent upward pressure on the world price of grains over the long-run future.

Conjectural factors. The confirmed optimists will argue that the economic force of the physical resource scarcities discussed above will be overcome by research, technological development, and farm technological advance. This may turn out to be the case. At this writing it is impossible either to prove or disprove this argument. But there are bits and pieces of evidence that should give proponents of this argument some pause. First, farm technological advance and the resulting rate of increase in agricultural productivity have been uneven and inconsistent in the United States in the 1970s. The "Green Revolution" and the resultant increase in yields per acre in South and Southeast Asia have slowed down and leveled off in the 1970s. Thus, in the developed world and the less developed world, that great force, farm technological advance, of the 1950s and 1960s, is sputtering in the 1970s.

Second, although much research in agricultural production is taking place around the world and continuous improvements in agricultural production practices and technologies are being made, there does not appear to be any production development in the offing comparable to the revolution in corn production in the United States from 1935 to 1965, or to the revolution in wheat production in Asia in the 1960s. With respect to agricultural production developments, we appear to be in a period of refinements, not major breakthroughs.

Third, world grain production lagged behind world grain consumption in the 1960s—a decade of great technological development and rapid farm technological advance.[7]

6. It should be recognized that the growing scarcity of natural resources in a finite world could operate to slow rates of overall economic growth in all countries around the world. Such developments would tend to vitiate the specific argument being made at this point, but they do not weaken the general argument that growth in food production for the world as a whole is likely to lag behind growth in food requirements over the long period 1975–2000. See, Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point, Second Report of the Club of Rome* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974).

7. The counter argument may be made that production controls in the United States and Canada contributed to a lag in world grain production in the 1960s, and without those controls in operation it will be easier to overcome the lag in the 1970s. This is a reasonable argument, but the fact remains that the lag in grain production in the 1970s is not being overcome.

To cope with this lag in world grain production and growing resource scarcities, research, technological development, and farm technological advance must be more pervasive and more effective in the 1970s, '80s, and '90s than they were in the 1960s. And this is one possible outcome. But in the judgment of this writer, the odds are strongly against such an outcome. We will have farm technological advance in the 1970s, '80s, and '90s and the resulting increases in agricultural productivity, but such technological advances and such increases in productivity are not likely to be great enough to increase world grain production sufficiently to meet the increased demands at a constant level of real grain prices.

Finally, there is that great conjectural factor, the weather. There is an argument being developed and advanced by the climatologists that the climate is changing, and adversely for crop production in the Northern Hemisphere. The argument states that the Northern Hemisphere has been cooling slowly since the 1940s. This cooling trend affects the flow and direction of wind currents in such ways as to make the monsoon areas of the world drier and growing conditions in steppe areas, such as the American plains, more variable and uncertain.

Whether this argument proves correct remains to be seen. But it does suggest that crop growing conditions around the world are not likely to be any better over the next 25 years than they were during the past 25 years, and there is some possibility that they will be worse—perhaps much worse, perhaps only a little worse. In any event, the argument being advanced by prominent climatologists does not give comfort to agricultural experts who argue that the rapidly growing world food requirements will be easily and readily met by increased food production. To the contrary, it suggests one more important cause for concern with regard to the future food supply-demand balance for the world.

In summary, it is argued here that it is most probable (although not certain) that the long-run trend in the real price of grains in the world, hence in the United States, will be upward. All the important forces that will be at work over the next 25 years would seem (as of 1976) to point in this direction. Higher real prices of grain will be required to pull the additional and very scarce productive resources into the agricultural production system, and these higher real prices will serve to restrict consumer demands for food around the world. In the United States, this will mean higher livestock product prices and cereal product prices with the consequent consumer frustration and anger. In the rapidly developing developed areas of the world (for example, Japan, Soviet Union), this will mean a reduced rate of increase in animal product consumption and consumer unrest. In the less developed areas of the world, this will mean reduced food grain consumption among the very poor and increased death rates among the very young.

This view of the long-run future is similar to the views advanced by the English classical economists of the nineteenth century.[8] The opening up of the great grain basket in North America in the nineteenth century and the technological revolution in agriculture in the twentieth century threw the timing of their

8. Benjamin Higgins, *Economic Development: Problems, Principles and Policies*, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968), ch. 3.

argument off by 100 years or more. But the finite world, it is argued here, once more is closing in upon the expanding number of consumers and the expanding wants of those consumers.

PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AROUND TREND

We should not expect world grain prices, hence U.S. food product prices, to trend upward in a nice, smooth configuration. Rather, we should expect world grain prices and U.S. food product prices to fluctuate sharply, widely, and unpredictably around trend unless governments intervene with effective stabilization programs and policies.

This is the logical expectation for the following reasons:

1. The world demand for total grains is highly inelastic—possibly approaching −.1.
2. The world production of grains varies from trend by 1 to 4 percent per year as the result of variations in the weather, hence in crop growing conditions. These annual variations in the weather are completely unpredictable.
3. The world is linked together by international trade in the grains so that a shortfall in production in one area (say, the Soviet Union) is reflected very quickly in the price of grain around the world (say, the United States).

What we have in the grains is thus an international market, albeit not a perfect one, in which total grain production varies modestly from year to year, around trend, as the result of variations in the weather. These modest variations in production, given the severe inelasticity of demand for grain, result, in turn, in wide swings in grain prices; and, since the variations in the weather are unpredictable, the fluctuations in grain prices are unpredictable.

This phenomenon of wide and unpredictable price fluctuations in world grain prices may be expected whether the real price of grains is trending upward or downward or is constant, so long as governments do not intervene with some form of effective price stabilization. In a free international grain market, sharp, wide, unpredictable price fluctuations are the norm.

Sharp, wide, and unpredictable grain price fluctuations may be welcomed by a few (grain traders and speculators with superior information), but for most people such fluctuations create problems. Consumers rightly observe that retail food prices rarely decline in one period by as much as they advanced in a previous period; increased margins tend to get built into the retail price in periods of high prices. Grain producers must be cautious in their investment decisions when their product prices fluctuate widely and unpredictably. And livestock producers can be ruined financially where grain prices advance sharply and dramatically but increases in their meat product prices lag behind the upturn in grain prices by a production period or two.

Sharp, wide, and unpredictable price fluctuations in agriculture create risk for the producer, and the greater this risk the more cautious the producer will be with respect to making new and costly investments in his business. Thus, the effect of unpredictable price variability in agriculture is to slow down the rate of growth in agricultural production. And if the long-run trend argument presented in the previous section is correct, then the consequences of sharp, wide, and unpredictable fluc-

tuations in the price of grains in the world market will be to slow down the rate of growth in world grain production, particularly in the highly commercial, surplus-producing areas, and exacerbate the long-run supply-demand balance for grains. The long-run supply-demand balance problem and the short-run price fluctuation problem are thus related.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy implications of the foregoing analyses are many and varied. The policy ideas and prescriptions for dealing with the problems identified and discussed will depend upon through whose eyes the problems are being viewed—U.S. consumers, U.S. farmers (and which farmers—grain producers, or livestock producers), consumers in the rapidly developing developed countries (for example, Japanese consumers), or consumers in the less developed countries (for example, consumers living in poverty in India), and on and on. Since it is not possible to consider the policy perspectives of every group in the world in this short paper, or perhaps in any single paper, we will focus on the policy needs of United States' consumers and producers with an eye on the international consequences.

If the world price of grains in real terms is to trend upward over the next 25 years, but with sharp, wide, and unpredictable annual fluctuations, then the United States needs to find ways and means of moderating that upward trend in world grain prices and to dampen down annual fluctuations around trend. It must find ways and means to moderate the upward trend in world prices unless it tries to isolate itself from the world market. But the latter action is impractical, since the United States is the leading grain exporter in the world. It, thus, turns out that the United States, if it is to deal effectively with its domestic food price level problem, must find ways to deal effectively with a world price level problem (namely, the world grain price level).

One approach to moderating the upward trend in the real price of grains in the world market for the United States would involve finding ways and means of increasing the total supply of grains in the world relative to the total demand for grains. It might seek to do this in any number of ways. We suggest three possibilities:

1. Increase the support for research and development on agricultural production and energy production within the United States.
2. Increase the support for research and development in agricultural production and energy production under various kinds of international arrangements.
3. Offer economic assistance to less developed nations as an inducement to them to effectuate population control measures; such a policy might be undertaken unilaterally or in cooperation with other developed nations.

Another approach to moderating the upward trend in the real price of grains on the part of the United States could involve certain redistribution policies which have the effect of contracting effective demand or increasing supplies. We suggest three possibilities:

1. Limit food aid and other forms of economic aid to less developed nations that are pursuing effective

agricultural development policies and population control policies. In effect, this is the John Smith doctrine that says, those who won't work must starve.

2. Limit the exports of grain to developed nations in accordance with some internationally agreed-upon formula.

3. Develop an international agreement involving the oil exporting and importing nations with the objective of subsidizing the use of energy in agricultural production.

The pursuit of some combination of the above policies would have the effect of expanding supplies or contracting demand in the world market, hence operate to moderate the upward trend in world grain prices. This would benefit consumers of grain products and animal products around the world, including consumers in the United States. But the pursuit of such policies would not benefit producers of grain in the United States, and the pursuit of such policies with too great vigor could force grain prices downward and create income problems for domestic grain producers.

To protect the economic interests of grain producers in the United States and thereby induce them to continue to expand output, it would appear both desirable and necessary to guarantee grain farmers a fair price for their product. This might be achieved through a price support program or an income support program involving target prices and deficiency payments. Such programs could well be nonoperational in many, if not most, years if the price and income support features of such programs were established just below, and moved along with, the world trend in grain prices. But the programs would be available on a standby basis to protect farmers against a downturn in world grain prices. In other words, it is argued here that farm producers must be provided with price and income protection if the national society expects them to produce at full capacity year after year.

To this point we have been concerned only with the trend problem, and the policy discussion has been limited to ways and means of moderating the long-run upward trend in the real price of grains in the world market. But what about the short-run fluctuations in the price of grains? To cope with this problem, the United States acting alone or in cooperation with other important importing and exporting nations must implement a reserve stock program for the grains with the capacity to even out supplies between crop seasons and thereby stabilize prices over time. There is really no alternative to such a policy, where crop production varies unpredictably as the result of unpredictable variations in the weather.

Any number of reserve stock programs might be conceptualized, each with a specific price stabilization objective and each with specific decision rules for acquiring and releasing stocks. We cannot in this brief paper explore the many policy ramifications of a reserve stock program for the grains.[9] We can and do argue, however, that a reserve stock program to stabilize world grain prices is both economically desirable and operationally feasible. But whether agreement can be reached with regard to price stabilization objectives within a country, such as the United States, or among

9. See, Willard W. Cochrane and Yigal Danin, *Reserve Stock Grain Models, the World and the United States* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station Technical Bulletin 305, March 1976).

such countries as the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., the E.E.C., and Japan, remains to be seen. To date, little has been achieved in the way of reaching an agreement with regard to price stabilization objectives. Producer interests seek a high price ceiling; consumer interests want a low floor price. And there matters stand.

CONCLUSION

A compromise on U.S. farm policy that was reasonably acceptable to all concerned was reached in 1965 after 20 years of struggle. But in the period 1970–75, the world of food and agriculture turned upside down; the general surplus condition gave way to a general deficit situation. It is the principal point of this paper that this general deficit situation will be with us for a long time to come. And this is a world problem from which the United States cannot divorce itself. It cannot and remain the leading supplier of grains to a deficit world.

So now the United States and the world are in need of a viable food and agricultural policy. But such a policy has not been forthcoming. Some of the elements of such a policy have been outlined above. But the arduous task of working out the compromise between consumer and producer interests within the United States is just beginning to be talked about. And the even more difficult task of effecting a compromise on food and agricultural policy among the importing and exporting nations, too, is in the very early discussion stage. Thus, we can think and talk about the elements of an international food and agricultural policy, as we have done above, but the shape and substance of the policy that must emerge is not at all clear. Perhaps its shape and substance will become clear in response to the unfolding future. But if the arguments presented in this paper are valid, we need policy guidance *now* to make the future more tolerable. As of 1976, that policy guidance is lacking.

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Rural-Urban Differences in Attitudes and Behavior in the United States

By NORVAL D. GLENN AND LESTER HILL, JR.

ABSTRACT: Recent American data reveal moderate to substantial farm-nonfarm differences on a few kinds of attitudes and behavior, but since farm people now are only about 4 percent of the population, the farm-nonfarm distinction cannot account for much of the total variation of any kind of attitudes or behavior. The kinds of attitudes and behavior which differ substantially between farm and nonfarm people usually differ monotonically by community size; hence, "ruralism" seems to some extent to characterize residents of the smaller dense settlements and, to a lesser extent, those of intermediate-sized cities. Furthermore, city residents with rural backgrounds tend to retain rural attitudes and behavior characteristics, size of community of origin being a stronger predictor of some attitudes than size of community of current residence. Although the association of community size with a more or less representative list of attitudinal variables is weak, such correlates of community size as age and socioeconomic status do not largely account for the larger associations, which probably reflect a tendency for social and cultural change to occur earlier in the larger communities. The explanatory utility of size of community of origin and of residence seems less than that of age and education but at least as great as that of several other explanatory variables favored by social scientists, such as family income and occupational prestige.

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THERE is considerable disagreement among social scientists concerning the importance of the rural-urban distinction in modern societies. At least three rather distinctive viewpoints have some prominence. The first, exemplified in Louis Wirth's classic essay on "Urbanism as a Way of Life," posits direct, universal effects of population size, density, and heterogeneity on important aspects of social structure, culture, and personality.[1] According to this view, the concentration of people of diverse characteristics and backgrounds into large, dense settlements necessarily produces social isolation, individualism, social disorganization, and a number of other phenomena.

A second major viewpoint, exemplified in the writings of Richard Dewey[2] and Herbert Gans,[3] among others, is that few if any social, cultural, and personality characteristics are necessarily and invariably associated with the size, density, and heterogeneity of settlements. Critics of the Wirth thesis also often point out that population size, density, and heterogeneity are imperfectly correlated with one another and that the effects of each may not be the same as the effects of the other two. According to this view, the correlates of urbanization vary from society to society and from time to time in any one society and are often little more than the results of historical accident. For instance, it is pointed out that many present rural-urban differences in the United States result from inclusion among the later immigrants—who arrived after the closing of the frontier and thus generally settled in the industrial cities—of a relatively large percentage of Catholics, Jews, and persons from southern and eastern Europe. Hence, rural-urban differences tend to reflect religious and ethnic differences.

Related to this second view is the thesis that rural-urban differences, whatever their source, tend to disappear during the advanced stages of urbanization and industrialization.[4] This view, which the senior author has called the "massification thesis,"[5] is that due to such influences as standardized education, improved means of transportation which break down rural isolation, and saturation of small towns and the countryside with stimuli from the mass media, urban culture and lifestyles are diffused to the hinterland—that rural people become almost indistinguishable from their city cousins. So far as we know, no social scientist has denied that considerable urban-to-rural cultural diffusion has occurred in modern societies, but the extent to which this diffusion has obliterated rural-urban differences remains an issue of debate.

An intermediate viewpoint—articulated most completely and clearly in a recent essay by Claude Fischer[6]

1. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 44 (July 1938), pp. 3–24.

2. Richard Dewey, "The Rural-Urban Continuum: Real but Relatively Unimportant," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66 (July 1960), pp. 60–6.

3. Herbert J. Gans, "Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life: A Re-Evaluation of Definitions," in Arnold M. Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962), pp. 625–28.

4. For instance, see Kenneth Boulding, "The Death of the City: A Frightened Look at Post-Civilization," in Oscar Handlin and John Burchard, eds., *The Historian and the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT and Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 143.

5. Norval D. Glenn, "Massification versus Differentiation: Some Trend Data from National Surveys," *Social Forces*, vol. 46 (December 1967), pp. 172–80.

6. Claude Fischer, "Toward a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 80 (May 1975), pp. 1319–41.

but presented in at least embryonic form in several earlier publications —is that whereas population size, density, and heterogeneity do not have all of the effects attributed to them by Wirth, they are conducive to innovation and unconventional behavior. According to Fischer, population concentration "produces a diversity of subcultures, strengthens them, and fosters diffusion among them. . . ." Presumably, the concentration of diverse people into dense settlements is conducive to a cross-fertilization of ideas, to an awareness of and tolerance of diverse values and lifestyles, and thus to innovation and unconventionality.

If in each society the cities tend to be the sources of innovation and to be in the vanguard of social and cultural change, appreciable rural-urban differences are likely to exist even if much urban-to-rural diffusion of culture has occurred and is occurring. During the initial phases of any particular process of change, the urban population will tend to change more rapidly, leading to rural-urban divergence. Later, "ceiling effects" will tend to limit the rate of change in the urban population, and urban-to-rural diffusion will lead to more rapid change in the rural population and to rural-urban convergence. Thus, as older rural-urban differences diminish or disappear, new ones will appear. Whereas no particular culture traits, aside from those closely associated with receptivity to change, will invariably be associated with rural or urban communities, important rural-urban differences of some kind will tend to persist even in the most highly urbanized and industrialized societies.

The social scientific literature does not provide the evidence (at least not in a systematic fashion) which would allow a definitive choice among the differing viewpoints. Although the preponderance of evidence seems to suggest that the Wirth thesis is not correct without important qualifications, survey data from virtually all modern societies reveal remaining rural-urban differences in regard to a variety of kinds of attitudes and behavior. There is evidence that in the United States some rural-urban differences have recently increased rather than diminished,[7] but the evidence does not allow any conclusion about the magnitude or direction of the overall change. The evidence that social and cultural change typically originates in cities and proceeds more rapidly among urban than rural people is convincing but not definitive. It is easy to demonstrate that change often has occurred in this fashion, but we do not know that it has always done so, even in modern societies, or that it usually has done so in most societies.

Even though the Fischer thesis is not undeniably correct, presently available evidence, as we assess it, makes it more credible than any competing theoretical perspective. We suspect that it (or some slight variant) will soon become the most widely accepted view among students of rural-urban differences (if it is not already), and we provisionally accept it. However, even a developing consensus on the basic sources of rural-urban cultural and behavioral differences will not still debate concerning the practical and theoretical importance of these differences in modern societies. For instance, the importance of differences created by any differing receptivity

7. Glenn, "Massification versus Differentiation," and Norval D. Glenn, "Recent Trends in Intercategory Differences in Attitudes," *Social Forces*, vol. 52 (March 1974), pp. 395–401.

to change depends in large measure on whether the receptivity varies in a more or less linear fashion with community size or whether the main difference is a disjunctive one between the most truly rural people (those who both live and work in the open countryside) and the remainder of the population. If the latter should be correct, the resulting rural-urban differences would be of rapidly diminishing practical importance in most modern societies as the rural-farm population becomes a very small proportion of the total. Furthermore, as Fischer is careful to point out, if his theory is correct, it does not necessarily follow that rural-urban differences are usually large enough to be of much practical importance or that the rural-urban distinction accounts for a large proportion of the variation in attitudes, behavior, and lifestyles in any society. To those who would understand, or who would utilize knowledge of, variations in attitudes and behavior in the United States, an important question remains unanswered: does the rural-urban distinction make enough difference to warrant serious attention? Our purpose here is to provide a provisional answer to that question.

THE MAGNITUDE AND NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENCES

The magnitude of rural-urban differences in attitudes and behavior shown by American national surveys varies according to kind of attitudes and behavior and according to the way the rural-urban distinction is made. Usually, although not always, the largest differences appear when farmers (and their families), or rural-farm people, are compared with the rest of the population. Although students of rural and urban society and culture do not agree on just how the rural-urban distinction should be made (or whether it should be conceived of as a continuum rather than a dichotomous distinction), there are compelling reasons for considering rural-farm people the most truly rural segment of the population and for considering the farm-nonfarm distinction the most theoretically meaningful of any dichotomous rural-urban distinction. As an aggregate, the farm population differs to an important degree in many demographic characteristics from even the residents of the smaller dense settlements, and farmers are the only major segment of the population for which both place of work and place of residence are usually in the open countryside. Residents of the open countryside who are in nonfarm occupations often (perhaps usually) both work and maintain most of their social relations in dense settlements of some size. Therefore, it is useful to begin a treatment of rural-urban differences with a farm-nonfarm comparison.

Recent national survey data show that farmers (and their families) do not differ substantially from other occupational categories in a large proportion of the kinds of attitudes and behavior covered by the surveys. However, differences not likely to have resulted from sampling error appear in responses to at least a large minority of the questions. For instance, Norval Glenn and Jon Alston drew on data from 92 questions asked on American opinion polls from 1953 to 1965 and found farmers, as a whole, to be relatively prejudiced, ethnocentric, isolationist, intolerant of deviance, opposed to civil liberties, distrustful of people, traditionally religious, ascetic, work-oriented, Puritanical, uninformed, and favorable to early

TABLE 1

RESPONSES (IN PERCENT) TO SELECTED ATTITUDINAL QUESTIONS ASKED ON AMERICAN GALLUP POLLS, BY OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

	PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS	WHITE COLLAR	FARM	MANUAL
Religious beliefs				
believe in the Devil (1968)	57	56	75	61
believe in life after death (1968)	76	66	86	71
believe in hell (1968)	60	56	86	68
believe in heaven (1968)	77	81	93	89
Issues concerning personal morals and vices				
think that birth control information should be available to anyone who wants it (1968)	86	81	64	76
think use of marijuana should be made legal (1969)	18	22	5	10
would like to see stricter state laws concerning sale of obscene literature on newsstands (1969)	71	69	81	79
would find pictures of nudes in magazines objectionable (1969)	64	64	89	76
have smoked cigarettes in past week (1972)	48	54	29	48
Minority-majority issues				
would vote for a well-qualified Jew for president (1969)	95	92	73	87
would vote for a well-qualified Catholic for president (1969)	95	93	80	91
would vote for a well-qualified Negro for president (1969)	76	74	56	70
would vote for a well-qualified woman for president (1969)	55	58	47	54
think the U.S. would be governed better if women had more say in politics (1969)	21	21	13	25
would vote for a well-qualified woman for Congress (1970)	90	90	71	82
approve of marriage between Catholics and Protestants (1969)	73	67	46	62
approve of marriage between Jews and non-Jews (1968)	71	69	34	59
approve of marriage between whites and nonwhites (1968)	28	24	9	20
Political issues				
consider themselves conservative (1972)	37	34	41	41
favor lowering voting age to 18 (1969)	60	62	72	67
think law enforcement agencies should be tougher in dealing with crime and lawlessness (1972)	80	81	93	84
would favor a law requiring a police permit to buy a gun (1971)	76	69	47	71
think college students should have a greater say in the running of colleges (1969)	29	33	16	27
have favorable view of Red China (1972)	30	20	17	22
have favorable view of Russia (1972)	54	40	35	38

SOURCE: Various issues of the *Gallup Opinion Index*.

marriage and high fertility.[8] These differences existed not only in the adult population as a whole but also among young nonsouthern Protestants. Although these differences tend to confirm popular stereotypes of rural-farm people, most of them were fairly small, and in many cases only a small minority of farmers exhibited the characteristics which were more prevalent among farmers than among persons in other occupations.

Rural-farm people have become such a small proportion of the total population that the most recent national surveys do not give reliable estimates of the characteristics of the remaining farmers. For instance, the American Institute of Public Opinion (the American Gallup Poll) stopped reporting separate data for the farm respondents late in 1973. However, data from the late 1960s and early 1970s show that farmers were still the most distinctive (and usually the most conservative) segment of the population in regard to many kinds of attitudes (see table 1). For instance, farmers tended to be more fundamentalist in religious beliefs, Puritanical, prejudiced, and conservative on political issues than persons in any other occupational category. In general, they resembled manual workers more than they resembled persons in higher-status occupations (although Glenn and Alston found farmers' attitudes on labor-management issues to resemble those of business and professional people).

8. Norval D. Glenn and Jon P. Alston, "Rural-Urban Differences in Reported Attitudes and Behavior," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 47 (March 1967), pp. 381–400. See, also, Norval D. Glenn and Jon P. Alston, "Cultural Distances among Occupational Categories," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 33 (June 1968), pp. 365–82.

Although a few of the farm-nonfarm differences in table 1 are fairly large, it should be kept in mind that we generally selected for reporting the largest differences we could find; therefore, the reported differences should not be considered representative of farm-nonfarm differences in general. Furthermore, the farm-nonfarm distinction accounted for only a small proportion of the total variation in responses even in the case of the items for which the differences were the largest. Since the rural-nonfarm population was no more than about 5 percent of any of the samples, even categorical differences between farmers and nonfarmers would not have produced substantial variation in the total samples.[9] Thus, in many respects the practical importance of even the largest farm-nonfarm differences is not very great. For instance, farmers do not constitute a "market" distinctive and large enough to be of much concern to most manufacturers and retailers, except those whose goods are specifically for the agricultural industry. On the other hand, farm-nonfarm differences do have some practical importance, the best example perhaps being in regard to politics. Farmers retain political influence disproportionate to their numbers (for instance, because "agricultural states," such as the Dakotas, with small populations but relatively large numbers of farmers, have two U.S. senators, the same as the populous industrial states), and any small portion of the electorate can be crucial to the outcome of a close election.

The theoretical importance of the farm-nonfarm attitudinal differences

9. Rural-farm people were about 5 percent of the total U.S. population in 1970 and are now only about 4 percent.

-.0220 -.179

TABLE 2

RESPONSES (IN PERCENT) TO SELECTED ATTITUDINAL QUESTIONS ASKED ON AMERICAN GALLUP POLLS, BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY*

	UNDER 2,500, RURAL	2,500–49,999	50,000–499,999	500,000–999,999	1,000,000 AND OVER
Religious beliefs					
believe that religion is old-fashioned and out-of-date (1975)	12	18	20	19	35
have a great deal of confidence in the church or in organized religion (1975)	51	48	41	44	32
are very religious (1975)	30	29	24	27	20
Issues concerning personal morals and vices					
think abortion under any circumstances should be legal (1975)	9	19	23	29	31
would favor anti-abortion constitutional amendment (1975)	53	43	45	38	38
think use of marijuana should be made legal (1974)	21	21	27	33	35
believe it is wrong for people to have sex relations before marriage (1973)	61	50	44	41	34
would find topless nightclub waitresses objectionable (1973)	68	69	58	51	46
Minority-majority issues					
favor Equal Rights Amendment (1975)	53	59	55	65	67
would vote for woman for president (1976)	68	73	73	76	80
consider being married, with children, and no full-time job to be ideal lifestyle (women only, 1976)	53	39	45	38	38
Political issues					
favor registration of all firearms (1975)	50	64	71	77	81
would favor conservative over liberal political party (1975)	42	43	39	44	36
feel that war is outmoded as a way of settling differences between nations (1975)	37	45	48	51	48
are politically liberal (1974)	16	26	28	27	35
favor unconditional amnesty for draft evaders (1974)	29	26	38	39	40
favor reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba (1974)	58	62	60	70	71
have a great deal of confidence in labor unions (1973)	11	14	16	15	18

SOURCE: Various issues of the *Gallup Opinion Index*.
* Suburban residents are classified according to the size of their central cities.

TABLE 3

SIZE OF COMMUNITY LIVED IN AT AGE 16, U.S. ADULT POPULATION, BY AGE, COMBINED DATA FROM SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN 1972, 1973, 1974, AND 1975

	AGE							
	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–69	70–79	80 & UP	TOTAL
Open countryside	22.3	28.5	30.2	38.9	44.6	46.9	55.6	32.9
Dense settlements with less than 50,000 residents	30.4	30.2	34.1	27.3	29.8	31.4	22.2	30.3
Cities with 50,000 or more population and their suburbs	47.3	41.3	35.7	33.7	25.6	21.6	22.2	36.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1,565	1,119	1,027	989	781	462	117	6,060

SOURCE: The General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (James A. Davis, principal investigator).

depends largely on whether they reflect largely socioeconomic, demographic, and religious-ethnic differences or whether they are in some way causally related to population concentration. Glenn and Alston conclude that most of the differences they found did not reflect differences in age, religious preference, region, income, or education; the differences existed among young nonsouthern Protestants as well as in the total population, and farmers often differed from manual workers, whom they resembled in income and education. Although we have not subjected the data in table 1 to the controls used by Glenn and Alston, we are confident that the controls would not eliminate most of the differences, since the topics are similar to those studied by Glenn and Alston. Furthermore, socioeconomic differences can hardly account for most of the attitudinal differences, in view of the often substantial attitudinal differences between the farm and manual classes.

It is apparent from community-size breakdowns of responses to the items used for table 1 (not shown) and from responses to a number of questions asked on more recent national surveys (table 2) that the farm-nonfarm distinction is not the only rural-urban distinction useful for explaining attitudes and behavior. Again, it must be pointed out that we tended to select for reporting the items showing the greatest variation in responses by our independent variable, and thus the data do not indicate the typical degree of variation in expressed attitudes among communities of different sizes. However, the reported data are very nearly representative of all of the data we examined in one important respect:[10] when there is any appreciable variation in responses by community size, the variation is usually monotonic rather than being a disjunctive difference between the smallest communities and all others. That is, the largest communities usually differ from the medium-sized

10. We examined all of the data in recent (since the late 1960s) issues of the *Gallup Opinion Index*.

communities about as much (and in the same direction) as the medium-sized communities differ from the smallest communities. This pattern of variation suggests that it is useful to conceive of a rural-urban continuum rather than a dichotomous rural-urban distinction. It also indicates that attitudinal and behavioral variation associated with degree of population concentration will not become unimportant simply because the most truly rural people become a very small proportion of the population. A rather substantial proportion of the population lives, and probably will long continue to live, in intermediate-sized communities;[11] and the differences between these people and the residents of the largest cities (and their suburbs) constitute rural-urban differences in one sense. Furthermore, there is no immediate prospect that rural-nonfarm people (residents of dense settlements of less than 2,500 population and nonfarm residents of the open countryside) will soon become an insignificant segment of the population.[12]

THE IMPORTANCE OF RURAL BACKGROUND

Even if the only important differences associated with population concentration were between the "truly rural" people and others in the society, "ruralism" would not soon virtually disappear from American society, assuming that early socialization has enduring effects on individuals. Although few Americans are now "truly rural," a substantial proportion of the adults have rural backgrounds (see table 3), varying from around half of the elderly to about a fourth of the young adults.

Rural-urban differences in backgrounds undoubtedly contribute to the attitudinal and behavioral differentiation of the urban population, although apparently not in quite the way that some social scientists have speculated. For instance, Leo Schnore speculates that class differences in attitudes reflect to a large extent the fact that a larger percentage of the people in the lower than in the higher classes have rural backgrounds.[13] To test this hypothesis, we did a regression analysis of 19 attitudinal and behavioral variables from the 1974 General Social Survey (see table 4).[14] We first regressed each variable on prestige of occupation (males) or prestige of spouse's occupation (married females), and then we added size of place of residence at age 16 (rural-urban dichotomy) as a control variable. For most of the dependent variables, adding the control variable did reduce the strength of the association, but in no case was the reduction more than slight (see table 4). For males, the mean correlation coefficient (which is equivalent to the zero-order beta) is .115 and the mean partial beta (standardized regression coefficient) is .107. For females, the values are .104 and .094, respectively. Therefore, at least in regard to the variables included in this

11. Thirty-one percent of the respondents to two national surveys conducted in 1974 and 1975 (the General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center) lived in cities with populations of from 2,500 to 249,999.

12. In 1970, rural-nonfarm people were 21.3 percent of the total U.S. population.

13. Leo F. Schnore, "The Rural-Urban Variable: An Urbanite's Perspective," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 31 (June 1966), pp. 131–43.

14. Since we were concerned with representativeness rather than with illustrating extreme cases, we selected the variables before we examined the data in order to avoid biasing the results via the selection process. For discussion of the "no peeking" rule, see Herbert H. Hyman, *Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys* (New York: John Wiley, 1972).

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP OF OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE (MALES) OR SPOUSE'S OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE (MARRIED FEMALES) TO SELECTED DEPENDENT VARIABLES, WITH AND WITHOUT RURAL-URBAN BACKGROUND CONTROLLED, WHITES, UNITED STATES, 1974

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	MALES		FEMALES	
	ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION	PARTIAL BETA	ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION	PARTIAL BETA
Frequency of church attendance	.116	.134	.021	.023
Republican party identification	.088	.112	.113	.118
Political conservatism	−.026	−.019	−.043	−.034
Belief that luck is more important than hard work in getting ahead	.017	.018	.038	.032
Frequency of socializing with relatives	−.167	−.155	−.112	−.121
Frequency of socializing with neighbors	−.005	.023	.046	.045
Frequency of socializing with friends who are not neighbors	.023	.006	.211	.191
Frequency of going to bar or tavern	.011	−.014	.067	.056
Expressed ideal family size	.023	.044	−.021	−.005
Permissiveness concerning premarital sex	.135	.095	.111	.089
Permissiveness concerning extramarital sex	.200	.178	.133	.125
Permissiveness concerning homosexual sex	.191	.171	.162	.151
Tolerance of communism	.148	.134	.142	.126
Belief in greater expenditures for education	.015	−.003	.084	.072
Belief in greater expenditures for welfare	−.058	−.042	.017	.007
Belief in greater expenditures for the military	−.249	−.230	−.155	−.142
Willingness to invite a black to dinner	.068	.055	.037	.021
Vocabulary test score	.473	.444	.317	.292
Number of children (persons age 45 and older)	−.181	−.169	−.138	−.127

SOURCE: The 1974 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (James A. Davis, principal investigator).

NOTE: Data in this and subsequent tables are limited to whites in order to control race. Truncation is used for control since race interacts with some of the predictor variables. All dependent variables are scored to form ordinal or interval scales with at least three categories.

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIP (PARTIAL) OF SIZE OF COMMUNITY LIVED IN AT AGE 16 AND OF SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF CURRENT RESIDENCE TO SELECTED DEPENDENT VARIABLES, WHITES, UNITED STATES, 1974

	STANDARDIZED PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENT (BETA)			
	MALES		FEMALES	
DEPENDENT VARIABLE	COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENCE	COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN	COMMUNITY OF RESIDENCE
Frequency of church attendance	−.007	−.051	.051	−.103
Republican party identification	−.067	−.038	−.020	−.017
Political conservatism	−.088	−.051	−.115	−.035
Belief that luck is more important than hard work in getting ahead	.062	−.004	.034	−.033
Frequency of socializing with relatives	.009	−.041	.065	−.033
Frequency of socializing with neighbors	−.066	−.022	.093	−.055
Frequency of socializing with friends who are not neighbors	.059	.082	.087	.019
Frequency of going to bar or tavern	.072	.083	.008	−.110
Expressed ideal family size	−.081	.034	−.081	−.001
Permissiveness concerning premarital sex	.073	.039	.050	.128
Permissiveness concerning extramarital sex	.095	.137	.077	−.011
Permissiveness concerning homosexual sex	.075	.146	.050	.027
Tolerance of communism	.084	.015	.055	.019
Belief in greater expenditures for education	−.032	.126	.091	.023
Belief in greater expenditures for welfare	−.028	.010	−.011	.073
Belief in greater expenditures for the military	−.074	−.074	−.074	.014
Willingness to invite a black to dinner	−.014	.096	.033	−.055
Vocabulary test score	.052	.051	.189	−.027
Number of children (persons age 45 and older)	−.096	−.016	−.119	−.043

SOURCE: The 1974 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (James A. Davis, principal investigator).
NOTE: Only the two community-size variables are predictor variables in the regression equations.

analysis (which, of course, are not necessarily representative of all attitudinal and behavioral variables), the higher proportion of low-status than of high-status people who have rural origins does not seem to be an important source of so-called class differences.

However, it is important that, in the case of several of the variables, size of community of residence at age 16 was a better predictor of the responses than size of present (at the time of the survey) community of residence (see table 5).[15] In the case of eight of the 19 variables for males and 14 of the 19 for females, the partial unstandardized regression coefficient is larger for size of community of residence at age 16 than for size of present community of residence. For males, the mean beta is .060 for size of community of residence at age 16 and .059 for size of present community of residence.[16] The corresponding means for females are .075 and .043.

Obviously, neither of the community size variables was an important predictor of most of the dependent variables we selected from the 1974 General Social Survey; most of the associations are neither statistically significant nor large enough to be important, even if they did not result from sampling error. This is true even for several variables which, according to the literature, should bear a rather strong relationship to community size. For instance, expressions of the ideal number of children for a family were virtually unrelated to size of present community of residence and only weakly related to size of community of origin. Some researchers require that a beta be at least .15 before it is considered worthy of interpretation; by that criterion, only the association among females of size of community of origin with the vocabulary test scores was large enough to be important. However, several other betas do not fall far short of .15 and, thus, probably reflect associations of some importance in the population. For males, these include the associations of size of present community of residence with permissive attitudes toward premarital and homosexual sex and with favorable attitudes toward formal education. For females, these include the associations of size of present community of residence with permissive attitudes toward premarital sex and of size of community of residence at age 16 with number of children and with liberal political orientations.

A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Of course, even the larger associations may not reflect direct effects of community size but rather may be spurious or reflect indirect effects through variables which intervene between community size and the dependent variables. If so, both the Wirth and the Fischer views of the effects of population concentration would tend to lose their credibility. To test for this possibility, we added nine background and current characteristics, all of which seemed likely to have some effect on some of the dependent variables, to the regression equation as predictors along with the two community-size variables.[17] We then selected each dependent variable with a zero-order correlation of at least .10 with one of the community-size variables and compared the correlation coef-

15. For this analysis, we used the same three-category community-size breakdown for community of origin and of current residence, namely, (1) open countryside, (2) dense settlements of less than 50,000 residents, and (3) cities of 50,000 or more population and their suburbs.

16. We disregarded the signs of the betas in computing these means.

17. We also recoded the community-size variables into the maximum number of categories consistent with retaining ordinal scales, which made the two variables incomparable with one another but allowed each to explain the maximum amount of variance in the dependent variables.

TABLE 6

ZERO-ORDER AND PARTIAL RELATIONSHIPS OF COMMUNITY-SIZE VARIABLES TO SELECTE DEPENDENT VARIABLES, WHITES, UNITED STATES, 1974

	Males				Females			
	Community of Origin		Community of Residence		Community of Origin		Community of Residence	
Dependent Variable	Zero-Order Corre-lation	Partial Beta	Zero-Order Corre-lation	Partial Beta	Zero-Order Corre-lation	Partial Beta	Zero-Order Corre-lation	Parti Beta
Political conservatism	−.112	−.091	*	*	−.118	−.058	*	*
Frequency of socialization with friends who are not neighbors	.172	.079	.147	.084	.189	.090	*	*
Frequency of going to bar or tavern	.167	.108	.118	.065	.103	.023	*	*
Permissiveness concerning premarital sex	.171	.093	.118	.036	.212	.042	.211	.13
Permissiveness concerning extramarital sex	.162	.073	.204	.152	.101	.045	*	*
Permissiveness concerning homosexual sex	.173	.064	.204	.148	.132	.016	.109	.06
Belief in greater expenditures for education	.086	.028	.114	.090	.137	.085	*	*
Belief in greater expenditures for the military	−.158	−.087	−.110	.048	−.148	−.059	*	*
Vocabulary test score	.225	.077	.184	.053	.333	.215	.127	.00
Number of children (persons age 45 and older)	−.123	−.101	*	*	−.142	−.100	*	*

SOURCE: The 1974 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Researc Center (James A. Davis, principal investigator).

NOTE: For the multiple regression analysis, the independent variables include all of th independent variables listed in table 7.

* Data not reported because zero-order correlation is less than .1.

ficient (zero-order beta) with the partial beta (see table 6).

Generally, the controls diminished the associations to an important degree, but only in a few cases wei the associations reduced to virtuall zero. We cannot be sure, of cours that we controlled all antecedei

TABLE 7

MEAN PARTIAL RELATIONSHIP (BETA) OF TWO COMMUNITY-SIZE VARIABLES AND NINE OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TO 19 SELECTED DEPENDENT VARIABLES, WHITES, UNITED STATES, 1974

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	MALES	MARRIED FEMALES
Size of community of origin	.067	.069
Size of community of residence	.059	.040
Region	.084	.076
Region of origin	.047	.071
Age	.159	.131
Family income	.049	.044
Subjective economic standing of family	.068	.071
Subjective economic standing of family at age 16	.041	.058
Occupational prestige (of spouse in case of females)	.055	.040
Father's occupational prestige	.041	.040
Years of school completed	.103	.102

SOURCE: The 1974 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (James A. Davis, principal investigator).

NOTE: Means are computed without regard to signs of the betas. All 11 of the independent variables are in the regression equations. The 19 dependent variables are those listed in tables 4 and 5.

and intervening variables which could account for the remaining associations, as indicated by the betas, but it appears likely that population concentration, or some very close correlates, had rather direct effects on some of the dependent variables, such as vocabulary (females), fertility, attitudes toward family size, attitudes toward communism, and attitudes toward premarital sex. If so, we speculate that, with the probable exception of the effect on vocabulary, the effects were mainly a matter of the people in the smaller communities lagging behind those in the larger communities as attitudes and behavior have changed.

The multivariate analysis also allows tentative conclusions about the relative explanatory power of the community-size variables and the other predictor variables, most of which are often used in social scientific research. The means in table 7 indicate that the explanatory power of age and education exceeded those of both size of community of origin and size of community of current residence by a considerable margin. Even region of residence had slightly better predictive power, on the average, than either of the community-size variables. On the other hand, the community size variables did not fare badly in competition with some other variables often used as explanatory variables in social scientific research, such as occupational

restige and family income. Of ›urse, the 19 dependent variables sed for these comparisons are not ecessarily representative, and the ›lative predictive power of the dif- ›rent independent variables varies great deal among the 19 dependent ariables.[18]

CONCLUSIONS

What, then, is the importance of ıe rural-urban distinction and of the ›mmunity-size variable to those 'ho would understand and deal 'ith attitudinal and behavioral vari- ›ion in the United States? The ıswer, clearly, is that the impor- ınce is more than negligible and that there is little reason to believe that the importance is diminishing or will soon diminish very much. It would certainly be premature to suggest that students of rural-urban differences should find more fruitful topics to study.

On the other hand, the importance of rural-urban differences should not be exaggerated. The rural-urban variable, along with many other explanatory variables long favored by social scientists, is losing much of its apparent importance as researchers increasingly use "proportional-reduction-in-error" measures of association and interpret their findings in terms of proportion of variance explained. For most attitudinal and behavioral variables, the predictive utility of the rural-urban variable is modest at best; "overinterpretation" of rather small differences between percentages has often obscured the fact that on most issues the rural and urban populations each has almost as much internal differentiation in attitudes as does the total population.

18. For a somewhat similar comparison, ›e George W. Lowe and Charles W. Peek, Location and Lifestyle: The Comparative xplanatory Utility of Urbanism and Ruılity," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 39 (Fall 1974), ›. 392–419. More recent research by Lowe ıd Peek, as yet unpublished, reveals that, ›r a large number of attitudinal variables om the General Social Surveys, a cluster of status" variables has considerably greater redictive power than a cluster of rural-rban-community-size variables.

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Political Structure of Rural America

By DAVID KNOKE AND CONSTANCE HENRY

ABSTRACT: Historical rural American political behavior has revolved around the three themes of radicalism, conservatism, and apathy. Post-World War II research on urban-rural differences reveals little support either for contemporary rural radicalism or greater political apathy in rural areas. However, rural citizens, particularly farmers, exhibit more conservative political orientations than metropolitan populations. The reapportionment revolution of the 1960s, which proponents thought would reduce rural advantage in state and national government, has not noticeably altered social policy outputs of state legislatures or the Congress in a more liberal, urban-oriented direction. The Electoral College currently under-represents rural influence in electing the president, although various alternatives tend to discriminate in reverse. Future trends suggest a diminishing political difference between rural and urban populations. Exposure of rural residents to mass media and the interchange of populations between geographic areas imply a gradual homogenization of social, cultural, and political values which will ultimately render country and city indistinguishable in terms of political behavior. Other social dimensions play a more central role in political conflict than the rural-urban dimension. Leaving aside the possibility of an unforeseen crisis, rural interests are unlikely to capture national political attention.

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THE political history of rural America interweaves three themes which appear contradictory on the surface but, on closer inspection, exhibit an underlying unity. Over the centuries, rural political behavior has alternated among agrarian radicalism, rural conservatism, and mass apathy. The wellsprings of these political styles arise in the social and economic conditions confronted by farmers and rural and small-town dwellers residing within a steadily urbanizing industrial nation.

Agrarian radicalism swept the Midwest and parts of the South for nearly half a century following the Civil War, as farmers responded to perceived depredations of an emerging hegemonic corporate capitalism. Indifference by the major political parties to farmers' crises in unreliable weather, uncertain markets, and unscrupulous financiers enabled third-party movements such as Populism to make sizable electoral inroads with proposals to limit the power of vested interests and expand control of the state over economic conditions. The cycle of agrarian protest triggered by economic downturns was finally broken only by the extended period of agricultural prosperity following World War II.[1]

Rural conservatism has been a more durable, pervasive orientation in the hinterland, suffusing not only politics but religion, morality, and lifestyle. Grounded in the values of moral integrity and individualistic self-help, rural Americans traditionally have long been suspicious and disdainful of urban centers. The political manifestations—opposition to big government, big business, big labor; isolationism in foreign policy; hostility to non-Anglo-Saxon minorities; intense patriotism—may be seen as part of a general defense of status and a way of life threatened by the encroachment of the urban industrial sector. This traditional rural conservatism has provided the mainstay of the Republican party but has also periodically fueled extremist movements, from prohibition to McCarthy and Wallace, which aimed to restore the rural sector to its real or imagined pristine state.

Mass apathy, the third face of rural politics, was extensively documented in *The American Voter*, perhaps the most influential account of contemporary agrarian politics.[2] Rural inhabitants, particularly farmers, displayed great irregularity in political participation and party loyalty, a volatility presumed to arise from inadequate socialization to the role of political actor. Agrarian politics, unlike the more stable, integrated political behavior of urban workers, was depicted as short-term, transient, and prone to evaporation upon solution of immediate grievances.

The three themes of agrarian radicalism, conservatism, and apathy may be seen as different manifestations of an underlying social and cultural isolation of rural America from the dominant mainstream. Remote from and largely untouched by national political currents, rural

1. On agrarian radicalism, see John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961). For a detailed examination and refutation of the thesis that McCarthyism has roots in the agrarian radicalism of the nineteenth century, see Michael Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

2. Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), ch. 13.

dwellers were prone to view political problems in simple, moralistic terms which called for direct, spontaneous action. The low salience of political action for most rural residents lay behind their predominant apathy and traditional conservatism. The weak tie to the larger political community made the rural mass a prime target for mobilization by radical appeals in economic and social crises. But the very ease with which rural folk could be shaken from lethargy presented tremendous obstacles to consolidating and sustaining any movement beyond the immediate resolution of crisis. Consistently, the mass bases of extremist movements sank back into apathy and traditional conservatism once the initial mobilization ran its course.

The rest of this paper focuses on rural political behavior since World War II. We are interested in evidence on the prevalence of radical, conservative, and apathetic modes in contemporary rural America. We present findings on the behavior and attitudes of the mass populace and the institutional structures of government, explicitly comparing rural and urban sectors for signs of convergence.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

If rural Americans are more politically apathetic than urban residents, they should show substantially lower levels of voting turnout, irregular patterns of voting for party candidates, as well as less participation in all forms of political action. Based on surveys with nonsouthern respondents during the Eisenhower elections, authors of *The American Voter* concluded that rural persons, especially farmers, were more inconsistent than urban workers in always voting and in voting for the same party's presidential candidates in all elections. Yet in replicating these analyses on later elections, we found the earlier findings to be atypical: more recent rural-urban differences in voting participation are not large and are sometimes reversed.

More damaging evidence against the rural apathy theme was presented in a major study of political participation by Sidney Verba and Norman Nie.[3] Their index of overall political participation showed that isolated villages and rural areas and isolated towns of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants had lower rates than any other type of community except small suburbs adjacent to large metropolises. However, such small places are populated with people whose lower education, occupation, and income levels make them less prone to political involvement. When the data were statistically adjusted to remove the effects of low social and economic status, the rural and isolated small communities were shown to participate politically more than the residents of large urban places.

The authors concluded that political activity was most prevalent in communities with well-defined political boundaries in which local participation could occur. As communities increased and began to lose their distinct boundaries from other communities, the general participation rates declined, particularly those actions aimed at influencing social issues in the community. Rather than being places devoid of political involvement, the rural areas, villages, and small towns offer their residents a greater chance for

3. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 229–47.

civic involvement and meaningful political influence than do the larger, more "central" urban settings. But, with increasing urbanization, the small and relatively independent communities which foster citizen participation in politics are becoming rarer.

PARTISAN POLITICS

For more than half a century, rural and small town America has been Republican in party support and voting behavior, while urban and especially metropolitan communities have generally been Democratic. Evidence from recent surveys does not show these partisan differences to be eroding.[4] As the South has edged closer toward two-party politics in state and national elections, signs of a similar rural-urban partisan cleavage have emerged there. Farmers in both the South and non-South are less likely than rural nonfarmers to call themselves Independents. Thus, contrary to the assumption that farmers are apathetic, they are more likely than any rural or urban group to identify with one of the major political parties.

In both regions, farming families are more likely to be Republican than any other residential category, with rural nonfarmers the next most Republican. In fact, due to the low level of Independents, southern farmers are not only the most Republican group but also the only group in which a majority identified with the Democratic party.

Historically, rural areas have voted "Democratic when farm prices are low and Republican when they are high."[5] *The American Voter's* analysis of the 1956 presidential election indicated that farmers who had experienced downward trends in their crop prices voted against the incumbent Republican administration. However, a replication of this analysis in the next three elections failed to find evidence that downward price trends translate into votes against the incumbent party.[6] And in the 1972 contest, despite high farm prices and record wheat sales to Russia, Richard Nixon actually received fewer votes among farmers in both regions than he did from small urban communities. Perhaps the general prosperity of the post-World War II period has dampened the alleged political sensitivity of American farmers to short-term shifts in their economic fortunes.

SOCIAL ISSUES

As well as continued preference for the Republican party, contemporary rural residents maintain traditionally conservative stances on a variety of political and social issues. In fact, a size-of-place gradient has frequently been observed, with rural residents the most conservative and liberal attitudes increasingly evident among town, small city, suburb, and large city residents in that order.[7]

4. The data used in this section and the next come from the 1973 and 1974 General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center and made available through the Roper Public Opinion Research Center. Neither organization is responsible for the interpretations made herein.

5. Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, *Politics and Voters* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 47.

6. David Knoke and David E. Long, "The Economic Sensitivity of the American Farm Vote," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 40 (Spring 1975), pp. 7–17.

7. This gradient was found with regard to civil rights attitudes by Hart M. Nelsen and Raytha L. Yokley, "Civil Rights Attitudes of Rural and Urban Presbyterians," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 35 (June 1970), pp. 141–52. However, see the absence of a consistent

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS TOLERANT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR COMMUNISTS, BY REGION AND SIZE OF PLACE, 1973–1974 GSS SURVEYS COMBINED

	WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW A COMMUNIST TO:		
REGION AND SIZE OF PLACE	TEACH IN COLLEGE	GIVE A SPEECH	HAVE A BOOK IN PUBLIC LIBRARY
South			
farm	17	23	28
rural non-farm	30	44	39
small city	35	48	46
large city	42	58	61
Non-South			
farm	25	55	51
rural non-farm	43	63	65
small city	40	59	60
large city	46	69	68

SOURCE: General Social Surveys for 1973 and 1974, conducted by National Opinion Research Center, made available through the Roper Public Opinion Research Center.

NOTE: Size of place categories: Farm—head of household farmer; Rural non-farm—population less than 2,500; Small city—2,500 to 49,999; Large city—50,000 or more.

Perhaps the most revealing evidence on traditional rural conservatism can be found in data from Samuel Stouffer's classic *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*. Using a 15-item "intolerance" scale of willingness to permit various civil liberties to atheists, socialists, and Communists, Stouffer found the size-of-place gradient for national samples in 1954. Rural dwellers were the least tolerant (16 percent) while those living in cities of 100,000 or more were the most tolerant (40 percent), and the same relationship appeared in both the South and non-South.[8]

Many of the Stouffer items were repeated in national surveys 20 years later. Table 1, which reports the percentage of tolerant respondents toward three items dealing with Communists, indicates that tolerance of nonconformity has risen over time, although a size-of-place gradient can still be seen. The pattern in the South on all three items is clearest, with tolerance uniformly increasing with community size. In the non-South, where tolerance levels are higher, farmers are still the most conservative and large city residents the most liberal, but the rural non-farm population is not distinguishable in attitude from the urban groups. Thus, while the farmers are still the most conservative category and the size-of-place gradient seems to hold in the South, the magnitude of differences seems to have diminished since Stouffer's initial study as the overall level of tolerance has grown.

EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS

While no farmers' group has mounted an effective electoral

size-of-place gradient for domestic economic welfare attitudes in Richard F. Hamilton, *Class and Politics in the United States* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 250.

8. Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), ch. 5.

challenge since the demise of the LaFollette progressives more than 40 years ago, two major extremist movements in recent decades have held disproportionate sway among rural Americans. Both Senator Joe McCarthy and Governor George Wallace found their brands of anti-Establishment rhetoric gaining votes from rural and small-town adherents. But the nature of their appeals indicates that, rather than seeking a radical restructuring of the social system, their supporters expressed the conservative traditions of the rural milieu.

Several liberal scholars have characterized McCarthyism as a lineal descendant of the populist/progressive "rural utopianism." On superficial grounds, the thesis has some plausibility since McCarthy's greatest electoral support in Wisconsin came from rural counties. But Michael Rogin's painstaking analysis disclosed that McCarthy's rural appeal was widespread throughout the state, while Robert LaFollette had always been rejected by the rich southern counties. "The rural supporters of McCarthy were not reacting to specific economic conditions and constellations of power that produced agrarian radicalism."[9] McCarthy's support, never a true mass movement, was basically confined within traditional Republican party politics among voters disturbed by communism and foreign policy issues.

George Wallace's third party presidential bid in 1968 was more successful in winning popular votes nationally than any since the LaFollette progressives. Yet the core of his support was concentrated in southern "black belt" counties—the rural areas of antebellum plantation slavery and contemporary high concentrations of blacks. These areas have a long history of repression, often violent, by whites against the blacks whose numerical strength posed a threat to white political supremacy. Southern whites living in black belt counties have historically given the highest electoral returns to candidates promising to delay or prevent black social, economic, and political advances.

The 1968 election saw non-metropolitan areas of the South giving Wallace more than 57 percent of their votes, while southern cities returned fewer than 40 percent, furnishing Richard Nixon with most of the remainder.[10] Even in the urban South, Wallace drew much of his support from first-generation farm and small-town migrants who remained attached to traditional, fundamentalist cultural values and beliefs.[11] The Wallace movement can best be seen as a classic rural conservative desire to rescind the flood of social change flowing against the rural way of life in the South (outside the South, Wallace held no special appeal for rural residents[12]). By the 1976 primaries,

9. See Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy*, p. 91.

10. Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 144. A correlation of +.38 for the percentage black and percentage vote for Wallace in 1968 for southern counties is reported in Ira M. Wasserman and David R. Segal, "Aggregation Effects in the Ecological Study of Presidential Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 17 (February 1973), pp. 177–81.

11. Harold G. Grasmick, "Rural Culture and the Wallace Movement in the South," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 39 (Winter 1974), pp. 454–70.

12. Outside the South, rural residents were no more likely to vote for Wallace in 1968 than persons living in cities of more than one million according to table 54 in

however, the movement had crested as the South was learning to accommodate the realities of industrialization and legal desegregation. Partly on the question of his health, but largely because his issues had lost their impact, Wallace's southern supporters began to abandon him for a mainstream centrist, Jimmy Carter. On the night of the North Carolina primary, Wallace delayed his concession speech waiting in vain for the rural counties to pull him through. Even the black belt gave more votes to Carter.

THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION

Political scientists and politicians alike have long believed that rural and urban political interests are incompatible. Nowhere has this belief found stronger expression than in the controversy over representation in state and national legislatures. Despite a doubling of the urban population from one-third to nearly two-thirds during this century, legislative districting patterns have lagged behind the shift from rural to urban society. Malapportioned districts were ascribed all manner of anti-democratic bias:

> ...in most states the rural districts, constituting most of the area of the states, elected a majority of the state legislature even though they often possessed a minority of the population.... The rural vote could thus dictate what schools and roads were to be built, how local water supply was to be allotted, and what was to be taxed. It could veto urban renewal or mass transportation programs. In short, it could maintain a minority control over legislation.[13]

The Supreme Court's 1962 order in *Baker* v. *Carr* that states reapportion districts on the basis of "one man-one vote" triggered the Reapportionment Revolution of the 1960s, which effectively redressed the rural-urban imbalance in Congress and state legislatures. But the real question is, did this standard for which metropolitan areas had fought so hard produce the changes in legislative policy outputs that its proponents sought? This natural political experiment has had sufficient time to show its effects. After an extensive review of the findings on rural and urban representation in state legislatures, Congress, and the Electoral College, our conclusion is that major change in legislation and expenditure has not materialized. The original case against rural areas' ability to block urban-oriented legislation was largely overstated. Rural and urban interests, while divergent, are by no means always inimical. And the ultimate aim of reapportionment—more equitable management of public purse and policy—has proven an elusive goal which depends upon factors other than proportional representation of the population in governmental bodies. We will document these contentions in the following paragraphs.

We can dispense with a persistent myth that rural areas tend to be dominated by one political party, typically the Democrats in the South and the Republicans in the Midwest, while urban areas are the center of competitive party politics. A massive investigation of party competition in all United States counties for the 1960 election turned up meager

Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 385.

13. Marjorie G. Fribourg, *The Reapportionment Crisis* (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1967), p. 2.

support for the assumption that increased urbanization leads to greater party competition. The correlation between the percentage of a county's population living in places of more than 2,500 people and the percentage of the vote going to the majority party in the presidential contest was only −.16. None of the 74 measures of county characteristics had a sizable impact on party competition.[14] Thus, reapportionment would not have led to the diminished presence of one party in legislative bodies, since neither Democrats nor Republicans were disproportionately distributed by size of place.

STATE LEGISLATURES

Little evidence has been produced to demonstrate that reapportionment has had significant effects on state policy and expenditures. While the ideal of equal representation is a deeply held value, the merits of this ideal do not lend themselves to easy empirical verification.[15] Indicators of the effects of malapportionment on public policy should be measured before and after redistricting in state legislatures, to ascertain how much of the change could be attributed to fairer representation. Most political theorists agree that environmental forces, including malapportionment, have some influence on legislative decisions. The difficulty lies in disentangling changes in legislative outputs due to reapportionment from those due to other environmental factors.[16] Richard Hoffe bert observed that in the America states, most environmental forces d not seem strong enough to accoun for major differences in governmer policies, with the exception c party competition which, as w noted above, does not coincide wit the rural-urban cleavage.[17]

If characteristics of legislativ districts influence the behavior c state legislatures, it most likel occurs indirectly. Thus, the lack c evidence to the effect that malappo tionment has obstructed neede urban legislation may simply refle the complexity of the process b which constituency preferences ar translated into legislators' vote One possible complicating factor i the pluralistic nature of the urba population. Geographic division form just one political cleavage along with racial, ethnic, religiou occupational, and status division The spectre of a monolithic urba majority or rural minority imposin its will in state legislatures is ur realistic.

> The so-called urban majority is actuall an aggregate of numerous and ofte politically antagonistic groups. Furthe more, political alliances cut across th boundaries of local units and legislativ districts. Some urban groups have closer identification with certain rur forces than with other urban interests.

14. Charles M. Bonjean and Robert L. Lineberry, "The Urbanization-Party Competition Hypothesis: A Comparison of All United States Counties," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 32 (May 1970), pp. 305–21.

15. Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 27 (August 1965), pp. 586–601.

16. R. S. Erikson, "The Partisan Impact c State Legislative Reapportionment," *Mid west Journal of Political Science*, vol. 1 (February 1971), pp. 57–71.

17. Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relatio between Public Policy and Some Structur and Environmental Variables in the America States," *American Political Science Revieu* vol. 60 (March 1966), pp. 73–82.

18. Gordon E. Baker, "One Person, On Vote: 'Fair and Effective Representation'? in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Representatio and Misrepresentation* (Chicago: Ran McNally & Company, 1968), p. 78.

Studies have consistently found few correlations between equal representation and public policy in the individual states. Thomas Dye's analysis for all 50 states found that the policy choices made in malapportioned legislatures were not noticeably different from those of well-apportioned legislatures. Most of the differences which occur result from socioeconomic differences among the states rather than as direct consequences of gerrymandered districts. Thus, reapportionment should not be expected to significantly alter the performance of state governments.[19] Similarly, Glen Broach's analysis of legislative roll calls in the 50 state legislatures discovered that urban-rural dimensions occur only on idiosyncratic issues and only sporadically on problems which clearly and homogeneously divide rural from urban interests. Urban and rural legislators do not organize as consistent legislatives blocs, nor does a rural or urban constituency consistently predispose a legislator to vote in given directions on most bills.[20]

Studies of individual state legislatures have generally found no enduring anti-city coalitions among the rural legislators. More frequently, the main opposition to urban-oriented legislation comes from interests within the metropolitan districts or adjacent suburbs.[21] In fact, one of the major consequences of the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s was an increase in the number of suburban districts in state and national legislatures at the expense of both rural and urban populations. Conflicts which superficially seem to be urban against rural interests, on closer look resolve themselves into more complex contests among social, economic, and cultural groups which are only incidentally associated with urban and rural geography. Present trends are likely to find these conflicts dissociated from the historical rural-urban dimension.

We do not mean to imply that no important differences exist between residents of the city and of the countryside. Differences of opinion, belief, and values persist as we have documented above. But the important point is that these differences are neither incompatible nor overwhelming in the actions of state legislatures. Clearly there are other social forces of greater importance which affect the outcome of political processes at the state level.

CONGRESS AND ELECTORAL COLLEGE

Compared with the large research literature on the effects of reapportionment in state legislatures' policy outputs, evidence of the impact of "one man-one vote" on the federal House of Representatives is scanty. Proponents of reapportionment had argued that the Congress would take on a more liberal tone with regard to domestic welfare legislation once redistricting had reduced the rural imbalance in the House. Little work subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision was undertaken to determine the validity of this argument, but that which has appeared tends

19. See Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy," p. 599.

20. Glen T. Broach, "A Comparative Dimensional Analysis of Partisan and Urban-Rural Voting in State Legislatures," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 34 (August 1972), pp. 905–21.

21. See F. M. Bryan, "The Metamorphosis of a Rural Legislature," *Polity*, vol. 1 (1968), pp. 191–212; David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 7 (December 1958), pp. 1051–65.

not to support it. The weighted-vote technique used by most investigators generally shows small changes in liberal legislation with more equitable population apportionment.[22]

Most of the controversy over reapportionment's effects on policy outcomes in the Congress has centered on the suburban districts rather than rural areas and inner cities whose share of the national population, and hence of representatives under the one man-one vote formula, has been shrinking to the benefit of the suburbs. The topic of suburban politics is too large to cover in a paper on the political structure of rural America, except to note the extreme diversity of political interests present in places adjacent to metropolitan areas. Milton Cummings pointed out that demographic trends will give suburban areas a plurality of House seats over metropolitan and rural areas in the near future, yet the legislative consequences will depend on "whether an issue fosters unity or division within the suburbs." On many issues pitting the suburbs against the central cities, rural congressmen may find themselves aligned with the suburbs.[23] After all, both areas have a common interest in avoiding the social and economic ills which plague the core cities. At other times, however, rural representatives may find themselves confronting an urban-suburban coalition, as in the dismantling of farm subsidies.

Presidential elections have thus far defied extension of the one man-one vote principle, despite several attempts to alter the Electoral College's winner-take-all formula in which the candidate with a state's plurality gets electoral votes equal to the number of senators and representatives. Several studies, operating from different assumptions, have tried to determine which social groups are disadvantaged under present Electoral College arrangements and what the impact of various alternatives might be. Lawrence Longley and Alan Braun, using a "voter power" method developed by John F. Banzhaf III, concluded that the most disadvantaged citizens reside in the medium-to-small states (from 4 to 14 electoral votes), while those in the eight largest states have disproportionately large influence. Specifically, suburban residents were found to be the most advantaged at 9.1 percent above the national per-citizen voter average, followed by central city residents (+8.0 percent), SMSA residents (+7.2 percent), and urban residents (+4.2 percent). Rural residents were the most disadvantaged with the rural non-farm at −8.0 percent and the rural farmers at −14.6 percent.[24]

Using a computer simulation, Seymour Spilerman and David Dickens simulated the effects of various alternatives to the Electoral College on the relative influence different population groups would have on the outcome of the presidential election. Although they were

22. Andrew Hacker, *Congressional Districting, the Issue of Equal Representation* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1963).

23. Milton C. Cummings, Jr., "Reapportionment in the 1970s: Its Effect on Congress," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., *Reapportionment in the 1970s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 209–41.

24. Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, *The Politics of Electoral College Reform* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 122; see, also, John F. Banzhaf III, "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College," *Villanova Law Review*, vol. 13 (Winter 1968), pp. 303–46.

critical of the Longley and Braun and the Banzhaf approaches, Spilerman and Dickens concurred that the current arrangement greatly enhances the influence of large metropolitan centers. Other arrangements would reverse the bias in favor of the rural counties, with a district allocation of electoral votes and a proportional division of a state's electoral votes according to candidates' popular vote percentages favoring rural and small town areas even more than the adoption of a strict popular-vote rule.[25] Not surprisingly, the strongest advocates of district and proportional division reforms are interest groups with a rural origin, such as the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau. The benefits to large urban states and to ethnic minorities in their disproportionate influence on presidential elections, as Spilerman and Dickens point out, is to some unknown degree offset by the larger rural representation in the Senate and through seniority control of congressional committees.

A LOOK FORWARD

Our review of contemporary political behavior and attitudes of the rural populace and their representatives in government leads to the conclusion that agrarian apathy and agrarian radicalism are no longer valid characterizations.[26] Agrarian conservatism continues to hold, although the differences between rural and non-rural groups have blurred in several instances. For the future, the shrinking farm population and the continual shift from family farms to agribusinesses portends a decreased electoral importance of that occupational group, excepting in the state politics of the Midwest where agriculture still dominates the local economy. The one issue likely to have persistent national impact is the role of the federal government in expanding export opportunities for the farm sector. Agricultural commodities will undoubtedly be a greater bargaining chip for the United States in the international political economy than they are today. Whether this importance will translate into enhanced influence in the domestic political system for the agricultural producers remains to be seen.

The key trend for the non-farm rural sector would seem to be toward greater homogenization with the urban political culture. As it has over the post-World War II period, the hinterland will continue to be exposed through mass media and interpersonal contacts to the dominant social, cultural, and political styles emanating from the metropole. Thus, we can expect the cities to further the colonization of the interior much as they have for the past 200 years. Barring some unforeseeable disruption, the end result of this trend will be to make the rural population as heterogeneous and politically diverse as the urban environment, so that all meaningful distinctions between the two will have disappeared.

Aiding this blending process is a backflow of urban dwellers to the small town and rural areas, bringing

25. Seymour Spilerman and David Dickens, "Who Will Gain and Who Will Lose Influence under Different Electoral Rules," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 80 (September 1974), pp. 443–77.

26. An apparent instance of agrarian radicalism in recent times is Cesar Chavez's unionization of farm workers. With recent success, it has become a part of the union system, rather than a radical challenge to the economic structure.

to these places the political ideas and styles of the city. Probably a more important demographic component of this change has been the centuries-long infusion of rural migrants to the cities. Acculturation has always been a slow process, sometimes taking generations to complete. Meanwhile the first-generation farm offspring have by their presence altered the mass political behavior of cities to more closely resemble the rural areas.[27] In the future, farm-reared elements will be a drastically diminished proportion of the population, but their historic role has been to reduce the political cleavage between the cities and the country.

A major example of how the political influences of historical rural and small town America continue to affect contemporary politics occurs in Congress. Samuel Huntington described congressmen as "small town boys," more likely than administrative leaders to retain the parochialism and conservatism of their upbringing even as the nation became increasingly cosmopolitan and sophisticated. Hence Capitol Hill remains a bastion of the nineteenth century well into the present one.[28]

Much of the future course of American rural politics lies outside the scope of demographic change, whose contours are at least visible if not predictable. The actions and inactions of political elites in the decades ahead will have a more profound effect on the issues that are articulated and placed on the agenda. But it is unlikely that the major social cleavage around which future political conflicts arise will involve the rural-urban dichotomy. Issues which differentiate Americans geographically currently have a low salience for both masses and elites. Only the eruption of a major crisis, such as in food production or energy resources, might polarize the rural and urban populations. Barring such a calamity, we are unlikely to find rural politics intruding on the national consciousness much in the future.

27. David Knoke and Angela Lane, "Size of Place, Migration, and Voting Turnout," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 3 (Fall 1975), pp. 127–39.

28. Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman, ed., *The Congress and America's Future* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 5–31. But see reservations expressed by Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Congressmen as 'Small Town Boys': A Research Note," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, vol. 14 (May 1970), pp. 321–30.

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Farm Labor

By VARDEN FULLER AND BERT MASON

ABSTRACT: Farm population estimates indicate that the massive off-farm exodus is approaching its termination; during 1970–74 the rate of farm population decline fell to an average 1.2 percent per year. Estimates of farm occupations for 1974 imply that the nation's agriculture is dominantly a self-employment industry, though multiple job holding is widespread. The aggregate of persons doing some farm wagework is extremely heterogeneous and the market for hired farm labor is characterized by casual employment relationships. Farm labor in the U.S. lacks market structure and is seldom a chosen life-time occupation. Of nearly 2¾ million who did some farm work in 1974, it was the chief activity for only 693,000. Contrary to popular conception, hired farm labor is not dominated by migrants; in 1974, about 8 percent of the farm work force was migratory. Evidence on labor force participation, daily and annual earnings, and hourly wages illustrates that the hired farm labor market is dominantly a ready-access, casual market for the salvage of low opportunity cost time. Recent developments in federal policies indicate that farm workers are likely to receive federal protection equal to nonagricultural workers. Since 1967, hired workers on large farms have been covered by Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage requirements, and agricultural minimum wages will be increased to general industry levels by 1978. Agricultural workers remain excluded from the federal unemployment insurance program and National Labor Relations Act. Farm worker unionization is prominent only on large-scale industrialized farms but will apparently continue to be exceptional nationally.

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IN 1974, 4.4 percent of the nation's population lived on farms and 4.3 percent of its work force was engaged in agriculture. If these census estimates had been referring to the same persons, the writing of a chapter on farm labor would seemingly be simple and forthright. But, unfortunately, the near-identity of these percentages is coincidence; furthermore, both magnitudes have limited significance. American ways of living and of working have versatility and variety that are formidable to statisticians and social analysts who would define, measure, and classify. That "farm" and "rural" no longer are synonymous is quite generally understood. But that people living on farms are not necessarily engaged in agriculture or that persons who do farm work may not be "farm population" or even engaged in agriculture are facts not generally comprehended.

To be counted in "farm population," a person need only be living on a place that meets the census definition of a farm. In recent times, that definition has been 10 acres of land from which $50 worth of farm produce had been sold in the preceding 12 months or any size of unit from which $250 worth of farm products had been sold.[1] Institutional populations falling under this definition are included. So inclusive a concept of what constitutes a farm has long been in controversy; the debate thereon brought about an agreement between the Bureau of the Census and the Department of Agriculture that in 1975 and onward minimum annual sales will be $1,000.

No less debatable and more elusive are the definitions and estimates of persons engaged in agriculture. They are based upon work performed within a specified week in April of each year. A farm operator doing any work whatever on his farm in the sample week is classified as self-employed—unless he has another job on which he spent more time in the sample week. Unpaid family farm workers must work at least 15 hours on the farm in the sample week to be counted as such and they too may be otherwise classified if they had another job on which more time was spent. Wage workers are counted as employed if they did any work in the sample week; they are classified by principal activity. Both population and occupation estimates are based on a household sampling procedure.

Given the widespread practice by farmers and hired farm workers of multiple job holding and the fact that April is not a peak of activity in farming, it follows that this occupational estimating procedure must omit numerous persons who do some farm work. An alternative to asking people what they did in a week in April is to ask them in December what they did in the past year. With respect to hired farm workers, this approach was initiated by Louis J. Ducoff of the former Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the mid-1940s and has been continued by the successor Economic Research Service.[2] With the excep

1. Estimates of farm population are obtained as an integral part of the annual April-based current population survey by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Economic Research Service, USDA, participates in preparation of the farm population reports. Each annual report contains an explanatory section on definitions and procedures. *Farm Population* is Series Census-ERS, P-27; the 1974 report is No. 46.

2. This series is titled *The Hired Farm Working Force*. It is issued annually by Economic Research Service, USDA, as part of its Agricultural Economic Report series.

tion of a few missed years prior to 1956, it has provided a valuable annual statistical accounting of persons who do any farm wage work—their numbers and characteristics, their earnings and participation in the labor force. Yet another way to find out about hiring of farm workers is to inquire of employers. This has been done monthly for many years by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in connection with crop reporting work.[3] A long and useful series on wages paid as well as volume of hiring is available from this source.

TRAVAILS OF IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT

All statistical categories about farm labor are compounds of discomfort: they depend upon recall; their definitions are arbitrary; they impose an appearance of homogeneity upon situations that are heterogeneous; they usually are derived as incidental by-products of other measurement enterprises, and then generally with a slim input of resources. Yet, even though periodic magnitudes may be dubious, their continued availability over a span of time offers a degree of solace. To know that estimated farm population in 1974 was 9,264,000 acquires more significance when we also know that (by the same estimating procedures) the comparable figure in 1960 was 15,635,000, for now we can speak of a 41 percent decline. And even if the magnitudes had been more restrictively estimated, the rate of changes would not likely have been substantially different.

Farm population estimates, which go back to 1910, quantify and explicate the swift transition to an urban industrial nation. In a half century the farm population fell from 32 million to 9¼ million—from one-third of the population to less than one-twentieth. When the off-farm torrent was at its postwar crest, the draining away was five to seven times the net natural increase each year. There were signals of impending urban social chaos embedded in the figures, but few were disposed to read them.

Through the 1960s, the off-farm drain continued at around 5 percent per year. A leveling-out had to come, and it seems now to have arrived. During 1970–74 the farm population decline has fallen to an average of 1.2 percent per year. Net off-farm movement is now confined to nonwhites, which means primarily southern blacks. In 1974 estimated nonwhite farm population was 655,000, or 7 percent of national farm population; measured against their own base, the off-farm movement of nonwhites was 9 percent per year, which also cannot last long.

Of the labor force residing on farms, some are engaged exclusively in agriculture, some in nonagriculture, and in many regions multiple job holding is prominent. The off-farm drain has mainly affected those that had been entirely or principally agricultural; the nonagricultural component of the farm population has remained fairly constant. As farm population has declined, this stable nonagricultural component has risen in percentage terms, thereby generating the arithmetic foundation for one of many quasi-myths: it is said that farm people are increasing their nonfarm work, but the fact is that farm people are decreasing their farm work. A similar illusion relates to nonfarm residents engaged in agriculture: their numbers have re-

3. This series is titled *Farm Labor*, U.S. Crop Reporting Board, Statistical Reporting Service.

TABLE 1

FARM POPULATION, LABOR FORCE, OCCUPATIONS; NUMBERS IN AGRICULTURE, BY RESIDENCE, 1960, 1965, 1970–1974

	Farm Population		Farm Residents in Nonagricultural Occupations		Occupied in Agriculture			
Year	All Persons (000)	Labor Force (000)	Number (000)	Percent of Farm Resident Labor Force	All Persons (000)	Farm Residents (000)	Nonfarm Residents (000)	Percent, Nonfarm Residents of Total
1960	15,635	6,266	2,064	33	5,395	4,025	1,370	25
1965	12,363	5,175	1,915	37	4,719	3,155	1,564	33
1970	9,712	4,293	1,878	44	3,696	2,333	1,363	37
1971	9,425	4,263	1,864	44	3,668	2,291	1,377	38
1972	9,610	4,361	1,956	45	3,678	2,308	1,370	37
1973	9,472	4,454	2,121	48	3,729	2,249	1,480	40
1974	9,264	4,419	2,078	47	3,773	2,242	1,531	41

SOURCE: Base data are from current issues of *Current Population Reports*, Series Census—ERS, P-27, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and U.S. Department of Agriculture.

mained fairly constant since 1960, but as the agricultural total has declined their percentage has risen. Again the cutting blade in the percentage computation was decline in farm occupations by farm residents. The numbers involved are summarized in table 1. One may observe therein that farm residents having nonfarm occupations exceed nonfarm residents having farm occupations.

Estimates of farm occupations for 1974 (summarized in table 2) imply that the nation's agriculture remains dominantly a self-employment industry notwithstanding the revolutionary shift to bigger farms. Most but not all farm operators and unpaid family laborers still live on farms; most but not all hired farm workers now live elsewhere, the latter in consequence of a well-defined trend. Women hold considerable prominence as unpaid family workers but little as operators. Women nonfarm residents who do farm work are mainly in the hired category.

WHO DOES NATION'S FARM WORK?

The greatest elusiveness about who does the nation's farm work resides in the awkward fact that a substantial fraction of it is done by persons who are not normally counted as being occupied in agriculture. These include farm residents whose chief activity is nonfarm work and numerous nonfarm residents who mainly are students, housewives, unemployed, retired, or otherwise not usually seeking work, and nonfarm workers who do some incidental farm work. The December inquiry procedure mentioned previously seeks to identify all persons in the current sample survey who did any farm wagework in the preceding year and thereby includes these various categories. In contrast to the April-based occupational approach which estimated

TABLE 2

PERSONS IN AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS BY SEX AND RESIDENCE, 1974

SEX AND CLASSIFICATION	FARM RESIDENTS (000)	NONFARM RESIDENTS (000)	TOTAL (000)
Both sexes, total	2,242	1,531	3,773
self-employed	1,350	455	1,805
wage & salary workers	469	1,016	1,485
unpaid family workers	423	59	482
Male, total	1,832	1,268	3,100
self-employed	1,266	412	1,678
wage & salary workers	393	830	1,223
unpaid family workers	173	27	200
Female, total	410	262	672
self-employed	84	44	128
wage & salary workers	76	186	262
unpaid family workers	250	32	282

SOURCE: *Current Population Reports*, Series Census—ERS, P-27, No. 46, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and U.S. Department of Agriculture, December 1975.

that 1,485,000 persons were agricultural wage and salary workers in 1974, the December inquiry procedure estimates that 2,737,000 did some farm wagework in 1974.[4] Of this large total, only 1,568,000 did 25 days or more of farm work. This smaller number bears a resemblance to the number that reported their April occupation. But these two numbers are only arithmetic lookalikes, not mildly divergent estimates of the same population.

Over the past 30 years, the total of persons doing some hired farm work has been estimated as high as 4⅓ million (1950) and as low as 2½ million (1970, 1971). Since 1960, the tendency has been toward decline, but inconsistently and without a strong trend. The highly casual portion doing less than 25 days of farm work has stood in the neighborhood of two-fifths. There has been a downward tendency in numbers of persons who obtain 150 or more days of farm wagework per year and a trend toward fewer days of work per year for those in this category. The statistics therefore say that the hired work of American agriculture is not becoming less casual and seasonal as its technological revolution progresses.

Of nearly 2¾ million who did some farm work in 1974, for only 693,000 was it chief activity; only 641,000 worked at it for at least 150 days; 1,435,000 were students, housewives, and others not regularly in the labor force. One-fifth of the large total were females; just under one-fifth were nonwhites; approximately 8 percent were migratory—according to a definition to be discussed subsequently. Two-fifths of the large total in 1974 did both farm and nonfarm work—the report speaks of these persons as "farm wageworkers who also did some

4. Except as otherwise indicated, the discussion that follows is based on data derived from *The Hired Farm Working Force of 1974*, Agricultural Economic Report No. 297.

nonfarm wagework." But for only one-eighth of these interindustry workers was farm wagework their chief activity whereas nonfarm work was the chief activity for almost two-fifths. In these facts and in such statements about them as quoted above lies the source of another quasi-myth. It is often said that hired farm workers are not so poor as they seem because they supplement their farm earnings by working at nonfarm jobs. But the truth is that this dual-sector employment is mostly by nonfarm workers who are supplementing their incomes by doing farm work. Those principally engaged in other than farm work plus those not normally in the labor market (but employed temporarily at both farm and nonfarm work) outnumber persons who are chiefly farm workers with supplementary nonfarm employment by 7:1. The greater truth, therefore, lies on the side of saying that farming offers substantial opportunities for nonfarm people to supplement their incomes. To a limited extent, farm operators also supplement their incomes by working as hired farm laborers.

MOST SEASONAL WORKERS ARE NOT MIGRATORY

Contrary to impressions that one may encounter, hired farm labor is not dominated by migrants. The urban tendency to speak of people doing harvest or casual farm labor as migrants or migratory workers promotes this exaggeration. In a nation of movers and high mobility, definitions that usefully distinguish migratoriness are not easily made. Nonrecurrent relocation of household is not migrancy as usually meant; nor is changing from one temporary job to another within commuting distance of a stable domicile. A significant perception of migratoriness undoubtedly involves recurrent uplifting of household concurrent with seasonality of employment. But there are many—such as entertainers and ski instructors—that meet this test, yet are seldom regarded as migratory workers.

For the annual *Hired Farm Working Force* reports, migratory workers include "those who (1) left their homes temporarily overnight to do farm wagework in a different county within the same State or in a different State with the expectation of eventually returning home, or (2) had no usual place of residence, and did farm wagework in two or more counties during the year."[5]

Thus defined, approximately 8 percent of the estimated 2¾ million who did some farm work in 1974 were migratory (table 3). This percentage level is characteristic of the 1970s and is reduced from the range of 10–15 percent that pertained in the 1960s. Regional patterns in the West and South reflect trends toward decreasing migratoriness which are more accentuated than national aggregates.

Of the 209,000 classified migratory in 1974, about half did both farm and nonfarm work, and their work pattern—some 50 days of farm work and 120 of nonfarm—was similar to that of nonmigratory workers who worked in both sectors. But migratory workers earned more per day in both sectors. Of those doing farm work only, migratory workers gained nothing over nonmigratory in days of employment, although their earnings per day were higher. These findings challenge another quasi-myth: that by following the sun and the crop maturity cycles, migratory

5. Ibid., p. 29.

TABLE 3

MIGRATORY FARM WORKERS, 1961–74

Year	Number of Migrant Farm Workers U.S. (000)	West (000)	South (000)	Migrants as Percentage of Total U.S. Hired Farm Worker Force	Migrants as Percentage of West Hired Farm Worker Force	Migrants as Percentage of South Hired Farm Worker Force
1961	395	108	226	11.3	17.4	11.3
1962	380	123	190	10.5	18.9	9.6
1963	386	130	201	10.7	18.9	10.1
1964	386	102	178	11.5	15.7	9.9
1965	466	144	188	14.9	21.4	11.7
1966	351	151	118	12.7	20.5	9.1
1967	276	112	109	12.2	13.4	7.7
1968	279	92	115	9.6	12.3	8.6
1969	257	102	70	10.0	15.5	6.5
1970	196	64	84	10.1	11.3	7.7
1971	172	82	56	6.7	14.4	5.1
1972	184	70	63	6.6	9.9	5.5
1973	203	89	60	7.6	12.1	6.3
1974	209	66	67	7.6	9.4	6.5

SOURCE: USDA, ERS, *The Hired Farm Working Force*, annual issues.

NOTE: Regions—West includes Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii, Alaska. South includes Maryland, Delaware, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas.

workers are able to get nearly a full year's employment.

In further contradiction of the popular image, it was found in 1965 that three-fifths of migratory workers (as above defined) had only one farm employer; the most typical migrant was a 25-year-old white male employed mainly at a nonfarm job who traveled without minor children across a county line but less than 75 miles within his home state to work temporarily at one farm job.[6] The dramatized migratory streams of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the mid-continent have had at least a semblance of structure and recurrent pattern, but their relative importance in the national farm labor scene was never equal to the prevailing image.[7]

REWARDS OF MIGRANCY ARE MEAGER

In terms of annual earnings, as reported for 1974, the worst situation is that of nonmigrants who do farm work only; those who either became migrants or got nonfarm

6. *Domestic Migratory Farmworkers*, Agricultural Economic Report No. 121, Economic Research Service, USDA, September 1967.

7. In 1970, it was estimated that 51,000 or 24 percent of the hired labor force in 14 states of the Atlantic coast region were interstate workers and were thus involved in the Atlantic coast migrant stream. These migrants were primarily black, Puerto Rican, or Mexican-American. Source: Ward W. Bauder, *Minorities in the Hired Farm Work Force of 14 Eastern States* (Ithaca, N.Y.: unpublished manuscript, 1976).

work did better, and those who did both made the highest earnings. Here are the comparative earnings for 1974:

	Annual Earnings	
	Nonmigrant	Migrant
Persons doing farm work only	$1,891	$2,476
Persons 25 or more days of farm work	3,046	3,102
Persons doing both farm and nonfarm work	3,200	3,688

If these earnings comparisons were to suggest inferences about rational behavior, it needs being noted that there are 2,528,000 persons in the lowest earnings category as against 107,000 in the highest, which leaves doubt that opportunities and choice prevail. Even were a choice of migrancy available, rational decision would have to go beyond weighing prospective additional costs and gains to matters of family welfare, housing, schooling, and what not. The gains in earnings to migrants are too meager to support a theory of rational choice as to migrancy—either to be or not to be.

Impressions and meager evidence concur in the prospective demise of farm labor migrancy. A settling down seems to be occurring, even in the lack of nonfarm job opportunities. Less harsh residency policies (eligibility for welfare), higher costs of being on the road, and stronger motives toward child education and family well-being seem likely to be influences.

Youth Is Characteristic of Hired Farm Workers

We have seen that the typical migrant is young, this is a characteristic shared by hired farm workers generally and is in contrast with the typically advanced age of farm operators. In 1969, the median age of U.S. farm operators was 51.2 years, whereas the median age for both males and females who did any amount of hired farm work was under 25.[8] Workers in the prime years of occupational life, 25–54, are less than one-third of the total. As table 4 further reflects, females who constituted less than one-fourth of the total, shared the tendency to be youthful. Yet, to inject a bit of humanity into cold percentages, it may be noted that the 1 percent in the females 65 years and over group includes 2,000 women who did more than 150 days of farm work in 1974.

What of others—those in prime occupational years and presumably committed? To examine this question, let us look at farm wagework participation of males in ages 35–54. In 1974, there were 316,000 of these, and they were 12 percent of all males who did any farm wagework. Almost one-fifth of these adult males were extremely casual—they worked on farms less than 25 days; at the other extreme, just over a third worked 250 days or more. The published tabulations do not permit us to know the extent of inter-sectoral employment by 35–54 year old males. But there is a tabulation which suggests that a 35-year-old may already have passed his prime earning years. Of those doing 25 or more days of farm work, males in the 25–34 age category got the most work (average 256 days) and earned the highest annual incomes (average $5,203 from farm work and nonfarm work for those that had any). The downward trend in annual earnings after the peak in age category 25–34 is sharp and

8. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1969 Census of Agriculture*, 1973, vol. 2, ch. 3.

TABLE 4

AGE-SEX COMPOSITION OF HIRED FARM LABOR FORCE, 1974

AGE	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL		
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
14–17	24	8	32
18–24	21	3	24
25–34	11	4	15
35–44	6	3	9
45–54	5	2	7
55–64	6	1	7
65 & over	5	1	6
Total	78	22	100

SOURCE: Derived from *The Hired Farm Working Force of 1974*, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Economic Report No. 297, July 1975.

consistent, ending with $1,614 for those 65 and over. Farm wagework may hold some rewards for schoolboys and muscular young men but not for the aging or the aged.

WHITES AND NONWHITES

Approximately four-fifths of the large total who do some farm wagework are classified as whites. Nonwhites doing farm wagework are principally southern blacks. Nonwhites obtain about the same average days of farm work as whites but only about half as many days of nonfarm work. Earnings per day are substantially lower for nonwhites in both farm and nonfarm work. In consequence of these differences, annual earnings of nonwhites in 1974 were 32 percent below those of whites. Since wage rates are comparatively low in the South, one may be inclined to suppose that regional differences are behind this apparent ethnic difference. But this hypothesis fails, because in the southern region nonwhites earned $2.40 less per day at farm work and $5.55 less per day at nonfarm work—and of the latter, they received an average of 30 days as against 54 for whites. In consequence, annual earnings for southern nonwhites at $1,613 were one-third below the $2,403 level of southern whites. In regions outside the South, the survey sample contains insufficient numbers of nonwhites to permit separate calculations.

FOREIGN WORKERS

As an emergency measure in the Second World War, farm laborers were temporarily imported from Mexico, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Canada under federal government auspices.[9] Some of this importation continued in following years. According to U.S. Immigration Service figures, approximately 8,400 contract workers were imported from Jamaica in 1975, primarily for the sugar cane harvest in the Southeast; there were no contract workers from the Bahamas during that year. Importation from Mexico was continued under quasi-government auspices until 1965, and in many years it was larger in volume than in the war emergency. Since 1964, Mexican citizens have continued to be a factor of some significance in the seasonal farm work force, especially of the southwestern region. These

9. Details of the wartime importation and the practices of early postwar years may be found in *Migratory Labor in American Agriculture*, Report of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor, 1951. The continuance of Mexican contract labor importation under the Bracero program until its termination in 1964 has been written about extensively but lacks a comprehensive reference. An instructive overview is Ellis E. Hawley, "The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950–1965," *Agricultural History*, July 1966. Writings about illegally entered Mexican aliens are seldom informative.

are not contract workers as under the expired Bracero program but illegally entered Mexican nationals (wetbacks) and Mexicans legally entered under immigrant visa. Citizens of Mexican origin (by birth or by parental origin) are a substantial and well-known component of the farm work force of the Southwest. Contrary to attitudes that are manifested occasionally, Americans of Mexican descent are not classified as nonwhite. Information on numbers, locations, and activities of this population segment is not comprehensively available. Nor is it with respect to the illegally entered aliens from Mexico.

IS THERE A LABOR MARKET FOR HIRED FARM WORKERS?

Economists like to visualize goods and services as flows through market places where those who have something to offer and those who want can come together, confront each other, and bargain to agreement. Countless books and articles are written about the markets for this and for that, including labor. Among the latter is a handful of items dealing with "the farm labor market." There are some markets, obviously not including the world market for grain and not likely including markets for farm labor, that have institutional structure, procedural regimen, and predictable modes of operation. In farm labor, the nexus of hiring and of subsequent employer-employee relationships is not much burdened by the paraphernalia that are supposed to characterize labor markets or the bargained outcomes that are supposed to emerge from them. There are undeniably particular situations—localities of specialization such as dairying, poultry, nurseries—that have market-like practices for the acquisition of labor. But for the great bulk of farm work, procedures of job-getting and hiring are as miscellaneous as the labor force is heterogeneous.

That farm labor in the United States is lacking in market structure reflects the fact that it is seldom a chosen, life-time occupation. We have seen that few (only 13 percent) of those doing farm work in 1974 were at it at least 250 days. These few might be regarded as the "professional" corps—persons committed to farm wagework and doing well enough at it to remain for the time being. This corps performs half of the nation's hired farm work. For the large remainder, farm wagework is a salvage opportunity—an easy-entry chance to earn something for time that otherwise has little or no value. The validity of this view is most clearly seen in the instance of students and housewives. But most of those who worked at both farm and nonfarm work (there were 1,138,000 of them) were salvaging time. The person who was chiefly not a farm worker and earning $23.55 per day at nonfarm work is not likely to forego days at that level of earning in order to do farm work at $15.20 per day. He and the other 437,999 similarly situated nonfarm workers in 1974 were utilizing the opportunity to work on farms when they otherwise might not have been employed. Their relation to farm employment was basically not different from that of students, housewives, retirees, or those whose chief activity was unemployment. Viewed in this manner, the ratio of "salvagers" to "professionals" in farm labor is almost 8:1. The earning rates of these participants in farm wagework reflect their varying degree of attachment to the industry. In 1974, those whose chief activity was farm wage-

TABLE 5

HOURLY FARM WAGE RATES WITHOUT BOARD OR ROOM, BY REGION[10]

	Census Divisions										Agricultural as a Percent of Industrial Wage Rates*
Year	NE	MA	ENC	WNC	SA	ESC	WSC	M	P	US	
1955	1.03	0.98	1.01	0.99	0.62	0.54	0.68	0.95	1.09	0.82	48
1960	1.16	1.11	1.08	1.08	0.72	0.62	0.76	1.06	1.23	0.97	46
1965	1.33	1.26	1.21	1.22	0.87	0.79	0.93	1.22	1.41	1.14	47
1970	1.83	1.74	1.72	1.66	1.38	1.36	1.37	1.59	1.90	1.64	51
1971	1.91	1.82	1.81	1.77	1.43	1.43	1.47	1.68	1.96	1.73	50
1972	2.02	1.90	1.90	1.87	1.53	1.56	1.56	1.80	2.06	1.84	50

	Standard Federal Regions											Agricultural as a Percent of Industrial Wage Rates*
Year	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	US	
1973	2.11	2.04	1.73	1.56	1.99	1.61	1.97	2.02	1.98	2.07	1.90	48
1974†	2.30	2.45	2.39	1.99	2.24	2.00	2.36	2.36	2.56	2.41	2.32	55
1975†	2.51	2.62	2.43	2.18	2.48	2.08	2.37	2.46	2.71	2.72	2.45	54

SOURCE: U.S. Crop Reporting Board, Statistical Reporting Service, *Farm Labor*; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics* and *Monthly Labor Review*.

* Production workers on private nonagricultural payrolls.

† 1974 and 1975 data are "workers paid by hour receiving cash wages only."

work earned an average of $18 per day at farm work; those who were chiefly nonfarm workers earned an average of $15.25 at farm work; those chiefly not in the labor force earned an average of $12.75 per day in farm work.

HOURLY WAGE RATES FOR HIRED FARM WORKERS

Hourly wage rates for hired farm workers (table 5) further reflect the salvage nature of the farm labor market. During the 1955–75 period, hourly wage rates for hired farm workers averaged about one-half of U.S. industrial wage rates. In the

10. In 1973, the Statistical Reporting Service changed the organization of reported regions from census divisions to standard federal regions. The regions are as follows:

Census Divisions—N.E. (*New England*): Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; M.A. (*Middle Atlantic*): New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania; E.N.C. (*East North Central*): Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin; W.N.C. (*West North Central*): Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; S.A. (*South Atlantic*): Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida; E.S.C. (*East South Central*): Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi; W.S.C. (*West South Central*): Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; M. (*Mountain*): Colorado, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho; P. (*Pacific*): Washington, Oregon, California.

Standard Federal Regions—I: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; II: New York, New Jersey; III: Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia; IV: North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida; V: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota; VI: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico; VII: Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska; VIII: North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado, Montana, Utah, Wyoming; IX: Arizona, California, Nevada; X: Washington, Oregon, Idaho.

prosperous agricultural years of 1974 and 1975, farm wage rates gained in relation to nonfarm wages, but still were only 55 and 54 percent, respectively, of average industrial rates. Evidence on labor force participation, daily and annual earnings, and hourly wage rates all link to illustrate the dominant characteristic of the hired farm labor market; it is an open access, casual market for the salvage of low opportunity cost time. If neoclassical economic theory is at all applicable to farm labor markets, then hired farm labor must also be low-productivity effort.

As indicated by data presented in table 5, there is considerable regional variation in hourly wage rates for hired farm workers. Traditionally, wages in the southern United States have been relatively low while those in the western regions have been at the top. In 1975, hourly wage rates for hired farm workers in the West were almost one-third above the average in the South. This differential reflects regional divergences in the structure and organization of commercial agriculture as well as the composition and functioning of markets for hired farm labor.

Although the southern region has remained at the bottom in terms of wage rates for hired farm workers, the gap between southern states and the rest of the nation has declined during the last two decades. California farm wage rates have been the highest in the continental United States, but the differential between California and U.S. averages has decreased from 32 percent in 1955 to 11 percent in 1975. Factors contributing to narrowing regional differentials might include rapid economic growth in the South, increased productivity of farm workers nationwide, minimum wage legislation, and movements toward federally-standardized income support programs.

MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION AND FARM LABOR

Governmental determination of minimum wage rates through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has had a prominent role in the history of American industrial relations. But agricultural employees were excluded from coverage under FLSA until 1967, although a few states included hired farm workers under state minimim wage statutes. Under the 1966 amendments to FLSA, minimum wage protection was extended to previously exempt irrigation workers and to some previously exempt hired farm workers. Minimum hourly wage rates for covered farm workers were $1.00 in 1967, $1.15 in 1968, and $1.30 in 1969.

In 1974, FLSA was amended to bring agricultural minimum wages up to general industry levels by 1978. These rates are as follows (table 6).

Federal minimum wage legislation applies only to larger farms, most of which already pay in excess of the applicable minimum. Agricultural employees who work for employers who used more than 500 man-days of agricultural labor during any calendar quarter of the preceding year are covered. Certain categories of farm workers, such as the employer's family and some piece-rate workers, are exempt from coverage even if they are employed on farms that meet the 500 man-day requirement. Full-time students can be paid no less than 85 percent of the minimum wage rate otherwise applicable.

TABLE 6

FEDERAL MINIMUM HOURLY WAGE RATES

	Effective Date				
Minimum Wage Rates ($)	May 1 1971	Jan. 1 1975	Jan. 1 1976	Jan. 1 1977	Jan. 1 1978
General agricultural	1.60	1.80	2.00	2.20	2.30
Full-time student, agricultural	1.36	1.53	1.70	1.87	1.96
General industry	2.00	2.10	2.30	2.30	2.30

According to special studies conducted for the Department of Labor by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Enumerative Survey, approximately 2 percent of all farms met this man-day requirement in 1967 and 1968.[11] These covered farms employed 35 percent of all hired farm workers in 1967 and 45 percent of all hired farm workers in 1968. Trends toward increasing farm size have probably resulted in higher proportions of covered farms and farm workers since the 1968 survey.

Several states have minimum wage coverage of hired farm workers. In most of these states, minimum wages are the same as specified by FLSA. The major effect of these state statutes is that many extend coverage to hired farm workers who work for employers not meeting the federal 500 man-day criterion. For example, California law specifies that farms having 5 or more hired farm workers at any time during the calendar year qualify for coverage.

Economic theory predicts that minimum wage rates will reduce employment, and workers who remain employed in affected markets will receive increased wages. Several attempts have been made to estimate the impact of minimum wage legislation on agricultural wage rates and employment. There is considerable divergence in the conclusions of these impact studies. For example, the previously-mentioned Department of Labor study concluded that the $1.00 minimum first applied in 1967 caused wages to rise without noticeably accelerating the decline in agricultural employment. In a later econometric study, Bruce Gardner concurred with the Department of Labor on wage effects, but disagreed on employment impact: "[P]oint estimates of the minimum wage variables imply that the 1967 extended minimum wage coverage raised the farm wage rate about 13 percent and that hired farm employment was reduced by about 18 percent from what it would otherwise have been."[12]

Limited research evidence available suggests that minimum wage legislation has probably exerted the dual effects of raising wages for some low-wage farm workers, while causing some low-productivity workers

11. *Hired Farmworkers, a Study of the Effects of the $1.15 Minimum Wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act* (Washington, D.C: U.S., Department of Labor, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division, 1969).

12. Bruce Gardner, "Minimum Wages and the Farm Labor Market," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 54, no. 3 (August 1972), p. 475.

to be displaced from farm employment. The precise magnitude and significance of these impacts remain moot issues.

At present and future levels of minimum wages for farm labor, it is clear that the major effect of FLSA will be in the low-wage areas of the nation, particularly the southern states. By comparing regional hourly wage rates for hired farm workers (table 5) with legislated minimum wage levels, it is clear that the *average* farm wage level is above the present statutory minimum in all regions.

In regions with low wages, most workers are employed on small farms and therefore will not be covered. The Department of Labor estimated in 1968 that only one-third of the farmworkers in the South were employed on farms that were large enough to be covered by FLSA minimum wage provisions. Conversely, 55 percent of all covered workers in 1968 were in the West, where average wage rates were and continue to be considerably higher than legislated minima. For example, California farming operations tend toward large-scale and therefore experience a high percentage of FLSA coverage, but average wage rates in 1975 were $.43 above the legal minimum established for 1978. Consequently, the impact of present federal legislation upon farm wages is not likely to be great, although it may have significant effects in limited instances of low-wage workers employed on large farms where state laws do not apply.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR FARM WORKERS

The Federal Unemployment Insurance Law of 1935 excluded farm work on the avowed grounds that it was not administratively feasible to apply the tax to farm employment and that seasonality of agricultural employment would threaten solvency. During the last 20 years, several unsuccessful attempts have been made to bring farm workers into the program. The Senate approved such a change in 1970, but the Senate-House Conference rejected it. In 1973, the Nixon administration proposed that coverage be extended to agricultural employers with four or more workers in each of 20 or more weeks or a $5,000 payroll in any calendar quarter. The House Subcommittee on Unemployment Compensation in 1975 held extensive hearings on several coverage proposals. These hearings eventually produced H. R. 10210, sponsored by Corman (D-Calif.), Steiger (R-Wis.), and others. The Ways and Means Committee reported this bill to the House in December 1975. At the time of this writing (May 1976), House consideration of H. R. 10210 is underway.

In a related development on the federal scene, the 93rd Congress approved a bill providing special unemployment insurance benefits at no cost to the states through December 31, 1975, to many workers not previously covered, including farm workers, domestics, and employees of state and local governments. This recession-generated program, called Special Unemployment Insurance, was later extended through March 1977. A few agricultural workers have been among the 900,000 recipients under this program.

Farm workers are covered under state unemployment compensation in Hawaii, Minnesota, Puerto Rico, District of Columbia, and California (since January 1, 1976). Other states have generally left agricultural employment uncovered, although sev-

eral allow voluntary participation by employers.

IMPACT OF EXTENDING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TO FARM WORKERS

After the failure in 1970 to extend unemployment insurance coverage to agricultural employees, Congress mandated the Department of Labor to undertake a study on the effect and impact of extending unemployment insurance to farm workers. The result was a regional research project in 12 northeastern states plus Ohio, Florida, and Texas.[13] Three additional studies were conducted by the state employment security agencies of Washington, Minnesota, and California.

These studies sampled worker and employer payroll experience and were based upon the 4-worker/20-week criterion mentioned previously. Highlight findings are summarized in table 7. Column 1 indicates that the largest number of covered employees would be in California, Florida, and Texas. Percentages of total farm employment covered (column 2) would vary from 93 to 33. Column 3 shows the benefits which covered farm workers would receive as a percentage of the wages on which farm employers would pay taxes. All states have ceilings on maximum tax rates to be paid by an employer, listed in column 4. Finally, column 5 indicates that farm employment is a small part of total employment and therefore would have only a minor effect on the state average tax rate.

This study sheds light on a major concern about extending unemployment insurance to farm workers. This concern is high benefit costs and high taxes. As shown in column 3, table 7, in most of the states studied, average farm cost was below the state's maximum tax. For the 48 contiguous states, average cost rates were estimated in a later study to be 3.3 percent of total agricultural payrolls.[14] These results indicate that, from the viewpoint of cost, it should be feasible to extend unemployment insurance to agriculture. Although the average benefit cost rate for agriculture is high in most states, it is not as high as for other seasonal industries such as construction.

Evidence available suggests that unemployment insurance for farm workers would not be prohibitively costly nor would it effect major disruptions in labor markets. Benefit cost levels for agriculture would be relatively high, but no worse than many presently-covered industries. Some workers would choose unemployment benefits over farm work and particular crops or geographic regions might be adversely affected, but in the aggregate a significant decline in farm labor supply is unlikely.

There appears to be little justification for continued exclusion of agricultural employees from unemployment insurance and the income security it guarantees other workers.

13. W. W. Bauder et al., *Impact of Extension of Unemployment Insurance to Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: Report submitted to the U.S. Department of Labor, 1972). The 15 states included in this report were: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.

14. Joachim Elterich and Richard Bieker, "Cost Rates of Extending Unemployment Insurance to Agricultural Employment," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 57, no. 2 (May 1975).

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED IMPACT OF EXTENSION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE TO FARM WORKERS, CALENDAR YEAR 1969*

STATE	COVERED EMPLOYMENT NUMBER (1)	COVERED EMPLOYMENT PERCENT OF TOTAL FARM EMPLOYMENT (2)	FARM COST RATE† (3)	MAXIMUM U.I. TAX RATE‡ (4)	TAXABLE FARM WAGES AS A PERCENT OF ALL TAXABLE WAGES§ (5)
California	216,000	86	7.6	3.7	1.6
Connecticut	5,916	83	7.4	2.7	.3
Delaware	1,718	73	4.2	4.5	.5
Florida	58,667	93	3.1	4.5	2.4
Maine	4,123	67	2.3	3.7	1.1
Maryland	4,122	56	2.5	4.2	.3
Massachusetts	3,951	76	3.0	4.1	.1
Minnesota	3,600	34	2.4	4.5	.2
New Hampshire	761	57	3.2	4.3	.2
New Jersey	8,967	82	6.9	4.2	.2
New York	15,626	60	1.9	4.2	.1
Ohio	10,712	61	3.4	4.7	.2
Pennsylvania	13,387	63	2.2	4.0	.2
Rhode Island	366	71	8.4	4.0	.1
Texas	36,427	53	3.8	2.7	2.4
Vermont	852	33	1.0	4.4	.4
Washington	19,437	72	4.3	2.7	.8
West Virginia	1,657	52	1.2	3.3	.2

SOURCE: W. W. Bauder et al., *Impact of Extension of Unemployment Insurance to Agriculture*, Report submitted to the U.S. Department of Labor (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1972), and special studies conducted by the state unemployment insurance agencies of California, Minnesota, and Washington.

* Farms with four or more workers in each of 20 weeks or with a quarterly payroll of $5,000.

† Cost rate = benefit payments as percent of taxable payrolls.

‡ The tax rate in effect at the time of the study.

§ Estimates based on coverage of four workers or more in 20 weeks, but without the additional provision of $5,000 in quarterly wages.

A corollary benefit of extending unemployment insurance to farm workers would be to put them in touch with other available but often unknown forms of aid and employment. An unemployed farm worker who files for benefits will have better access to programs and opportunities of which he might otherwise be unaware.

UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

"Agricultural laborers," not defined, were excluded from the National Labor Relations Act (1935, NLRA). In the Senate committee, their exclusion was said to be for "administrative" reasons; in the House committee, it was described as being only temporary. However described or excused, the legislative record was sparse on this point and did not establish that exclusion, as a class, was other than arbitrary, discriminatory, possibly unconstitutional, and a political casualty. Whatever else, it was unequal treatment under the law.

In following decades, attempts were made occasionally to amend

NLRA and strike out this exclusion. In the absence of effective organizations of farm laborers, these efforts were carried vicariously—by sympathetic churchmen, liberal civic groups, the AFL-CIO and unaffiliated national unions, and a few prolabor legislators, the latter beginning with Senator Robert LaFollette. Whenever such efforts seemed to be getting serious, they were opposed by organized farmers, but not including National Farmers Union and National Farm Organization.

Collective bargaining by hired farm workers is rare. Although there have been several short-lived efforts elsewhere to unionize farm workers, many involving strikes, only on the large industrialized farms of California and Hawaii has the movement attained prominence and endurance. These states are exceptional in that they have labor-management relations laws covering farm workers. That farm unionization and labor laws are coincidental in these two states does not mean that if laws are enacted to protect it, unionization will follow. In both states, some degree of power to organize pre-existed, and legislative reactions were more concerned with monitoring exercise of power than with conferring it. Neither state governments nor the federal are noted for conferring power upon the powerless in the name of justice and equity. Governmental intervention into this area holds protections for both employers and workers. Hence it is only when union power emerges or threatens that employers withdraw opposition to such legislation sufficiently to allow it minimum political support.

Unionization does not normally occur unless cohesiveness and articulation are already developed or show promise of development. These attributes, in turn, depend upon a broadly shared community of continuing interests and channels for their communication. Among nonprofessional workers, the development of these attributes does not readily occur without physical compaction at the work site. Even though the requisite conditions come into being, the recent history of unionization does not suggest that indigenously initiated organization is likely; rather, with favorable conditions in place, outside organizers may become impressed with their possibilities. Accordingly, unionization of farm workers in California and Hawaii depended heavily upon nonfarm union initiative, including, among others, the longshore and teamster unions as well as AFL-CIO. Rational decision-making by established labor organizations as to where to allocate organizational resources does not much more rest on sentiment than does assessment of product markets by business corporations.

Viewed through these perspectives, the unlikelihood of broad-scale unionization of American hired farm workers seems apparent. The bulk of them lack the shared interests, the long-range attachments, the compactness, and opportunities for communication that offer a rewarding field for organizational investment. Without radical and unforeseen changes in enterprise structure, collective determination in agricultural employment will apparently continue to be more exceptional than dominant. Nevertheless, if unionization attains strength and endurance in the exceptional locations that are favorable to it, the terms and conditions established there through collective bargaining are likely to have propensity for proliferation into non-bargaining

regions. Moreover, an organized component—even though a small fraction of the total—could well become politically influential in respect to laws and programs affecting all farm workers.

CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD FARM LABOR

Although agriculture is moving from a structure of traditional family farming toward an industrial enterprise system (particularly in the West), the farm labor market has not developed structure and regimen similar to that observed in nonfarm labor markets. The aggregate of all persons who do some farm wagework is extremely heterogeneous, and the market for hired farm labor is characterized by casual employment relationships. Recent evidence suggests that the farm labor force has become somewhat more stable in composition and residence, but farm employment continues to be dominated by uncertain employer-employee relations and part-time workers seeking salvage of low opportunity cost time.

Recent developments, such as extension of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 to agriculture and movements to include farm work under employment insurance reflect a shift in attitude toward agriculture and that farm workers are likely to receive increasing federal protection on a basis equal to that afforded nonfarm workers. While minimum wage legislation is unlikely to exert major economic impact, the fact that statutory rates for agriculture will be the same under FLSA as for general industry by 1978 holds important implications for public policy. This move toward standardized treatment indicates that agriculture is losing its special and exempt status under federal legislation. Continuation and amplification of this shift in posture hold important considerations for other policy matters, such as collective bargaining, fair labor practices, and workmen's compensation.

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The Rural Aged

By E. GRANT YOUMANS

ABSTRACT: Available data suggest that the rural aged, compared with urban older people, have substantially smaller incomes, are restricted in mobility because of inadequate transportation facilities, report poorer physical health, and reveal a more negative outlook on life. Evidence suggests that the industrialization of rural communities may have a negative impact upon the rural elderly. Periodic longitudinal studies of rural older persons in strategic locations of the nation are needed to provide guidance for programs and services.

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IN RECENT decades, public attention has been directed to the conditions of life of older people in American society. Awareness of these conditions has been augmented by the increasing number and proportion of the aged in the population and their consequent greater visibility to the rest of society. In 1850 about 3 percent of the population was aged 65 and over; 100 years later, it was 8 percent; and in 1975 persons aged 65 and over constituted 10 percent of the population, representing 9.2 million men and 13.1 million women. It is estimated that the present percentage will increase slightly during the remainder of this century, but the absolute numbers of persons aged 65 and over will increase to 40.6 million by the year 2000. Slight improvements in mortality are anticipated. Average life expectancy at birth is predicted to increase to 69.9 for men and 78.0 for women by the year 2020.[1]

The U.S. Bureau of the Census reported 5,431,906 persons aged 65 and over as living in rural areas of the nation in 1970. Of these, 4,533,714 were rural nonfarm and 898,192 lived on farms. In the rural nonfarm population, the females exceeded the males in number, but in the rural-farm population there were more older men than older women.[2] Demographic data indicate a growing concentration of aged persons in small towns of the United States. This increase is partially explained by the out-migration of young people and the in-migration of retired farmers from the open country and elderly people from urban centers.[3]

The growing attention to problems of the elderly has been accompanied by an enormous volume of literature about aging. During the first half of the century (1900–1948), about 18,000 publications on aging were reported,[4] but in the 12 years following, over 34,000 publications appeared.[5] It is reasonable to assume that research on a topic of such vital concern as human aging will continue to expand.

In such a rapidly growing research field, there has been a notable defect—the limited number of studies of older persons living in rural environments in the United States. Yet such a deficiency is not too surprising. It is characteristic of American society that new fields of inquiry emerge in urban centers and then gradually spread to rural areas. Social gerontology, a late arrival to the disciplines concerned with aging, has followed this pattern. Almost all social gerontologists are urban dwellers, and their research efforts have been directed mainly to studies of human aging in city environments.

The objective of this chapter is to present information on the objective

1. *Interchange*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., January 1976).

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1970: Detailed Characteristics*, Final Report PC(1)-D1, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), table 199.

3. Donald O. Cowgill, "The Demography of Aging in the Midwest," in Arnold M. Rose and Warren A. Peterson, eds., *Older People and Their Social World* (Philadelphia: F.A. Davis, 1965).

4. Nathan W. Shock, *A Classified Bibliography of Gerontology and Geriatrics* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951).

5. Nathan W. Shock, *A Classified Bibliography of Gerontology and Geriatrics, Supplement One, 1949–1955* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957); and *A Classified Bibliography of Gerontology and Geriatrics, Supplement Two, 1956–1961* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963).

and subjective conditions of life of the sizable number of older persons who live in rural areas of the United States. It is recognized that standards for assessing the life of the rural elderly do not exist in either the objective or subjective domain. In the absence of such criteria, it is assumed that comparisons of data on the rural aged with data on the urban aged will be useful.

The observations that follow are organized around selected questions that are assumed to have an important bearing on the lives of the rural aged in the United States. What is the nature of "rurality" in the United States: What are the income levels of the rural aged? Does industrialization of rural areas benefit older people? What is the nature of the social life of the rural elderly? What is the health status of older persons living in rural areas? How adequate is the subjective life of the rural aged? What are the implications of the answers to these questions for older rural Americans?

RURALITY

The status and well-being of any large category of persons is inextricably interrelated with the social, economic, and cultural conditions of the society in which they live. The term "rural" suggests an agricultural economic base, low population density, and relative isolation from large population centers.[6] As a social psychological concept, "rurality" suggests a continuum. At one extreme is a complex of behavior and mental outlook characteristic of what anthropologists call a folk[7] or *gemeinschaft*[8] society. At the other end of the continuum are found the orientations characteristic of contemporary large urban centers. Both types of orientation obtain in any given region, area, village, town, or city, and the degrees of commitment to one or the other pose important problems for the inhabitants.

The traditional or folk type of society and culture places strong emphasis on conventional behavior and conformity to traditions and customs and values strong adherence to kinship control of behavior. Persons living in societies predominantly of the folk type tend to have few interpersonal contacts and such contacts tend to be primary in nature and of long duration and limited to a small geographic area. Sacred and religious beliefs play an important role in the orientations of people in the folk type of society.

In contrast, the modern orientations of contemporary urban life emphasize more individualistic behavior, a rejection of custom and tradition, and weakened kinship control. The typical urbanite engages in many social contacts of a secondary nature and of short duration. In the urban centers, one finds strong adherence to secular values and beliefs and a tendency to reject sacred and religious orientations.

In recent decades, most rural areas in the United States have undergone substantial changes. There has been a notable shift from the older folkway of life to a more modern and technologically advanced type of

6. Robert C. Atchley, *Contemporary Conceptions of "Rural"* (Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation at Miami University, prepublication manuscript, 1976), pp. 1–14.

7. Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 52 (1947), pp. 293–308.

8. Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, *Rural Social Systems* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 784.

society. Trends toward modernization in most rural areas are reflected in increased productivity, fewer farms, and more part-time farming; in more specialized and increasingly efficient agricultural businesses; in more complex social organizations, such as schools, churches, and business enterprises; in improved transportation and communication facilities; and in greater movements of rural people from place to place.[9]

The conflicts between allegiance to the folk or to the modern urbanized type of culture and society pose critical problems for many older Americans who live in small cities, towns, villages, and the open country, or on farms. The older population in these areas, most of whom were born before 1910, undoubtedly internalized orientations toward life that are characteristic of a folk type of society. The young adults, born mostly in the 1950s, tended to adopt a way of life more typical of an industrialized type of society.

The intergenerational differences that ensue are acutely painful for many olders persons. The differences in outlook, the variances in behavior, and the conflicts are especially troublesome to older people who are members of minority groups. These older persons, such as rural black Americans, rural American Indians, and rural Spanish-speaking people, experience the trauma of witnessing the disappearance of the cultural ways that gave meaning and significance to their lives.[10] Rejected, lonely, and out-of-touch with contemporary values and behavior, many of them have little to look forward to and little to live for. They tend to be the forgotten and neglected people passed by in the modernization process.

INCOME

An adequate annual income is probably the most important indicator of the economic well-being of persons at any stage of the life cycle. It is assumed that annual incomes received by men and women living in urban centers of the United States reflect the economic rewards derived from an industrialized society and that such incomes may be used as a standard of comparison.

Data on annual incomes in the United States by age, sex, and place of residence are provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for 1959 and 1969. An examination of these income figures indicates the economic position of various rural age groups in the nation relative to that of urban persons age 14 and over for that decade.

Table 1 places in salient perspective the disadvantaged economic position of the rural aged males relative to that of other male age groups in the nation in 1959 and 1969. Throughout the decade, the annual median incomes of the rural aged males were markedly less than those of all urban males age 14 and over, substantially less than those of all rural nonfarm and farm males age 14 and over, and less than those of urban males age 65 and over.

The relative economic position of

9. Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, *Social Change in Rural Societies* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972).

10. Jerold E. Levy, "The Older American Indian," Olen E. Leonard, "The Older Rural Spanish People of the Southwest," and Stanley H. Smith, "The Older Rural Negro," in E. G. Youmans, ed., *Older Rural Americans* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

TABLE 1

ANNUAL MEDIAN INCOME BY SEX, AGE GROUP, AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1959 AND 1969

	MALE			
	1959		1969	
AGE GROUP AND RESIDENCE	($)	%	($)	%
Urban age 14 and over	4,559	100	6,860	100
Rural nonfarm age 14 and over	3,330	73	5,591	82
Rural farm age 14 and over	2,105	46	4,509	66
Urban age 65 and over	1,961	43	3,188	46
Rural nonfarm age 65 and over	1,351	30	2,205	32
Rural farm age 65 and over	1,417	31	2,514	37
	FEMALE			
Urban age 14 and over	1,606	100	2,514	100
Rural nonfarm age 14 and over	951	59	1,838	73
Rural farm age 14 and over	823	51	1,534	61
Urban age 65 and over	844	53	1,562	62
Rural nonfarm age 65 and over	662	41	1,104	44
Rural farm age 65 and over	632	39	887	35

SOURCE: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population, 1960 and 1970: Detailed Characteristics*, Final Reports PC(1)-D1 and PC(1)-D1, United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962 and 1973), tables 219 and 245.

the rural aged males was fairly constant over the decade. In 1959 and 1969, the respective annual median incomes of rural nonfarm males age 65 and over were $1,351 and $2,205, only 30 and 32 percent, respectively, of that of all urban males age 14 and over. For the rural-farm males age 65 and over, the respective annual median incomes were $1,417 and $2,514, only 31 and 37 percent, respectively, of that of all urban males age 14 and over. The disparity for the urban aged over the decade was not as great; respective annual incomes were $1,961 and $3,188, or 43 and 46 percent of that of all urban males age 14 and over.

The annual median incomes of female age groups in the nation showed trends similar to those for the men from 1959 to 1969. Over the decade, the annual median incomes of the rural aged females were substantially less than those of all urban females age 14 and over, much less than those of all rural nonfarm and farm females age 14 and over, and less than those of urban females age 65 and over (table 1).

The relative economic position of the rural aged women, like that of the rural aged men, was fairly constant over the 10-year period. In 1959 and 1969, the respective annual median incomes of rural nonfarm females age 65 and over were $662 and $1,104, only 41 and 44 percent, respectively, of that of all urban females age 14 and over. For rural farm females age 65 and over, the respective annual median incomes were $632 and $887, only 39 and 35 percent, respectively, of that of all urban females age 14 and over. Again, the income of elderly urban females compared more favorably ($844 and $1,562; 53 and 62 percent respectively) than did that for rural females (table 1).

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Many rural communities in the United States, while retaining characteristics of traditional and folk societies, have undergone considerable industrialization. The Rural Development Act of 1972 was designed to encourage and accelerate economic growth in rural areas of the nation. Implementation of the act involved developing strategies whereby rural communities could attract industrial enterprises. It was assumed that such enterprises, if established in rural areas, would increase employment and services, increase incomes, inject new money into the community, and, in general, improve the quality of life.

Many rural communities have painfully discovered that the expected benefits from industrialization have not been achieved. Preliminary evidence suggests that the process of industrialization in many rural areas of the nation has had a differential impact upon various categories of persons. Some groups in the communities have benefited while other groups have experienced detrimental effects.[11]

A five-year longitudinal study in rural Illinois offers evidence of the negative impact of industrialization upon the economic well-being of the elderly in the area studied.[12] The hypothesis examined in the study was that the "industrial development of small communities is directly associated with a decline in the relative economic status of the elderly residents of the communities." The hypothesis was subjected to empirical tests in what the authors called a "natural experiment." Two communities of comparable social, demographic, and economic characteristics were selected. One community, designated the "experimental" area, had witnessed the construction of a heavily capitalized, ultra-modern cold rolling mill in the five-year period. The second community, used as a "control" area, had not experienced industrial development.

The findings in the study suggest that neither the economically active rural aged nor the retired rural residents of the experimental area benefited from industrial development. The study did not attempt to assess the impact of industrial development upon other aspects of life of the older residents, such as the cost of living, mental and physical health, local tax structure, and community facilities and services.

SOCIAL LIFE

An important indicator of well-being is the freedom and opportunity to interact with persons and groups of one's choice. Many older rural persons are limited in their social activities and an important factor in these restrictions appears to be the lack of adequate transportation facilities.[13] Older rural women apparently are more restricted in social life than older rural men.[14] A

11. Mary Jo Grinstead, Bernal L. Green, and J. Martin Redfern, *Rural Development and Labor Adjustment in the Mississippi Delta and Ozarks of Arkansas* (Fayetteville, Ark.: Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 795, 1975).

12. Frank Clemente and Gene F. Summers, "Industrial Development and the Elderly: A Longitudinal Analysis," *Journal of Gerontology*, vol. 28 (1973), pp. 479–83.

13. Ira Kaye, "Transportation Problems of the Older American" in J. B. Cull and R. E. Hardy, eds., *The Neglected Older American* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1973).

14. Carl V. Patton, "Age Groupings and Travel in a Rural Area," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 40 (1975), pp. 55–63.

low socioeconomic level and retirement are salient factors in the reduced social participation of many older rural men.[15] Further, according to Walter McKain, the present generation of older rural people grew to maturity when the family provided the dominant form of social life.[16] Today, the traditional social function of the family has almost disappeared in many rural areas of the nation, and no satisfactory social organization has been developed to replace it.

A comparative study of older persons living in an urban and a rural environment provides some detailed data on their family relationships, their community participation, and their leisure-time hobbies and pastimes.[17] In both rural and urban areas, proximity was an important factor in the frequency of visits between the older person and his or her children and siblings. The children and siblings of the urban aged were somewhat more widely dispersed than those of the rural elderly; despite this distance factor, urban older persons visited with their children and their siblings more often than did the rural older persons. In addition, the rural older people said they depended more on their children and siblings to initiate visits than did the urban aged. These rural-urban differences in family visiting patterns probably reflected the more limited financial resources of the rural elderly as well as the poorer transportation facilities available in the rural area.

Slight differences were found between older rural and urban persons in the average number of reported community activities (rural 1.5 and urban 1.7). In both areas the most popular community activity was church related, and for the great majority this was the only activity reported. A greater proportion of the urban than rural aged took part in service and welfare organizations, in social clubs and lodges, and in Golden Age clubs. As might be expected, a larger proportion of the rural aged were members of farm organizations. Informal social activities played a slightly more important role in the lives of the older rural persons and a greater proportion of the rural than of the urban elderly said they knew people in the community well, offered help to their friends and neighbors, and visited with friends and neighbors.[18]

Older rural persons engaged in slightly fewer hobbies and pastimes than did the older urban persons (average number 2.5 and 2.7, respectively). A slightly larger proportion of rural older persons engaged in fishing and hunting, while a larger proportion of urban aged engaged in playing cards, woodwork and crafts, dancing, and collecting. More than one-fourth of the persons in the study said they would like to take part in more activities, but there was little difference between the rural and the urban older persons in this desire. A slightly larger proportion of the rural than urban aged said that their lives could be more useful and that time was a burden.[19]

15. Philip Taietz and Olaf F. Larson, "Social Participation and Old Age," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 21 (1956), pp. 229–38.

16. Walter C. McKain, Jr., "Community Roles and Activities of Older Rural Persons," in E. G. Youmans, ed., *Older Rural Americans* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

17. E. Grant Youmans, *Aging Patterns in a Rural and an Urban Area of Kentucky* (Lexington, Ky.: Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 681, 1963). In 1959, data were collected from 1,236 men and women age 60 and over, half of whom lived in a metropolitan center and half in a rural county of Kentucky.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

HEALTH

It is commonly believed that rural living in the United States offers distinct health benefits to older people. It is alleged that the rural elderly enjoy the advantages of abundant fresh air and sunshine, out-of-doors activities, a slower-paced lifestyle, and strong emotional support of close family and friends. It appears that such an idyllic picture of rural America is the product of popular writers. Careful studies do not substantiate the pastoral fantasy that glorifies rural communities as a paradise for older persons.[20]

Two studies in Kentucky offer systematic data on the comparative health status of rural and urban older persons. In both studies, each person interviewed was asked if he or she had any ailments or health conditions that bothered the respondent either all the time or periodically. Those who answered "yes" were then asked to name the ailments or health conditions. In the 1959 study, 74 percent of the rural aged reported one or more ailments, compared with 61 percent for the urban aged; the rural older persons reported a higher prevalence of arthritis and rheumatism, high blood pressure, urological difficulties, and ailments of the respiratory system.[21]

In the 1971 study, responses to the question on physical health were placed in eight substantive categories.[22] On seven of these categories, the older rural men and women reported a greater proportion of ailments than did the urban aged; the rural elderly reported double the proportion of persons afflicted with cardiovascular difficulties and slightly greater proportions having respiratory, sense organs, endocrine, urinary, and psychiatric problems.

Available data on self-reported health ratings provide some clues about the health of rural and urban older men. Rural older men consistently rated their health as poorer than did the older urban men. Only 15 percent of the rural elderly men rated their health as "good," compared with 47 percent for the older urban men. Of the rural aged men, 75 percent said their health was worse than at age 50, compared with only 51 percent of the urban older men; 56 percent of the aged rural men said they had serious health problems, but only 24 percent of the urban aged men made such a statement; and 76 percent of the rural aged men compared with only 40 percent of the urban older men reported that their health conditions had obliged them to cut down on their activities.[23]

The comparatively poorer health of older rural persons undoubtedly reflects a variety of social and economic conditions. Among these are the characteristically lower economic and educational levels of the rural people which inhibits their benefiting from health programs and knowledge. In addition, in the United States, the distribution of medical and health care services has favored urban locations, as is evidenced by the concentration of

20. Walter C. McKain, Jr., "Aging and Rural Life," in W. Donahue and C. Tibbits, eds., *The New Frontiers of Aging* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957).

21. E. Grant Youmans, *Aging Patterns in a Rural and an Urban Area of Kentucky*.

22. E. Grant Youmans, "Age Group, Health, and Attitudes," *The Gerontologist*, vol. 14 (1974), pp. 249–54. The older persons studied were age 60 and over.

23. E. Grant Youmans, "Health Orientations of Older Rural and Urban Men," *Geriatrics*, vol. 22 (1967), pp. 139–47. The younger men were age 60 to 64 and the older men age 75 and over.

research centers, clinics, medical specialists, dentists, and various ancillary medical personnel in the more populated areas of the nation.[24]

SUBJECTIVE LIFE

For most persons, old age brings limitations of one kind or another. The cumulative effect of these decrements tends to have a negative impact upon the subjective life of many older persons. Each person has within his life-span a potential for developing a positive outlook, depending on a variety of biological, psychological, and sociological forces influencing his behavior. Available evidence suggests that rural environments have less potential than urban settings for producing a favorable mental outlook among older people.

A study of value orientations offers some clues about the subjective life of older rural and urban persons.[25] In a Kentucky study, nine scales were used to assess orientations toward selected values in American society, such as authoritarianism, religion, achievement, dependency, and pessimism. Respondents in the rural and urban samples agreed or disagreed with three statements on each scale. Responses to the statements indicated that the rural older people tended to have a more negative outlook on life than did the urban older people. The rural aged were also more authoritarian in viewpoint, more fundamentalistic in religious outlook, less motivated toward achievement, evidenced a greater dependency on government, and revealed greater hopelessness and despair.

An attitudinal study of rural and urban older persons revealed findings similar to the previous report on values.[26] In this study each person in the rural and urban samples responded to 72 agree-disagree statements constituting 24 attitude scales about economic well-being, self-image, morale, community life, family relationships, and general outlook. Comparison of mean scores on the 24 attitude scales yielded 17 statistically significant differences between the older rural and urban persons studied; of these, the urban aged scored more favorably than the rural elderly on 12, and the rural aged scored more favorably than urban older persons on 5, resulting in an overall ratio favoring the urban aged of 2.4 to 1.

The findings of the study indicated that the rural elderly, compared with the urban aged, worried more about their financial conditions, revealed less satisfaction with their housing, and maintained they had greater need for more money; revealed a more negative view of themselves and a poorer self-evaluation of their health; found their lives more dreary and were more concerned about their inability to lead useful lives; rated their communities less favorably in terms of visiting patterns, neighborliness, and gen-

24. Bert L. Ellenbogen, "Health Status of the Rural Aged," in E. G. Youmans, ed., *Older Rural Americans* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

25. E. Grant Youmans, "Perspectives on the Older American in a Rural Setting," in J. B. Cull and R. E. Hardy, eds., *The Neglected Older American* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1973).

26. These findings are based on a survey this author conducted in 1971 of 803 persons age 20 and over living in a metropolitan center and a rural county of Kentucky. Aged persons were age 60 and over. The study was carried out jointly by the Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station, Lexington, Ky.

eral benefits; and reported greater alienation and more worry.[27]

In contrast, the rural aged, compared with the urban aged, revealed a greater sense of general happiness, greater family pride, stronger family support, and stronger feelings of personal gratification, as well as giving more favorable ratings to their neighborhoods as places in which to live.[28]

IMPLICATIONS

The disadvantaged position of older persons in urban environments in the United States has been previously documented.[29] Older persons in rural environments of the nation appear to be even more disadvantaged. Available information suggests that many rural older persons have extremely small incomes, inadequate means of transportation, a restricted social life, and poor physical and mental health. Many suffer from triple jeopardy: they are old, poor, and isolated in communities lacking organizations to serve the aged.[30]

The conditions of life of rural older persons in the United States strongly suggest the need for research and application in nonmetropolitan gerontology. Reliable information is needed on all aspects of life of older persons living in smaller cities, towns, villages, the open country, and on farms. Of special importance is the need for regional comparisons and for careful longitudinal studies conducted at strategic locations. Periodic assessments at these locations could provide public and private agencies with reliable data on demographic and migratory trends; on income, employment, housing, taxation, transportation facilities, and the industrialization process; on physical and mental health and nutritional levels; and on public safety, crime, social welfare, family and community life, and recreational and leisure-time facilities.

A feasible organizational structure to serve the interests of the rural and nonmetro aged is the concept of the Area Agency on Aging as outlined in the 1973 amendments to the Older Americans Act.[31] Such a client-centered agency could serve as an advocate of the interests of older persons, as a planner and coordinator of services for the aged without actually providing services, and as a catalyst and innovator in finding and pooling untapped resources and information needed for comprehensive programs and services for the older people.

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Mathilda W. Riley and Anne Foner, *Aging and Society*, vol. 1: *An Inventory of Research Findings* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968).
30. *Triple Jeopardy: Myth or Reality* (Washington, D.C.: National Council on the Aging, 1972).
31. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Social Statistics for the Elderly, Area Level System, Stage 1, Omaha (Washington, D.C., 1975).

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Farmer Cooperatives

By RANDALL E. TORGERSON

ABSTRACT: Farmer cooperatives are voluntarily owned business organizations controlled by their member patrons and operated for and by them on a nonprofit or cost basis. These organizations are an integral part of the economic organization of agriculture. They are organizational tools that enable farm families to have access to markets and achieve a degree of marketing power so that farmers can compete and survive in an increasingly concentrated food and fiber economy. Cooperatives also represent an alternative organizational form to carry out business activities and are distinguished from other types of businesses because they represent economic democracy in action. Growth in their use, as a dimension of market structure, has been limited by the prevailing school of thought on cooperation in the U.S. A conflict exists between cooperatives' perceived role in this school and the hard realities of fundamental changes in market structure. Expanded use of cooperatives is also influenced by the external environment, such as the legal climate for growth, sources of finance, and public attitude toward collective action by farmers in an era of a close balance between supply and demand for food and relatively higher food prices. The ultimate measure of cooperative success, however, is performance in enhancing the economic well-being of members and rural communities.

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COOPERATIVES are, in practice and theory, an off-farm extension of the farm firm, an integral part of the farming enterprise that allows farm operators to extend themselves vertically to one or more stages in the marketing channel. The premise for cooperation lies primarily in the structural relationship of farm operators, characteristically atomistic in nature (many in number and relatively small in size), compared to those with whom they buy and sell (few in number and relatively large in size). Without ability to organize, farmers are powerless to deal with firms that are increasingly characterized by fewer numbers, larger market shares, more diversification in product lines, and greater vertical integration of operations. The changing market structure of agriculture, a prime motivator in early organizing efforts associated with the emergence of commercial agriculture, remains today the underlying rationale for cooperative efforts by farm operators.

Farmers also organized because services were not available to them in their rural communities or because those services were not available at reasonable costs. A broader social purpose was embraced in early organizing efforts—popularly called the "cooperative movement"—to improve one's individual position, community, and the competitiveness of the capitalistic economic order through self-help organizational activity based on democratic principles. Each of these ingredients is very much a part of the fabric of cooperative organizations today and can be expected to continue in the future.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES AFFECTING COOPERATIVES

As concentration continues in the industrial organization that comprises our political economy, the food and fiber production sector finds itself affected by and engulfed in some of the same forces that are leading to structural change in nonfarm industry. Vertical coordination, for example, has proceeded to such an extent in some commodity sectors that farmers without a contract or cooperative through which to market simply have no market outlet, especially in years of heavy production. Farmers in California, for example, are often motivated more by simply having a home for their production—through their cooperatives—than by a primary concern with price.

Changing marketing patterns, furthermore, have eroded the viability of traditional pricing mechanisms for raw farm products. Open assembly markets for farmers in some commodities have even ceased to exist. This situation prevails in most processed fruit and vegetable markets and in dairy, poultry, and livestock subsectors in certain parts of the country. Creditors, an important determinant of direction in the economic organization of agriculture, are typically reluctant to extend production credit unless producers have a guaranteed market for their products. The net result of vertical arrangements has been a more fragmented marketplace in which value determination and price discovery are complicated by a variety of direct sales arrangements and formulas.

Like vertical coordination, horizontal growth in the food industry—motivated by economies of size and new technological advances in processing, handling, and transportation—has expanded trade territory and supply requirements of food and fiber firms. In order to meet these large supply demands, farmers have had to organize more broadly,

primarily through merger of local cooperatives, acquisition, and internal growth, on a market-wide scale. Organization on a regional basis by dairy farmers to supply the requirements of 500,000 quarts-per-day distribution plants serving a multi-state area typifies this development.

Similarly, noncooperative firms have organized on a conglomerate basis through a merger explosion in the 1950s–1970s. This typically involves firms in several industries and has given them more stabilized earnings potential as well as tremendous strength derived from their diversified character. Earnings from one business endeavor can easily be plowed into expanded growth in another industry. Or assets of an acquired company can be stripped and the company sold in a financially deteriorated state. To compete with diversified agribusiness firms, cooperatives have felt some compulsion to diversify themselves rather than risk the trauma of low earnings in one commodity or supply field due to an off year. However, cooperatives by their nature, as well as by public policy constraints, are limited to engagement in only member-related activities. Diversified growth, to the extent that it has occurred among cooperatives, has therefore been limited to combinations of various product marketing or service functions which were oriented to needs of members.

The gravity of these currents of changing market structure weigh heavily upon farmers, especially in assessing the adequacy of their marketing tools to fend for them. Similarly, it is generally important to the public that an appropriate power balance is maintained between agricultural producers and processor-handlers in a time when increasing contracting and other means of internalized vertical coordination are replacing open markets as a means of establishing prices and other terms of trade. Balanced marketing power is highly important to the preservation of a competitive framework for agricultural transactions, as well as for the retention of a dispersed form of ownership in agricultural production.

Farm operators have met these challenges by developing countervailing power through strongly financed and well-structured cooperatives and bargaining associations that have been able to meet competition on a more nearly equal basis. Strong local associations have been developed that meet farmers' needs along with a system of regional cooperatives that support the local associations. Cooperatives have come of age in the past decade in their capacity to serve farmers' and ranchers' needs for farm supplies, credit, marketing, and related services. Capability to meet these needs was not possible until cooperatives developed into large-scale efficient operations with a high degree of sophistication.

Despite organizational adjustments by producers, the pace of structural change in the nonfarm sector is proceeding at a rate that challenges, and sometimes exceeds, farmers' willingness and financial ability to organize in an effort to countervail it.

MEMBERSHIP, BUSINESS VOLUME, AND MARKET SHARE TRENDS

Since the close of World War II, cooperatives have made slight gains in their share of marketing and purchasing activity. Aggregate memberships have decreased about 1 million since 1950, along with a diminishing total farm population from which to draw membership. Business volume

TABLE 1

COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP, BUSINESS VOLUME, AND MARKET SHARE STATISTICS FOR SELECT YEARS[1]

YEAR	AGGREGATE MEMBERSHIPS (MILLION)	AGGREGATE BUSINESS VOLUME NET (BILLION $)	AGGREGATE MARKET SHARE, MKTG. & SUPP. (%)
1950	7.1	8.1	20.9
1955	7.7	9.8	23.9
1960	7.2	12.4	26.0
1965	6.8	15.6	28.3
1970	6.2	20.6	26.8
1975 (est.)	6.1	37.8	30.1

has increased over 400 percent in the same time period to nearly $38 billion in net volume as shown in table 1. This figure is put in perspective when one considers that the combined net business volume of the 7,800 farmer cooperatives in the U.S.A. in 1975 was not even equal to the $44 billion business volume in 1975 of Exxon, the country's largest industrial corporation.

The aggregate market share of net cooperative business, before adjustments for value added, increased from almost 21 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in 1975. The volume of farm marketings handled by cooperatives experienced the most rapid growth from 23 to 34 percent in this time period, as shown in table 2.

TABLE 2

MARKET SHARES REPRESENTED BY COOPERATIVES OF TOTAL FARM MARKETING AND FARM SUPPLY ACQUISITIONS FOR SELECTED YEARS (%)

YEAR	MARKET SHARE (MARKETING)	MARKET SHARE (FARM SUPPLY)
1950	22.7	16.0
1955	26.1	17.9
1960	29.1	18.3
1965	31.8	19.5
1970	30.6	18.5
1975 (est.)	34.1	20.8

Farm supply business, in contrast, increased from 16 to 20 percent from 1950 to 1975.

While these aggregate figures suggest progress by cooperatives, individual commodity statistics provide a rather sobering picture. In those subsectors representing the major value of off-farm sales, such as grain, poultry, and livestock, cooperatives have been just holding their own or have experienced decreasing market shares. In contrast, farmers have increased their use of cooperatives in the dairy and specialty crop subsectors over the same time period. The importance of these developments must be evaluated against the backdrop of nonfarm entry into farm production and vertically coordinated arrangements used by food marketing firms that tend to displace farmers and limit their marketing opportunities. In short, there are many farm commodity subsectors and areas of the country in which cooperatives are not well organized and suffer from low market shares and weak market penetration. To the extent that vertical organization continues in agriculture, farm operators will face problems of access to markets and

1. Farmer Cooperative Service, "Statistics of Farmer Cooperatives," Select Research Reports from 1950–1975.

parity of marketing power that demands fuller use of cooperatives as their organizational tools.

Limitations to the expanded use of cooperatives are conditioned by (1) farmers' individualistic and fatalistic notions that preclude effective group action; (2) a prevailing normative school of thought on cooperation that conflicts with more vigorous initiatives; and (3) by an external environment, found in public sentiment and our economic and political institutions, that has been hostile to group action by farmers, particularly in times of shortages and relatively higher food prices.

INFLUENCE OF SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON EXPANDED USE OF COOPERATIVES

The genesis of the cooperative movement has given rise to several distinct schools of thought. Historically, six of these at one time or another, have had a particular impact on the development of cooperatives on the North American continent. To the extent that at least one of these has a current constraining influence upon the extent of cooperative development in the United States, it is worth summarizing the evolution of these distinct schools.

The first school of thought originating in the United States was known as the "Sapiro school" of thought, named after Aaron Sapiro, who, as a bright young California lawyer, was active as an organizer of cooperative marketing organizations in the early 1920s. Sapiro advocated a form of orderly commodity marketing that was at that time unique to organizational efforts within the United States and which had several distinct features. Included among the features of Sapiro's school were association on a commodity basis; long-term legally binding contracts with grower members; a centralized organization structure; pooling of products according to grade; controlling a large enough proportion of the crop to be a dominant market factor; democratic control of cooperatives by members; use of professional experts in management and other technical positions within the cooperative; and limitation of membership to growers.[2]

As such, the Sapiro school advocated a specific organizational structure as well as a plan of action on the part of cooperatives so that they would become a major factor in the agricultural community. Sapiro's organizing capability carried his particular brand of cooperation throughout the United States as well as Canada and left an indelible mark on U.S. agricultural cooperation, particularly on the Pacific coast. The advocacy of Sapiro led to a wave of organizational activity that had as one of its goals a legal monopoly for cooperatives engaged in agricultural marketing.

Sapiro's goal or objective was to organize countervailing monopoly power for farmers through strong commodity cooperatives which maintained long-term supply and production contracts as necessary. Contracts were designed to be a production-marketing coordinating device so that cooperatives could provide a predictable quantity of products for sale. This type of aggressive and top-down organizational philosophy was subsequently challenged by another distinctly American school of cooperative thought advocated by E. G. Nourse.

The school of thought advocated

2. Grace C. Larsen and Henry E. Erdman, "Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farmer Cooperative Promotion," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, September 1962, p. 242–68.

by Nourse became known as the "competitive yardstick school." Cooperatives were viewed, as in the Sapiro school, as being part and parcel of the existing capitalistic system and a legitimate form of business activity. But they were viewed as serving to restrain the capitalistic system and to modify excesses that were associated with it. Stated in other words, cooperatives were viewed as being a yardstick by which cooperators could measure the performance of the capitalistic system, at levels where they felt exploited, and of the conduct of the firms in it. Cooperatives were also viewed as correcting many evils of capitalism and performing a balance wheel or checkpoint function that improved the competitive performance of the economic system itself.[3] Cooperatives were thus viewed as being supplementary to capitalist enterprise, a view held in common with a German school of thought in the late 1800s led by Herman Schulze-Delitzsch.[4]

The competitive yardstick school attributed to cooperatives a broader societal function in the political economy than was ever endorsed or conceived by the Sapiro school. To successfully perform this normative function, it was believed that cooperatives need handle as a goal only about 15 to 30 percent of the particular commodity in question. As is easily discerned, this perspective was substantially different from the goal embraced by the Sapiro school. A cooperative's major attribute, according to Nourse and subsequent followers, was enhancing competition and perfecting the capitalistic system compared to a system performing without the cooperative alternative.

A third school of thought that has influenced cooperative development on the North American continent, particularly in Canada, is known as the "cooperative sector" school. In essence, the cooperative sector school developed following the philosophy of Fauquet, a French scholar who conceptualized cooperatives as basically separate and distinct from both capitalism and public enterprise, and thereby affording a "middle way" between them. Four distinct sectors could be distinguished in an economy according to Fauquet: (1) the public sector; (2) the capitalist sector; (3) the private sector proper that includes noncapitalist units and activities of households, farms, and crafts; and (4) the cooperative sector.[5] The difference in the cooperative sector was in the fact that ownership, control, and use of the particular enterprise involves the same group of people, namely owner-users, as members of the cooperative. The cooperative sector of the economy, being separate, required a distinct set of laws and supporting institutions.

A fourth school is known as the "cooperative systems" school. As identified by Torgerson in 1967, this school views "cooperative systems" as being national organizations in the geographic sense, such as cooperatives, professional associations, and political parties that are in a specific relationship by reason of cooperation of people for at least one

3. E. G. Nourse, "From Dogma to Science in Cooperative Thinking," *Agricultural Cooperation—1946* (Washington, D.C.: American Institute of Cooperation, p. 8).

4. Paul Lambert, *Studies in the Social Philosophy of Cooperation*, Cooperative League of the USA, 1963, p. 96. See, also, G. Fauquet, *The Cooperative Sector* (Manchester: Cooperation Union Ltd., 1951), pp. 11–14.

5. Ibid, p. 106.

definite end.[6] Since farmers have supported both cooperatives and professional interest organizations (general farm and single commodity types) as instruments for goal attainment, it is deemed necessary to examine the functional unity of structural forms in the study of decision making and representation by farm operators.

This school views analysis of the total bundle of organized farm activity as essential to understanding how farmers divide organizational tasks structurally and functionally in pursuing their improved farm income goals. The activities of these organizations are viewed as being mutually supportive and complementary with any conflicts ultimately resulting from the farmer's multidimensional role as manager, laborer, investor, and landowner. This school, which finds support in earlier theoretical works by Robert Liefman[7] and Ivan Emelianoff,[8] establishes coordinated cooperative systems as necessary for accomplishing the division of labor and specialization between cooperatives and professional associations needed to accomplish specific functional tasks to achieve optimum marketing strength for farmers.

The fifth school of thought—also the most radical because of its departure from basic cooperative fundamentals—might be appropriately called the "management manipulation" school. In essence, this school, originated from the Harvard Agribusiness Management complex, advocates the use of cooperative-corporate combinations.[9] Cooperatives are viewed as a means of enhancing management strategy of private firms that desire an assured source of continuous supplies of farm products and a means of avoiding major capital expenditures. A linkage is made between a group of farmers organized through a cooperative and the corporate firm—often called a joint venture. In many instances, this arrangement also involves certain types of management contracts between the initiating corporate firm and the farmer-owned processing facility. In other situations, a joint processing operation may be undertaken by the cooperative, which serves an assembly function, and the corporation. While strongly advocated in recent times on the North American continent and abroad, this particular school of thought originates more as a management device for the benefit of the corporate sector than for the benefit of farmer-members as users of cooperatives.

A sixth school, the "cooperative commonwealth" school of thought, originated outside the United States but has strongly influenced cooperative development in this country and throughout the world. The cooperative commonwealth arrangement, which is found in many European countries, places no limitation on the possibilities that cooperatives have of expanding into many fields of business activity. Ultimately, cooperatives can even achieve dominance in any particular commodity or service activity in a country and would thereby improve and help to develop a fuller cooperative and

6. Randall E. Torgerson, "The Cooperative Systems Approach to Improving Farm Incomes" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1967).

7. D. Robert Liefman, *Cartels, Concerns and Trusts* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1932).

8. Ivan V. Emelianoff, *Economic Theory of Cooperation* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1942).

9. Ray A. Goldberg, "Profitable Partnerships: Industry and Farmer Co-ops," *Harvard Business Review*, March 1972, pp. 108–21.

economic social order. In many respects, the Rochdale weavers, widely known for packaging the "principles of cooperation," had this as one of their goals and objectives when they originated their cooperative activities in 1844 in England. This school is found today among the highly developed and successful consumer cooperatives in England and the farmer cooperatives in the Scandinavian countries.

The commonwealth school in most respects is grounded in pragmatism. An economy is envisioned in which producers and consumers undertake joint activity to enable them to succeed as viable units. If this involves such a high degree of organization that cooperatives become the dominant economic institution, then so be it. Profit-seeking enterprises continue to exist but maintain a secondary role, just the opposite of what is found on the North American continent today. Since the cooperative is simply an organizational tool in behalf of owner-users, it is viewed as a higher order economic institution because it embraces equitable treatment of members economically and higher social ideals through democratic processes than does the conventional profit-seeking firm. Implicit in this school is the notion of strong control and leadership from members originating at the local level and succeeding, through federation, to regional, national, and even international levels of organization.

Of the schools of thought identified, the first two have had the initial as well as the most significant impact to date upon cooperative development in the United States. An obvious conflict exists between the Sapiro and the competitive yardstick schools concerning the cooperative's role and just how dynamic these organizations should be in fulfilling their member-oriented and societal objectives. The Sapiro school is directed primarily toward internalized benefits and advocates a fuller organizational development of marketing power in behalf of members, approaching that advocated by the commonwealth school. Its strongest following is found among the fruit and vegetable and other specialty crop cooperatives and bargaining associations on the Pacific coast and more recently among the direct membership regional dairy cooperatives that have emerged in the Midwest and South since the late 1960s.

The competitive yardstick school, in contrast, advocates pro-competitive external benefits derived from cooperative activity as well as internal market correcting benefits to members. The chief difference is that cooperatives accomplish their role in the yardstick school with only a limited aggregative market share and seek nothing more; that is, they play a secondary role to the profit-seeking firms that dominate the capitalistic system. In fact, E. G. Nourse argued that cooperative objectives were not to supersede other forms of business, but were to see that they (other business forms) were kept truly competitive.[10]

Of the two schools of thought, the competitive yardstick school has had the most prevailing acceptance and influence, particularly in the Midwest where most of the cooperatives are found and where the concept originated. Similarly, it is the school that has met with the widest support from public policy makers. Interestingly, it is the precise level that cooperatives in the aggregate have

10. Joseph G. Knapp, *Great American Cooperators* (Washington, D.C.: American Institute of Cooperation, 1967), pp. 372–78.

occupied in all of the post World War II era. Whether this rather limited scope of cooperative activity, as envisioned by early thinkers of the competitive yardstick school, is adequate in today's structural environment represents a major question.

Clearly there are new dimensions to the environment in which farm operators and their cooperatives must operate today. A power struggle is underway for the control of agriculture. A realization is developing in the farming community that a mere 15 to 30 percent of the farm credit, purchasing, and farm marketing activity offers no assurances that farm operators have the organizational tools to adequately represent their best economic interests and to keep them in business in the future. Greater organizational efforts are being called for to increase market shares, secure market outlets through obtaining a consumer's franchise for cooperative branded products, obtain fair prices, and assure access to reliable sources of farm inputs at reasonable prices.

If a new school of cooperative thought is emerging to replace the competitive yardstick school, it is in the formative stages at this time. In all likelihood, it will embrace some of the positive features of the yardstick school insofar as stimulus to competition is concerned, but will also embrace more of the cooperative systems, commonwealth, and Sapiro schools in terms of substance and goals. The extent of this development will be largely conditioned by the external environment.

THE CHANGING EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT TOWARD COOPERATIVES

The external environment that establishes the climate for group action by farm operators has undergone an element of change in the mid-1970s. The basis for this change can be found in the basic supply and demand balance for food and fiber items, the rise of populism, and associated concern with size of institutions, financial constraints on younger farmers entering farming, and the prevailing enforcement of antitrust laws and other governmental regulations relating to group action by farmers.

When availability of foods at cheap prices was affected by worldwide shortages beginning in 1972 and food prices vacillated widely in tune with our current market-oriented policy, the climate toward cooperatives and other forms of group action by farmers appears to have changed. Cooperatives, much to the surprise of their members, came under a barrage of attacks, each suggesting that they were the sources of higher food prices, that is the food price villains. The attitude toward group action in agriculture therefore appears to be conditioned in part by the relative supply and demand balance of food and fiber items. So long as food was in abundance and farmers suffered from the traditional depressed markets, public sentiment appears to have been strongly supportive of their efforts to organize for fairer prices. In the food-short environment, however, it appears that public sentiment toward policies and action encouraging group action turned hostile.

Many farm operators questioned how farmer cooperatives, as the instrument of farmers' marketing efforts, could have become villains simply by virtue of the turnaround in traditional supply and demand relationships. The thought to producer patrons was astonishing—as

well as revolting. What were cooperatives doing differently that could have brought on such a shower of wrath? If cooperatives played the role envisioned in the competitive yardstick school of thought, and were in fact competition enhancing instruments in the marketplace, why would the political environment turn so hostile toward them with regard to farmers' rights to organize and market collectively through their organizations?

In attempting to answer these questions, farm leaders have been forced to rethink many of the basics of organization, their legislative underpinnings, and the type of activity and external climate which is going to be necessary to keep farmers in business and to keep farmer cooperatives viable as effective instruments in behalf of members. Of paramount importance is the realization that the nature of the cooperative has not changed significantly from the past. Production decisions continue to be made individually by farm operators in response to market signals. Cooperatives are generally obliged to accept all of the products that farmers deliver to them. Since farm production is not as yet an industrialized production process in which production control decisions are centralized, cooperatives are clearly operating in a market-oriented fashion in which the public interest is protected by the self-regulating market mechanism. Cooperative leaders are aware of the need to more effectively communicate their public interest and competition-enhancing role, irrespective of size of market share, to the public at large.

One of the characteristic features of the political economy in the mid-1970s has been the rise of populist sentiments on the part of many people. This is manifested in the form of mistrust of large-scale institutions like corporations, labor unions, and government. People express a desire for more direct access to government and the economic activity that envelopes their lives. It is also manifest in talks by many political candidates who, in this Bicentennial and presidential election year, have picked up the cry for a return of power to the citizenry and for more control over big business, whose growing presence ostensibly stifles competition.

Cooperatives appear to have been cast into the lot with other big businesses. Since several cooperatives appear in "Fortune's 500" list of largest industrial businesses in America and since a few cooperatives in this category have annual sales exceeding $1 billion, cooperatives appear to be viewed as "just another business" and are not distinguishable in the public's mind's eye. A question that is frequently asked is whether cooperatives, like other large-scale voluntary organizations, are responsive to members' needs as they grow in size. Are they subject to member control and influence? Or are cooperatives tending to fall into the trappings of other large-scale voluntary groups in which only a small minority are active participants and therefore more influence in decision making is shifted to the sophisticated managers who have been hired to operate these organizations on a day-to-day basis? The answer is that a cooperative business, even when big, is fundamentally different from big business in two respects: (1) it is oriented to the needs of users, not investors; and (2) it has two goals in view. One is an economic goal of improving the well-being of members and the other the social goal

which is aimed at elevating the position of members upward through a bootstrap organizational process based on self-help principles and democratic organizational processes. Clearly this is a problem which is not going to go away. Cooperative leaders must continually work to structure their organizations for effective representation and control by owner-users.

Another influence from the external environment concerns the availability of credit for expanded growth of cooperatives. One of the biggest challenges cooperatives continually face is keeping ownership in the hands of current users. Farmers typically must balance financing of their off-farm businesses —their cooperatives—with on-farm capital and equipment investments. During inflationary times, these investment decisions become critical because plant replacement costs are very high. Furthermore, young people entering into farming are faced with high land values and frequently have a low equity base. Traditional lenders are hesitant to grant long-term loans without government guarantees. At the same time, many cooperative financial experts advance management strategy for building permanent capital in cooperatives. This gives management more flexibility to do what it wants to do—a potential threat to members if management, uncontrolled, adopts the philosophy that control follows money, not member-users. New institutional reform, such as permanent debt financing or long-term lease of farms, will likely help alleviate these problems. In the meantime, capital availability will serve as a major constraint on expanded cooperative marketing efforts.

The other major area in which concern has been expressed and which continues to condition the environment in which cooperatives operate is the attitude toward enforcement of the nation's antitrust laws. Careful scrutiny of regulatory activity in all industries including the food industry has followed the advent of higher food prices. This has focused much attention on cooperatives' leeway under the antitrust laws and on federal marketing orders, which embrace the Sapiro concept of "orderly commodity marketing" and have helped to operationalize it. It also manifests itself in concerns by public interest and consumer groups about whether the marketing institutions and government programs established in times of food surpluses and depressed farm incomes are now appropriate in times of food shortages, such as those experienced in recent years. Agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which have responsibility for enforcement of antitrust laws have traditionally viewed cooperatives with a jaundiced eye. Consumer concern over higher food prices led to stricter enforcement and to advocacy of changes in basic enabling legislation for cooperatives, such as the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922.

Areas of concern expressed by the regulatory agencies are focused on such things as corporate membership in cooperatives, market shares held by farmers through their cooperatives, and the ability of cooperatives under the law to make use of federations and agencies-in-common to establish prices and to effect other marketing arrangements over broad regional areas. Cooperatives growth opportunity in the future will be largely evaluated in terms of cooperative performance. A lesson

learned from the recent scrutiny is that cooperatives cannot succeed organizationally in behalf of members by simply emulating a corporate model. Instead, cooperatives need to maximize their uniqueness and their distinctive owner-user features as an alternative form of business organization. New legislation to enable farmers to develop effective pricing mechanisms and allow greater latitude for organizational activities at higher levels will be necessary to fully develop this alternative.

In summary, cooperatives have an underlying strength in serving our national interest by providing an avenue for farmers to participate in an increasingly concentrated business economy. By their very nature, cooperatives interject a degree of market competition that pushes the market nearer to the competitive norm. As is true with experiences in development of the cooperative movement to date, a basic underlying requirement is the role for education concerning cooperative techniques, organization structure, practices, and principles to the various publics, including cooperative members, employees, the public at large, Congress, and other branches of government. In order to survive and to make their continuing contribution, cooperatives need to emphasize their uniqueness and stick to their organizational basics. In the final analysis, however, cooperatives' contributions will be measured by the economic survival and well-being of members.

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The Rural Church and Rural Religion: Analysis of Data from Children and Youth

By HART M. NELSEN AND RAYMOND H. POTVIN

ABSTRACT: The heyday of studies of the rural church was the 1920s–1940s. Even then researchers noted that structural rather than ecological characteristics were especially important in understanding it. A more recent focus has been on rural-urban differences in religiosity. Research done in the 1960s and 1970s indicated differences only on the ideological (belief) dimension. Data from two 1975 studies—one involving children in Minnesota and the other adolescents in a national sample—are reported, showing continuing rural-urban-metropolitan differences in religious belief. There are higher rates of fundamentalism for Protestants in the first two residential categories. For the first sample, the relationship between SES and fundamentalism virtually disappears in the rural area. The importance of residential (and church) propinquity of social classes is suggested as an important intervening variable, and this brings the focus full circle in terms of ecological versus structural and organizational characteristics. Finally, the future of the rural (small) church is discussed. Negative effects of inflation and the overall decline in national church membership and participation and the positive effect of church decentralization as they impinge upon the rural church are discussed.

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PARALLEL with the changing perspective from religious sociology to the sociology of religion has been the decline of locality-based, descriptive studies and the emergence of broader, theoretical interests in the overall relationship between religion and society. The older orientation had more to say about the rural church, while the newer approach addresses more general questions about religion, whether urban or rural. However, because of an apparent decline in religious practice, renewed interest in religious organizations, at both the local and national levels, as well as an increase in denomination-based research may well be forthcoming. It appears that the churches are now ripe for organizational analysis; if so, some of that interest will surely center on the rural religious institution.

This article will review the literature on the rural church and on the religious orientations of rural residents. We will then present current data on differences between religious orientation of rural and urban children and adolescents, focusing on the relative importance of residence and class membership in explaining these differences. In a concluding section, we will speculate on the future of the rural church as well as on the impact of interclass contact within residential areas and local religious organizations upon religious orientation. We suggest a considerable gain in insight when ecological and structural perspectives are linked in the study of rural religion.

THE RURAL CHURCH

The period of the 1920s through the 1940s was replete with studies of rural and urban churches. Research conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Religious Research, funded with Rockefeller money during 1920–1934, contributed to this heyday of parish sociology. A perspective held by some, including H. Paul Douglass,[1] was that "the city church is an evolved rural church." Benson Y. Landis commented that "there is some evidence that organized religion is of more importance in the rural than in the urban community."[2] In a general, sociological description of religion in America some four decades ago, C. Luther Fry commented on the membership differences by residence:

> It is widely believed that country people belong to church in relatively greater numbers than city people. As a matter of fact the proportion of people who belong to church is higher in cities than in rural areas. This . . . seems to reflect differences in opportunity arising from the fact that many sparsely settled areas have few churches.[3]

The close relationship between population size and religious mem-

1. Harlan Paul Douglass, *1000 City Churches* (New York: George H. Doran, 1926), p. 83. For an introduction to the early works, see Frederick A. Shippey, "The Variety of City Churches," *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 2 (Summer 1960), pp. 8–19. See, also, C. Joseph Nuesse and Thomas J. Harte, eds., *The Sociology of the Parish* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951).

2. Benson Y. Landis, "The Church and Religious Activity," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40 (May 1935), pp. 780–87.

3. C. Luther Fry, with the assistance of Mary Frost Jessup, "Changes in Religious Organizations," President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), pp. 1021–22. For a comparable, recent overview, see N. J. Demerath III, "Trends and Anti-Trends in Religious Change," in Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Indicators of Social Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 349–445.

bership and attendance was documented by Edmund DeS. Brunner.[4] These studies seemed to document that while there were too few churches for a given geographical area, there were too many for the size of population supporting them.[5] With population shift, many of these small churches would continue to close or curtail their programs. As Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle noted, "as the trade-center churches grow at the expense of those in the rural neighborhoods, the wealthier farmers tend to withdraw to the town churches, leaving other farmers without adequate church facilities."[6]

In his bibliography on the church in rural areas, W. Seward Salisbury[7] observed that the most extensive study of the rural church was that directed by Lawrence Hepple.[8] Luckily, that study of the church in rural Missouri was replicated in 1967, some 15 years later. It was noted that while there was a slight net loss in the number of congregations in the area surveyed at the two points in time, the loss was more among church- than sect-type groups. Furthermore, Edward Hassinger and John Holik, who redid the study, noted that the loss was not due to merger but that "in the vast majority of the cases, it is clear that the demise of a church resulted from failure to maintain a membership sufficient to provide a minimal program—that is, to function as an organized group."[9] Churches were more likely to close in the open country and villages with less than 200 population.[10]

From his study of the rural Missouri churches, Hepple had concluded that "it appears that it would be more advantageous to study churches in terms of size . . . than in terms of location."[11] This comment returns us to the work of the pioneers in denominational research, especially the comment by Douglass and Brunner that

> the real difference is not between the church in the small city and in the large, but between churches of different sizes; for larger churches everywhere strongly tend to have more complicated organization, to employ staffs of paid workers instead of the single pastor, and to undertake more varied programs.[12]

4. Edmund DeS. Brunner, "Sociological Significance of Recent Rural Religious Surveys," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29 (November 1923), pp. 325–37.

5. Robert L. Skrabanek, "The Rural Church: Characteristics and Problems," in Alvin L. Bertrand, ed., *Rural Sociology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 244.

6. Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, *Rural Social Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 454.

7. W. Seward Salisbury, *Religion in American Culture* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 511–12. In chapter 16, "Religion in Representative Subcultures," Salisbury addresses the rural church (see pp. 430–39).

8. Lawrence M. Hepple et al., *The Church in Rural Missouri*, Research Bulletins 633A-G (Columbia: Missouri Agriculture Experiment Station, September 1957–February 1961).

9. Edward W. Hassinger and John S. Holik, "Changes in the Number of Rural Churches in Missouri, 1952–1967," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 35 (September 1970), p. 359.

10. Edward W. Hassinger, J. Kenneth Benson, and John S. Holik, "Changes in Program and Suborganization of Rural Churches in Missouri in a Fifteen-Year Period," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 37 (September 1972), pp. 428–35. Another outstanding restudy was that undertaken in Southern Appalachia by Earl D. C. Brewer. See his "Religion and the Churches," pp. 201–18 in Thomas R. Ford, ed., *The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962). The earlier Southern Appalachian study was by Elizabeth R. Hooker, *Religion in the Highlands* (New York: Home Missions Council, 1933).

11. Lawrence M. Hepple, *The Church in Rural Missouri: Part V, Rural-Urban Churches Compared*, Research Bulletin 633E (Columbia: Missouri Agriculture Experiment Station, July 1959), p. 296.

12. Harlan Paul Douglass and Edmund DeS. Brunner, *The Protestant Church as a*

After all their work based on a model of the city church as "the rural church evolved," that comment seemingly guts the rural-urban perspective.[13] It appeared that an organizational rather than ecological perspective would have more payoff. Indeed, the old "Town and Country" units within the denominations were changed to focus instead on the problems of the small church.[14]

RURAL RELIGION

This conclusion does not negate the possibility that rural-urban differences in religious orientation do, indeed, exist. While Hart Nelsen and Stuart Storey observed that the literature of the 1950s and 1960s claimed that rural-urban attitudinal differences were greatly diminished, if not eliminated, because of increasing rural-urban contact, they presented evidence to document continued differences in at least one attitudinal area and suggested the need for continued research.[15] Additional evidence for (even an increase of) differences was presented by Fern Willits, Robert Bealer, and Donald Crider.[16]

Prior to this work, Norval Glenn and Jon Alston subjected poll data to secondary analysis. They found that ruralites were more traditional and fundamentalist in religious beliefs and more likely to attend religious services and to listen to or watch services on the radio or television. However, they were lowest in church membership and the authors commented that "we doubt that church membership is a good index of religious interest or devoutness."[17]

From secondary analysis of four sets of Gallup data gathered between 1954 and 1968, Hart Nelsen, Raytha Yokley, and Thomas Madron ex-

Social Institution (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1935), p. 87. For a comparable, more recent study, see David O. Moberg, *The Church as a Social Institution* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962).

13. For an analysis assessing the independent effects of church size and residential location, see Hart M. Nelsen and Robert F. Everett, "Impact of Church Size on Clergy Role and Career," *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 17 (Fall 1976), pp. 62–73. In general, clergy serving small congregations were more likely to consider career changes than those serving larger ones. Ministers serving the smaller rural congregations seem more satisfied with their ministries than their counterparts elsewhere. Church size was a more important variable than church location.

14. A United Presbyterian committee at the synod level noted that "small churches are facing the issues of survival at the present time, in part because of financial burdens, in part because of the unavailability of pastoral leadership, in part because of a sense of hopelessness, in part because other avenues of ministry have yet to be explored and their full implications realized." This committee discussed the "viable church" not by location but in terms of size; and they noted that although 350 is sometimes used, they adopted 250 members or less as the definition of the small church. See: Task Force on the Small Church, Synod of Lakes and Prairies, United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., "The Small Church" (Bloomington, Minn.: Office of Communication, Synod of Lakes and Prairies, UPCUSA, 1975), pp. 9, 1. For working papers used at a symposium on the small church, see Jackson W. Carroll, ed., *The Small Congregation: A Search for New Possibilities* (Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1976).

15. Hart M. Nelsen and Stuart E. Storey, "Personality Adjustment of Rural and Urban Youth: The Formation of a Rural Disadvantaged Subculture," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 34 (March 1969), pp. 43–55.

16. Fern K. Willits, Robert C. Bealer, and Donald M. Crider, "Level of Attitudes in Mass Society: Rurality and Traditional Morality in America," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 38 (Spring 1973), pp. 36–45.

17. Norval D. Glenn and Jon P. Alston, "Rural-Urban Differences in Reported Attitudes and Behavior," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 47 (March 1967), pp. 381–400.

amined residential differences on four dimensions of religiosity—ideological, intellectual, experiential, and ritualistic.[18] The authors divided the last dimension into two subdimensions—prayer and attendance. Significant differences were found on the ideological dimension, with ruralites being more conservative than urban dwellers. The data were presented controlling separately for sex, education, age, region, and religious identification (Protestant-Catholic). The writers noted that "residential differences were greater for less-educated, older, Southern, and Protestant respondents, suggesting that residential differences may, indeed, be diminishing over the course of time." It was also concluded that one could not claim that the rural dwellers were more religious; it could be said, however, that they were more conservative in ideology.[19]

Two final studies need review. Claude Fischer analyzed 1957 Gallup and 1968 SRC poll data on religion, controlling "as many individual-level and confounding attributes as were available, meaningful, and practical in order to isolate a contextual effect of community." The relationship between residence and the Gallup religiosity scale (heavily centered on the ideological dimension) persisted, while there was little relationship between residence and church attendance, consistent with the finding by Nelsen et al. One exception was that metropolitan suburbanites with children were especially likely to be church attenders. Fischer concluded that "though the associations are, as we expected, quite small, there is some indication that urbanism has an independent effect on traditionalism as reflected in religiosity. . . ."[20]

From an analysis of data from a sample of North Carolina Episcopalians, W. Clark Roof conceptualized localism-cosmopolitanism as explaining the effect of size of city on religious orientation, or "the local-cosmopolitan distinction aids in interpreting the psychological process by which urban experiences shape religious commitments." On the relationship between community size and orthodoxy, he found, however, that the direct effects were stronger than the indirect effects. Overall, "local community attachments undergird both socio-religious group participation and personal beliefs and practices."[21]

ANALYSIS OF NEW DATA

Not only are many of the data used for the studies we have reviewed somewhat out-of-date, but they are also from adults, some of whom received their socialization as children

18. On dimensions of religiosity, see Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, *Religion and Society in Tension* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 18–38; but see, also, Richard R. Clayton and James W. Gladden, "The Five Dimensions of Religiosity: Toward Demythologizing a Sacred Artifact," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 13 (June 1974), pp. 135–43.

19. Hart M. Nelsen, Raytha L. Yokley, and Thomas W. Madron, "Rural-Urban Differences in Religiosity," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 36 (September 1971), pp. 389–96.

20. Claude S. Fischer, "The Effect of Urban Life on Traditional Values," *Social Forces*, vol. 53 (March 1975), pp. 420–32. See, also, Hugh P. Whitt and Hart M. Nelsen, "Residence, Moral Traditionalism, and Tolerance of Atheists," *Social Forces*, vol. 54 (December 1975), pp. 328–40.

21. Wade Clark Roof, "Traditional Religion in Contemporary Society: A Theory of Local-Cosmopolitan Plausibility," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 41 (April 1976), pp. 195–208; see, also, his "The Local-Cosmopolitan Orientation and Traditional Religious Commitment," *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 33 (Spring 1972), pp. 1–15.

in rural areas but later migrated to the urban area. If we speculate that the more personal elements of religious orientation, such as religious belief and experiential religion including prayer, might be less likely to change upon migration, the expectation of residential differences on the ideological dimension of religiosity is considerably reduced, since the presence of urban dwellers with rural backgrounds would mute these differences. On the other hand, migration patterns have changed, religious beliefs supposedly are on the wane, and so forth. However, such speculation does lead to the importance of studying rural and urban children and adolescents or of controlling for residential background in using adult data. In this article we opt for the former.

The religious beliefs and practices of rural people are directly linked with life as they experience it.[22] Consequently, religion can be seen as an expression of worldview. Earlier, in describing an especially rural subculture, we noted that fundamentalistic, episodic religion provides Southern Appalachians with a general model they have of life and the world as experienced.[23] The concept of a wrathful and punishing God is related to sectarianism.[24] Such a belief and orientation stem from social conditions related to a simplistic and fatalistic worldview of life. Of course, we are describing very isolated and not simply rural locations and subcultures when we write in this vein.[25]

Nonetheless, we would expect to find traces of fundamentalism in the

22. Roof's orientation—with a "conception of traditional religion essentially as a subculture rather than as the normative basis of modern society"—is central here. We might wish that he had a better measure than that of local-cosmopolitan. See Roof, "Traditional Religion in Contemporary Society," p. 206. Nelsen attempted to get at much the same concept which he called "religion as world view"; but he utilized class, residence, and reading level. See Hart M. Nelsen, "Sectarianism, World View, and Anomie," *Social Forces*, vol. 51 (December 1972), pp. 226–33. For an acculturation model of religious change for black Americans as they moved from participation in the rural church to residence in the metropolitan environment, see Hart M. Nelsen and Anne K. Nelsen, *Black Church in the Sixties* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), pp. 1, 58–81.

23. Hart M. Nelsen and Raymond H. Potvin, "Appalachian Religion Transplanted," Paper given at the Conference on Appalachians in Urban Areas, Columbus, Ohio, the Academy for Contemporary Problems, March 28, 1974. On religion and worldview, see Clifford Geertz, "Religion: Anthropological Study," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13 (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1968), pp. 398–406; and Robert Bellah, "The Sociology of Religion," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13, pp. 406–14.

24. See Brewer, "Religion and the Churches"; Hart M. Nelsen, Thomas W. Madron, and Karen Stewart, "Image of God and Religious Ideology and Involvement: A Partial Test of Hill's Southern Culture-Religion Thesis," *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 15 (Fall 1973), pp. 37–44; Charles Hudson, "The Structure of a Fundamentalist Christian Belief System," pp. 122–42, in Samuel S. Hill, Jr., et al., eds., *Religion and the Solid South* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1972).

25. It is in these "more rural" areas where the churches must accommodate to familism and the emotional orientations of the residents. Consequently, these churches tend to be small, kinship-oriented, and fundamentalistic. Revivalism is central, and there is considerable backsliding. It is in this setting where religious membership is probably less frequent, in comparison to the less rural areas and to the city. Organized church programs play a less important role in the Southern Appalachians and similar areas. See Hart M. Nelsen, "Attitudes toward Religious Education in Appalachia," *Religious Education*, vol. 65 (January–February 1970), pp. 50–5. See, also, Hassinger, Benson, and Holik, "Changes in Program and Suborganization of Rural Churches in Missouri

rural area. The findings already cited in this article (that rural dwellers are more likely than urbanites to subscribe to conservative religious ideology) support this. To this end, we analyzed two sets of data collected from children and youth. Studying these age groups means that a significant part of the possible rural to urban migration effect previously discussed is avoided. Presumably, we will measure more closely possible subcultural, that is, residential differences in religiosity.

The first set of data, collected by Hart Nelsen, is from school children residing in the "Valley of the Jolly Green Giant," from the area around LeSueur to Minneapolis, Minnesota. Schools were selected in order that both working- and middle-class children would be represented in rural, urban, and metropolitan categories. In our tables, as well as in the study, rural meant under 2,500 population, urban 2,500 through 49,999, and metropolitan 50,000 and larger (including Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area—SMSA). For this set of data, residence is determined by location of the school. Students enrolled in grades four through eight (about ages 10 through 14) attending public and Catholic parochial schools completed in the classroom an extended questionnaire taking between one-half and one hour. A total of 3,085 children cooperated; but of these, 85 did not respond to one-third or more of the questionnaire, generally because they did not complete it. These 85 were deleted, leaving a sample of 3,000. The data were collected in 1975. In our analysis, we use only the public school data.

The second set of data, collected by Raymond Potvin, is from a national probability sample of youth —young men and women 13 to 18 years of age living in households in the continental United States in April 1975. The sample was selected and questionnaires administered by the Gallup Organization for the Boys Town Center at Catholic University. The response rate was 70.3 percent, a fairly high rate for studies of this kind and with this target population. The data was gathered by means of a self-administered questionnaire in the home, with the interviewer present to guarantee the respondent privacy and confidentiality. The number of respondents totaled 1,121. For these youth, residence is determined by their own place of residence.

Our focus is on religious ideology, particularly fundamentalism. In line with previous findings, our expectation is that children and youth from the rural areas will be more conservative in religious ideology. However, some of this relationship may be due to social class. Therefore, we will examine residential differences in ideology holding constant social class.

In assessing residential propinquity between high and low status persons by race, Brigitte Erbe has written that "differences in the socioeconomic composition of the immediate neighborhood in which blacks and whites of the same socioeconomic status live may account for some of these [racial] differences [even though class is

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in a Fifteen-Year Period"; William G. Mather, Jr., *The Rural Churches of Allegany County*, Bulletin No. 587 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, March 1934); Louis Bultena, "Rural Churches and Community Integration," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 9 (September 1944), pp. 257–64; and John A. Hostetler and William G. Mather, "Participation in the Rural Church," Paper No. 1762 (State College: Pennsylvania State College School of Agriculture and Agricultural Experiment Station, October 1952).

held constant]."[26] The same might be said for residence. Even though social class is controlled, residential differences might remain because in some localities and churches middle-class ruralites might well have a greater chance to interact with working-class individuals, thus eliminating the class differences and increasing the residence differentials in some contexts. For example, since the smaller, rural Protestant churches are more class-inclusive than their counterparts in the urban areas,[27] one might expect class differences to be reduced because of middle-class interactions with lower classes in these areas. Also, one might expect the residence differential to be greater among the middle classes because of this middle-class interaction with lower classes in the rural and small town churches. On the other hand, Catholic parishes are territorial (with the exception of some ethnic-constituted parishes) in both rural and city areas and thus are generally more class-inclusive than Protestant churches. Therefore, one might not expect the same effect (lack of class interaction in the city); and residential differences, if any, should be slight.

THE FINDINGS

For measuring fundamentalism on the part of the children, we utilized one item from Nelsen's measure of sectarian religious ideology: "Do you believe that God sends bad luck and sickness on people as punishment when they do wrong?"[28] Residential differences on this item are found in table 1. There was a low negative relationship on the part of Protestant children and a negligible negative relationship for Catholic children. Among Protestants, the value of the partial gamma (controlling socioeconomic status—SES) was somewhat lower than the value of the zero-order gamma (−.17 compared to −.20). Parenthetically, the zero-order gamma for Protestants for the relationship between SES and fundamentalism was −.23 ($P < .001$); children whose fathers held white-collar jobs were less likely to believe that God sends bad luck and sickness on people as punishment when they do wrong.

For the national sample of adolescents, a fundamentalism scale was devised,[29] consisting of four Likert-

26. Brigitte Mach Erbe, "Race and Socioeconomic Segregation," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 40 (December 1975), pp. 801–12.

27. For example, see Mather, *The Rural Churches of Allegany County*, p. 26.

28. The item was slightly reworded from the original, which read: "Do you believe that God sends misfortune and illness on people as punishment for sins?"; see Nelsen, "Sectarianism, World View, and Anomie," p. 229. The analysis reported in this article uses collapsed responses, counting the "I don't know" response together with belief that God does send misfortune and illness. Two other analyses were completed: leaving the response out (which gives two categories —disbelief and belief) and making it a middle category. All three methods gave essentially the same results. "No responses," however, were deleted from the analyses utilizing the children data (the nonresponse rate here was low).

29. Using a principal component factor analysis and a varimax orthogonal rotation, the responses to 13 religious questions were reduced to four factors: (1) personal-experiential religion, emphasizing, for example, closeness of God, prayer, and the importance of religion; (2) assent to authority, or believing one's faith should be accepted without question; (3) religious practice, focusing on formal religious participation; and (4) fundamentalism.

The four fundamentalism items given in the text had loadings ranging from .51 through .84 on this fourth factor. Parenthetically, let us note that of the three variables other than fundamentalism, both the personal-experiential and the religious practice factors

TABLE 1

PERCENT FUNDAMENTALISTIC BY RESIDENCE (ZERO-ORDER AND PARTIAL RELATIONSHIPS)

Sample and Denomination	Percent Fundamentalistic by Area of Residence: Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Gamma: Zero-Order	Partial*
Children					
Protestant	53.2 (188)	53.3 (270)	40.2 (388)	−.20†	−.17
Catholic	41.1 (202)	46.8 (77)	38.4 (255)	−.05	−.05
Adolescents					
Protestant	62.4 (258)	63.5 (96)	49.8 (297)	−.21‡	−.16
Catholic	46.4 (69)	58.1 (62)	50.8 (199)	.01	−.01

* SES is controlled.
† $P < .001$.
‡ $P < .01$.
NOTE: For all other relationships, $P > .10$. Here and elsewhere in the article, significance was tested through the use of Chi-square.

type items: God punishes people who sin, the Bible is God's word and must be obeyed, the church or religious authorities represent God in this world, and God controls everything that happens everywhere.[30] Note the similarity of the first item to the measure used in analyzing the children data; it had the highest factor loading (.84) on fundamentalism of these four items. As in the case of the children data, there was a low negative association between residence and fundamentalism on the part of Protestant but not Catholic adolescents. The data appear in table 1. Again, the partial gamma had a value somewhat reduced from the zero-order gamma (−.16 and −.21, respectively). Parenthetically, the relationship between educational level of the fathers and fundamentalism of the Protestant youth was low and inverse (gamma = −.21, with $P < .01$). It is interesting to note that even within the Protestant samples the relationship between residence and fundamentalism is not linear. While the lowest percentages are found in the metropolitan areas, urban areas appear as fundamentalist as and sometimes more so than rural areas. We shall return to this fact in our discussion. Since Catholic youth showed no significant residential differences, as hypothesized previously, they were dropped from further analysis.

Table 2 presents the same relationship among Protestants specifying for SES level. For the children, occupational level of the father was used for the measure of SES, since this measure was more reliable with younger children (only 6 percent of

were inversely related to residence in the case of Protestant but not Catholic adolescents (the values of gamma were −.16 and −.20, respectively). Rural adolescents were most and metropolitan youth least religious here. Our focus in this article is on the ideological dimension, here being fundamentalism, and thus we give no additional data on these other factors.

30. Points were assigned to the responses to these four items as follows: 1—strongly disagree; 2—disagree; 3—don't know and no response; 4—agree; and 5—strongly agree. (similarly, no response on education will be assigned to education's middle category.) The summated scores were dichotomized as low fundamentalism—scores 4–14; and high fundamentalism—scores 15–20.

TABLE 2

PERCENT FUNDAMENTALISTIC BY RESIDENCE AND SES (CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS—PROTESTANT ONLY)

SAMPLE AND SES (PROTESTANTS)	PERCENT FUNDAMENTALISTIC BY AREA OF RESIDENCE			CONDITIONAL GAMMA*
	RURAL	URBAN	METROPOLITAN	
Children				
blue-collar	53.1 (98)	61.4 (145)	46.0 (124)	−.11§
white-collar	53.3 (90)	44.0 (125)	37.5 (264)	−.21§
conditional gamma†	.01	−.34‡	−.17	
Adolescents				
low education	68.3 (104)	72.0 (25)	53.6 (69)	−.23**
medium education	60.6 (104)	66.7 (36)	55.5 (119)	−.09
high education	54.0 (50)	54.3 (35)	41.3 (109)	−.21
conditional gamma†	−.19	−.25	−.18	

* Strength of the relationship between residence and fundamentalism at each level of SES.
† Strength of the relationship between SES and fundamentalism for each area of residence.
‡ $P < .01$.
§ $P < .05$.
** $P < .10$.
NOTE: For all other relationships, $P > .10$.

the respondents under analysis did not know or respond to this question, while the comparable rate for father's education was 29 percent). For adolescents, education was employed; and it was collapsed as low (did not graduate from high school), medium (high school graduate), and high (some college or more).

An examination of both tables indicates again that urbanites are as apt to be fundamentalistic (if not more likely) as rural dwellers, while those in the metropolitan areas are less likely to be fundamentalistic. The exception consists of the white-collar urbanite children who are midway between children from the rural and metropolitan areas in terms of percent fundamentalistic (see table 2). Within this group alone do we find a unilinear relationship between residence and fundamentalism.

In the rural areas there are no SES differences for children, while in the urban and metropolitan areas children with white-collar fathers are less likely than those from blue-collar backgrounds to be fundamentalistic. These differences are especially pronounced among urban children. Metropolitan adolescents with fathers who have either a low or a medium level of education tend to be alike in terms of percent fundamentalistic, while youth of high education backgrounds are less likely to be fundamentalistic. Education and fundamentalism are inversely related, but not significantly so, for rural and urban adolescents.

CONCLUSIONS

Let us sum up the model of rural religiosity and organized religion in the rural areas implicit in the main part of the text. In isolated rural areas (more applicable in the past), residents were less likely to belong to and regularly attend church services; but, in part because of low education levels and because of

revivals which occasionally occurred, these same individuals were as likely or perhaps more likely to believe in God. Frequently this was a punishing God; and the religious ideology was one of fundamentalism. As urbanization occurred and with the building of hard-surfaced roads and the increase in levels of education, rural residents became as likely to participate in organized religion as their city cousins.[31]

Research done on the rural church indicates the importance of considering it not from an ecological but an organizational perspective. It is not the place of residence but the size of the church that is important in determining the program, whether there is a minister (and how well trained he or she is), and, most important of all, its fate—whether it continues or closes its doors. With out-migration from the rural areas, many small churches did, in fact, cease, while many continue a precarious existence. Of those that have continued, many are sectarian and often utilize lay preachers. Of the mainline small churches that continue, many are "yoked" in twos or threes so as to have sufficient budget for more viable programs. With inflation, as well as a current decline in membership on the part of many mainline denominations, there is no reason to expect the decline of the rural (small) church to abate. Though the rural areas are probably less affected by the overall decline in membership and participation, still the national headquarters of the denominations are harder pressed for monies, meaning that there are fewer subsidies for the small churches.

On the positive side for the small church is the movement toward decentralization on the part of at least one major denomination (United Presbyterian), with regional units taking more incentive instead of leaving programs in the hands of the national body or its larger units. This might spur parishioner interest and involvement; and that, of course, is central in the life of the small church.

Can any change be expected in rural religious orientations? Previous findings indicated that rural residents are more likely than urbanites to hold conservative religious beliefs. Using two sets of data—from children and adolescents—we found some evidence for such differences continuing with the younger generation. Metropolitan dwellers score lowest on fundamentalism, but a shift seems to be taking place between rural and urban dwellers (but not at the high educational or white-collar levels), the latter generally scoring somewhat higher. Is the simplistic and fatalistic worldview of life which characterized rural dwellers in years past now becoming a characteristic of small urban areas, thus explaining the greater percentage scoring high on fundamentalism in those areas?

Furthermore, the interaction between social class and residence is important in explaining fundamentalism. Earlier we noted that middle-class ruralites and small-town dwellers are more likely to be in contact with working-class individuals than, presumably, are city or suburban dwellers. Protestant churches especially tend to be more class-inclusive in the rural areas and small towns. This should tend to

31. Indeed, rural Protestant adolescents were most likely to engage in religious practices and to score high on the personal-experiential factor of religiosity. See the previous footnote.

increase residential differences among middle-class Protestants but reduce SES differences among rural and small-town Protestants.[32] This is, in fact, what we generally discovered with one important exception—the "medium education group" among adolescents showed the lowest relationship between residence and fundamentalism. This may be due to measurement error, since "no response to father's education" was classified in this middle group. Catholic parishes are more class-inclusive than Protestant churches in the metropolitan areas; and, as expected, while Protestants revealed significant residential differences, the Catholics did not.

Remaining to be tested is our suggestion of the importance of class integration. We had no items to operationalize directly that concept in our studies; and, therefore, we can only note that our findings gave some support to the promise of residential (and church) propinquity of social classes as an intervening variable. We have come full circle in our discussion of rural religiosity in turning from ecological effects on belief to the structural or organizational perspective recommended by earlier researchers of the rural church.

32. We suggest research on the effects of class-integration on the part of both children and teachers in the religious education programs.

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The Quality of Life in Rural America

By DON A. DILLMAN AND KENNETH R. TREMBLAY, JR.

ABSTRACT: Attempts to measure quality of life (QOL) in rural America have gone through three stages, focusing first on economic well-being, later on a broad array of so-called objective indicators, and finally on subjective evaluations. All remain important to gaining a comprehensive understanding of the QOL in rural America. An analysis of objective conditions points to several areas of deprivation among rural people, especially economic well-being and the receipt of institutional services, but suggests they are better off than urban Americans with respect to their material and social environment. Rural people's subjective assessments are strikingly consistent with the objective conditions of their environment. However, they evaluate their overall QOL more positively than do urban Americans, possibly because they give greater weight to the relatively intangible aspects of their environment. A cautious look at the future suggests the current population turnaround and prospects of resource scarcity are critical factors likely to affect the QOL enjoyed by rural Americans.

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OPINIONS on the quality of life (QOL) being experienced by rural Americans are far from unanimous. There are those who view rural life as one of considerable deprivation, with major human needs going unmet. Rural residents are described by them as the "people left behind," a characterization that refers to far more than the massive rural exodus that has left well over 200 counties in America with less than one-half the number of residents that once lived there and hundreds more with greatly reduced populations. The phrase also depicts the conditions under which large numbers of rural people are seen as living, that is, fewer jobs, lower incomes, fewer educational facilities, poorer health care services, less adequate fire protection, and basically too little of most important services. Population decline in rural areas is viewed as having brought about the weakening of the tax base of rural communities and the deterioration of social institutions. This has resulted in a lack of financial resources and leadership which drastically limits the ability of these rural communities to deal with the critical problems affecting their residents. Thus it is concluded that the QOL in rural America is neither high nor adequate.

Even if rural areas were similar to the rest of the country on the conditions just described, and they are not, a strong case could be made that being rural inherently means being deprived. Both rural and urban America have changed radically since Benjamin Franklin justified his preference for cities by noting that it was only there he could find "the satisfaction of pursuing whatever plan is most agreeable, without being known or looked at." But the role constraints and more regularized lifestyles enforced by the smallness of the rural community remain, and have been something from which many feel the need to escape. In addition, rural communities have a deserved reputation for being harbingers of social injustice. They have been among the last to accept tenets of equality and individualism which have been defined as progressive by the dominant society. Neither are rural areas known for their support of the cultural arts. Size alone makes it impossible for them to provide their residents with cultural facilities—from operas to museums to professional sports—which come close to equaling those found in large cities.

This negative evaluation of rural America is countered by one that focuses on the current social ills afflicting cities and sees rural life as possessing the natural cure. People flocked to the cities in search of opportunity. While many found it, many more found themselves confronted by a complete inventory of society's worst problems—crime, traffic jams, polluted air and water, noise, and racial tension. To live in a large city has meant for many of these people a life that is unsettled and filled with conflict. Ironically, rural America has become viewed by a growing number of Americans as having a higher QOL not because of what it has, but rather because of what it does not have!

Rural life has been idealized ever since Thomas Jefferson's dream of a society of free farmers. Thoughts about a slower pace of life, neighborliness, open spaces, and clean air have exhibited the same magnetic attraction to some people that skyscrapers and symphony orchestras have for confirmed urbanites. Existence of a strong desire for a more rural life has recently become more prevalent among Americans, as indicated by polls and surveys which have repeatedly, and to our know-

ledge without exception, shown the general population to have a strong distaste for life in large cities.[1] In addition, the current reversal of the rural to urban migration trend suggests that these preferences of at least some Americans for rural life is not an idle pipedream. People are beginning to act on their preferences in ways that would suggest they are looking to rural America as a way of improving their QOL. Thus, for this group of Americans, rural America is seen as the place where the good things in life can be found, something like living a contemporary version of the "Waltons" for yourself.

The two views we have stated above, one maintaining that the QOL is lower and the second that it is higher in rural as opposed to urban America, both have some basis of justification. Clearly, there are advantages as well as detriments associated with rural life. Reconciling these viewpoints is made difficult less by different interpretations of the same data than it is by disagreement on what constitutes QOL.

WHAT IS QUALITY OF LIFE?

Efforts to define and measure QOL have gone through three stages. The first, which prevailed for most of this century, tended to equate QOL with economic well-

1. See, for example, Don A. Dillman, *Population Distribution Policy and People's Attitudes: Current Knowledge and Needed Research*, Paper prepared for the Urban Land Institute under a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1973, pp. 27–68; James L. Sundquist, *Dispersing Population: What America Can Learn from Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1975), pp. 24–6; Duane Elgin et al., *City Size and the Quality of Life* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 27–38.

being; not an unreasonable thing do considering the times. Rap economic growth had put substa tially greater purchasing power in the hands of most Americans, th giving them the ability to acqui more of the material goods and se vices they desired. There were fe doubts in anyone's mind, wheth scholar or laborer, that the publ was far better off and closer realization of its dreams, and ther fore a high QOL, than at any time our history. This view prevailed u til shortly after the middle of tl present century.

Ironically, economic prosperi was largely responsible for tl emergence of dissatisfaction wi its adequacy as a singular indicat of QOL. One reason why this o curred has to do with man's seer ingly insatiable appetite for impro ing his life situation. When ce tain wants are satisfied, other wan seem always to surface. Efforts achieve a satisfactory QOL th take on the aura of a never-endi search for which the object is no single tangible item, but rather i provement over one's current situ tion. The economic progress of th century might well be described, Maslowian terms, as having m lower level needs (such as physi logical, safety, and security) to su an extent that people's energies b came free to focus on higher lev needs (such as belongingness, e teem, and self-actualization). Tl search for satisfaction thus switch from concrete goals, whose relatio ship to specific needs was general clear (and realizable by econom means), to more abstract goa whose relationship to needs w often vague even to those in pu suit of them.

A second way in which econom prosperity hastened its own demi as an accurate indicator of QC

stemmed from its interference with the achievement of non-economic wants. For example, the drive for economic wealth treated the environment with wanton disregard. Resources that might have been spent on minimizing the effects of effluents on air and water became wages and profits instead of costs of production. A clean environment became a much desired goal partly because our affluence allowed us to afford it. Yet, a reason for prosperity and the material goods it brought us was our willingness to accept a dirty environment. Economic progress also brought about fundamental changes in the organization and location of industrial activity which extracted severe human costs. Cities, for quite understandable reasons, became centers for a much larger share of the productive enterprise. One reason for this phenomenon was that economic activity had become footloose—by 1971 only about 7 percent of the labor force needed to be located close to natural resources as opposed to 30 percent some 30 years earlier.[2] The phenomenal rise in per capita productivity in agriculture, enabling the farm labor force to shrink while continuing to meet national demand for farm products, was an important component of this change. A second reason for urban growth was the emergence of new sets of locational constraints, which, in general, rural communities could not provide (for example, well-developed utility systems, a full range of transportation facilities, and financial institutions). Large cities thus became the spawning ground and natural place of growth for new industries, the kind best able to pay premium wages and make high profits. As a result of these changes, migration to the cities was inevitable. There is little doubt that these migrants were better off economically than they had been previously. But for many, migration meant breaking family ties and leaving behind cherished lifestyles. It also meant adapting to the kinds of places that polls show people do not want to live. That this adaptation was not entirely successful is suggested by the research finding that the people who most want to move from cities to rural areas are those who once lived there.[3]

The situation seemed almost paradoxical. On the one hand, the attractiveness of economic well-being was so powerful that no other forces could arrest the drive toward it. But once attained, and perhaps taken for granted, people turned to how they might satisfy other wants, including some which had previously been given up for financial gain. Unfortunately, some of these wants, such as clean air and water, had become the victims of economic progress and were no longer readily available. Economic well-being, considered by most to be the original solution to mankind's woes, had itself become the problem, bringing with it the need to rethink the meaning of QOL.

The second stage in development of the QOL concept consisted of its expansion into many areas of life. Emphasis was placed on identifying ways of objectively measuring educational achievement, health services, political participation, leisure time, crime rates, and a seemingly

2. Niles M. Hansen, *Intermediate-Size Cities as Growth Centers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 13.

3. Don A. Dillman and Russell P. Dobash, *Preferences for Community Living and Their Implication for Population Redistribution* (Pullman: Washington Agricultural Experiment Station, 1972), pp. 13–21.

indeterminate number of other conditions that somehow express mankind's wants. Near statistical madness prevailed as researchers rushed to count acres of parks, ratios of people to libraries, and how many suspended particulates were in the air. The development of these so-called objective indicators of well-being raised a new set of issues which could not be satisfactorily answered, however. When one's focus was on economic well-being, more always seemed better. But for many of the new QOL indicators, the question was open as to what goals contributed to a high QOL. For example, are more years of schooling necessarily a good thing? Is there not some point beyond which educational attainment becomes superfluous? And if so, what is that point? These questions might conceivably be given tentative answers except that the expansion to multiple indicators of well-being meant that interconnections among them had to be taken into account. Somehow we must be able to ascertain whether societal resources might be better spent on achieving additional increments of education or equally costly increments of health services or perhaps trading off crime rates against pollution levels.

For some of the objective indicators, the question also arose concerning which direction for change was most desirable. Consider, for example, the divorce rate. Some would consider a rise in the divorce rate as indicative of an increase in family instability and therefore a decline in the QOL. Others could argue that such an increase reflects greater individual freedom and a decline of societal pressures for holding together marriages that were less than satisfying to those involved in them. The essential weakness of the objective indicators movement, then, is the lack of "a commonly accepted social welfare function or value system whose existence is a necessary condition of an efficient indicator of quality of life, meaningful to all people in the nation."[4] Thus, even though this second stage in the development of the QOL concept succeeded in focusing attention on the great need for multidimensional measurement, it fell short of describing exactly what those measures should be and whether specific changes in indicators reflect improvement or decline. It is for this reason that the third and most controversial stage of the QOL concept—the subjective approach—emerged.

Subjective measurement of QOL is based on the seemingly simple assumption that society exists to meet the needs of people in it, and to find out whether those needs are being met we should simply go out and ask them. The focus of concern is on such terms as happiness, satisfaction, sense of well-being, aspirations, and the like. This suggests that to measure QOL in an area such as health services, we should use survey techniques to ask people whether they think their medical needs are being met. Further, we can ask them questions such as whether it is more important to increase certain health services or to expend the same resources on improving educational opportunities. The subjective approach is seen as compatible, and even essential, to the objective indicators movement previously discussed. Without it, we run the risk of concluding that our QOL has been objectively improved, but in

4. Ben-Chieh Liu, "Quality of Life Indicators: A Preliminary Investigation," *Social Indicators Research*, vol. 1 (1974), p. 188.

ways for which we haven't the slightest desire.

Strong arguments have been put forward concerning the limitations of employing subjective indicators to measure QOL as well. One shortcoming of the subjective approach is that major differences may exist between what people perceive to be true and objective reality. A person may honestly believe that his drinking water is of the highest quality, while a bacterial analysis could show that the same water is quite unfit to drink. It is similarly the case that people's perceptions are often individually focused and unrealistic. For example, a resident of a large city might express keen dissatisfaction with any detectable amounts of air pollution and have a strenuous desire to restore previous pristine qualities. Yet, accomplishment of such a goal is most likely unpractical and would result in detrimental effects on economic activity and draw from expenditures allocated to other concerns, such as health and education. Thus, acting on this preference may make little sense. Finally, we might note that expansion of people's frustrations often stems as much from socially based relative deprivation as from absolute deprivation. A physician earning $40,000 per year may be just as dissatisfied as a store clerk earning $2.50 per hour if he perceives his income as being lower relative to other doctors. Such a phenomenon as dissatisfaction, then, cannot be adequately measured simply by using subjective indicators.

It is far from clear what weight should be accorded to subjective indicators of QOL. However, the difficulties involved in making such a decision reflect the reality of the world in which we live as well as the inherent difficulties of assessing the QOL that a nation provides its people. In defense of employing the subjective approach in measuring QOL, Frank M. Andrews points out that there are "some reasons to believe that 'subjective' indicators provide at least as objective measures of what they intend to assess as do the 'objective' indicators of what *they* try to assess."[5] But the fact that subjective indicators are just as adequate as objective indicators in assessing QOL gives us little comfort, for each fails to measure certain aspects of QOL. We have attempted to make clear the notion that each stage in the development of the QOL concept has introduced concerns not adequately handled by the others, and that each has its limitations. The earlier stages discussed are thus by no means obsolete, as concern with objective indicators and economic well-being remains high. The conclusion we reach is that QOL assessment needs to consider the concerns of all three dimensions of QOL, as we shall endeavor to do in this paper.

WHAT IS RURAL?

We cannot ignore the need to specify what is meant by "rural," a term which conjures up different connotations to different people. Some consider all people residing outside a metropolitan (metro) area (that is, a county or group of contiguous counties in which there is at least one city, or twin cities, with a population of 50,000 or more) as being rural. Others accept the traditional U.S. census definition of rural (that is, residents of open country

5. Frank M. Andrews, "Social Indicators of Perceived Life Quality," *Social Indicators Research*, vol. 1 (1974), pp. 281–82.

and towns of less than 2,500), regardless of the metro distinction. A third way of thinking about the meaning of rural, and one which we prefer, is along the lines of a range of ruralness, as set forth by Fred K. Hines and his associates. On the basis of this method, a range of ruralness can be inferred (for example, from least to most rural) by population size of either counties or cities. A flexible definition of rural is advantageous, even necessary in this paper, inasmuch as data relevant to examining the QOL in rural America have been collected using a variety of definitions, sometimes allowing for gradations in ruralness but in most instances only a dichotomous distinction between rural and urban.[6]

OBJECTIVE INDICATORS OF QOL

Selecting areas of concern on which to base an assessment of objective QOL requires some degree of arbitrariness, as there is no agreed upon list of what constitutes an adequate set of topics. Our selection has been guided by the results of community problem surveys and the QOL literature in general. Both suggest a number of topics which are areas of high concern for most Americans, and thus important components of QOL.

Economic well-being. If it were necessary to pick just one indicator to evaluate QOL, there is good reason for making it an economic one. An indicator such as "family income" is a general measure of the resources that a family has at its disposal for meeting its various needs, whatever they might be. This aspect of convertibility consistent with one's subjective preferences makes such a measure qualitatively different from most other measures, such as housing and education, which indicate levels of achievement that require expenditures of one's resources.

No matter which indicators of economic well-being are used to assess the QOL of rural Americans, the conclusion is basically the same—rural areas are worse off than urban ones, and the more rural the area the greater the discrepancy. In 1969 the median family income for the United States was $9,590. Nonmetro residents earned only $7,615, less than three-fourths of the $10,406 earned by metro residents. People living in the most rural areas (for example, counties not adjacent to metro areas with no towns greater than 2,500) earned only $6,142, or 59 percent of the income of metro area residents. It should be mentioned that the effect of these differences on people's lives is somewhat less than might be imagined inasmuch as the cost of living in rural areas is somewhat lower. Unfortunately data are not available for making precise comparisons, but those which exist suggest that cost of living differences make up for less than half the differences in actual income. As one might expect based on the data just presented, rural areas have more of the nation's poor. About 20 percent of all nonmetro residents, as compared to 1[illegible] percent of metro residents, are considered to be living below the poverty level. In the most rural counties more than one out of every four persons are classified as living in poverty.

6. For a brief overview of the uses of "rural," see Fred K. Hines, David L. Brown, and John M. Zimmer, *Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population in Metro and Nonmetro Counties, 1970* (Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1975), pp. 3–6.

Overall, the 1960s saw a somewhat greater improvement in the economic well-being of rural Americans than among their urban counterparts. As a share of the total population of the United States, the proportion of low income nonmetro persons declined from 22 percent to 14 percent. Incomes of all nonmetro residents increased by 79 percent during the same time, compared to a 68 percent gain for metro residents. However, it is important to recognize that in terms of absolute dollars of income, the gap widened to some degree, with metro family incomes increasing an average of $4,195 while nonmetro family incomes went up $3,337.[7] Thus, differences between rural and urban incomes remain, and seem likely to continue.

Education. Formal education is widely accepted as one of the most important indicators of QOL. The vast majority of all occupational positions in American society have certain minimum educational requirements which must be met. To gain entry into the most desirable occupations and professions requires even higher levels of educational achievement. Furthermore, simply living and participating in our increasingly complex society demands skills which our system of formal education seeks to impart.

It can be safely suggested that rural residents have less formal education than their urban counterparts. In 1970 the median number of school years completed by people living in metro areas was 12.2 versus 11.2 for all nonmetro residents. In the most rural counties, educational attainment drops to only 9.9 years. It is disturbing to note that the high school drop-out rate is also higher in rural areas. The percent of 16- to 17-year-old children not enrolled in school is 9.5 in metro counties and 13.6 in nonmetro counties. Consistent with previously discussed patterns, the most rural counties have the highest proportion (15.2 percent) of children in this age group not enrolled in school.[8] This suggests that the disadvantageous position of rural people is likely to persist into the future. Contributing to the difficulties of improving educational attainment in rural areas is the lack of vocational training and other post-high school opportunities made unavailable by low population densities and inadequate tax bases. Rural residents who seek such opportunities must often commute long distances or move to a larger place. In the past, most of the young people who have opted in this direction for greater education have, in effect, bought a one-way ticket to the larger cities, the only places where their newly acquired job skills could be profitably applied.

Health care. One of the most pressing and difficult to resolve problems of rural Americans may well be that of health care. It is a problem comprised of several dimensions, of which the availability of medical personnel is one of the most important. In 1970 there were twice as many physicians per 100,000 people in metro places as there were in nonmetro places. It was also true that the more rural the area the greater was the lack of physicians—counties of less than 10,000 people had an average of one physician for every 2,103 persons compared to 700 for the nation as a whole and 450 for the largest cities.[9]

7. Ibid., pp. 44–60.

8. Ibid., pp. 23–8.

9. For a discussion of physician shortages in rural America, see, for example, American

Particularly missing in rural areas are the highly trained specialists which form the foundation of modern medicine. In addition, rural doctors are older, generally work more hours, and are less up to date on medical advances than their urban counterparts. The situation of rural physicians applies to other realms of the medical enterprise as well, as rural areas are characterized by shortages of pharmacists, nurses, dentists, and other medical personnel.[10]

Perhaps the unavailability of health services in rural areas is reflected best by the fact that such services are used less frequently by rural people. For example, nonmetro residents average 4.1 trips to the doctor per year while metro residents average 4.8 visits.[11] And this difference can hardly be due to a lower need for medical attention on the part of rural Americans. In fact, rural areas exhibit a higher incidence of chronic disease, more days lost from work due to illness, and a greater rate of work-related injuries. The most rural areas also experience morbidity and infant mortality rates far in excess of the general population.[12]

The pattern that these data suggest is of a chain that is difficult to break—fewer medical personnel, contributing to the practice of less preventive medicine, and as a result a greater need for medical services. The difficulty of attacking health problems is accentuated by the seemingly insurmountable barrier of low population density, which is often much less than the minimum needed to support medical specialists and their even more specialized and expensive life-saving equipment. Although considerable effort is being expended by both state and federal government to improve health services in rural areas, the situation may even worsen before it becomes better. One indication of this speculation becoming reality is that the older doctors practicing in rural places are dying or retiring and not being replaced. In fact, between 1963 and 1970 the number of rural counties with no physician at all increased from 98 to 132.[13]

Housing. The quality of housing is of interest to us for several reasons. To a vast majority of Americans, housing represents more than just shelter. As the most immediate aspect of one's community living experience, it shapes people's lives. At the same time it is the frequent object for expression of people's drive for improvement, and thus reflects well-being in other dimensions of life. Further, money spent on one's home is, for most families, the largest single consumer expenditure they make.

In general, rural housing does not compare well with that found in urban places. Although there is a higher incidence of home ownership by nonmetro residents (70

Medical Association, *Distribution of Physicians in the U.S., 1970* (Chicago: American Medical Association, 1971).

10. Edward D. Martin, "The Federal Initiative in Rural Health," *Public Health Reports*, vol. 90 (July–August 1975), pp. 292–94.

11. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Health Characteristics by Geographic Region, Large Metropolitan Areas, and Other Places of Residence, U.S., July, 1963–June, 1965* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Health Statistics, 1967); cited in Peter A. Morrison et al., *Review of Federal Programs to Alleviate Rural Deprivation* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1974), p. 53.

12. M. H. Ross, "Rural Health Care: Is Prepayment a Solution?" *Public Health Reports*, vol. 90 (July–August 1975), p. 298.

13. Morrison et al., *Programs to Alleviate Rural Deprivation*, pp. 53–4.

percent versus 60 percent for metro residents), the median property value of that housing was only $12,200 in 1970 while that for metro areas was $19,000. Those people living in nonmetro housing were also more likely to live in relatively crowded conditions, as there was an average of 3.32 persons per household compared to 3.04 in metro housing in 1970. Of housing without adequate plumbing, about one-third are located in metro areas and about two-thirds in nonmetro areas.[14] Finally, the quality of drinking water delivered to rural homes is lower than that received by urban homes, partially a result of their reliance on individual wells while urban homes are serviced by processing plants which ensure the purification of water.[15] These discrepancies between rural and urban housing reflect far more than differences in what people can afford. The averages we have reported are greatly influenced by the fact that the vast majority of new homes have been built where population growth has been greatest—namely, in urban areas. The absence of building codes and a shortage of credit in rural areas are other important factors limiting rural housing. Essentially, it can be suggested that in rural America the building of homes has often been viewed as an expenditure likely to depreciate, whereas in fast growing metro areas it has been an investment from which sizable returns were likely to be achieved.

Crime. During the last decade, fear of crime has consistently appeared near the top of the list of concerns expressed by Americans. At the same time, it is generally recognized as one of the advantages of life in rural areas. A sizable and persuasive quantity of data exists to support this view. For example, while metro areas reported a murder rate of 11 victims per 100,000 residents in 1974, it was only 8 in nonmetro areas. The incidence of aggravated assault was more than twice as high in metro areas (243 versus 112 per 100,000), and robbery was more than 13 times as high (274 versus 20 per 100,000). Similar results are found for the occurrence of property crimes, as urban areas reported greater rates of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. These differences may be even more striking if we consider that criminals in urban places go unnoticed to a greater extent than is the case in rural areas. In addition, rural police are slightly more successful than their urban counterparts in solving criminal offenses—clearing 24 percent of all crimes compared to 21 percent in metro areas.[16] Greater safety from crime and violence appears to represent a clear advantage of rural life.

Environmental quality. The environment came into its own as a major dimension of QOL in the late 1960s, largely a result of people's growing awareness of the environment around them and the tell-tale signs of environmental deterioration—air pollution, water pollution, high noise levels, and the like. Objective data confirm people's intuition that cities are noisier, the air dirtier, and the water more polluted than rural areas. And the

14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population and Housing* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

15. Commission on Rural Water, *A Program for the Future—Water and Sewer in Rural America* (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Rural Water, 1974), p. 6.

16. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports, 1974* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

larger the city, the worse the environmental conditions get, reaching hazardous levels in some instances.[17] For example, urban residents have a greater chance of being exposed to "unacceptable" noise levels as well as breathing air that can help lead to emphysema, asthma, and similar respiratory disorders.[18] In some places, large-scale urbanism also creates conditions contributing to a poorer climatic situation, that is, less sunshine, more rain, and higher temperatures.[19] Finally, scenic beauty is most likely lower in urban areas. Generally, there are more trees, open spaces, and natural recreational sites in a rural location. Obviously this higher level of environmental quality found in rural areas is partially a result of low population density, precisely the factor contributing to a low QOL on previously discussed dimensions.

Recreational activity. Increasing amounts of people's time are spent in some form of recreational activity, making it an important dimension of QOL. Generally, rural people participate in recreational activity to a somewhat lesser degree than do urban people. For example, the number of activity days per person is lower among rural residents—91 days versus 97 days per year for urbanites. The types of activities engaged in differ significantly between rural and urban residents as well, with rural people participating more in outdoor-oriented activities (for example, fishing, hunting, and camping) and urban people engaging more in activities requiring developed facilities.[20] These results are not surprising. Low population density and the scarcity of funds severely limit the ability of rural areas to build and support tennis courts, movie theaters, bowling alleys, and similar facilities. However, this lack is compensated to a considerable degree by the availability of outdoor activities that often cannot be provided in cities, at any price.

In general. One of the greatest difficulties of evaluating objective measures of QOL is that no satisfactory means exists for adding them up into an overall index. And even though we have done little more than scratch the surface with the above seven dimensions, albeit important ones, we believe some general conclusions are justified. The overall picture is mixed, with rural Americans scoring well on some conditions of life but not on others. Deprivation is most likely to be experienced in material well-being and the receipt of institutional services. The lack of educational and health services we have noted can be extended to the availability of legal aid, counseling services, and other specialized activities of all sorts. Some of the same conditions (for example, low population density) making it difficult for such services in rural America to be on a par with those of urban America also make it possible to maintain a high quality material and social environment. However, this leaves us with a question that cannot be resolved by objective evaluation alone—namely, which conditions are most important to rural people?

17. See, for example, Council on Environmental Quality, *Environmental Quality—1975* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); Alfred Van Tassel, ed., *Our Environment: The Outlook for 1980* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

18. Elgin et al., *City Size*, pp. 97–100.

19. Ibid., pp. 102–4; see citation, p. 104.

20. U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, *1970 Survey of Outdoor Recreation Activities* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

This is an issue which can only be addressed by turning to the realm of subjective indicators.

SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS OF QOL

Researchers have only recently begun systematic inquiry into the subjective aspects of QOL. Those studies which have been done tend to differ in a fundamental way from those which have examined objective conditions of QOL. Whereas the latter have focused individually on each domain of life, inquiries into the subjective realm have given primary attention to generalized feelings of well-being. That the starting place for subjective evaluation of QOL has been on measures which transcend and find a balance among all life conditions is rather ironic, inasmuch as overall measures summarizing objective conditions remain a much sought but yet-to-be-realized goal. This does not mean that subjective measurement is any easier. Researchers have not yet agreed on the best method for measuring QOL; to date, a variety of approaches have been used—from asking people's "satisfaction" and "happiness," to having them select from lists of words those which best describe their life. The verdict has yet to be reached on which method or methods provide the most valid measures of people's subjective perceptions.

Although relatively few studies have been done, most of which allow only gross rural-urban comparisons and lack comparability with one another, a fairly clear image of the QOL rural Americans think they are experiencing is beginning to emerge. In the most ambitious study yet undertaken, a sense of well-being scale was carefully developed using responses to several questions. Results from this recent national study by Angus Campbell and his associates show that people's sense of well-being increases consistently as one moves from large cities to rural places.[21] Rural-urban differences persisted even when the influence of income, the strongest single predictor of well-being, was controlled. The findings are given increased strength by the discovery that strong correlations existed between a generalized measure of well-being and life satisfaction in 17 life domains (such as housing, health, and education). Perhaps most important is the authors' conclusion that reports of a global sense of well-being that can be meaningfully viewed as a composite of feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with a variety of more specific domains of life.

Differences in sense of well-being reported above need to be interpreted in the context of overall levels of well-being. People throughout America report high, nearly overwhelming, satisfaction with their lives. In response to a direct question about their overall satisfaction with life, one component of the well-being scale, only 7 percent indicated a sense of dissatisfaction. The proportion of people dissatisfied with specific life conditions averaged about the same as that for overall satisfaction, with the exceptions of educational attainment and savings where dissatisfaction was somewhat higher. We conclude, then, that although the subjective sense of well-being increases with ruralness, the differ-

21. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers, *The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976); see, especially, pp. 51–3 and 222–37.

ence between urban and rural places most certainly is not the difference between whether or not people are generally satisfied with their lives.

A second approach to examining the subjective aspects of QOL has relied on the concept of "community" satisfaction. Focusing on people's evaluations of their community is appropriate in that it is the arena in which jobs are normally provided and institutional services offered, both of which greatly influence QOL. Angus Campbell and his colleagues found that suburbs, small cities, and towns were usually rated best on specific community attributes. While rural areas ranked lower, though still ahead of the larger cities, on the items of garbage collection, public schools, police-community relations, police-protection, public transportation, and streets and roads; they were ranked best by their residents on the attributes of levels of local taxes, climate, and parks and playgrounds. Somewhat surprising in light of the foregoing was the finding that people's overall sense of community satisfaction ascends sharply and consistently with decreases in urbanization and is decidedly higher for rural places. While urban residents tended to be less satisfied with the whole than among any of the parts, rural people were more satisfied with the whole than any one of the parts. This finding is supported by a number of state-wide surveys which have found that although rural people rated access to certain services (particularly medical care) lower than their urban counterparts, their overall community satisfaction was higher.[22]

One plausible explanation for the higher overall rating of rural communities is suggested by those same state surveys—rural people rate their communities higher on nonservice items, some of which are of an intangible nature. And, in the final evaluation, these qualities are given more weight than is the lack of certain services. For example, in one survey metro residents rated theii communities as best on all income and service items (such as availability of good paying jobs, streets and roads, and education), whereas nonmetro residents, and particularly those from the most rural counties rated their communities highest or air quality, safety from crime anc violence, and desirability as a place to raise children.[23] In another state it was reported that ruralites fel that access to the outdoors, oper spaces, and friendliness of people were advantages that offset service inadequacies.[24] Similarly, a recen national survey of the elderly, a sub population of special interest be cause of their greater need for loca provision of services, showed tha those who lived in rural communi ties were more than twice as likel

22. See, for example, Anne S. Williams, Russell C. Youmans, and Donald M. Sorenson, *Providing Rural Public Services* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1975); Don A. Dillman Annabel Kirschner-Cook, and Richard Fernandez, *Community Satisfaction and Population Redistribution Policies* (Pullman: Washington State Agricultural Research Center, in process); James A. Christenson, *Through Ou Eyes: Community Preferences and Population Distribution* (Raleigh: North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, 1974); James A. Christenson, *North Carolina Today and Tomorrow: People's Views on Community Services* (Raleigh: North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, 1976).

23. See Dillman, Kirschner-Cook, and Fernandez, *Community Satisfaction*.

24. See Stan Albrecht, *Rural Development Its Dimensions and Focus* (Logan: Department of Sociology, Utah State University 1974).

(50 percent versus 23 percent) to be satisfied with their community than were those living in cities of over 250,000 people.[25] Thus, substantial support exists for the notion that the inadequacy of certain services is offset by the presence of other qualities in rural places.

A different indicator of community satisfaction is found in the numerous community-size preference surveys which have been done.[26] Without exception, these surveys have shown large city residents more interested in moving to rural places than are rural residents in moving to cities. Whereas surveys show that only 4 out of 10 urban residents want to remain in the city, fully 9 out of 10 rural residents want to stay just where they are.[27] Virtually none of those living in the smallest communities prefer trading their life situation for that found in the large cities. Finally, it might be noted that in recent years rural residents have been much more likely to think that their communities were getting better as places to live than were residents of cities and suburbs.[28]

The picture that begins to emerge of people's perceptions of QOL is now somewhat clearer. Overall, satisfaction among all Americans is high. Even so, differences in generalized feelings of well-being do exist between rural and urban Americans and tend to favor living in rural areas. Rural people are well aware of the shortcomings of their communities, especially the inadequacy of important services. In fact, their perceptions in this regard are remarkably consistent with the objective evaluations we discussed earlier. However, these inadequacies are balanced by the more positive evaluations of other community qualities by rural people, some of which are of a relatively intangible nature and are often omitted from objective evaluations of QOL.

THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Recollections of how quickly outmigration from rural America turned to in-migration and cheap plentiful energy disappeared during the first half of the present decade compel us to be cautious in making any predictions of the future QOL of rural Americans. While the safest methods of prediction have long involved extrapolation from the past, the possibility that we are exiting from an age of economic bounty and entering a new period of resource scarcity calls our past assumptions of the world into question. We are now only beginning to grope for the correct assumptions to make about the future. Thus a discussion of possibilities rather than probabilities seems most prudent.

One factor which must be considered as having a high potential for substantially changing the QOL of rural people is the current population turnaround, if it continues. Increased economic activity and higher population densities resulting from this turnaround are likely to do more to improve educational opportunities, medical care, and other institutional services than artificial stimuli could ever hope to

25. Lawrence M. Hynson, Jr., "Rural-Urban Differences in Satisfaction among the Elderly," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 40 (Spring 1975), p. 65.

26. See, for example, Elgin et al., *City Size*; Dillman and Dobash, *Preferences for Community Living*; Glenn V. Fuguitt and James J. Zuiches, "Residential Preferences and Population Distribution," *Demography*, vol. 12 (August 1975).

27. William Watts and Lloyd Free, eds., *State of the Nation* (New York: Universe Books, 1973), p. 81.

28. Elgin et al., *City Size*, p. 36.

accomplish. Rural population growth will not be an unmixed blessing, however. Even modest increases for communities long on the decline, and now populated predominantly by homogeneous long-term residents, are likely to have dramatic impacts. New residents with city-bred beliefs are likely to question the values of long-term residents and even their cherished ways of getting things done. Conflict may well be the result of sudden increases in heterogeneity. Further, those objective aspects of QOL on which rural America scores high (such as environmental quality and crime) are partially a result of low population density. An increase in population may decrease the ability of rural areas to provide these advantages. Even though we can expect services to improve as a result of population growth, its contribution to the QOL of rural areas may be offset by a decline in the more intangible qualities that have made rural communities rank so high on subjective evaluations of QOL.

For years we have been reminded of the inextricable link of urban and rural America which closely ties the fortunes of one to the other. It is becoming increasingly clear that the future of rural areas is similarly linked to the affairs of the world as a whole. Now that the capability of creating energy and other crucial resource shortages rests in foreign capitals, "uncertain" is the word that seems to come closest to describing future hopes. Another round of energy shortages, resulting in substantially higher prices, would likely create special difficulties for rural residents. For many of these people, the fact that a city is only an hour or two away from their garage door, behind which sits their own private car, has done more than anything else to make rural America not only livable, but the most desirable place to be. Should energy shortages threaten individualized travel, people in sparsely populated areas, where mass transport is least feasible, will likely suffer the most. Further, any shortages of material goods would seem most deleterious to rural people, inasmuch as they are at the ends of the distribution lines, the usual place where cutbacks are made first.

Perhaps the most significant concern which looms ever more boldly on the horizon is a reversal in our material standard of living. If it occurs, this could shift the whole QOL issue from how to improve it to how to hang on to what we already have. Past changes in QOL give us little idea of what such a transformation would be like. In any event, the uncertainty that clouds our view of the future suggests the need for increased monitoring of QOL and more efforts to increase our understanding of it, fundamental necessities for policy decisions aimed at providing the best that is possible.

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Population Redistribution, Migration, and Residential Preferences

By GORDON F. DE JONG AND RALPH R. SELL

ABSTRACT: Census Bureau population estimates for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas in the 1970s reveal, for the first time in over 50 years, higher population growth and net in-migration for nonmetropolitan areas than metropolitan areas. This dramatic and largely unanticipated reversal in the traditional population growth pattern is not limited to nonmetropolitan areas adjacent to metropolitan centers, but is also happening in many of the remote nonmetropolitan counties. In this article, the impact of residential preferences on population dispersal migration behavior is analyzed by means of data from a longitudinal migration survey. The widespread preference for small cities, villages, and the countryside identified in public opinion polls is not the significant factor in nonmetropolitan migration. Rather, population dispersal migrants are characterized by the willingness and apparently better ability to give up the urban-based conveniences to shopping, work, and public transportation to live in nonmetropolitan environments. Barring the crippling effect of an energy crisis, the medium-range prospect for continued nonmetropolitan population growth appears plausible.

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THE dominant trend in population distribution and internal migration in the United States during the twentieth century has been an increase in the urban and a decline in the rural population, due primarily to an almost continuous flow of rural to urban migrants. However, recent data from the Census Bureau indicate that the rural to urban pattern of population change may have halted or even been reversed. The first indications came with the estimate that during the 1970–73 period, nonmetropolitan area population increase was 4.2 percent compared to 2.7 percent for metropolitan areas.[1] What has been the historical setting for the recent evidence concerning population redistribution? What are some of the explanations for the changing pattern of population distribution? Specifically, is the metropolitan-to-nonmetropolitan pattern of population distribution in part explained by attitude preferences for the qualities of life or lifestyle of nonmetropolitan areas? We explore these questions and some possible factors influencing future metropolitan-nonmetropolitan population distribution patterns in the United States.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1900 TO 1970

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States has been characterized by the dual dimensions of moderately rapid overall population growth and the redistribution of this growth through large-scale migration of people from rural farming areas to towns and cities. The broad outlines of these two population phenomena are presented in table 1 which highlights the basic shifts in United States population distribution over the last 70 years. During this time, the total population of the United States increased 2.7 times over the 1900 figure. But the population within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (as defined by 1960 SMSA boundaries) increased 4.4 times, while the population outside SMSA boundaries was only 1.4 times the 1900 population. In every decade from 1900 to 1970, the proportion of people living in metropolitan areas increased. Since the average family size for families in nonmetropolitan areas throughout this period was larger than in metropolitan areas, the increasing metropolitan structure of our population was in large part a consequence of the flow of migrants from America's nonmetropolitan areas, although during the first few decades metropolitan growth was also enhanced by substantial immigration from foreign countries.

Since our discussion of population distribution in the United States will focus on metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, it is important to note how these terms differ from the rural-urban classification. The Census Bureau defines a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as:

> a group of contiguous counties which contain at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more, or "twin cities" with a combined population of at least 50,000. In addition to the county or counties containing such a city or cities, contiguous counties are included in an SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are essentially metropolitan in character and are socially and economically integrated with the central city[2]

1. Calvin L. Beale, *The Revival of Population Growth in Nonmetropolitan America* (Washington, D.C.: Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS-605, June 1975).

2. United States Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20,

TABLE 1

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1900 TO 1970

Census Year	Total United States Population	Within SMSA's*				Outside SMSA's	
		Total	%	Within Central City	%	Total	%
1900	75,994	31,836	41.9	19,785	26.0	44,158	58.1
1910	91,973	42,028	45.7	27,122	29.5	49,944	54.3
1920	105,711	52,508	49.7	34,641	32.8	53,203	50.3
1930	122,775	66,712	54.3	43,070	35.1	56,063	45.7
1940	131,669	72,576	55.1	45,473	34.5	59,093	44.9
1950	150,216	88,964	59.2	52,138	34.7	61,252	40.8
1960	178,467	112,385	63.0	57,710	32.2	66,082	37.0
1970	202,143	130,257	64.4	61,452	30.4	71,886	35.6
1970†	202,143	138,790	68.7	63,472	31.4	63,353	31.3

SOURCE: Irene B. Taeuber, "The Changing Distribution of the Population in the United States in the Twentieth Century," in the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population, Distribution, and Policy*, vol. 5, ed. Sara Mills Mazie (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 78, table 19.

* Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) boundaries as of 1960 have been used to eliminate effect of additions and deletions of areas from the SMSA classification.

† SMSA boundaries as of 1970.

The census definition of urban has changed several times since 1900, but in general people living in places with population greater than 2,500 are classified as urban residents. Thus, people living in isolated places between 2,500 and 50,000 population would be classified as urban but not metropolitan, and conversely people living in sparsely populated areas of metropolitan counties might be classified as rural. In 1900, 60.3 percent of the United States population was classified as rural and 58.1 percent as nonmetropolitan while by 1970, 26.3 percent was classified as rural and 31.3 percent as nonmetropolitan.[3] Even though nonmetropolitan and rural do not define equivalent categories, the population dynamics using either definition result in much the same pattern for the large majority of the United States population now classified as both urban and metropolitan.

Table 1 also indicates that even though Americans increasingly live in metropolitan areas, the central cities of these areas are declining in population. This trend, which started in the 1930s and accelerated since 1950, indicates the well-known suburbanization phenomenon. The dynamics of urbanization in the United States has thus included limited decentralization within metropolitan areas.

The large-scale migration which accompanied metropolitan population growth often has been cited as evidence for nonmetropolitan population decline. However, the

No. 285, "Mobility of the Population of the United States: March, 1970 to March, 1975" (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975).

3. Irene B. Taeuber, "The Changing Distribution of the Population in the United States in the Twentieth Century," in the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population, Distribution, and Policy*, vol. 5, ed. Sara Mills Mazie (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 31–108.

data in table 1 indicate that while the rate of growth for the nonmetropolitan population was less than for the metropolitan part, the number of nonmetropolitan residents continued to increase slowly throughout this century. Many small towns and rural areas, of course, have actually declined in population, but in each decade since 1940 the percentage of growing small towns in nonmetropolitan areas has consistently been greater than the number of small towns declining in population;[4] and it has been the small towns with populations greater than 2,500 which have demonstrated the greater capacity for continued population growth during this period.

EVIDENCE FOR A CHANGE IN THE 1900 TO 1970 TREND

Since the United States presently takes a complete census every 10 years, evidence of changes in population growth and migration patterns since 1970 must be based on less complete count data sources. Between the decennial censuses the Census Bureau makes estimates of population for counties, and although individual county estimates may sometimes be inaccurate, in grouped form these estimates provide a reasonably accurate picture of population changes. County population estimates can now be validated against independent record systems such as Social Security recipients and aggregated Internal Revenue Service returns. These sources generally confirm the picture which emerges from census estimates. Using the Census Bureau's 1974 definitions of SMSA boundaries, Calvin Beale and Glenn Fuguitt have convincingly demonstrated that the long-term net outflow of people from metropolitan America was halted between 1970 and 1973.[5] In the 30 years from 1940 to 1970, about 9 million more people left nonmetropolitan areas than moved into them, but in the three-year period between 1970 and 1973, over 1 million more people moved into nonmetropolitan areas than left them.

An important question is to what extent this migration turnaround phenomenon is an aspect of continued suburbanization, a trend which dates back at least to the 1930s. To provide at least a partial answer to this question, nonmetropolitan counties were grouped as adjacent to SMSA's and not adjacent to these larger cities. These data, summarized in table 2, show that although counties adjacent to metropolitan areas are slightly more likely to have increased in population than are nonadjacent counties (68 percent versus 60 percent), nonmetropolitan population growth in the 1970s has not been confined to areas within commuting distance of metropolitan centers. When compared with net inmigration for the 1960–70 decade, the migration turnaround in table 2 actually has been more dramatic in the nonadjacent counties.

In addition to county population estimates, the Bureau of the Census conducts a monthly Current Population Survey. In March 1975 this survey of over 50,000 households asked people where they lived in

4. Glenn V. Fuguitt, "Population Trends of Nonmetropolitan Cities and Villages in the United States," in the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population, Distribution, and Policy*, vol. 5, p. 117.

5. Calvin L. Beale and Glenn V. Fuguitt, *The New Pattern of Nonmetropolitan Population Change* (Madison: Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Working Paper 75-22, August 1975).

TABLE 2

PERCENT OF COUNTIES GAINING POPULATION BY NET MIGRATION
1950–60, 1960–70, 1970–73

COUNTY DESIGNATION	1950–60 (%)	1960–70 (%)	1970–73 (%)	N
Metropolitan	58	62	68	(630)
Nonmetropolitan	12	22	63	(2470)
adjacent to an SMSA*	17	30	68	(1009)
not adjacent to an SMSA	10	18	60	(1461)
All counties	21	31	64	(3100)

SOURCE: Calvin L. Beale and Glenn V. Fuguitt, *The New Pattern of Nonmetropolitan Population Change* (Madison: Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Working Paper No. 75-22, August 1975), p. 23, table 3.
* SMSA—Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

March 1970. Based on answers to this question, the Census Bureau estimates that, between 1970 and 1975, 6,721,000 people left metropolitan areas while 5,127,000 moved into metropolitan areas.[6] This represented a gain of 1,594,000 people through migration by America's nonmetropolitan areas. By comparison, for the five-year period between 1965 and 1970, 352,000 more people moved *to* metropolitan areas from nonmetropolitan areas. Including population change from natural increase as well as internal and international migration, the Current Population Survey estimates the 1970 to 1975 population increase was 3.6 percent for all metropolitan areas in the United States and 6.3 percent for all nonmetropolitan areas.[7] Current Population Survey and county population estimates, along with the collaboration of Social Security and Internal Revenue Service records, lead to the conclusion that the metropolitan-nonmetropolitan pattern of population redistribution is real, that the phenomenon is widespread, and that it is not confined to areas immediately surrounding metropolitan areas. Clearly an increasing number of Americans are choosing to move beyond the daily influence of metropolitan living toward those areas which have historically provided the population for our cities.

6. United States Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 285.

7. United States Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 292, "Population Profile of the United States: 1975" (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976).

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF NONMETROPOLITAN POPULATION GROWTH

The current state of the arts on regional population growth and economic development does not provide a well integrated, high level theory to explain the recent population trends in nonmetropolitan America. Rather there seems to be several general sets of tentative hypotheses that emerge from empirical analyses, such as the county population change research of Calvin Beale and Glenn Fuguitt.[8]

One of the major theories of spatial population growth patterns is suggested in the urbanization

8. Beale and Fuguitt, *The New Pattern of Nonmetropolitan Population Change.*

literature of human ecology.[9] The fundamental social processes which underlie urbanization are industrialization and the accompanying increased specialization in the labor force and the spatial differentiation of population and land-use patterns. Population distribution patterns are primarily affected by the migration of people in response to industrial location and residential class and ethnic heterogeneity. Consistent with these basic processes is the hypothesis of metropolitan decentralization outward from metropolitan central cities to suburban rings and beyond into "exurban" nonmetropolitan areas. From this perspective, the population spillover is largely in areas of physical proximity and accessibility to a metropolitan center with transportation routes facilitating the commuting pattern of the spillover population to work places within the metropolitan region. Consistent with this theory, Calvin Beale and Glenn Fuguitt's analysis shows that nonmetropolitan counties adjacent to metropolitan counties did increase in population during the 1970–73 period. However, the rate of population increase in these nonmetropolitan counties was not as rapid as the rate for entirely rural counties which were not adjacent to a metropolitan area. Thus, it would appear that urbanization theory provides only a partial explanation for the recent nonmetropolitan population growth trend.

A second possible explanation for nonmetropolitan population growth emerges from a related fundamental tenet of human ecology that residents in a community seek to maintain an equilibrium between their numbers and the life chance or sustenance activities presented by the social organizations within a community.[10] Thus an increase in employment opportunities leads to an increase in the size of the population that can be supported in a community. These dynamics, in turn, frequently change the pattern of in- and out-migration. Consistent with this theory is the attempt to explain nonmetropolitan population growth as a function of industrial development in nonmetropolitan areas. Again, Calvin Beale and Glenn Fuguitt's evidence suggests that nonmetropolitan counties with an above average proportion of the labor force employed in manufacturing did increase in population and experienced net in-migration during the 1970–73 period. Overall, however, the increase in industrial activities, as indicated by employment in manufacturing, is a relatively weak explanation for the newly emerging nonmetropolitan population growth trend. Nationally, the rapid increase of service industries represents the significant new area of employment opportunities, and as of yet many of these opportunities are only beginning to locate in nonmetropolitan areas.

A somewhat stronger explanation for the recent nonmetropolitan population growth is the presence of a senior state college within the county. This explanation can be seen as a long-term latent consequence of earlier decisions concerning the

9. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society* (New York: Ronald Press, 1971).

10. Amos H. Hawley, "Human Ecology," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, 1969), pp. 328–32; and W. Parker Frisbie and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Components of Substenance Organization and Nonmetropolitan Population Change: A Human Ecological Investigation," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 40 (December 1975), pp. 773–84.

spatial location of state supported institutions of higher education. The relative importance of this explanation for the recent population trend is closely tied to the current effects of the post-World War II "baby boom" in the United States. However, the primary causal factor in the location of the state colleges, as well as the spatial location of military bases and other governmental expenditures, is public policy decision making. The latent, sometimes unanticipated impact of public policy on population distribution in the United States is different in kind but not in its effect from the more direct population dispersal policies of many European countries.[11]

A fourth and stronger potential explanation that emerges from Calvin Beale and Glenn Fuguitt's analysis focuses on noneconomic factors which seem to attract people to counties that can be characterized as retirement and recreational areas. Frequently located near mountains, lakes, or other areas of natural beauty, the high net in-migration to these counties is consistent with the general hypotheses that residential preferences for areas with noneconomic amenities are playing a significant role in determining migration and population redistribution to nonmetropolitan areas. The available evidence for counties does not permit an adequate test of this general thesis of migratory motivational factors, but we have data from a longitudinal survey which will permit us to explore the impact of residential preferences on population dispersal migration behavior.

Residential Preference and Migration Behavior

The emergence of personal preference in migratory behavior is emphasized by the geographer Wilbur Zelinsky in his analysis of internal migration patterns at different stages of national socioeconomic development.[12] He notes that in the most advanced and affluent societies, residential change and movement have become a way of life. Furthermore, the most distinctive feature about migration in advanced societies is the emergence of noneconomic motivations for migration. With specific reference to America, he hypothesized "that the increasingly free exercise of individual preferences as to values, pleasures, self-improvement, social and physical habitat, and general life-style in an individualistic, affluent national community may have begun to alter the spatial attributes of society and culture in the United States."[13] The pointed emphasis on a range of individual preference factors, particularly the possible impact of residential preference factors on population dispersal was considered significant enough to be included in the deliberations of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future.

Theoretically, residential preference is a dimension of an individual decision-making model of migration

11. James L. Sundquist, *Dispersing Population: What America Can Learn from Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1975); and Gordon F. De Jong, "Population Redistribution Policies: Alternatives from the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Israel," *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 56 (September 1975), pp. 262–73.

12. Wilbur Zelinsky, "The Mobility Transition," *The Geographical Review*, vol. 61 (April 1971), p. 247.

13. Wilbur Zelinsky, "Selfward Bound? Personal Preferences and the Changing Map of American Society," *Economic Geography*, vol. 50 (April 1974), p. 144.

designed to be applicable to specific migration streams (in this case, streams affecting nonmetropolitan area population change). Two general approaches to residential preferences research emerge from the literature. The first approach examines residential preferences as a factor in housing and/or intra-urban neighborhood choice, while the focus of the second is on the issue of size of place preference and population dispersal. The interest of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future was on this latter approach, due in large part to the results of public opinion polls which have reported for some time now Americans' strong preference for living in smaller cities, towns, and rural areas rather than in large cities.[14]

Size of place preference has been studied by Glenn Fuguitt and James Zuiches with a national sample and by the author in a report on Pennsylvania population redistribution.[15] In respect to size of place preferences, the results of these two studies are much the same in that they markedly qualify the public opinion poll conclusions. It appears that while nearly three-fourths of the respondents do not want to live in a large city, neither do they want to live very far away from one. When respondents expressed a preference for a location by the degree of proximity to a large city of over 50,000 people, there is a marked preference for smaller towns and rural areas within commuting distance (about 30 miles) of a large city. Population growth has, in fact, taken place in these exurban residential area commuting zones, but many more distant nonmetropolitan areas have also experienced population increase and net in-migration. What emerges from this type of preference data is that, although people seem to want a small town or rural environment, they also want it to be near a metropolitan center.

14. James J. Zuiches and Glenn V. Fuguitt, "Residential Preferences: Implications for Population Redistribution in Nonmetropolitan Areas," in the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population, Distribution, and Policy*, vol. 5, pp. 621–30.

15. Glenn V. Fuguitt and James J. Zuiches, "Residential Preferences and Population Distribution," *Demography*, vol. 12 (August 1975), pp. 491–504; and Gordon F. De Jong, "Residential Preference Patterns and Population Redistribution," in Wilbur Zelinsky et al., *Population Change and Redistribution in Nonmetropolitan Pennsylvania, 1940–1970*, Report submitted to the Center for Population Research, National Institute of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1974.

SIZE OF PLACE PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION BEHAVIOR

Attempting to relate where surveys say people prefer to live with census data on population change does not provide a direct test of the hypothesis that size of place or urban proximity preference is a factor in population dispersal migration behavior. We were able to test this hypothesis by means of a longitudinal survey of 1,096 Pennsylvania households, starting in spring 1974, of whom 227 had changed residences by the time of a spring 1975 follow-up survey.[16]

A major finding is the striking incongruity between the size of place where people say they want to live and the actual size of place of destination of their move one year

16. Gordon F. De Jong and Ralph R. Sell, *Residential Preferences and Migration Behavior*, Report submitted to the Center for Population Research, National Institute of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1975.

later. A total of 58 percent actually located in the central city or suburb of a large or medium-size city while only 24 percent had expressed a preference for such a size of place. By comparison, 42 percent actually located in a smaller city, village, or the countryside while 76 percent stated a preference for these size of place locations. Most of those who were able to attain their preferred size of place were movers preferring the same size of place as they lived in one year earlier. Other than these people, only 11 percent of movers preferring a smaller size of place than their area of origin were able to attain that preference. Clearly, many people who expressed a preference for a smaller city, village, or countryside location actually moved to a larger sized place, while relatively few actually moved to a smaller sized preferred location. We repeated the analysis using preferences about proximity to a metropolitan center, but the basic findings remained the same. We thus conclude that residential preferences expressed in terms of small city, village, or the countryside, or proximity to a city location seem to have little relationship to actual population dispersal migration behavior. This conclusion does not minimize the favorable orientation to rural and small town life expressed by respondents. However, the findings do suggest that the links between size of place preference statements and area destination of movers one year later are not straightforward. One of the possible explanations is that size of place categories and proximity to a large city are relatively unimportant concepts to respondents when it comes to actual location decisions. These categories may be surrogates for specific home, community, or area attributes or characteristics which members of the household desire. It is to a test of this possible explanation that we now turn.

Residential Preference Attributes and Migration Behavior

As part of our longitudinal survey of Pennsylvania population redistribution, respondents were presented with an extensive list of 47 preference attributes about characteristics of residential locations. These included attributes of a new house, new neighborhood, the work situation in a new location, physical and cultural attributes of a new region, and convenience attributes of a new location. Respondents were asked to indicate whether each item was a very important, important, or not important characteristic to have if they could move to a new location. Our focus is on households which moved in a nonmetropolitan direction even though some of the new residential locations are within the outer suburban or exurban parts of a metropolitan area.

To test the hypothesis that residential preference attributes rather than size of place preferences are important in metropolitan to nonmetropolitan migration, we present a comparative analysis among metropolitan households that between the spring 1974 survey and the follow-up survey one year later had moved out of a metropolitan center, moved elsewhere, or did not move. Our analysis is guided by Georges Sabagh and associates' approach of identifying factors on which nonmigrants may differ from movers changing locations in various directional streams.[17] Using grid coordi-

17. Georges Sabagh, Maurice van Arsdol, Jr., and Edgar Butler, "Some Determinants

TABLE 3

MEAN RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE ATTRIBUTE SCORES AND DIFFERENCES AMONG METROPOLITAN NONMOVERS, NONMETROPOLITAN DIRECTION MOVERS, AND OTHER METROPOLITAN AREA MOVERS

	Move Status				
	Nonmovers		Nonmetropolitan Direction Movers		Movers
Preference Item	Score	Difference	Score	Difference	Score
Weighted N	1002		33		90
Convenience to work	1.8	.2	2.0	.4	1.6
Convenience to shopping	1.6	.5	2.1	.4	1.7
Safeness of streets	1.4	.2	1.6	.3	1.3
Public transportation	1.8	.4	2.2	.3	1.9
Cost of housing	1.4	.1	1.5	.2	1.3
Availability of parks	2.1	.3	1.8	.1	1.7
Convenience to recreation	2.2	.1	2.1	.1	2.0
Spaciousness of yard	2.0	.3	1.7	.1	1.8
Quality of schools	1.7	.3	1.4	.1	1.5
Availability of entertainment	2.5	.3	2.2	.1	2.3
Contact with people	2.4	.3	2.1	.1	2.2
Opportunities for culture	2.4	.2	2.2	.0	2.2
Convenience to church	1.8	.2	2.0	.0	2.0

SOURCE: Gordon F. De Jong and Ralph R. Sell, *Residential Preferences and Migration Behavior*, Report submitted to the Center for Population Research, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1975, table 9.

NOTE: Scores represent means of the responses to questions pertaining to how important the characteristic would be in a new home, neighborhood, or area. Response categories were 1 = very important; 2 = important; 3 = not important. Differences of greater than .2 are conservatively significant at the .1 level.

nates of respondents' postal zones obtained from a cross listing of latitudes and longitudes of zip codes, a household was defined as in a metropolitan toward nonmetropolitan stream if: (1) at the time of the first survey in 1974 the household was located in the urbanized area of a large (over 500,000 population) or medium-sized city (50,000–500,000 population); (2) the area of destination was not another urbanized area; and (3) the distance from the new location to the nearest metropolitan center was further after the move than before the move. Other movers are primarily intra- and inter-metropolitan movers in households which at the time of the first survey lived in a large city, suburb of a large city, or medium-sized city and relocated in an area not included in the above stream. Nonmovers are those urbanized area households which did not change residence between the first survey in spring 1974 and the follow-up survey in spring 1975. During this period, 3 percent of all metropolitan area households in our sample moved in a nonmetropolitan direction, 8 percent were classified as other metropolitan movers, primarily local movers, and 89 percent did not move.

Residential preference attributes which differentiate nonmetropolitan direction movers from other metropolitan area movers and nonmovers

of Intrametropolitan Residential Mobility: Conceptual Considerations," *Social Forces*, vol. 48 (September 1969), pp. 88–9.

are shown in table 3. Nonmetropolitan direction movers listed quality of schools as a most important factor to look for in a new location. Other very important factors were the cost of housing and living in the new area, the safeness of streets, spaciousness of a yard, and the availability of parks. In general, these are items for which satisfaction should be facilitated by the nonmetropolitan move. Items for which the mean preference score indicates responses tending toward the less important end of the scale are more generally the metropolitan based qualities of public transportation, availability of entertainment, and opportunities for culture.

Turning to a comparison of the 13 items which showed substantial difference between at least two of the three groups, the three items that were more important to the people who did not move represent factors which are in fact easier to satisfy in more urban environments: public transportation, convenience to shopping facilities, and, to a lesser extent, convenience to church. Nonmetropolitan direction movers reported less importance for public transportation and shopping convenience, and hence their moves in a direction which indicates less ease in obtaining these services and amenities were probably facilitated by a lack of preference for these more metropolitan based services. On the "attraction" or "pull" side, the four items for which the nonmetropolitan direction movers show the greatest preference—spaciousness of yard, quality of schools, availability of entertainment, and opportunities for contact with people—were also important to other metropolitan area movers. In other words, all metropolitan area movers have a greater preference for these factors when compared with respondents who did not move.

The data suggest a similar interpretation for safeness of streets, cost of housing, and convenience to work, which were items most important to the other primarily local metropolitan area movers. These items are least important for nonmetropolitan direction movers, with nonmovers in between. This suggests that safeness of streets is important to the more local metropolitan area movers possibly because they will stay within the metropolitan environment where presumably the safeness of streets issue is more salient. Cost of housing may be less important for nonmetropolitan movers, because, as will be shown below, these movers have higher incomes and better jobs than other movers and nonmovers. Nonmetropolitan direction movers do not consider convenience to work as particularly important, and this perhaps represents a trade-off condition they are willing to accept to live in a nonmetropolitan area.

SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF NONMETROPOLITAN MOVERS

Because family and socioeconomic status characteristics are such important factors in mobility behavior, we analyzed selected characteristics of metropolitan nonmovers, nonmetropolitan direction movers, and other metropolitan area movers. Several rather substantial differences among the groups are evident (table 4). When compared to nonmovers, nonmetropolitan direction movers are on the average 17 years younger, have almost two years more education, are in occupations with a higher socioeconomic status, and have incomes averaging about $1,500 higher. The income figure is particularly salient since nonmetropolitan direction movers are younger and presumably have less labor

TABLE 4

SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF METROPOLITAN NONMOVERS, NONMETROPOLITAN DIRECTION MOVERS, AND OTHER METROPOLITAN AREA MOVERS

	MOVER STATUS		
CHARACTERISTICS	NONMOVER	NONMETROPOLITAN DIRECTION MOVER	OTHER MOVERS
Weighted N	1002	33	91
Age of head of household	50.2	33.3	34.7
Education of head (yrs. completed)	11.2	14.0	12.6
Total family income: 1973 ($)	9,200	10,700	8,400
Socioeconomic status of head	43.9	59.0	47.7
Household type (% nuclear family)	62.3	83.5	57.4
Average household size	3.3	3.1	3.4
Marital status (% married, spouse present)	68	87	64
Sex of head (% male)	74	92	74
Race (% nonwhite)	20	11	15

SOURCE: Gordon F. De Jong and Ralph R. Sell, *Residential Preferences and Migration Behavior*, Report submitted to the Center for Population Research, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1975, table 10.

force experience than do nonmovers. Family characteristics indicate that nonmetropolitan direction movers are more likely to be headed by a male and be a husband and wife family unit without other relatives than are metropolitan nonmovers. The average household size is slightly smaller, which is reflected in the nuclear family structure. The proportion of nonwhites among these movers is only about half (11 percent versus 20 percent) that of nonmovers.

When compared to other metropolitan area movers, nonmetropolitan direction movers average only about a year younger, rather than the 17 year differential when compared to nonmovers. Since the ages of these groups are quite similar, comparisons on the remaining factors have greater meaning since, in general, income, education, and household size are all strongly related to age. Nevertheless, nonmetropolitan direction movers have completed almost one and one-half years more schooling, are in occupations over 10 points higher in average socioeconomic status, and have over $2,000 greater incomes. The fortuitous control for age between the two mover groups makes these findings particularly noteworthy.

CONCLUSIONS

While size of place residential preference was only minimally related to actual population dispersal migration behavior, we have identified some residential preference attributes which characterize nonmetropolitan direction movers. A high proportion of all metropolitan area movers expressed a preference for quality schools, spacious yards, availability of entertainment, and opportunities for contact with people. However, the crucial point seems to be, what are people willing to give up in order to attain these preferences, at least some of which are associated with a nonmetropolitan environment? It appears, given the low preference strength, that people moving in the nonmetropolitan direction are willing to give up the urban based items of con-

venience to shopping and work and public transportation. In the process, they are probably willing to pay more for housing. It thus appears that movement to satisfy preferences is contingent upon qualities that a household is willing to forgo or can realistically expect to circumvent in the movement to nonmetropolitan areas.

The social and demographic characteristics of nonmetropolitan direction movers help to explain the findings that, although there is widespread preference for smaller-sized places and amenities associated with these places, few people can act to satisfy their preference. Metropolitan people who actually moved toward nonmetropolitan areas are probably better able to satisfy their preferences due to their higher status positions and integrated family situation which often afford less dependence on a given spatial locality. The higher average income of nonmetropolitan migrants facilitates a reliance on a private car as opposed to public transportation, and this may make less convenient shopping of little consequence. The energy-related character of the interaction between residential preference attributes, social and economic characteristics of households, and population dispersal migration behavior becomes quite apparent. However, we must caution that, as with other relationships between attitudes and behavior, it is likely that extensive research will be necessary to identify the important dimensions and circumstances through which the numerous individual and household constraints, needs, resources, and preferences interact to precipitate a decision to migrate to a nonmetropolitan area.[18]

THE FUTURE OF POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

Although we have touched upon some current population estimation problems which must be confronted in determining the reality of the current metropolitan and nonmetropolitan growth trends, these technical issues do not provide a basis for assessing the long-term prospects for continued nonmetropolitan population growth in the United States. Population projection is at best an art and not a science, and to engage in such an enterprise with such sketchy evidence as is currently available is to risk total repudiation. The admonition notwithstanding, it is possible to identify some of the factors that would appear to underlie a continuation of the metropolitan to nonmetropolitan growth trend for the future. Some are facilitating factors, while others have their roots in more basic structural changes in the American society.

Heading the list of facilitating factors for nonmetropolitan population growth are communication and transportation advancements which permit business and personal interaction over wider areas of space. Telecommunications, interactive computing systems, as well as modernized highways are illustrative of the factors which permit the relocation of individuals, industry, and business to places increasingly remote from centers of industrial and commercial activity. The future would seem to bode a continuation of these communication-transportation developments and with it a continued facilitating factor for nonmetropolitan population growth.

18. Howard Schuman and Michael P. Johnson, "Attitudes and Behavior," in Alex Inkeles et al., eds., *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 2 (Annual Reviews Incorporated, 1976).

As a higher rate of urbanization is inexorably tied to a high rate of national population growth, so a lower rate of urban population growth is linked to the current United States trend toward a zero population growth society. Rural fertility is declining, further reducing urbanward migration response pressures. A low rate of total population growth also alters the long-term age distribution of the population toward an increased proportion of older citizens and a decreased proportion of young people who traditionally dominate metropolitan direction migration streams. As was noted earlier, many retirement areas are currently in the vanguard of nonmetropolitan population increase. A forecast of a continuation of the current below-replacement level rate of national population growth cannot be made with certainty; however, there is no evidence at present to indicate a return to the post-World War II fertility pattern of more than three children per family.

A third facilitating factor for nonmetropolitan population growth is the general level of affluence of the United States population. Increased commuting costs is but one example of the trade-offs which are often involved in the move to nonmetropolitan areas. While an increase in the general level of affluence of the United States population is by no means assured in the years ahead, an enhanced level of real income seems more probable than the reverse condition.

With these facilitating factors providing a favorable milieu for continued nonmetropolitan population growth, what are some of the basic structural factors which may determine the continuation or reversal of nonmetropolitan population growth? We suggest at least five basic factors.

Demographic factors. Future nonmetropolitan population growth is undoubtedly tied to the depletion of the excess reservoir of farm labor which has resulted from the modernization and mechanization of the rural farm enterprise in the United States. Facilitated by the reduction in rural fertility, the excess farm labor source of past rural to urban migrants has now been sharply curtailed. Correlated with this demographic factor is the increased ability of nonmetropolitan residents to find employment in the nonfarm sectors of nonmetropolitan area economics. Continuation of these trends would portend a reduction in the gross out-migration of nonmetropolitan workers.

Economic factors. The sometimes erratic trend in the national and international economic system is undoubtedly an important factor in the future of nonmetropolitan population growth. Periods of high national unemployment, particularly high industrial unemployment, have traditionally been associated with the reduction in the economically motivated "pull" of urbanward migration. High urban unemployment also contributes to return migration which for many migrants involves a nonmetropolitan destination. It is certainly significant that nonmetropolitan population growth has also occurred in many European countries and Japan during the early 1970s—a time of world economic recession.

Social-cultural factors. The past 10 years have been difficult times for urban government and urban institutions. To many of our citizens, the result has been a lowering of the quality of life, particularly in some of the older and larger metropolitan areas in the country. The host of social and environmental issues which compose the "urban problem"

have undoubtedly tarnished the "bright lights" that attracted many migrants to the cities. Severe urban problems are not characteristic of all United States metropolitan areas, however, as most cities under 750,000 population, and especially cities in the South and West, have continued an above average rate of population growth. An important parameter of future nonmetropolitan population growth may be the reemergence of the image of large cities as desirable places to live and work.

Population distribution related policy factors. Although the United States may not develop population dispersal policies similar to those in many European countries, the latent impact of state and national policies on population redistribution trends cannot be ignored. Regional economic developments including tourism and retirement development programs, regional variation in federal spending, urban rehabilitation efforts, land use policies, taxation policies, and racially related policy decisions and practices are but an illustrative list of the often conflicting policy-based forces which affect the locational decisions of business and industry as well as individuals and families. If the situation in other industrial nations is any guide, continued uncontrolled urbanization and significant regional economic differentiation will become of increasing policy concern.

Residential preferences. As we have demonstrated in this paper, residential preferences for nonmetropolitan areas are correlates of metropolitan to nonmetropolitan migration. Although it is possible that there has been a recent increased preference for nonmetropolitan areas, the more reasonable position suggests the preexistence of such a preference structure for many Americans. However, it may be only in recent times that constraints have been reduced enough so that these preferences can be attained by some people. If this line of reasoning is correct, we would expect residential preference factors to continue to exert an influence toward nonmetropolitan population growth.

In summary, we find some factors which argue for and others against continued nonmetropolitan population growth. At present, the numerical superiority of metropolitan-to-nonmetropolitan as opposed to nonmetropolitan-to-metropolitan migration is small and significant primarily in its departure from the past trend. It is possible that the future may see a fluctuating pattern of year-to-year variation in metropolitan-nonmetropolitan population balance. Barring the potentially crippling effect of an energy crisis on nonmetropolitan residents, the medium-range prospect for continued nonmetropolitan population growth appears to be highly plausible. Such a fundamental change in the basic population distribution trend may hold some desirable, as well as undesirable, consequences for the future of nonmetropolitan America. Can the nation and the states afford to foster such nonmetropolitan growth communities and assume higher capital costs of infrastructure and the higher operating costs of providing essential services over greater distances? Who should assume the higher costs? What are the consequences for metropolitan areas in population decline? And most important, how will population redistribution affect the happiness and quality of life of Americans?

Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

IERBERT S. DINERSTEIN. *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962.* Pp. xiv, 302. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. $14.95.

This book is a useful addition to the lready voluminous literature analyzing ıe Cuban Missile Crisis. It provides a etailed examination of the way in which ıe elites of Cuba and the Soviet Union iewed events leading to and during the risis. Written by a distinguished student f Soviet foreign policy, the interpreta- ion relies heavily on an exhaustive nalysis of the Cuban and Soviet press of he period.

One thesis that the author develops is ıat the understanding that Cuban, oviet, and United States elites derived om the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 significantly contrib- ted to how the three countries dealt vith the development of the Cuban evolution. United States elites were npressed with how easily a regime ould be toppled. Soviet elites saw the pisode as evidence of American trength in the Caribbean, and both oviet and Cuban elites were convinced hat the United States had a strong propensity to intervene to block reform and revolution With the memory of what had happened in Guatemala, the United States could unleash the Bay of Pigs invasion, not fearing that it would develop into the fiasco that it did. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union saw the invasion as confirmation of United States hostility toward leftist regimes, but both also saw the failure of the invasion as a sign of a shift in the balance of forces in the Caribbean and Latin America to the detriment of United States influence. Their fear of what the United States might attempt was heightened, but they also became somewhat contemptuous of the United States ability to order the course of events in the area. With these understandings, emplacing Soviet missiles in Cuba could seem to be a relatively low risk strategy for promoting the security of the Castro regime.

Emplacing Soviet missiles in Cuba could also serve other purposes of the U.S.S.R., and a second major thesis that Dinerstein advances is that there were different views within the Soviet Union about the proper course to be followed, particularly during the height of the crisis. This position is most persuasively argued by a careful, comparative analysis of the themes stressed in the Soviet Government Statement of 23 October

1962, and in the editorials in *Red Star*, *Pravda*, and *Izvestia* on 24 October 1962. Unexpectedly faced with Kennedy's resolve to remove the missiles, Khrushchev was prepared to back down, but there appeared to be some within the Soviet Union who wanted to challenge the United States determination, and those willing to compromise appeared to hold a spectrum of views.

Neither thesis is completely new; the contribution of the book is to provide detailed support for the arguments. The book also provides a fascinating chronology and analysis of the interaction among Castro, the *Partido Socialista Popular*—the Cuban communist party, and the Soviet Union. The Cuban revolution did not follow the Marxist-Lenist prescription for colonial countries, and eventually the Soviet Union was confronted with a self-proclaimed communist who after incorporating the PSP into his own Integrated Revolutionary Organization would purge several of the long-time leaders of the previously existing communist party. The situation could have posed a portentous dilemma for the Soviet Union, but Soviet policy appears to have promptly and pragmatically settled on support of Castro. This story has also been recounted previously, most recently in Alain Joxe's *Socialisme et Crise Nucléaire*, but never with such attention as Dinerstein has given to Soviet sources.

Because of the nature of the sources relied on in this book particularly for the analysis of Cuban and Soviet policy, much of the interpretation is inevitably speculative. Dinerstein acknowledges this, and he argues that his function is as much to raise questions as to provide answers. His attempts with respect to both purposes are wise, balanced and judicious. If one were to read only a single analysis of the famous crisis this book would not be appropriate, but it would be essential in a list of several analyses.

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MATTEI DOGAN, ed. *The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants*. Pp. 313. New York: Halsted Press, 1975. No price.

Eighteen European contributors have produced fourteen national analyses and cross-national comparative studies of eleven contemporary European political elites. Most of the difficulties and pitfalls of similar previous works (excessive abstraction, endless model building, unreasonable jargon, and prolonged description and definition) have been avoided in this well-integrated and obviously collaborative volume so ably organized and edited by M. Dogan of the *Centre National de la Rercherche Scientifique*.

In addition to a crisp and pointed introduction by the editor, there are two pieces each on the British and French high civil servants, three on Lowlander bureaucrats (two on Belgium and one on the Netherlands), one each on Italy, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia and Poland, and a highly competent comparative synthesis on attitudinal perspectives in Bonn, London, and Rome. If central public administration is the focal point, then the disturbing absence of the Brussels "mandarins" of the European Community is a minor defect of this otherwise invaluable production.

All of the essays provide the particulars on the augmented scope of modern state bureaucracy and the parallel decline of parliamentary power. The emphasis is on the economic role of government, mainly the budget process, nationalized industries and central planning, which are the basic ingredients for this massive transfer of power from legislative entities to the senior state officials. Many specific and unique factors have favored the growth of civil administrators, such as administrative centralization and ministerial instability in France, Italy's prefectoral system, the Dutch proclivity to select top bureaucrats as ministers, or the Belgian practice of institutionalizing ministerial cabinets of civil servants in quasi-political posi-

tions. Different relationships between power and politicization are evaluated, with Polish and Belgian politicized and relatively powerless administrators contrasted with the French and Swedish lack of partisanship and strong influence and power. Variants of public elites exist and are depicted, but similarities of the new technocrats appear frequently. The vast technostructure they populate appears more complex and difficult to comprehend than the mandarins themselves.

In the process of locating and dissecting top civil servants within pluralistic power structures, this book documents the decline of the traditional mandarins (the ambassadors and prefects) and the rapid ascent of the finance and business trained and oriented chiefs who control the summits of the administrative hierarchies. The essential and penetrating point about these *appointed* modern mandarins who have often displaced the *elected* politicians in many sectors of power is that they all derive their strength from the executive and importantly function as decision-makers in collectives such as agencies, commissions, boards, or committees. This survey sheds significant light on the advantages and limitations of this change in the power factor as it has moved from parliaments to executives and ministers to the top civil servants.

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CHARLES FRANKEL, ed. *Controversies and Decisions: The Social Sciences and Public Policy*. Pp. v, 299. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. $10.00.

From tentative beginnings around the turn of the century, involvement in policy making by the social sciences expanded slowly in the interwar period, becoming significant in national affairs after World War II. However, at the very time social science involvement peaked in the 1960s a series of misadventures, beginning with the aborted Project Camelot, began to call it into question. The crisis of confidence in government following upon disillusionment with the IndoChina War, the Watergate scandals and revelations of illegal activities by the C.I.A. and F.B.I. created an atmosphere of suspicion around liaisons between government and the social sciences. It is hardly surprising, in view of these developments, that a series of reviews of the promise and risks in the involvement of the social sciences in policy making have been undertaken recently. Of them *Controversies and Decisions* is without peer.

The essays comprising *Controversies and Decisions* fall into two general groups: one seeking to answer the charge from both the extreme left and extreme right, that no line can be drawn between "is" and "ought" and hence, ultimately, between science and politics; another which accepts the view that science (including social science) is an objective study of matters of fact which thrives when permitted autonomy and encouraged by an atmosphere of freedom, but which nevertheless faces grave risks of corruption when its findings are employed, as they inevitably will be, in the formation and execution of social policy.

Among the first group of essays: Charles Frankel defends the distinction between "is" and "ought" introduced by Hume and Kant and forming a tradition culminating in Max Weber; Stephen and Jonathan Cole present evidence for the role of universalistic (objective) criteria in the determination of the award system of science; Hugh Hawkins traces the uneven progress of the separation of objective social science from social reform; Robert Nesbit traces the sources of Weber's concepts of value-neutrality and academic freedom to the ideas and practices of Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Among the second group of essays: Lee Cronbach traces the career of the public controversy over mental testing; Yaron Ezrahi reviews the Jensen controversy, the recent form of the nature-

nurture dispute; Paul Doty explores the ambiguities in scientific roles when they polarized on opposite sides of the Anti Ballistic Missile debate; Kenneth Boulding employs the imagery of ecology to locate the precise niche of science in the total framework of human affairs; H. Field Haviland traces the growth over time of social science involvement in public policy making; Adam Yarmolinsky formulates the contrasts in time schedules and suppositions as between social scientists and public policy makers; and Edward Shils explores problems in the simultaneous legitimation and public use of social science.

To all persons fascinated by the Faustian bargains so often struck when science makes itself the handmaiden of power, this book of essays will be of interest.

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DAVID B. ROBERTSON. *A Theory of Party Competition*. Pp. x, 210. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. $15.95.

Since its founding in the early 1960s, the University of Essex has established a reputation for having a first rank political science program. In part this book is a by-product of the stimulating intellectual atmosphere associated with Essex political scientists such as Jean Blondel, Anthony King, Ian Budge, Anthony Barker, and Michael Taylor.

David Robertson's book reflects the empirical and mathematical bent which characterizes the political science curriculum at Essex. The book is a detailed re-examination, critique, and extension of the theory of party competition that Anthony Downs, an economist, formulated twenty years ago in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Moreover, this book reviews various subsequent refinements and interpretations of Downsian theory. Robertson contends that Downs overlooked elements essential to a theory of party competition—for example a failure to attend to the differing motives of party voters, party activists, and party leaders. The argument is detailed, complex, and at some points, disjointed. Robertson posits several additional hypotheses to the basic Downsian theory and then proceeds to test them.

For data, Robertson uses the results of British general elections but mainly the party manifestoes (1924–1966), and the election addresses of individual candidates for the House of Commons. These are subjected to various quantitative research tools: content analysis (of themes—not individual words—in the manifestoes and speeches), factor analysis, regression analysis, path analysis, and various diagrammatic presentations. The manifestoes are the basis for examining the shifting appeals of the two major parties over a forty year period. Election addresses of candidates in 50 sample constituencies each from the 1924 and 1955 elections and the results in those constituencies are employed to examine the impact of party appeals at the level at which a voter makes his decision, that is, the constituency rather than the nation as a whole as is the case only for presidential systems. Basic to these enterprises are Robertson's dual assumptions that voters are essentially rational and that party identification is critically defective in explaining voter behavior. Overall the book is provocative and often persuasive.

Unfortunately, the book is marred by several copy errors and other inattention to scholarly detail. For example, decimal points are missing from several tables that report loadings for factor analysis; the notation or numbering system for chapter subjections is inconsistent and confusing; there are numerous spelling errors such as Herig for Henig (pp. 36 and 210), cannons for canons (p. 141), Eysack for Eysenck (p. 56), and Duvergar for Duverger; and the citation form—the author's name followed by publication date in parentheses—makes the reader a slave to *passim* if he wishes to pursue the citation. Finally, there is no index, which greatly limits the reference quality of the work.

Despite these flaws, specialists in voter behavior and democratic theory should peruse the book. Those who

are uncomfortable with quantitative methods can easily absorb chapters 1, 2, 6 and the three appendices.

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ARTHUR ROSETT and DONALD R. CRESSEY. *Justice By Consent*. Pp. xiii, 227. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1976. $10.00.

This is an excellent primer on plea bargaining for pre-law and law enforcement students, recent law school graduates and those inexperienced persons concerned with the daily functioning of the American criminal justice system. Plea bargaining is one of the most important and controversial issues of the day. The authors, a professor of law and a professor of sociology—two of the nation's most prominent scholars, point out that "... of the one hundred adults arrested on felony charges and arriving at the front door of an American courthouse . . . only two or three will be escorted out the back door . . . to a state prison" (p. 34).

Each chapter deals with a different aspect of plea bargaining. For example, Chapter 4 discusses the role that judges perform. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the special problems of prosecutors and public defenders. Chapter 8 is of special importance for it systematically rejects the principal demands for reform of plea bargaining advanced by its critics. Finally, all eight chapters are cleverly linked by describing in each chapter the daily experience with plea bargaining of an imaginary person who had been arrested and charged with burglary in the first degree.

There is one significant disappointment that requires some discussion. The authors mistakingly equate plea bargaining, the administration of justice with rendering justice. They attempt to persuade the reader that negotiation and compromise, the etiquette necessary for successful plea bargaining, constitute justice. Justice is reduced to mere form or procedure. The substantive aspects of justice ,such as sameness of treatment, impartiality and predictability are ignored.

Plea bargaining is never recognized for what it is, simple arbitrariness. And arbitrariness has always been the antithesis of sameness of treatment, impartiality and predictability. This arbitrariness forces an accused person to stand helpless before the authorities. His or her fate is determined by expediency, rather than more noble societal values. The rule of law is imperiled. In conclusion, if this work is to be really beneficial, the reader ought to have first read a first-rate philosophical treatise on the meaning of justice. John Rawl's *Theory of Justice* (1971) is an excellent example of such a work.

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JOHN D. STEINBRUNER. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis*. Pp. xi, 366. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. $14.50.

John Steinbruner has attempted something laudable but difficult: to construct a general theory and then to show that it illuminates a complicated event. The theory is cybernetic decisionmaking; the event, the rise and demise within the NATO alliance of the multilateral nuclear force (the MLF). The book is divided evenly between a theoretical discussion of three paradigms of decisionmaking (the analytic, the cybernetic, and the cognitive) and a careful, rich reconstruction of the MLF debacle from 1956 through 1964. Others may disagree, but I do not find that the MLF case demonstrates the validity of the cybernetic paradigm for analyzing how large, fragmented, competitive, executive bureaucracies deal with intractable foreign policy problems. It is not that the theory has no utility whatsoever (although, as will be argued below, I find the theory to be counter to the political essence of statecraft); but rather that the MLF case substantiates the theory only weakly and, indeed, perhaps not at all.

In the theoretical section, Steinbruner

focuses on two central facets of foreign policymaking: first, how decisionmakers cope with the uncertainty of their craft; second, how they deal with the ofttimes inherent conflicts among the goals they pursue.

In dealing with uncertainty, Steinbruner follows the tradition of Simon, March, and Lindblom. He rejects what he calls the analytic paradigm (what Simon called "economic man" and what Lindblom called "synoptic rationality") because it requires that statesmen, in order to make decisions, have perfect or nearly perfect information about their circumstances. The analytic paradigm does not accurately describe the way decisionmakers operate because it stipulates conditions that cannot be met. It is the second requirement of the analytic, paradigm, however, with which Steinbruner is centrally concerned. The heart of his theory is this: a decisionmaker does not integrate values; instead, he separates them. The failure to construct tradeoffs occurs both because of the complexity of the issues to be analyzed and because of the strivings of the human mind toward consistency in its beliefs. Statesmen can handle complex issues only by breaking them down into their simpler component parts and then by giving each part to the organizational subunit most knowledgeable with its intricacies. These units will analyze the component part according to their standard operating procedures, which means that they will consider only a few, highly selective variables and will provide solutions that protect or enhance only their vested organizational interests. Partial solutions based on selective analysis and on vested interests are not likely to yield careful tradeoffs among conflicting goals. Modern governments, by nature fragmented, thus facilitate value separation.

What governmental institutions separate the human mind does not put back together. When told that there is an inherent conflict among his goals, either a statesman will deny that such a conflict exists by arguing that the goals are unrelated to one another; or, he will assert that the goals are supportive by arguing that the attainment of one will facilitate the attainment of the other(s). Outright denial is more common than rationalized support; both occur because the mind strives toward consistency (harmony) among its beliefs. Thus, the cybernetic part of Steinbruner's theory tells us that top level decisionmakers by necessity must parcel out complex problems to subunits that consider only a few variables when choosing from among options. The cognitive part tells us three additional things: first, these top level statesmen initially make categorical judgments about what is desirable and attainable; second, subsequent evidence to the contrary is not likely to alter those judgments; and, third, therefore, when faced with conflicts among the partial solutions offered to them, decisionmakers will not construct the careful tradeoffs necessary for an optimal solution.

Does the MLF bear out the postulate of value separation? Consider the two value problems that NATO presented to American presidents from 1956 through 1964. First, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson wanted to maintain (or acquire, depending on your perspective) centralized (American) control over any nuclear war that NATO might fight; second, they wanted to respond in part to the Europeans' desire to regain autonomy over their own fates and in particular to assuage their doubts over America's nuclear guarantee to them, doubts that were generated by Russia's presumed lead in nuclear forces and then by America's flexible response doctrine. (The emphasis on conventional defense in flexible response seemed to Europeans to cast doubt on the reality of the American nuclear umbrella.) Centralized, presidential control over the use of nuclear weapons was designed to minimize the chances of nuclear war occurring and to keep damage to a minimum if it did occur. The attempt to redress Europe's loss of independence was designed to preserve the cohesion of the NATO alliance and to halt or reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons among its member states. The first goal, however, conflicted with the second. The only way the Europeans could truly

regain their sense of independence from the United States would be to acquire or augment their own nuclear forces. America's continued control over Europe's fate was at loggerheads with America's attempt to aid Europe in regaining control over its own fate. It was impossible to proliferate and not to proliferate nuclear weapons with the same policy.

The MLF attempted the impossible. America would assist the Europeans in developing a European nuclear force, but she would retain a veto over its use. The original proposal made by the Kennedy Administration required that any MLF which materialized be integrated fully with America's strategic nuclear forces (the retention of the American veto); but it also promised that the United States would be flexible on the issue of control over firing (the relaxation of the American veto). There was a rationale to this apparent madness: once the Europeans became deeply involved in planning the details of a joint nuclear force, they could be educated by the Americans into the horrors of nuclear war, into the need to maintain rigorous, deliberate control over it should it occur, and, consequently, into the need for centralized (presidential) conduct of it. The MLF offered many different things to many different people; but to Kennedy it offered a chance to resolve his NATO dilemma even though he always remained dubious of the MLF's chances of success.

Were there any alternatives to the MLF? This is not an idle question. Before one can dismiss the MLF as a poorly constructed policy, one must present a viable alternative. Steinbruner presents only one, but then promptly offers compelling evidence for rejecting it. Rather than sharing nuclear weapons the Administration could have shared nuclear information, such as its targeting plans and intelligence data. Presumably, this was done beginning in 1965, after the demise of the MLF. Why not before? Steinbruner states that such candor was rejected out of fear that it would heighten, not diminish, the Europeans' desire for their own nuclear forces. Sharing information risked "... opening up for stark review the vulnerability of Europe to Soviet IRBMs" (page 212). By 1965 or 1966, the United States would have enough ICBMs to target those IRBMs; but in 1961 and 1962, it did not.

When viewed together with America's massive ICBM buildup, the MLF does make some sense. It was a device that might have bought time until America could confront the Europeans with her massive superiority. By itself, it might even have moved the Europeans to acquiesce more completely in their dependence on the United States. The MLF and the massive American buildup of ICBMs in the early 1960s were two integrated responses to a difficult problem: how could the United States completely persuade the Europeans that it would come to their defense when in the process it would subject itself to devastation. That the MLF did not work perhaps suggests, not that its assumptions were faulty, but that the problem was irresolvable. To assert, then, that the proponents of the MLF did not squarely resolve the inherent conflict between stemming nuclear proliferation within NATO and enhancing Europe's sense of autonomy misses the central point. The MLF was an attempt to straddle a conflict for which no solution was then available. It was a policy that deliberately tried *not* to make an explicit tradeoff, but to slide, fudge, and waiver as much as the political conditions would allow. Steinbruner has missed the *political* point of the MLF in his attempt to make the facts fit his psychological theory.

Finally, if the cybernetic-cognitive paradigm does not work for the MLF case, will it work for others? Obviously, no definitive answer can be given; but I offer two general reflections. First, the cybernetic aspect of the theory reduces to the question of whether American Presidents are institutionally prevented from making coherent policy amidst executive fragmentation. If Presidents cannot control their bureaucratic underlings, then they cannot begin to make tradeoffs. I have written elsewhere on this subject and have not found the evidence to be persuasive that a Presi-

dent cannot have his way with his *executive* subordinates on those issues that he deems crucial to his presidency. Second, the cognitive aspect, although intriguing, strikes me as counter to the spirit of politics. After all, politics is the art of the possible. Whether domestic or international, politics means making compromises. And that, by definition, consists in consciously confronting value conflicts and in carefully constructing the optimal tradeoffs. And even when we find no evidence that this has been done, there is always the additional reflection: the true political animal will be vague and ambiguous when he senses that decisiveness and clarity can be dangerous to him.

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BARBARA WARD. *The Home of Man.* Pp. xii, 297. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. $8.95.

In 1972, Lady Barbara Ward Jackson and Dr. Rene Dubos prepared the definitive report on the state of the human environment for the Stockholm Conference Secretariat. The ensuing volume, *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet*, established the conceptual framework for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment. *The Home of Man* provides an overview of the issues with which Habitat, the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, dealt at Vancouver in June 1976.

Lady Ward points out that it is extremely difficult to get a "coherent" grip on the issue of the human habitat because (1) the habitat includes everything; and (2) never before has the man-made environment been in such a state of "convulsed and complete crisis." The greatest wandering of the people is taking place at a time when mankind has a clearer vision of equality and human dignity for all people, when they are much more aware of the limits of the environment. She estimates that 1,500,000,000 people will pour into the world's cities between now and the year 2,000 A.D. How will they be provided with housing, food, jobs, and essential services? How will the destitute villages be given new purpose, vitality and expanded vitality? Essentially, the book is divided into six parts beginning with the advent of the city, and then moving swiftly into the city as we know it today. She then treats of the technological order, the poor world's settlements, the problems of management, and the universal city.

As Mr. Penalosa writes in his introduction, "*The Home of Man* is a synthesis of Barbara Ward's writing, teaching and lecturing, in which she has so eloquently pleaded for a new understanding of the interdependence of peoples, for planetary management of both the human and the natural environment, and for the moral as well as economic justification and need for a new world order." She observes that if we accept the goal of a world order designed to secure a fairer distribution of the planet's resources and to put an end to concentration of wealth, within and between nations, which are incompatible with human justice, dignity and self-respect, we must then determine the instruments, scale and priorities. Until the necessary institutions are in place and functioning, "life for man on earth, life in his settlements, rich and poor, North and South, in village or megapolis, must remain a haunted danger-shadowed uncertain risk." Nevertheless, however muddled the outlines may appear, a new international economic order, "aiming at justice and cooperation, is, quite literally, a matter of life and death."

Lady Ward writes from a broadly philosophical, but undogmatic and practical point of view. She buttresses her position with a solid command of the pertinent data at hand. This is a challenging book which should be read and pondered not only by students of sociology, economics and politics, but by statesmen who presume to lead us in consideration of the basic problems of the contemporary world, and by the general public. That alone, of course, will not lead to solutions of problems—but it could point to ways and means.

Where there is no vision, the people perish. There is much vision in this volume.

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DAVID WILKINSON. *Revolutionary Civil War: The Elements of Victory and Defeat*. Pp. vi, 229. Palo Alto, Calif.: Page-Ficklin Publications, 1975. $6.95. Paperbound.

Civil wars are usually long, intense, and violent combats among large, organized forces struggling to control a state. Although the best cases of this type of "internal warfare" belong to the 20th century (especially in Mexico, China, Spain and Russia), this phenomenon is not a new one; it appears and reappears across centuries as well as across cultures.

Because revolutionary civil wars are long, large, organized and polarizing conflicts they portend a drastic change of regimes and of foreign policies; they influence foreign states and attract foreign interventions. The United States, interestingly enough, has involved itself in several such conflicts, and as Wilkinson points out, "without success or distinction" and frequently "without understanding their characteristic features."

The study of the outcomes of such wars is less advanced than the study of their origins, although it raises such engaging questions as: Why do wars end as they do? Why do the winners win and the losers lose? Wilkinson directs himself to the question of the causes of victory and defeat in revolutionary civil wars, and abstracts and synthesizes historians' and observers' explanations for victories in eight revolutionary civil wars fought in several countries, in several areas, by factions with widely diverging political complexions. The eight cases are: Rome (83–82 B.C.); England (1642–46); Mexico (1914–15); Russia (1918–20); China (1926–28 and 1930–34); Spain (1936–39); and China (1946–49).

After presenting these eight cases, Wilkinson then covers Political Factors (Resources, Time, Leadership, Strategy, Program, Organization, Political Work, Political Control, Mobilization and Political Base); Military Factors (Position, Leadership, Strategy, Organization, Security of the Rear, Troops, and Supply); and Analysis (The Model Loser, the Ideal Victory, the Dilemma of the Moderates, and the Question of Strategy).

While the text covers 129 pages, 80 pages are devoted to Appendices, Notes, and Bibliography. This indicates the richness of the sources Wilkinson has consulted (especially Sorokin, Edwards, and Brinton—in addition to others). Fortunately, we cannot even summarize many of his hypotheses and conclusions. Some of them could be easily questioned; but, at any rate, they are very interesting.

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AFRICA AND ASIA

SUFIA AHMED. *Muslim Community in Bengal, 1884–1912*. Pp. 425. Bangladesh: Oxford University Press, 1976. Tk. 85.00.

The author teaches in the Department of Islamic History and Culture at Dacca University. Her book is an expanded version of a London thesis accepted in 1960. Despite the many hardships which her community has recently undergone, the author has made good use of her years since London, and we can recommend her book to libraries which have a special interest in Islam, South Asia and the sociology of religion. Her material, drawn in the main from London archives, is divided into five big chapters: (1) educational developments, (2) economic conditions, (3) social and political activities, (4) partition of Bengal and (5) Muslim writings in Bengali. The author's principal contribution appears at the very end of her long book—that the Muslims of Bengal, if they felt themselves to be distinct from the Hindus, also felt themselves to be distinct from other Muslims in India (p. 374). The

author's path to this conclusion, so fateful for Pakistan's prospects, forces the reader to go through a sudden change of direction which centers around the Arabic concept of *adab* (belles-lettres, good manners, and the like). The author never mentions *adab*, nor does she underscore the relevance to her community and its history of the Muslim class system, but she deals with these matters as her documents would have them dealt with, namely, by way of the importance of Urdu in Bengali Muslim education. The Muslims, thus, are first seen as standing fast in their loyalty to Urdu ("... whatever the poorer classes might speak, they wished Urdu to be the medium of instruction in their schools," p. 28), but in her important chapter on literature the author records the names of numerous Muslim authors who wrote in standard Bengali and who made it an acceptable medium even for the orthodox. The author performs an important service by describing this change in the appeal of literary Bengali, but she does not try to explain it. Perhaps there can be no satisfactory explanation until the map of Muslim humanism in South Asia has been better drawn, but there have been attempts worth consulting, such as Mahmud Shah Qureshi, *Etude sur L'Evolution Intellectuelle chez les Muslmans du Bengale, 1857–1947* (Paris, 1971).

Numerous printing errors will have to be corrected in the book's second edition, but these do not mar the author's basic achievement at the present time.

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ADDA B. BOZEMAN. *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities*. Pp. xiv, 429. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $27.50. Paperbound, $12.50.

RICHARD HARRIS, ed. *The Political Economy of Africa*. Pp. ix, 270. New York: Halsted Press, 1975. $15.95. Paperbound, $6.95.

At first glance these two books appear so different that one wonders how they could be handled in the same review. What they have in common—at second glance—is that each questions conventional "Western" ways of analyzing and evaluating our political and economic relationships with Africa. Bozeman argues that African folkways have not been adequately understood by the West, a failure which has had profound implications in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. Harris and his authors, on the other hand, would argue that the West has understood Africa too well, and that we have taken undue economic and political advantage through our superior knowledge.

The Bozeman book does not have a political axe to grind; it is scholarly, explanatory and analytical of ways in which conflict is handled differently in Africa from the West. The Harris book, on the other hand, is avowedly political; it is grounded on left-wing doctrines.

Bozeman cites three principal distinctions between African and Western modes of conflict resolution. The first relates to literacy. Not only have African societies not long been literate, but merely creating a way of writing does not materially alter thought processes that have been moulded by non-literacy. Abstract intellectual activity cannot evolve in non-literate societies, and precise records of past events are not possible. Non-literacy leads a society away from positivism. The second distinction relates to time, which Bozeman declares is circular rather than linear in African societies. The past, present, and future; the dead, the living, and the unborn, become inextricably mixed, as if all existed simultaneously. The third relates to tribalism and kinship patterns. Non-literate societies must be small and self-sufficient if they are to endure.

From these three principles, Bozeman develops a set of propositions which she believes are common to African societies and which differ from Western concepts. In the West, the predominant view is that all wars are avoidable and all conflicts can be solved. In African societies, she argues, war is a norm, and disputes need not be resolved. The British made the mistake of believing that African tribes

were the analog of European States, and that treaties would bind. They discovered tribes to be fluid, dividing and re-forming in different patterns, often migratory. Treaties did not bind, and it was difficult to pin down authority and responsibility.

Order and disorder are seen in Africa as functions of magic, power, and death. Since all human beings come from a superior magical order, all are suspect as potential carriers of evil forces. This characteristic would obviously affect the manner in which commerce and industry are carried on, and raise the question of the minimum amount of trust necessary for fruitful relationships.

Although Bozeman is less categorical, and more qualifying, than may appear in the short space allotted for this review, even so her opinions are bound to be challenged in the liberal West. Now that we have presumably passed the Spencerian age of believing in "superior" and "inferior" cultures—only different ones—it will come as a shock that a Professor of International Relations in a prominent American college points to African cultural characteristics which—though the author does not say so outright—could readily explain underdevelopment, instead of by lack of capital or modern skills.

It is, furthermore, not a large step to conclude that modern economic analysts, in applying macro models, are repeating the errors of the British in attributing certain behavior patterns to the Africans. Yet the Bozeman book is well documented, and it is worthy of serious, if disquieting, consideration by Western scholars.

Of an opposite bent is the book by Harris. In addition to an introduction by the editor, it contains articles on Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and South Africa, and a comparative analysis of Kenya and Tanzania. Harris's opening salvo attacks the prevailing Western notion that "modernization of the underdeveloped countries . . . . has been impeded by a variety of obstacles and *conditions* within each of the underdeveloped countries." He draws his model from the left-wing economist, Andre Gundar Frank, with virtually no modifications or further development, only repetition of left-wing arguments that have already been heard *ad infinitum*. Harris writes of how British colonialism disrupted African society by the slave trade (p. 5), in contrast to Bozeman who points out that the slave trade was a way of life in Africa from the seventh century (p. 125).

Fortunately, some of the authors that Harris picked (not all of them) partially redeem the book for him. The essay on Ghana (by Emily Card) is informative and objective in its criticisms, which are aimed at capitalist and socialist economic theory alike. The author is so balanced in her writing that it is difficult, finally, to see how she arrives at her "socialist type" conclusions. The essay on Nigeria (by Barbara Callaway) is also objectively written. Although "political economy" is written into the title, it is all politics and no economics. It contains an informative description of the events leading to the Biafran secession. The essay on Kenya/Tanzania (by Lionel Cliffe) is too rambling; it should have been further edited. It contains no economic analysis but depends on the author's faith that socialism is superior to capitalism. No studies are cited that demonstrate effectively that Tanzania has had a more worthwhile experience than Kenya, although the author asserts that this is the case. The article on Zambia (by Dennis Dresang) contains some useful facts in the history of Zambia's independence, but it is superficial. Once again, there is no economic analysis, and the case for "dependence" is far from made. The article on South Africa (by Martin Legassik) is highly informative on political events. One does not have to be a socialist, however, to be convinced that South Africa is a country of oppression, and the author has a field day listing the evil things that the government has done to the Blacks. The non-socialist reader, however, would remain unconvinced that South Africa constitutes a "typical" case of capitalistic oppression; therefore, it may have been a bad choice for the volume.

Furthermore, the author uses language of insinuation (such as the "alliance of

gold and maize"). He makes sinister those productive activities (for example, mining and farming) that other would find laudable. Is it not the manner in which they are conducted, rather than the activities themselves, that is sinister? The author should be more careful in sorting out one from the other.

In sum, the Bozeman book is a scholarly, but unsettling, effort to analyze the conflict mechanism in Africa, which has implications far more widespread than are carried by the author. The Harris volume reiterates much of left-wing rhetoric concerning the economic imperialism of the West. Its principal virtue is the amount of factual information and political (not economic) analysis that it contains.

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JOHN F. CADY. *The United States and Burma*. Pp. vi, 303. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $17.50.

At the end of World War II, the Harvard University Press inaugurated a new series of original studies of foreign countries, under the editorship of Sumner Welles. Its goal was to produce a clearly written, unbiased authoritative work on a specific country "to give Americans a reliable and objective basis on which to do their own thinking about foreign policy. . . ." The authors, for the most part, were already established authorities on their particular country. The texts were presented without footnotes or specific references and the greater portion was given to examining the history, culture, institutions and economy of the country; only a small section, usually at the end of the volume, was devoted to a review of the relations of the particular country and the U.S. Within that frame of reference, the latest addition, John F. Cady, *The United States and Burma*, meets all the established criteria. It is essentially a history of Burma with only meager references to its relations with the United States. For the most part, it repeats in somewhat condensed form what Cady wrote nearly two decades ago in his well-documented and well-received *History of Modern Burma* (Cornell University Press) with the addition of two new chapters devoted to the events of the last decade and a half.

As so many in this series before it, this volume fails in its discussion of the particular country's relations with the U.S., past and potential. The present editor of the series, Edwin O. Reischauer, acknowledged in his preface that "Burma has never loomed large in American eyes, nor is it likely to do so soon." However, this can only become meaningful if Burma is placed in its Southeast Asian context and as the near-neighbor of China and India, Laos and Thailand. Given its location and its determination not to be drawn into the "cold war" of the United States and the Soviet Union or to become a pawn of its larger neighbors, it is vital for anyone seeking explanations to know why Burma's neutralism apparently succeeded, while that of Laos and Cambodia failed. For the reader more interested in internal politics than in foreign relations, the problem of how Burma struggled with the issue of uniting several ethnic minorities into a nation or how Burma managed to live for nearly thirty years with Communist and multi-ethnic insurgency, there is little in this study to answer the questions.

For anyone unfamiliar with Burmese history before independence, this is a good introduction. It is unfortunate that Cady's editor did not encourage him to depart from the series' format and develop a fresh approach which would have allowed him to use his rich knowledge of early post-war U.S.-Burma relations, or to draw more fully on his personal experiences as a teacher and researcher in Burma. For this reviewer, it is this that should have been at the center of this study and not what we have been given.

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CHARLES GRINNELL CLEAVER. *Japanese and Americans: Cultural Parallels and Paradoxes*. Pp. ix, 290. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976. $12.75.

Comparative study as a method is employed in many fields although one will find few serious efforts in which several disparate dimensions of two cultures are carefully juxtaposed and analyzed for similarity and dissimilarity. More frequently such a study will focus on only those elements of concern to a particular discipline or will be preoccupied with some fundamental comparative model.

Professor Cleaver's effort may indeed have its limitations in terms of orthodox methodology and he admits a personal limitation in terms of language capability. Nonetheless, Americans and Japanese alike will benefit from this fascinating study of their two cultures. Cleaver looks at the folkways, mores, arts, social attitudes, symbols, work habits and living accommodations as media for discovering mutual likenesses and differences.

The author's approach is to examine within a general topic the symbols and attitudes of the respective peoples. He relies on both his own observations and those of others as manifest in literature, academic writings and related resources. He then seeks to crystallize as finitely as possible the relative characteristics of the two peoples and cultures. For example, in his chapter on "The Old Environment: Nature" he metaphorically concludes as follows, "The Japanese marriage to their homeland has lasted for a long time, and their infidelities, their flirtation with gaudier mistresses have been of relatively short duration. Yet their wife is frailer than the Americans'. The Americans' land is robust, but their attentions have been rapine, and their affection has never been unambiguous. And they seem less eager to swear off dalliance with shiny profits. Both peoples must necessarily change their ways, or their old wives will curl up and die."

As can also be deduced from the above quotation, Professor Cleaver regularly inserts a note of doom unless the two peoples repent their "wicked" ways. Perhaps this tendency causes some disservice to his effort in that some of the elements of beauty and value in the two cultures are thereby subdued or reduced in their appreciation.

Still and all, this study is valuable and insightful and provides both scholar and layman a resource for reflection and introspection. In the reviewer's judgment the greatest weakness is the author's lack of knowledge of the Japanese language, for with that added element he could have refined his appreciation of the nuances of the different perspectives. Yet, to criticize for this reason does not do justice to what is nonetheless a worthwhile study.

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MICHAEL LIPTON and JOHN FIRN. *The Erosion of a Relationship: India and Britain since 1960*. Pp. xv, 427. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. $32.50.

The main argument of this richly detailed and spirited book is that throughout the 1960s there was an accelerating, many-sided and to some extent avoidable erosion of good relations between Britain and India. The authors (both academic economists at British universities) contend that since 1960 most of the main linkages—trade, capital flows, population movements, publishing connections—have been severed, or at least severely weakened. And they strongly, and repeatedly, deny that this erosion is either the inevitable consequence of decolonization or still less it is inexorably the result of deliberate skillful redesigning and diversifying of their policies by the two countries. Indeed, one of the authors' main contentions is that Indo-British disengagements have stemmed in large measure from mutual disenchantments, misper-

ceptions and drift, through "inattention rather than intention," and have been carried far beyond what might have resulted from a sustained and genuinely practical calculus of mutual interests, even from a calculus which accorded due weight to Britain's growing links with western Europe and India's desire for real diversification and increased self-reliance.

It is, of course, arguable that 1960 represents no important watershed in Indo-British relations comparable in any way with 1947, or even 1956 or 1973. The authors are most concerned, however, to measure as clearly and fully as possible, displaying their methods and evidence fully in the process, the elements of entwined interest which in the 1960s bound, and which could and in their view should continue to bind, the two countries together. While Lipton and Firn are aware of the ambiguities of "interest" and know that it is ingenuous to believe that peoples and politics always maximize their interests—for they often fail to conceive and calculate them with clarity and accuracy—there is, none the less, at times a neo-utilitarian touch of overweening rationalism about their analysis. The powerful negative side of the authors' argument is to stress—and lament—the triumph of inadvertence and drift. Their more important and valuable positive contribution is, however, to document and measure, wherever possible, the changing condition of Indo-British relations throughout the 1960s; and this they do in greater depth and detail than has ever been done in any publication hitherto.

Their last, thirty-page, chapter, entitled "Indo-British Relations in a Divided World, 1960–80," attempts prognosis and prescription as well as description, and somewhat anxiously and querulously adopts a moderately optimistic note.

This book was written mostly between mid-1974 and mid-1975 and asserts on its last page of text (p. 236) that there is "at present [a] fairly favourable Indo-British *political* climate." This was before the declaration of the Emergency and Mrs. Gandhi's incumbency coup. There is much material provided in this book with which to contest the authors' conclusions as well as to substantiate them.

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RAUL S. MANGLAPUS. *Philippines: The Silenced Democracy*. Pp. ix, 205. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976. $7.95.

This is a disturbingly disappointing book and not well written to boot. At a time when considerable attention is focussed on the Philippines with the renegotiation of our bases agreement with the Marcos regime, the fate of democracy and human rights in the Philippines deserves better treatment than has been given by the President of the American-based "Movement for a Free Philippines." Unfortunately, Manglapus is somewhat typical of those in opposition to Marcos. He blames the United States—not the Filipino—for Marcos' rise to power and the continuation of martial law in the Philippines. He criticizes Marcos for the abuse of human rights—as well he should—and for an unfinished land reform program. But Manglapus, like others in opposition, has yet to put forth serious suggestions for programs which might help solve the monumental problems which must be tackled if the Philippines is to survive—population, economic growth and the redistribution of wealth. What he seems to be saying is that Marcos has been in power long enough, let us in opposition have a crack at the power and wealth that go with traditional rotation of political rule in the Philippines.

Manglapus devotes considerably more space to criticism of the U.S., its values and leadership than to a hard look at Philippine problems. He, as with so many other Philippine leaders, finds it much easier to blame the United States for all of the ills of the Philippines rather than face the unhappy truth that Filipinos are captains of their own fate.

It is perhaps significant that two thirds

of this book is a reprint of a musical play "Manifest Destiny" which Manglapus wrote while at Cornell. The play itself reflects some superficial research into the 1898–99 period when the United States began its colonial rule in the Philippines. In this metier, Mr. Manglapus shows that he is better at writing off-color limericks than handling banners at the barricades. His lively interest in his female characters makes one wonder whether Imelda Marcos some day might not be able to charm Manglapus into giving up his comfortable "refugee status" in the United States and to return to the Philippines where at one time he did indeed give noble service to his country and the cause of freedom.

In the meantime, Mr. Manglapus may be expected to continue his efforts to convince us that we can start solving the problems we created in the Philippines by cutting off all aid to the Marcos regime.

Unfortunately neither Manglapus, other political opposition leaders nor the church show convincing signs that they or the Philippine people are sufficiently riled up over the loss of human rights, the absence of democracy, corruption or any of the other abuses attributed to Marcos, to really do much about it except philosophize and blame someone else for their woes. At this time the Philippines does not appear to be ready to pay a very high price to return the voice to democracy.

Harrison Salisbury's foreword is a good shorthand rendition of our relations with the Philippines although he too attributes to the U.S. Government greater support for, and satisfaction with, the Marcos regime than the record warrants.

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ROBERT M. MARSH and HIROSHI MANNARI. *Modernization and the Japanese Factory*. Pp. vii, 437. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $27.50. Paperbound, $11.50.

WILLIAM BRUGGER. *Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise, 1948–1953*. Pp. v, 374. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $27.50.

This sociological study of Japanese modernization questions the extent and success of the "paternalism-lifetime commitment Japanese factory model," claims that "the most successful firms have in fact moved in the direction of a more modern organizational structure and will continue to move in this direction. . . [and] those firms that have not . . . will suffer significant organizational strains," and gives greater weight to the impact of "universal" organizational elements than to "Japanese" characteristics in the effective functioning of enterprises. The Japanese "miracle" of swift, robust economic growth after World War II and into the seventies is seen as the consequence of technological convergence of Japanese industry toward a modernized social organization rather than to any set of cultural and institutional facts.

These conclusions are inferred from nine months' field work divided among three large main Japanese firms (electric, shipbuilding, and sake companies) in which observation, consultation, analysis of firm records, personnel interviews, questionnaire response from production, staff and managerial employees provided quantitative data (subject to multivariate statistical analysis) as well as the ethnographic context. The authors were concerned with several theoretical questions on the modernization process: How much convergence of technology without convergence of social structure in organizations can there be? Which organizational type maximizes effectiveness? To what degree do culture and social history, on the one hand, and organizations' technological and structural characteristics, on the other, explain attitudes and behaviors of factory personnel?

Professors Marsh and Mannari, in seeking understanding from their data, attempt to relate technological modernization, the modernization of social or-

ganization, and organization results of industrial manufacturing firms and their operating units. Toward that end their research deals elaborately with salient dimensions of the factory: formal structure, systematic procedures (rules), division of labor, status structure, economic and social rewards, social integration (employee cohesiveness, paternalism, recreational participation, company identification, conflict, interfirm mobility, and lifetime commitment norms and values), job satisfaction, work values, technology, and performance. For each firm, detailed questionnaire answers were secured covering each of these structured elements. The book's chapters follow the above structured elements in exposition. Four appendixes set forth: the research methods, construction of indexes of the above elements of social organization, correlation matrices, and multiple regression analyses.

Since the authors do not claim either that their three firms were selected at random or that they are representative of large firms in general, in their industry or not, their study primarily describes and explains in great detail patterns of social organization, attitudes, and behaviors in the firms studied. In this context the study provides a wealth of material and insight on these three Japanese factories. Unquestionably much of what is described and explained has relevance for large Japanese plants in general, just as much may be valid only for the three firms. Understanding the process of modernization in Japanese industry cannot help but be advanced by this thorough work, if used carefully, not only from the wealth of information, but also for the unanswered questions that must be pursued by other researchers who deal with the modernization process in Japan and elsewhere. This reviewer wonders, however, how, on the basis of the three firms' patterns, the convergence theory can be so strongly upheld and the paternalism-lifetime commitment model equally strongly rejected. After all, sustained Japanese economic growth rates, significantly higher than in numerous other advanced industrial societies, cannot be explained primarily by convergence toward the social organization of economies such as the United States with markedly poorer industrial performance. Similarly, significantly lower Japanese unemployment rates than those in the United States most probably can be related to important institutional differences in the two cultures.

Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise, 1948–1953 goes considerably beyond its title, and its author provides perceptive descriptive analysis of salient strategies and tactics of the Chinese Revolution reflected in industrial organization and control from 1948 to 1953. Focusing on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) attempts to implement a new factory system embodying revolutionary objectives and based on a Soviet model, the author throws light not only on groping efforts to fashion a proletarian industrial society, but also on the process and thinking that led ultimately to a rejection of the USSR's example.

Dr. Brugger's approach is broadly sociological and political but he also considers important economic issues and deftly puts the CCP's socialist modernization attempts in the comparative context of Russian, Japanese, and prerevolutionary Chinese industrial experience. Then he analyzes insightfully the political environment in which CCP industrial organization policy and practice unfolded from 1948 to 1953. The control scheme for rational socialist industrial organization in its planning, accounting, and incentive aspects is then critically described followed by an appraisal of the curbs developed on managerial bureaucratism and authoritarianism.

The author's major theme—that the CCP's attempted implementation of a Soviet organizational and motivational model conflicted with pre-1949 Chinese patterns—poses significant questions answers to which clarify our understanding of the Chinese development strategy process. There was a contradiction between CCP policy for democratization and organization of factories and the

limited human resources available; the Soviet model being copied was unclear; there were further contradictions between different leadership types and the handling of internal conflicts; the Soviet and Chinese approaches to planning, motivation, and organization were quite different. Dr. Brugger infers that "there existed within the [Chinese] Communist Party a tradition of 'centralised leadership and divided operation,' a genuine commitment to participatory democracy and an attitude towards conflict that was not merely 'suppressive.'... this tradition conflicted with the [Soviet] model of organization. . ." (p. 258).

The alien Soviet model was never really put in operation and the CCP attempt failed. The result was that the Chinese were forced to shape their own organizational process and in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution (CR) the pre-1949 tradition was a principal source for mechanisms and tactics experimented with in factories and mines in the rejection of the "one-man management" model. The author sees some hope for the Chinese realizing democratic industrial organization based on worker participation during the CR and expanded since and the extension of CR-developed "creative" approaches to education that undermine the mystique of the expert.

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ALFRED C. OPPLER. *Legal Reform in Occupied Japan*. Pp. xx, 345. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $20.00.

As an autobiography, this book provides appropriate and interesting reading. However, as a source of much new information for the legal scholar, it hardly fulfills one's expectations. It deals largely with the well-known bureaucratic method of reaching conclusions about disputed legal points, sets forth the author's estimate of his colleagues and expresses his own opinions on numerous political and non-legal topics. No more than about one third of the material relates directly to "Legal Reform in Occupied Japan" but that part is worthwhile, is clearly and intelligently presented and is implemented by reference to some actual cases in Japanese courts.

The author states that the present Japanese Constitution, which was fathered by the American Occupation Authorities, adopted by the Japanese Diet and provided for legal reform, "merely pushed forward existing reforming and liberalizing trends that would have effectuated similar results although at a slower tempo," but he fails even to intimate how slow that tempo might have been. He emphasizes that the retention of the institution of the Emperor eased the acceptance of new democratic ideas by the Japanese people. This reviewer when Chief of the Japanese Staff, Property and Institutions Section of Foreign Economic Administration had also advocated this course. The current independence of the Judiciary is noted as well as the facts that largely because of the Japanese traditional respect for judges, the jury system was not imposed and the Revised Codes display inquisitorial as well as adversary traits. The author's evident understanding of and empathy with the Japanese people most likely did help to avoid excessive Americanization of the Japanese legal system. As he rightly claims, the success of the American Occupation legal staff can be judged by the fact that the implementing legal and judicial reforms have remained virtually unchanged although they could have been abolished or revised by a simple majority of the Japanese legislature.

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ROBERT M. PRICE. *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*. Pp. 275. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. $12.50.

In his book, Price sets out to prove through a series of surveys something which is obvious to the observer of Ghana—or almost any transitional society—that individuals in governmen-

tal roles are torn between loyalty to the system of government and to the family background from which they came. He describes the alternatives as "universalistic" and "particularistic." The universalist will adhere to standards of ethical behavior which do not differentiate between the applicants for the services he can provide. The particularist will be motivated to act in accordance with traditional patterns which will mean in practice aiding those to whom he has ties of family, clan or tribe.

In determining the behavior of Ghanaian civil servants, Price surveyed three groups. First he interviewed civil servants themselves. He then talked with university students, many of whom would be candidates for government positions and who then were among the "consumers" of the services of government employees. His third group was a segment of the general population in order to ascertain impressions of civil servant behavior. In general, the questions, notably those to the civil servants, were (1) what would you do in a particular situation, and (2) what would you expect others to do in the same situation. He found, not unexpectedly, that even among the most highly educated civil servants there was a lingering of particularistic behavior and a higher degree of expectation of particularistic behavior on the part of others. Among university students there appeared to be a level of idealism with respect to their own future behavior, but a more realistic attitude toward the behavior of others already in office. The third group tended to think in terms of traditional patterns when they required services from government officials. None of this strikes the reader as exceptionally original.

The development of the theme is labored and the writing turgid and prolix. In good dissertation form, many pages are devoted to a review of the literature with ritualistic citations of sources from Max Weber to the present. The samples are small and are not scattered throughout Ghana. This is defended, with justification, by mention of limitations on time and funds. It could perhaps be further justified by noting that Accra is, after all, the center of much governmental activity and holds a cross section of Ghana's population. However, it seems almost certain that a study of the local government level would show higher particularistic behavior and expectations.

There must be some doubt as to the knowledge of Ghana itself on the part of Price. For example, he concentrates on family relationships but appears (pp. 98–99) to miss the matrilineal character of most Ghanaian tribes when he seems uncertain about an explanation of a person in the mother's side of the family receiving greater preference than a "closer" relative on the father's side. He does bury an explanation in a footnote, but one would think this would be a primary consideration which was worthy of closer examination. In his limitation to family ties, he does not look at wider tribal affiliations which are also important, that is, in dealing with a consumer of his own tribe as opposed to one of a different tribe would the civil servant tend to give preference to his tribal colleague. The record seems to indicate that he does, but this is not considered by Price. Also he has come rather late to the realization that wives of government officials often have their own sources of income (p. 157).

The book is useful so far as it goes. There is too much attention to the jargon of the subject and the topic warrants exploration of broader aspects than it has been given.

CRAIG BAXTER

Accra
Ghana

EUROPE

MICHAEL HECHTER. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966.* Pp. xviii, 361. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. $15.75.

In the period from the annexation of Wales (1536) to the 1966 British census, Hechter concerns himself with the rela-

tive merits of diffusion and internal colonial models of national development as exemplified in the British Isles. He starts by maintaining that the "current flourish of national consciousness among cultural minorities in advanced industrial societies poses something of a sociological dilemma." It is only a dilemma to those who have assumed it "to be endemic to the early stages of national development" (p. 15). Thus he devotes himself arduously to the support of internal colonialism at the expense of diffusionism even though both are demonstrably operative, and he fails to take into full account the extent to which ethnicity and religious organization can grow out of or substitute for class-based struggles.

This work highlights contrasts between certain types of historical studies and of sociological studies based upon historical data. Hechter appears impatient with the uniqueness of events, with historical ambiguities, and with changing banners and rationales for intergroup and especially interclass competition, domination, and conflict. He sets up and tests quite specific and simplified models and hypotheses. His book is thus cluttered with repetitious theorizing to maintain favored conceptions that will presumably withstand social change and to compare alternative hypotheses that can be contrasted only after oversimplified definition of their terms.

He finds "problematic in complex society . . . the social conditions under which individuals band together as members of an ethnic group" (p. 37). This becomes especially problematic because of the limited definition he gives to "culture" as "a set of observable behaviors which occur independent of a group's relationship to the means of production and exchange" (p. 312)! Few cultural anthropologists would accept that limited viewpoint, but it enables him to place "ethnicity" in a setting of such a notion of "culture" rather than as one of the guises of intergroup and interclass domination and conflict in society.

Perhaps if Hechter had devoted more attention to the machinations of the elites controlling the evolving core of the United Kingdom, he would not have concluded that "very little is known . . . about the prevalence of ethnocentric attitudes towards inhabitants of the peripheral regions on the part of key decision-makers. This kind of information may be worth pursuing" (p. 347). It might, indeed.

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JOHN ROBERTS. *Revolution and Improvement: The Western World, 1775–1847*. Pp. xii, 290. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $20.00.

Tolstoy, in the second part of the epilogue to *War and Peace*, was ironically amused by modern history's belief that the aim of the whole historical process was "the welfare of the French, the German, or the English people, or its highest pitch of generalization, the civilization of all humanity, by which is usually meant the peoples inhabiting a small northwestern corner of the great mother-earth." John Roberts, Fellow and Tutor in Modern History at Merton College, Oxford, continues in the tradition held suspect by Tolstoy and affirms that what happened in Western Europe between 1775 and 1847 determined the subsequent destiny of the globe. The world is seen as following in the wake of Western Europe's history much as the small fishing boats of Ireland, packed with impoverished emigrants, captained by skippers who knew no navigation, waited, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in the sea lanes of the North Atlantic to follow the great steamers to the New World, and into an unknown port after the great ships had dropped anchor. Roberts is not, however, concerned to establish in any detail how the West altered the world, but rather to reflectively analyze the cumulative and irreversible changes taking place in Europe and America in the seventy-two years ending in 1847.

Roberts is sensitively aware that the developments he charts occurred at different rates and times throughout

Europe. What matters to him is the reshaping of Europe that began on the eve of the American and French revolutions and was fixed by the eve of the revolutions of 1848. It is the great merit of his work to deftly, and in very brief compass, identify the cluster of changes that transformed the European state systems, politics, ideology, economy, rural and urban existence, collective mentality. His principle of organization is that of a series of thresholds passed sequentially within specific time zones by the states of Europe. The crisis of the old order, the *ancien régime*, provided one such common experience, the French Revolution another, and the urbanizing, industrializing commencements following 1815 offered the final gate into modernity.

A work of synthesis is rarely original in each of its parts and Roberts' book is no exception. His originality lies in his skill at juxtaposing the common and uncommon experiences of the European states and in holding together and linking events and trends seldom captured in a single frame. His dexterity astonishes and delights the reader upon whom no great demands are made. However, the reader may at times be less artful than the author when, for example, he is required to dodge, in the space of a paragraph, from contemplating the bright prospects of American expansion in California to considering the mournful plight of Poland at the half-way mark of the nineteenth century. It is not possible to object to Roberts' conclusion that by 1847 the Middle Ages was over for great parts of Europe. His wit and balance evoke admiration and it is churlish to observe the absence of profundity or of theoretical surprises. This history enlarges the reflective opportunities of its readers and admirably fulfills the intention of its author.

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LAWRENCE SCHOFER. *The Formation of a Modern Labor Force: Upper Silesia, 1865–1914*. Pp. xvi, 207. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. $12.00.

HENRY WEISSER. *British Working-Class Movements and Europe, 1815–48*. Pp. viii, 226. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976. $17.50.

The Great Transition from rural, agricultural societies to urban, industrial types has been the subject of innumerable studies by economists, historians and sociologists over the past hundred years. Professor Schofer's study of the formation of an industrial labor force makes a contribution to some neglected considerations of this complex social process. The focus of this analysis is Upper Silesia, a region of southeastern Prussia defined on two sides by Russia to the east and by Austria-Hungary to the east and south. The area is important because it represents one of Germany's principal mining and smelting centers pre-1945.

The author begins with a *detailed* description of the economic setting covering its geography, geology, demography, labor force profile, and general entrepreneurial orientation. Moving quickly through an account of ethnic and geographic origins of the labor force, the main topic—the dynamics of the shift from the land to industry—is introduced. Here Schofer, concentrating on the mining and smelting industries, provides some insightful accounts of the multiple forces operating on the industrial labor market: The relationship between the landless and the landholding peasant to industrial employment; the recruitment process; the paternalism of the entrepreneurs; the problems of labor turnover and absenteeism; strikes; and finally, the evolution of a "modern labor force," which is implicitly defined as one which has reconciled itself to labor discipline and orderly behavior.

Emerging out of this wealth of detail is one main thesis. The author is at pains to argue that if one is to understand a modern labor force, it is imperative to adopt a multicausal historical framework, but does not place any particular emphasis on the conventional wisdom which sees early Labor

exploited at the hands of avaricious Capital. Schofer argues that "... one can probably better comprehend the evolution of a modern labor force by regarding labor-management relations not merely as an adversary process but as a mutual learning experience for both groups in a total industrial context" (p. 138).

Professor Schofer's position is, to say the least, not shared by most students of early Labor-Capital relations—particularly those of Marxian persuasion. We can agree with his perception that new forms of analysis are needed to move social historians beyond "The working-class - labor - unions - conditions - of - the - workers structure" (p. 2). However, if we are to be convinced of this unusual thesis, it is going to take a broader data base than one anomalous case-study of one nonrepresentative industry. Case studies are of limited generalizability to begin with, and Upper Silesia is more problematic than most in this respect. Constraints on a free flow of labor from the surrounding areas is one major typical feature; the ethnic relations between the German and Polish workers of that period is another—as we will see when we examine Professor Weisser's study of the working classes in Europe at that time. In summary, it would seem reasonable to say that while Schofer offers some interesting hypotheses for further empirical investigation, the case for a generalization about the formation of a modern labor force remains to be made.

Comparing the two books, Professor Weisser's work is by far the more intellectually stimulating of the two. The setting is London during the tumultuous years, 1815–48, when the working-classes experienced an explosion of consciousness in both Britain and Europe. Here is a classic example of the dialectical process of class development as the various groups and individuals interact in moving the working classes of Britain and Europe toward the possibility of breaking out of their traditional "false consciousness" and into a "class for itself."

The role of the "ultra radical press" is treated in great detail. During the period under study, some sixty radical newspapers were in circulation for various periods of time. As outlets for radical organizers, these newspapers had tremendous influence in building and sustaining an internationalist perspective among the hitherto provincial British workers. The structure of political events on the Continent in the 1830s is shown to have been a major cause of the emerging international worker's movement. The July revolution in France (1830) is chosen as the beginning of a mature class consciousness. Weisser traces the contagious excitement generated by this uprising of the French workers for the political awareness of Britain and the rest of Europe. Belgian and Polish revolutions follow in rapid succession in the same year. Soon "... the Polish cause became a magnificent source of entertainment and interest for the British workers, and eventually served as a catalyst to bring together proletarian internationalists, exiles of various nations, and foreign intellectuals" (p. 48).

Among this great collage of social activists were the distinguished personalities of Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, both Germans who were to become the key figures among the architects of the internationalist platform. This platform soon became organized in the Chartist movement, a monumental social movement which originated in 1836 with the London Working Men's Association—a rather provincial organization of craftsmen dedicated to intelligent and balanced reform. Given the impetus provided by events on the Continent, the LWMA soon blossomed to the Chartist International with all of the ambitions implied by the grandiose name: "... emancipation of the producing classes, not only in Britain, but throughout the universe" (p. 72).

Professor Weisser skillfully communicates a sense of the electric ferment which surrounded the growth and development of the Chartists and its progeny, the Fraternal Democrats. The open rallies with banners "rippling in the breeze," vitriolic manifestos of the working-class, goals of emancipation—they all unfurl as a fascinating serial. Out

of this gigantic internationalist undertaking came the Communist League, the famous (infamous) Communist Manifesto and socialist ideology which would eventually command a third of the world's allegiance. Sadly, the pacifism and brotherly sentiments which were central to the original movement floundered in the face of the nationalism typifying today's political arenas.

This essay can be credited with making a significant contribution to the literature of class consciousness. A particular strength can be attributed to the causal connections Weisser was able to demonstrate between the structure of the British and European political conflicts and the social-psychological consequences of their aftermath. Though clearly written for specialists in 19th century British history, this work is a fine addition to the libraries of economic historians and sociologists interested in early working-class dynamics.

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TONY SHARP. *The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany*. Pp. 220. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. $19.25.

Tony Sharp of Dundee has converted his long doctoral thesis into a scholarly account of a significant topic which has been so far not fully understood. What was understood was the political aspect of the various wartime diplomatic conferences. What has been lacking was a study of the military context of the wartime diplomacy on Germany. The author has made a very exhaustive recitation of the military aspects of wartime diplomatic negotiations over occupied and divided Germany. He has combed through not only all the principal published materials in documents and secondary works but he has gone through the recently opened Foreign Office and Cabinet papers. In addition to this he has interviewed and/or corresponded with many of the main personalities in the decision making processes who are alive. Among them are U.S. Generals R.W. Barker and John H. Hildring; U.S. diplomats John J. McCloy and Robert Murphy; and British diplomat Lord Strang. Several of their assistants were also contacted.

The narrative presented is a long involved story which tells the interactions between military strategy and diplomatic negotiating. It is a maze of detail, difficult at times to follow but there for the curious reader to ferret it out. One of the misconceptions of some writers who followed the WWII diplomatic jockeying about the occupation of Germany was that the division of Germany was fairly well sealed by the European Advisory Commission setup in London in October, 1943. This was certainly far from the truth. Before then and ending with the final zone protocol of July 26, 1945, much transpired. One gets the picture of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin and de Gaulle all jockeying for positions involving political aims. Juxtaposed alongside these was Eisenhower stressing the military and nonpolitical objectives to have a complete and speedy victory. The fact was that in all the discussions about zones of occupation in Germany, enclaves in the northwest part of Germany and the sectors of Berlin, there was the transcending factor of military operations whose exact outcome neither Stalin nor the western generals knew precisely. Perhaps one of the most uncertain of the WWII allied leaders about the timetable of victory was Stalin himself. He did not know how fast his armies could push back the Nazis. This variable was also dependent on how fast the British and U.S. armies could move into Germany and how far they could penetrate in a specific time period. Tony Sharp shows how Stalin was concerned about legitimizing Soviet occupation of Berlin early in the game lest the western allies would get there first. The author takes the reader through a huge mass of detail concerning all the strategic planning and main military operations in the western front. He tells how the U.S. got the Bremen enclave and how Roosevelt thought about circumventing the support of U.S. forces in Germany through another route than through

France. He shows how indefinite were the zones that were to be given to the western allies, as to which was to get the northern part and which the southern part of Germany. He gives fascinating details on how the French secured their zone of occupation out of the American zone. He tells the history of how the sectors in Berlin were agreed upon as well as how many other thorny problems of occupation planning were decided.

This book is not easy reading, but it is a commendable study, impartial and objective and serves as a definitive reference book on what happened.

By giving summaries and conclusions at the end of the chapters, the author would have facilitated the task of the reader. Perhaps a popular edition of this encyclopedic work would rectify these minor shortcomings of this most welcome study.

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DENIS MACK SMITH. *Mussolini's Roman Empire*. Pp. xii, 322. New York: The Viking Press, 1976. $12.95.

Denis Mack Smith, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, has presented us with another of his lively, provocative studies of Italian history. This most recent contribution is an "essay" on the major facets of Mussolini's foreign, colonial, and military policy from 1922 to 1943, with particular attention devoted to the last half of that period. The author's theme is "how Mussolini deliberately and even carefully steered his Fascist movement into imperialism and into a succession of wars which eventually left Italy prostrate" (p. v). Mack Smith's prior assumption is that the nature of Mussolini's political career is better revealed by what Fascism became than by how it began. Thus the book is a study of political and military defeat and the reasons for that defeat; at the same time, it is a study of the effectiveness and dangers of propaganda. When the Duce in the final months of his life mused on his own triumph and defeat, he would not concede that he had any major responsibility for what had gone wrong. Mack Smith, on the other hand, quite correctly places most of the blame for these disasters on the dictator himself.

Mussolini's Roman Empire is an excellent piece of scholarship at the expense of the Duce's ludicrous side. It is the result of careful study of a great number of memoirs, diaries, Fascist publications of the time, secondary works, and the photostat files of the *Segreteria particolare del Duce* which were seized by the Allies at the end of the war and are preserved at St. Antony's College, Oxford. The book will interest a broad range of readers and provide history teachers with innumerable examples of the Duce's bombast and inconsistencies to enliven their lectures. Its abundant footnotes, which unfortunately have been relegated to the back of the book, will be of much assistance to other scholars.

The author quickly skims over the 1920s, since those years have been thoroughly researched by Alan Cassels and others. For the later years, however, much more research needs to be done, and Mack Smith has made a noteworthy contribution to this period. His book significantly supplements such major studies in English as those by George W. Baer on the Ethiopian war, Elizabeth Wiskemann, Mario Toscano and others on the shaping of the Axis and the Pact of Steel, and F.W. Deakin on the years 1942–45. Difficulties remain. It is not yet easy to consult the records of Italian government departments for the 1930s. Historians are also handicapped by the fact that in Italy no official investigations of the conduct of World War II were undertaken comparable to those that took place during and after the first world conflict. Moreover, Fascism (or its memory) continues to be a burning political issue in Italy, making dispassionate historical investigation difficult at best. This fact has recently been underscored by the vigorous polemics (in which Mack Smith has participated) that greeted publication of the fourth volume of Renzo De Felice's massive "biography" of *Mussolini il duce: Gli anni del consenso, 1929–1936* (Turin: Giulio

Einaudi, 1974), a study which takes Mussolini and his regime in these years considerably more at face value than does Mack Smith's book.

Mussolini's Roman Empire brims with fascinating revelations. Among the most interesting are those pertaining to the brutal and often racist nature of Fascist colonial policy in Libya and East Africa. The policies pursued in Libya are discussed at greater length, however, in the important study by Claudio Segrè, *The Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), which came out while Mack Smith's book was already in press. While Mack Smith does not claim to have presented an exhaustive treatment of Fascist foreign policy, it is nevertheless somewhat surprising to find almost no mention of relations with the Holy See. Several volumes of Vatican documents pertaining to World War II have now been published, and the reviewer's "Pius XII, Italy, and the Outbreak of War," *Journal of Contemporary History*, II, No. 4 (October, 1967), has some relevance to Mack Smith's discussion of events leading to Italy's entry into the conflict.

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JOHN M. STARRELS and ANITA M. MALLINCKRODT. *Politics in the German Democratic Republic*. Pp. vii, 399. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. $22.50.

It is still a real challenge to apply structural-functionalism à la Gabriel A. Almond to one of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. John Starrels and Anita Mallinckrodt have done so with regard to the economically most modern of the people's republics, East Germany, and produced a remarkable contribution to the Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government. Relying heavily on East German publications and writers of the official state party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party), the authors have succeeded in constraining the Communist waterfall of words and the myriad of impressions of this extraordinary system in strictly functional categories. The resulting analysis constitutes a challenge not only to the materials but also to the structural-functional framework which tends to give systems more logic and rationality than they may really possess. The book is full of the newest information and revealing glimpses, such as on the representation of women in public office (pp. 101–102), or of the interface between private and public life which is crucial to the understanding of any Communist system. The description of elections in the German Democratic Republic (pp. 154–156) and other aggregation and persuasion processes is pithy and eschews the kind of critical comment that has often taken precedence over factual knowledge in other Western accounts. The only criticism that comes to mind is the failure of this structural-functional model to account for the international environment (except for a few pages of straight narrative at the end) of the East German Republic to explain the extent to which this system can be considered "a penetrated system" or an example of the dependency model. This omission is all the more surprising since at least one of the authors has elsewhere written most knowledgeably about the foreign policy of the DDR. Apart from this omission, however, this book is a major systematic contribution that fills a gap of long standing in our knowledge of this rising industrial power. One can only hope that it will be made available in paperback for classroom use soon.

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JOHN M. STEINER. *Power Politics and Social Change in National Socialist Germany: A Process of Escalation into Mass Destruction*. Pp. viii, 466. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976. $22.50.

This book is a historical maverick, unclassifiable, methodologically eclectic, eccentrically organized, irritatingly

repetitious, and fitfully brilliant. The author, former Auschwitz inmate and witness to some of our century's more ghastly events, has a definite point of view and many strong things to say. Striving to understand the psychological and social reality of National Socialism, he roams far and wide, on and off the beaten path, foraging and trespassing for deeper insights. In the end I think he brings some interesting quarry at bay.

The source material for this book includes extensive readings in the social sciences by authors such as Adorno, Arendt, Durkheim, Erikson, Fromm, Goffman, R.D. Laing, C. Wright Mills, Ortega y Gasset, Rathenau, and Weber; most of the basic Nazi literature; memoirs and diaries of Nazis, anti-Nazis, and survivors; and unpublished interviews, biograms, and 450 questionnaire protocols submitted to former members of the SS and German Armed Forces. All this material is presented in a somewhat discursive, unsystematic manner. Theories protrude throughout the empirical data. How, where, and when the author acquired the suggestive SS and Wehrmacht interviews is never clearly revealed. And yet it is evident the author is a sound scholar, careful with his evidence and attentive to ambiguities.

The first part of the book deals with a social psychological theory of power, ideology, political crime, and bureaucracy. Then comes the most significant section of the study. Taking the SS as an example of a totalitarian bureaucracy, Steiner delves deeply into the institutions, ethos, and "life styles" of these members of the black-shirted Nazi elite. It's a gruesome story of organized fanaticism and calculated terror. What Steiner brings to the often-told record is a conceptual framework that enables him to explain—quite effectively—the function of morality and honor in the SS, the unconscious meanings of racial discriminations, and the role of the "new religion" in the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. How these syndromes of ideological morality were projected outward into other Nazi institutions and the German bureaucracy, how they escalated into rationales for the "Final Solution" of the Jewish problem: these parts of horrible story are vividly portrayed terms of the sociology of deviance a accountability.

It is no easy task to come to terms w the ideas in this book. There are seari agonized discernments scattered nearly every page. Curiously the autl fails to use H.V. Dicks' reeent book *Licensed Mass Murder: A Soc Psychological Study of Some SS Kill* and Florence Miale and Michael Selz *The Nuremberg Mind*. He also negle Gitta Sereny's *Into That Darkness* fascinating depth-psychological port of Franz Stangl, former Commandant Treblinka. But Steiner's work gi historians new and valuable persp tives on old and dastardly deeds.

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DAVID VITAL. *The Origins of Zionis* Pp. i, 396. New York: Oxford Univ sity Press, 1975. $22.00.

Zionism was described in 1906 Solomon Schechter, Dean of the Jew Theological Seminary of America, "the declaration of Jewish indep dence from all kinds of slavery, whetl material or spiritual. . . ." Evolving in late 19th century, it gripped the imagi tions of small groups of intellect pioneers concerned with the "Jew Question," and grew rapidly, larg under the impact of successive a Semitic developments in the world large. It achieved its climactic succes 1948 with the establishment of the St of Israel, although "for a full third of Jews the State of Israel came too lat

This work concentrates on the "o gins" of Zionism in the period 1881– from the onset of Russian pogroms to convening of the first Zionist Congr Mr. Vital emphasizes that "the genesi the Zionist movement occurred in period immediately subsequent to, a to a large extent as a consequence of, events of the years 1881–84 in R sia . . ." (p. 65). The pogroms as Russ governmental policy convinced both

ghettoized and the assimilationist elements of East European Jewry that the solutions to their problems would have to be sought outside Russia. Flight to the West (notably America) was the major option, but other alternatives were fostered as well, among them—the Zionist idea and movement.

Vital traces the development of the nascent Zionist movement—the *Hovevei Zion* (Lovers of Zion)—following the publication of Dr. Leo Pinsker's powerful manifesto, *Autoemancipation!* At its founding meeting in Kattowitz in 1884, it resolved to support the trickle of settlers and settlements in Palestine, to deal with the various governmental bodies, and to coordinate the activities of its constituent societies. After its initial enthusiasms, however, it began to fade and languish, as did the colonies in Palestine.

Occasional pockets of Zionist sentiment appeared in Western Europe at the same time, but these were largely composed of expatriates from the East, and as such made little impact on the indigenous population. Vital describes the roots of Western Zionism essentially as a "malaise," a disillusionment with the inadequate place of Jewish identity in the modernized social setting.

Zionism was thus going nowhere—in east or west—when Theodor Herzl burst onto the scene, in 1896, with the publication of his "*The Jewish State*." Assuming personal leadership of both arms of the movement, he welded it rapidly and forcefully into a significant new force in the Jewish world, and ultimately in the international community as well. Learning quickly that the western philanthropists were not receptive to his "political" Zionism, and that the Eastern Zionists were suspicious of his assimilated background, Herzl determined to call an international Zionist organization into being by convening a Zionist Congress of delegates in Basel in 1897. The rest is history.

Vital provides an in-depth social and intellectual history of this brief 16 year span and documents thoroughly his contention that this period was a decisive watershed in shaping the parameters of the subsequent stages of the Zionist movement. Such later issues as political initiatives versus philanthropic benevolence, socialism versus private enterprise, a state versus a protectorate, massive immigration versus cultural upgrading, immigration to America versus immigration to Palestine, secularism versus religiosity, open debate versus circumspect caution, ideology versus eclecticism; all of these were active considerations during this period and are dealt with in thoroughgoing fashion in this work.

In this type of scholarly analysis, one can easily create the impression that the pioneer *Hovevei Zion* were too cautious, limited and fearful (p. 160), that the western Zionists were too mercurial and out of touch with their respective realities (p. 228), and that Herzl was simply not sufficiently equipped to handle the great mandate (p. 260, 318). Vital, however, allows his material to speak for itself in its dramatic implications and achievements, and offers his personal, concluding judgment that

> . . . it seems beyond question that this movement for revival and radical change in Jewry did attain results which may fairly be called revolutionary and, further, that its definitive form dates from 1897. For that reason alone the First Zionist Congress must now be judged one of the pivotal events in the modern history of the Jews.

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UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

THOMAS J. ARCHDEACON. *New York City, 1664–1710: Conquest and Change*. Pp. 197. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $9.75.

In this book Professor Archdeacon has tried to apply methods currently associated with the study of pre-Revolutionary American communities and analysis of nineteenth century ethnic politics to research on late seven-

teenth century New York. His thesis is that the English conquest of New Amsterdam produced major economic and social changes which were reflected in ethnic political rivalry between Dutch and English culminating in Leisler's Rebellion of 1689. For Archdeacon, Leisler's Rebellion was a Dutch protest movement supported by those longing for older, better days before the English conquest. This thesis seems unsound and is not sustained by the author's own evidence. Archdeacon's analysis of earlier community studies in which he attempts to root his own work is partial and tendentious. More alarming, however, is his assumption that nineteenth century ideas of nationalism and national identity are applicable two hundred years earlier. His work shows little understanding of seventeenth century Dutch society and he ignores recent authors who have questioned whether a distinctly Dutch society existed in New Netherlands in 1664. Indeed the three most recent monographs on New Netherlands find no place in Archdeacon's bibliography.

The most valuable part of this study is the attempt to reconstruct the social and occupational structure of late seventeenth century New York. Tax and census rolls, church records, marriage licenses, indentures, wills, inventories and legislative records have been used to build up a picture of the occupations, wealth and places of residence of New Yorkers between 1664 and 1710. By the latter date sixty percent of the city's population was still Dutch in name, language and religious traditions, while English, Huguenots, Jews and Blacks made up the majority of a polyglot remainder. In a mercantile economy the wealthiest men were Dutch, but they shared power and prestige with a large group of English and Huguenot newcomers with whom they intermarried. The majority of the Dutch were to be found neither in the elite nor among the poorer sections of society. They were men of middling rank—small merchants, retailers and skilled artisans—living more separately from the newcomers than the Dutch elite. It is this large group of middling Dutch citizen whom Professor Archdeacon sees a downwardly mobile, but he provides n adequate discussion of their father occupation nor of the relative size an complexity of the city's economy in 166 and 1710. Although Archdeacon argue otherwise, this reviewer was more im pressed by the evidence, which show that men of various backgrounds sup ported the different political factions o the period. Archdeacon produces ver limited material to support his claim c intense status frustration among th majority of Dutch. Throughout the book too much is assumed as when the autho extends his doubtful thesis from Nev York City to the whole colony (p. 147). I his preoccupation with a 'status revolu tion' Professor Archdeacon has marre what could have been an importan social analysis of early New York.

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EARL BLACK. *Southern Governors an Civil Rights*. Pp. xi, 408. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 197 No price.

Earl Black does a superlative job c gathering, correlating, analyzing an reporting comprehensive data on *wha* happened to racial segregation issues i gubernatorial campaigns and election in southern states from the period im mediately preceding the Suprem Court's *Brown* decision in 1954 throug the elections of 1972. Careful, systemati research and documentation pervade th 11 chapters, 54 tables, 29 figures, appendixes (with 4 additional tables), 4 pages of notes and a serviceable inde that comprise this vital new sourceboo of information and hypotheses. Th author's conclusions, however, abou *why* attitudes and rhetoric changed cor cerning segregation—which he sums u with the observation that "nationa stateways can indeed modify regiona folkways"—may be more a product c inferential preference than of empirica proof.

Utilizing as foundation for his work al

the 80 governorships at issue between 1950 and 1973 in the eleven southern states, Professor Black probes the ways in which and degrees to which candidates for governor significantly altered traditional commitments to a racially segregated society. Voting data from all of the southern counties for Democratic first primaries, Democratic second primaries and closely contested final elections are compared so as to identify demographic and geographic factors affecting support for militant segregationists. Prototypes of his initiatives in data assembly and interpretation are Figures 24, 25, and 26 that plot indexes of changing racial stances of candidates and winners by state, region and subregion. Texas and Tennessee emerge as the only states in the post-*Brown* period in which nonsegregationists consistently exhibited greater strength than segregationists. Not surprisingly he finds racial change least evident in Deep South elections.

Professor Black is at his best when, having properly acknowledged his intellectual indebtedness to V.O. Key, he proceeds through data analysis to dispute Key's hypothesis about the relationship between Democratic factionalism and racial politics. Whereas Key indicated that insistence upon the racially segregated status quo would be more characteristic of multifactional than unifactional systems because "a cohesive faction has the power to discipline wild-eyed men," Black's data show no persistent relationships between factional structure and racial change. Once the threat to white supremacy materialized with the *Brown* decision, Black observes, some of the most centripetal state political organizations, such as Virginia's Byrd Organization, provided platforms for "wild-eyed men" of their own.

Professor Black's analyses will interest students of the current political scene as well as those seeking historical perspectives on change. After crediting Jimmy Carter with explicit repudiation of racial discrimination in Carter's gubernatiorial inaugural, Black subsequently observes that Carter was "far from genuinely liberal on civil rights" and that "his subsequent performance . . . failed to match the promise of his inaugural."

Whether or not author and reviewer have similar priorities, Professor Black has written a stimulating, innovative, and essentially optimistic volume that will be required reading for all who are concerned with the interactions of politics and human rights.

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MATTHEW A. CRENSON. *The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America*. Pp. xii, 186. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. $10.00.

Americans have long disparaged bureaucracy and its "red tape." But no matter who is in power the day-to-day operations of the federal government remain constant in the attempt to move matters along. This book views the question of bureaucracy in the United States as it was handled during the Andrew Jackson presidency.

Crenson views the Jacksonian years as the true beginning of an entrenched political-minded bureaucracy. Certainly the Jacksonians were unlike any administrators in the federal government before 1829 although this book clearly shows many of the Jacksonians were wealthy and former Federalists. The old assumption of the spoils systems revolution is shown to be inaccurate by Crenson.

Before describing Jackson's administration the author devotes several chapters to a background analysis. Here he looks at the political beliefs and social institutions of the 1820s. There is an admirable section on what historians have said about "Jacksonian Democracy" which can be read by the novice or those needing an update on the issue.

The character of Jackson comes through as shrewd and subtle. Quite frequently he let others take the blame for his mistakes or do the dirty work. No one was more accomplished at this than Amos Kendall who occupies a good portion of the book.

In fact, Crenson narrows his study to the machinations of the Post Office Department and the General Land Office. The reader sees the corruption and difficulties facing the government when the nation was young, separated by time and space, and changing rapidly. Kendall's negotiations with railroads to carry the mails and the question of abolitionist literature in the mails is examined. Both instances afford a view of how matters were dealt with long ago.

This is not a lengthy book but the importance of it is twofold: first, the author tackles a largely previously neglected aspect of the Jackson Era and, secondly, he has something vital to say beyond the constant rehashing of the Jackson theme. For these reasons the book should be in research libraries and possessed by students of the American government.

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DAVID HOLBROOK CULBERT. *News for Everyman: Radio and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America.* Pp. xvi, 238. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $13.50.

One of the major preoccupations of the historiography of Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policies has been a debate on the degree to which they were or were not a reflection of public opinion. David Holbrook Culbert's *News for Everyman: Radio and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America* adds significantly to this literature by demonstrating that during the six years prior to Pearl Harbor, the broadcasts describing German aggression in Europe made "the news" an integral part of daily radio programming and "played a major role in creating a climate of opinion favorable to an interventionist foreign policy" (p. 5).

Culbert is concerned primarily with what six commentators—Boake Carter, H.V. Kaltenborn, Raymond Gram Swing, Elmer Davis, Fulton Lewis, Jr., and Edward R. Murrow—had to say about the ominous events in Europe. Far Eastern affairs, seldom mentioned by the six, receive only scant attention. Other newscasters are omitted because the either did not write their own cop analyze the news, or include person political comment. However selective i approach, the author does offer con manding assessments of these new analysts' style and impact.

Of the six, Culbert notes, only two-Carter and Lewis—were isolationist Yet the others, all interventionist exerted by far the greatest influence. I the process they sacrificed objectivity t the point of becoming tools of th administration. Each of the six was trul distinctive. Carter helped strengthen th pre-Munich isolationist mood i America and was forced off the air (i part, by administration pressure) for h trouble. Kalternborn not only broadca directly from a civil war battlefield i Spain but his eighteen-day commenta on the Munich Crisis established radio the preeminent source news on foreig affairs. With a Wilsonian's determinatio to promote liberal ideas throughout th world, Swing became an unoffici spokesman of the Department of Stat Davis demonstrated that a keen wit an impeccable credentials could overcom the worst speaking voice on the ai Addressing himself primarily to elites i order to advance his career, Lewis's mai importance lay in the fact that he had little influence on the average America In his "This is London" broadcast carefully tailored to have the greate aural appeal, Murrow made real su abstractions as patriotism and nation honor.

Culbert is at his best in describing th quality and nuances of voices and imag projected over the air. While he convincing in demonstrating radio's in pact on public opinion, his conclusio on its influence on foreign affairs a more tentative. His excellent biblio raphy should be consulted by all wh study radio in the thirties. A product prodigious research, *Radio for Ever man* is an important contribution to o understanding of the relationship b tween mass media and public opinion

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LOUIS FILLER. *Appointment At Armageddon: Muckraking and Progressivism in American Life*. Pp. xiii, 446. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $15.95.

Above all else this book is the author's attempt to place muckraking and progressivism in what he considers their proper context in American history. At one and the same time Filler sees progressivism and muckraking as dynamic forces in our history, for both good and bad, for idealism and, at the same time, for racism, warfare and other dark sides of our history. This reviewer wonders why not, for are not these two facets of our history themselves but microcosms of our totality? We are taught in undergraduate school that one of the cardinal sins in writing or thinking history is to forget to place events or themes in their historical context. What Filler is doing is just this—for examples, portraying Teddy Roosevelt, E.L. Godkin, Tom Watson and Henry Wallace in the light of their own particular times and needs.

What makes this book important is the way Filler "sees" the role of progressivism and muckraking in American history. Filler is an important historian, for he is the author of such major works as *The Crusade Against Slavery (1830–1860)*, in the Harper New American Nation series, and *Crusaders for American Liberalism*. What he thinks and writes of is important to historians as part of historiography and to those in the social sciences who are concerned with conceptualizations about American history.

The book is divided into three sections: "Past and Present," "Industry," and "Progressivism." In these sections, as well as in his introduction, Filler laments that "ours is not an era that has reason to anticipate progress" (p. xii). This is the essence, the theme of this book, that although progressivism is dead in our country and is criticized very harshly now, we still have much to learn from analyzing progressivism.

Filler downgrades some well-known progressives and resurrects others from the grave of obscurity. He attempts to place Theodore Roosevelt in historical perspective by reminding us not to judge T.R. on today's bases. He also reminds us that racism and progressivism were not one and the same in most instances, even in the case of Tom Watson of Georgia (p. 131).

Whether or not we accept many of Filler's statements and beliefs we can accept many of his assumptions. Progressivism could develop because of "meeting of minds and energies that reached from the bottom of the social order to the top" (p. 158). The "South was more than its demagogues" and "the South attained a more promising future for its blacks and whites" than what Watson represented (p. 138).

There are some minor flaws with the book, both as to interpretation and its production. Filler accepts that the "long count" in the Jack Dempsey-Gene Tunney fight was the result of mobster involvement with sports, enabling Tunney to keep the championship. I doubt if many historians subscribe to this position. There are several editing mistakes that should have been caught in galley proofs. For example, footnote three in the text is labeled number five (p. 14). But these really do not detract from the overall usefulness of the book. This work should be read in conjunction with Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (1955) which it contradicts, and somewhat supersedes.

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TONY MARTIN. *Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association*. Pp. x, 421. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $17.50.

Dr. Tony Martin, born in Trinidad, educated at the University of Hull, England, Gray's Inn, London, and Michigan State University, is Associate Professor of History and Black Studies at Wellesley College. He asserted in his Preface (p. ix):

This book is based on the simple premise that no one could have organized and built up the largest black mass movement in Afro-American history, in the face of continuous onslaughts from communists on the left, black reactionaries on all sides, and the most powerful governments in the world, and yet be a buffoon or a clown, or even an overwhelming impractical visionary.

Equally debatable are his conclusions (p. x) that Garvey prevailed against his ideological opponents and that "it was only with his deportation from the United States that his organizational grip on the black masses in North America and, to varying degrees elsewhere, slowly began to loosen. Even then, his ideological legacy continued to be a major force in black communities." The author's conclusion about the feud between Garvey, on the one hand, W.E.B. DuBois, William Pickens, A. Philip Randolph, Chandler Owen and Robert Bagnall among others on the other hand, attributed "a major portion of the responsibility for Garvey's imprisonment and deportation . . . to the integrationist onslaught, especially as manifested in the campaigns of Du Bois and the NAACP, and the black Socialists Owen and Randolph" (p. 333). And in his observation that "there was no hint of racial arrogance" in the direct dealings of such advocates in the 1930s of white supremacy as Senator Theodore G. Bilbo of Mississippi and Ernest Sevier Cox of the White America Society with Garvey ignores the devastating effect of their support on large numbers of Americans. The author presents no proof that Garvey's ideological legacy of separatism and Back to Africa "continued to be a major force in black communities." The reviewer knows that the FBI has tried, unsuccessfully, to assess this influence.

If the author had not been imprisoned by his determination to prove that "Marcus Garvey has as good a claim as anyone to the distinction of being the greatest black figure of the twentieth century" (p. 359), his volume would have greater value. For instance, such scholars as Arthur A. Schomburg and Carter G. Woodson cooperated with Garvey in Promoting interest in "Black History." The list of branches of the Univers: Negro Improvement Association in th United States and abroad is valuabl The footnotes and the bibliography r veal comprehensive research.

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PAUL DAVID NELSON. *General Horati Gates: A Biography*. Pp. xiii, 31' Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Unive sity Press, 1976. $17.50.

After two centuries Horatio Gat remains one of the most controversi figures in our struggle for independenc Paul David Nelson has attempted a appraisal and a reevaluation of th military career of this paradoxical ma Born in England in 1728, Gates serve with some distinction in the Britis army, seeing extensive service i America during the last of the wars wi France. He moved to Virginia in 177 and purchased a plantation there. O June 17, 1775, he was commissioned Brigadier General and appointe adjutant-general of the newly forme Continental Army, and he reported t Washington at Cambridge on July 9t Excelling in organization and admini trative detail, Gates rendered valuab service to the Patriot army. In 1777 h won the spectacular and perhaps dec sive victory at Saratoga. This, howeve was followed by heated controversy wi Washington. Service with the Board War and in several minor capacities w followed by Congressional appointme to command the southern army followi the American surrender at Charlesto Gates' disastrous defeat at Camde probably the worst American debacle the entire war, ruined his reputation a closed Gates' career as an independe commander. He served with Washingt from 1782 to 1783. In Virginia and later New York, Gates achieved some min social and political success during t post-war years. He died in 1806.

Writing in 1931 Randolph G. Adan noted that the manuscript sources for life of Gates were voluminous. Th author has examined many of tho

sources and both his bibliography and footnotes vouch for their frequent use. A revision of a doctoral thesis, this book is perhaps mistitled. It is not a full-scale biography of Gates; rather it is a study of his military role during the Revolution. There is an almost total disregard of Gates' personal life. Ten percent deals with the life of Gates before his arrival in Virginia at the age of 44; fifteen pages are devoted to the last 23 years of his life.

As a study of Gates' military career, however, this book earns several kudos. The author examines, with care, his leadership at both Saratoga and Camden and the complex and troublesome story of his difficulties with Washington in 1777 and 1778, often referred to as the Conway Cabal. As such it deserves the attention of those studying the military history of our Revolution. The author is remarkably objective in his recognition of the mistakes and weaknesses of Gates. His appraisal of Schuyler, antagonist of Gates in 1776 and 1771, is forthright and balanced. Nelson justifies his assertion that Gates was "a modestly gifted military officer with both commendable and damaging traits of character" (p. xi).

The study is somewhat marred by occasional reliance on secondary sources and by an absence of documentation that would have been helpful (see p. 91). The accounts of Stanwix and Bennington, admittedly peripheral to a study of Gates' leadership, leave something to be desired. In general, however, the documentation is impressive and the analysis and evaluation are always interesting and often convincing.

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NORMAN H. NIE, SIDNEY VERBA and JOHN PETROCIK. *The Changing American Voter*. Pp. vii, 399. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $15.00.

The Changing American Voter is one of the really important books of recent years. Based on data collected from numerous national surveys conducted between 1939 and 1974, and including material from over 30,000 interviews, the authors have undertaken to update and bring into new perspective the findings of the 1960 classic *The American Voter*. That work was a pioneering effort in post-war political science and represented one of the first important adaptations of survey research techniques to voter behavior. Based on a University of Michigan/Survey Research Center study of the 1956 election, the researchers concluded that voters cast ballots based on personality and party affiliation rather than on issues.

The new study concludes that the American public is more issue-oriented than it has been in the past and that it is more detached from the political parties than at any time in the past four decades. The current study confirmed the earlier findings that party identification is a long-term commitment, established early in life and ordinarily maintained after that. The growth of the number of independents does not contradict that basic assumption although it does modify it. Partisan commitments, however, do interact with the issues of the day. The partisan attachments that arose out of the New Deal years remained dominant in the 1950s when the surveys upon which *The American Voter* was based were being conducted. Though the New Deal issues were not as salient as they had once been, they had not been replaced by new issues that were of deep concern to the electorate.

The 1960s and 70s however, brought to the fore a whole new range of intensive and emotional issues which upset the old system. The Vietnam War, the urban crisis, racial conflicts, Watergate and a major economic recession are all issues which cut across the old New Deal alliances and voting patterns. Part of the change in voter attitude is attributable to a change in the public belief systems. Candidates and parties have begun to be evaluated in terms of the issue positions which they represent to the voters. Furthermore, as the authors point out, the new issue-coherence and the increased level of concern over issues have been translated into a greater connection between issue positions and the vote.

Probably the second major finding in this study was the impressive decline in partisanship among the voters of America. The Independents now represent the largest group in society, slightly larger than the Democrats and twice as large as the Republicans. Even among those who claim a partisan identification, the allegiance is weak. Voters are more likely to desert their own party to vote for candidates of the other. Citizens are generally dissatisfied with the parties as they are presently constituted. And, at the same time, the voter has developed a more clearcut set of issue commitments and is using them as a voters' guide.

Most of those who are involved in teaching and research in American electoral politics will welcome this book. It is likely to take its place on that relatively short shelf composed of "important" books in political science.

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RICHARD L. RUBIN. *Party Dynamics: The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change*. Pp. 203. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. $9.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

This is a book of two parts. The first part spends four chapters to make a point that could have been presented in one; but the second part is one of the most cogent analyses in print of the various conflicts that have been consuming the Democratic party for almost a decade. The features of the electorate that Richard Rubin turns to for an understanding of the recent history of the Democrats—suburbanization, the "Catholic factor," labor, southerners, blacks, the New Politics Democrats, and elite factionalism—are unquestionably the place to begin. The problem with the book is its strikingly uneven analysis of these elements.

The first chapter observes that the rise of the suburbs has not presaged a decline in the Democratic majority, because migration to the suburbs did not convert Democrats to Republicans. The major finding in this chapter is the substantial difference between eastern and midwestern suburbs in the proportion of Republican supporters. He also shows that in the east the number of Republicans moving out of cities and into suburbs is proportionally greater than the number of Republicans moving into midwestern suburbs. As a result, the relatively greater Republican bias of eastern suburbs is maintained. The next two chapters repeat the finding that there are fewer and less loyal Democrats among Catholics and union members in the east compared to the midwest.

This eastern-midwestern difference is interesting and merits analysis. Unfortunately it is not analyzed; it is simply talked about, with the result that the chapters are overlong, repetitious, and boring. The basic finding is demonstrated too many times. The only attempted explanation of the regional variation is mounted in the chapter on "The Catholic Factor" when Rubin shows that regional differences in the social status of Catholics is not the explanation for the regional differences in partisanship. Redundant data and verbal overkill largely destroy the merit of this part of the book.

In Chapter four he finally offers an explanation of this regional difference that is both imaginative and theoretically intriguing. His basic thesis is that the Democratic party in the east has been less successful at holding the loyalities of some elements of the New Deal coalition because the eastern Republican party is substantially more liberal than its midwestern counterpart. In Rubin's view, smaller issue differences between eastern Democrats and Republicans have weakened the Democratic predisposition of some groups of voters. To test this explanation, Rubin compares eastern and midwestern Republican and Democratic Senators in terms of their welfare and racial liberalism. He finds that midwestern Republican Senators are substantially more conservative than their Democratic colleagues, while eastern Republicans are only mildly more conservative than eastern Democrats on welfare questions and a fraction more liberal than the Democrats on racial

natters. Unfortunately, his use of these lata is only illustrative, and his failure o analyze them systematically leaves his ›riginal insight untested. In short, the lata that could redeem the first three ·hapters are not presented; and they are ıecessary since his explanation defies he convention that party identification is ormed by references to national and not tate politics (the south excepted, ›erhaps).

In the next two chapters the merit of he book is finally established. His nalysis of the factionalism of Demoratic elites and the changing Demoratic electorate is excellent. The impor-.ınce of the ideological orientation of the ıiddle-class, New Politics Democrats to his factionalism is clearly drawn. The hanging contribution of blacks, union ıembers, Southerners, and city dwellers ı the Democratic vote is woven into a ›ersuasive explanation of the success of ıe "anti-regular" campaigns of McCar-ıy, Wallace, and McGovern. Overall, he ffers a fine analysis of how changes in ıe Democratic electorate since the late 'orties have fueled the turmoil of the ›arty over recent elections. His discus-ion of the importance of racial questions ›r the South, for blacks, and the new ıiddle-class Democrats is particularly ood. The intra-party history which ermitted the emergence of the race ssue is also explained. Rubin's explana-on of the concern with which blacks iew Democratic factionalism is particu-ırly interesting in light of black support ›r Jimmy Carter over several liberal)emocrats in the 1976 primaries.

The impact of television and the xpanding primary system on the Demoratic party, and the greater permeability f its elite selection process is the focus f the last two chapters. These chapters rovide an insightful discussion of the elationship between the selection of)emocratic candidates and the character f intra-party conflict, especially with egard to the problem of meshing the ·references of Democratic activists with ıose of the general voting population.

If the data in the first half of this book ad been as skillfully analyzed as the ·ends in the second half of the book are insightfully interpreted, this would be a substantial contribution to the literature on party change. It is a tribute to the quality of the later chapters that it is worth buying the book just to read them.

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WOODROW WILSON. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Vols. 20, 21: *1910*. Edited by Arthur S. Link et al. Pp. xxii, 604; xx, 644. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975, 1976. $22.50, $25.00.

These are turning point volumes in the series as it depicts not only the full evolution of Wilson's life, but the conditions, personalities, and interests which gave him his major decade. Volume 20 begins and continues with a thick dossier of letters, minutes, charges and countercharges about a matter which should have had minimum general interest: the location of a new graduate school at Princeton. It can be only because of Wilson's qualities that it stirred politicians and bystanders remote from Princeton and its projects.

What related the numerous participants in a movement which, by the end of Volume 21 elected Wilson governor of New Jersey? Clearly, it was their search for efficiency in government. They had experienced a decade of reform which had reached everywhere, forcing social decisions of every kind on almost everybody. That wave of reform was still activating talented people of every kind throughout New Jersey, and threatening its Republican and Democratic machines. The profoundly conservative George Harvey persuaded the Democratic boss, James Smith, Jr., that Wilson would be a brake on untidy reformers who, if they won power, would submerge parties in popular clamor. In effect, Wilson offered to be the people's representative within a political system too intricate for any individual to grasp. As one party worker put it: "I am like thousands of other Democrats . . . anxious to see the State in the hands of honest, unselfish and sane administrators. . . . The people are tired

of demagogues, quacks and cure-alls" (XXI, 21, 86).

The critical fact was that Smith needed assurances that Wilson would not turn on those who made him governor. Wilson was glad to indicate that creating his own machine was "the last thing I should think of" (XX, 540). He set down other Delphic phrases which persuaded Smith and others that Wilson would meet other due political obligations. Smith did not take to heart Wilson's ". . . so long as I was left absolutely free . . . in the matter of measures and men."

Wilson's combination of strength and weakness displays him as wholly made by his times. He rouses hatred among Princeton elements who see his demand for a "democratic" graduate school harmful to their brand of elite interests. Had Wilson resigned under pressure, as he might have done, his saga would have ended there, with Wilson doubtless rounding out his career as a well-respected administrator elsewhere. His impassioned defense of policies before the Pittsburgh alumni, April 17, 1910, was received in silence. But it brought him national sympathy, even a vibrant letter which he did not answer from a "demagogue," David Graham Phillips, Princeton '87, who hoped "you will be able to make Princeton the university of the present and future, instead of a mockery of medievalism" (XX, 363ff., 372). Yet Wilson had retreated on the graduate school location and protested that it was his "ideals" which distinguished him from his opponent Dean Andrew F. West.

Wilson had a bad, querulous moment when it seemed there might be an open fight for the Democratic nomination, rather than, as he had insisted, having it handed to him by party bosses without qualifications, without struggle, without self-exposure of any kind. He rushed to his sponsor Harvey for reassurances. Yet he also consistently denied to reporters and inquirers that he sought the office of governor at all, and was ingenuous in voicing his surprise at being nominated. Wilson found phrases for everyone which did not outrage their party opponents, whose suffrage he also needed. Famous is the exchange between the reformer George L. Record and Wilson (XXI, 338 ff., 406 ff.) which won over Record without alarming Record's foe, Smith. Wilson also assuaged labor elements on one side, and corporations on the other. By the end of Volume 21, Wilson is receiving congratulations on victory from everybody, including Smith, and his campaign has been national news.

Wilson expresses his deep obligation to Harvey, and thanks Smith for his congratulations, though he had denounced the boss during the campaign. Later, Wilson will repudiate Smith and abandon Harvey, and be himself denounced as an ingrate. It is an open question, to be answered by scholars, how much difference Wilson's governorship, and the operations of his public service commissions, made, over what other Smith appointees might have done. Wilson was far from being the only sensitized instrument of change in New Jersey or elsewhere.

During his campaign, Wilson had argued that what the times needed was not new men but new programs, and indeed new programs—not necessarily identifiable with Wilson—would materialize in New Jersey, as elsewhere and in the Federal structure. The best of Wilson's eloquence is yet to come, and to be weighed for its pertinacity in his time and ours.

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ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR. *On Watch: A Memoir*. Pp. vii, 568. New York: Quadrangle, 1976. $12.50.

During Admiral Zumwalt's four years "on watch" as Chief of Naval Operations, he struggled diligently to improve morale and efficiency in numerous ways. He earned a reputation as a thoughtful, farsighted, military administrator. His efforts to eliminate needlessly authoritarian practices ("Mickey Mouse") and pervasive racial discrimination in the Navy were hardly successful, but unde-

niably constructive. There has been a definite movement to implement equal career opportunities for women and blacks, particularly with increased respect for the rank and file of Navy personnel.

Zumwalt's memoirs include fascinating vignettes of a brief tour in China in 1945 where he first met his Russian-born wife, Mouza. There is, moreover, a thoughtful section about Naval vessels and weaponry. He discusses the politics of weapons procurement, the budgetary process, and bureaucratic politics from a military perspective. For foreign policy scholars deficient in any of these areas, there is a wealth of data to consider.

The author lays much of the blame for the failure of Naval shipbuilding programs in recent years on Hyman S. Rickover. Zumwalt concedes that the 76-year old Admiral with legendary influence in Congress rarely if ever pushes for ineffective weapons systems. As head of the relatively obscure Division of Nuclear Propulsion he is rarely the object of public attention. Nonetheless, Rickover's obsession with nuclear vessels and his powerful opposition to naval alternatives which might be considerably cheaper and relatively efficient, has resulted in much consternation in Washington. Rickover is not merely parochial, he is ruthless, according to Zumwalt. Thus, few oppose him openly. With allies throughout the Navy who have served under his tutelage and in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Armed Services Committees (in particular on the House Seapower Subcommittee), Rickover quietly promotes his favorite projects and personnel.

As yet another chronicle of internecine politics during the Nixon-Kissinger years it compares favorably to other accounts due to the author's detailed notes and keen memory of conversations between elites. Foreign policy scholars and students of civil military relations particularly will find these memoirs provocative and useful in the years ahead. Of interest may be Kissinger's alleged comments on Russia's ascendency *vis-à-vis* the U.S. (p. 319), Prince Bernard's "Catch-22" rationale for a constant U.S. commitment in Western Europe (p. 358), and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's view of parity in strategic arms (p. 487).

On potentially critical foreign policy issures such as the endangered ecology of the seas, the question of a Palestinean State and projected conflict in Southern Africa, there is virtually no mention. Understandably, we have come to expect that military leaders (and Zumwalt clearly ranks among the most impressive in recent years) confine their thinking about America's future security to important power relationships.

Unfortunately, there is too much mental masturbation about the likely outcome of conventional naval war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Zumwalt believes that it is necessary to keep statistical odds on such hypothetical conflicts). Whereas, naval conflict between the superpowers is quite conceivable, the possibility that one side would accept defeat without utilizing all forces, including nuclear weapons, seems remote. One of the most important political developments which reduces the threat of an accidental war because overzealous commanders engage in macho confrontations ("playing chicken" on the seas) was an understanding concluded in 1972 (p. 391).

Zumwalt's concerns are similar to those of the Secretary of State whom he came to distrust so deeply. Thus, this book is primarily interesting because of Zumwalt's argument that "we should begin to gird ourselves for a harsher adversary relation with the Soviet Union." The focus on "the growing maritime power of the Soviets (was) the most immediate and formidable threat to the U.S. . . ." is clear (p. 330). What some will consider his "worst-case analysis" of the military capabilities and political intentions of the U.S.S.R. others will consider an objective and thoughtful study. Readers should not neglect the search for alternatives to the policies that Zumwalt and Henry Kissinger represent in the text.

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SOCIOLOGY

ELIOT FREIDSON. *Doctoring Together: A Study of Professional Social Control*. Pp. xiii, 298. New York: Elsevier, 1976. $13.50.

Eliot Freidson has for some years been directing attention to the way in which medical care may be influenced by the settings in which it is offered. He has also raised questions about the effectiveness of professional social control in the medical field.

Doctoring Together reflects both these concerns. It is the first full-length account of an intensive study he conducted more than a decade ago in a large urban medical organization, summaries of which were published in article form in the '60s. Although somewhat belated, this new volume providing extended discussion of the findings, is a valuable addition to the literature. It includes for the first time a thorough description of the research methods employed in the study, gives verbatim excerpts from interviews with physicians, and presents its analysis within a systematic framework of concepts and theory. Much of this profits, no doubt, from Freidson's work on his recent Sorokin-Award winning volume, *Profession of Medicine* (1970).

The medical organization selected in the early '60s for study was a model of its type, incorporating features advocated by reformers. It operated under a prepaid-service-contract-plan in which some 45,000 persons were enrolled, and employed on a salary basis some 50 physicians. As a specail protection, the insurance company which administered the organization made periodic checks on standards of medical care. Freidson's study tested the effectiveness of this emergent type of system.

Under the broad principle that "the way work is organized and controlled influences the nature of work itself," the study depended basically first, on an analysis of the organization, its rules and its structure, and secondly, on the opinions of the physicians about their work and that of their colleagues. The study aimed "not so much to measure results as to understand how and why the organization operated as it did." Methods of research employed approximated the field-study type, including: observation ("just being there") attendance at staff meetings, review of medical and other records, and, most importantly, interviews. In order to obtain a more complete view, physicians were encouraged, at least initially, to talk at length about their problems as they saw them, rather than responding to fixed questions.

The analysis focusses primarily upon the processes of social control. Two models of social control are contrasted: the *bureaucratic model* associated with hierarchical organization and supervision, and the *professional model* in "a company of equals." Elements of both models were found in the medical organization. Complaints by physicians stemmed largely from bureaucratic restrictions enforcing required office hours, crowded schedules and a general "overload" which militated against optimal care. Problematic relations with patients resulted, moreover, from elimination of the fee barrier and from the fixed-panel system preventing choice of physicians.

Freidson takes a more serious view, however, of the failures of professional control to bar from practice those physicians known by their colleagues to be guilty of substandard practices. Occasional "talking-to" repeated offenders or boycotting them personally in referrals were the only measures taken.

The book is important in view of changes in medical care being considered by our country. It is stimulating reading and admirably well organized for teaching purposes.

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MURIEL GARDINER. *The Deadly Innocents: Portraits of Children Who Kill*. Pp. vii, 190. New York: Basic Books, 1976. $8.95.

In his preface Stephen Spender notes that the author is not so much concerned

with explaining why young people commit homicides as describing the conditions in which some of them have done so. The tragic and deplorable backgrounds of these young offenders are almost beyond belief. Spender states that the author's purpose is to persuade readers to agitate for changes in the family, the schools, the law courts, and the rehabilitation centers. Her compassionate account will arouse her readers, although some may question her objectivity.

According to the dust jacket this book contains portraits of ten children, all under the age of eighteen, who have killed or attempted to kill. Yet two of the children are eighteen years of age and not all of them killed or attempted to kill. One committed armed robbery and kidnapping, but is brought within the fold by the assumption that he acted with the intent to kill himself. He wanted to threaten a police officer with his gun so that the officer would kill him. Another is described as a "bystander" at a murder.

The author, a psychoanalyst, read English literature at Oxford University, but her literary style may surprise her tutors. School grades drop catastrophically, delicious aromas come from the kitchen, tremendous sympathy springs up, and a heart pounds with joyful anticipation. Her psychoanalytic interpretations, fortunately few in number, may surprise her training psychoanalysts. A young sailor's intention to spend his last evening on leave with a girl friend may have meant choosing between heterosexuality and homosexuality. His mother by withholding money for this evening, may have become, at least symbolically, the instrument for depriving him of a normal heterosexual relationship, perhaps forcing him into homosexuality. The killing of his mother is described as having all the earmarks of a homosexual panic.

Long quotations of conversations, some of them extending back into early childhood, do not ring true. The "bystander" at the brutal beating of an elderly burglary victim, feeling letdown by the outcome, is reassured by one of his partners in crime: "Cheer up, old fellow. Here, have a beer. We can't make a b grab every time, you know. And that gol watch is a real beauty. Cuff links not ba either. We three are going to draw lots see who gets what." After they learn th the victim has died they spend a jol evening drinking, talking, and plannir for the future.

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RICHARD KIECKHEFER. *European Witc Trials: Their Foundations in Popul and Learned Culture, 1300–1500*. P x, 181. Berkeley: University California Press, 1976. $13.50.

E. WILLIAM MONTER. *Witchcraft France and Switzerland: The Borde lands During the Reformation*. P 232. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Universi Press, 1976. $15.00.

Some contemporary historians believ that testimonial accounts of devi trafficking in fourteenth and fifteen century Europe were in reality artifac imposed by judges and Inquisitors upc the statements made by participan during the prosecution of allege witches. *European Witch Trials* repor an empirical test of this thesis.

Professor Kieckhefer usefully disti guishes between *sorcery* (the magic use of conjurations and spells to achiev desired ends), *invocation* (calling up ev spirits to hear one's bidding), ar *diabolism* (Satan-worship). He holds th the need among learned men, who general dominated the agencies of ju tice, for an Aristotelian-rationalist expl nation of how sorcery could cause hai storms, crop-failures and other bligh led them to reject the peasants' simp reasoning that "magic" did "magic things. Instead, drawing upon mature Christian theory, the learned adopte the notion that the wondrous things dor by sorcery resulted from willful dealin between the sorcerer and the unde world of incubi, succubi, demons ar familiars, for help from such bein seemed a necessary causal link betwee

a mere mortal's intent and its sometimes awesome manifestation. To obtain such aid the witch-sorcerer agreed to submit to Satan.

Kieckhefer located trial documents containing uncoached witchcraft allegations made by people of little or no learning, and compared these with accusatory materials in whose formulation some part had been played by officials. His canvass of some 500 trials which took place between 1300 and 1500 in Switzerland, France, Germany and England turned up depositions relating to 35 that were free of "learned" intrusions. In all 35 plain sorcery was the offense usually alleged by the unlettered deposers, but in practically all cases where officials, with their leading questions, terror and torture, had a hand in things there were charges of invocation and diabolism as well. The association predicted by Kieckhefer's hypothesis is thus borne out by these data. Whether they are sufficiently definitive is another matter, as the author acknowledges; numerous caches of documents remain to be similarly studied.

In this brief review I cannot do justice to Professor Monter's rich and stimulating monograph. *Witchcraft in France and Switzerland* chronologically complements Kieckhefer's work, for Monter's concern lies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but his research was confined geographically to witchcraft in the then-remote hamlets and villages of the Jura, now divided between France and Switzerland. Because the archival centers in the region have been spared by wars and catastrophes, records survive on hundreds of local witch trials, allowing the use of quantitative analysis in their study.

The seven quasi-autonomous governments in the Jura varied in language, religion and traditions, enabling Monter to "test and compare" witchcraft theories, since witchcraft and the responses to it differed among the seven. While sorcery continued to be the chief *maleficia* during the centuries in question, popular belief in invocation and diabolism had sufficiently grown by then to provide a groundwork for the great surge of witchcraft trials which occurred throughout Europe in the last quarter of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. During the surge, several thousand individuals suffered death by fire, strangulation, beheading and drowning, while thousands of others—more fortunate?—kept their lives but were crippled by torture or driven into miserable exile. Monter examines possible linkages between the contrasting Jura cultures and differing severities in punishment, kinship and vicinal propinquities, panics over plague-spreading witches, and the role of religious teachings.

To me, Monter's most fascinating conjectures pertain to the witches themselves. That the victims of Europe's witch madness tended not to be representative of their populations of origin is an old notion in witchcraft studies; Monter has given it an empirical foundation. His archival diggings unearthed details on no fewer than 833 individuals who underwent the torments of interrogation and trial between 1527 and 1677 in the Jura: from these he produced a kind of profile of a Jura witch. Out of the settlements of that region there streamed into the courts suspects who were disproportionately female, old, spouseless, friendless and poor, and whose local reputations had earlier been sullied by petty crimes, sexual laxity or quarrelsomeness. Socially they comprised a deviant substratum whose riddance would cause few regrets. Viewed functionally, the witchcraft mania served to diminish an annoying presence in the Jura settlements through a dreadful purge of the unwanted.

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SAR A. LEVITAN and ROBERT TAGGART. *The Promise of Greatness*. Pp. 308. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $15.00.

Levitan and Taggart describe the prevailing mood of the American public and its policy makers as timid and negative on the subject of governmental interven-

tion. This public feeling has recently found support and encouragement with the publication of a number of studies conducted by social scientists which proclaim the failure of the social welfare programs undertaken in the last decade. Through a reassessment of the existing data and analytical studies, Levitan and Taggart now present the case for a more positive evaluation of these governmental efforts.

Lest one get the impression that the authors of this study purport to have produced the first objective evaluation of the social welfare programs of the Great Society, they clearly state the normative purpose of their work: "This book was written to defend our belief that the 1960s' programs and policies and their continuation had a massive, overwhelmingly beneficial impact and that the weight of evidence convincly supports this view" (p. viii). They make no apology for their lack of scientific objectivity. Indeed, given the inadequacy of information on many questions and the primitive state of the tools of evaluation, these men believe that no study of the social reforms of the last decade can honestly claim to be either completely exhaustive or objective.

Despite the admitted inefficiencies and the negative spillovers from a number of the Great Society's programs, Levitan and Taggart argue that the weight of the evidence suggests that governmental attempts at constructing a better society have been reasonably successful. The task which remains, in their view, is that of the completion and rationalization of the existing social welfare system. The meaningful and successful pursuit of the general welfare requires positive governmental action.

This study will probably assist and encourage those social activists who have been on the defensive in recent years. Even if the reader disagrees with the overall assessment made by Levitan and Taggart regarding these attempts by government to construct a better and more equitable society, one must be impressed with the documentation and general good sense exhibited in this work and by the lack of self-righteous or polemical style in the analysis made by these authors. Such a temperate and careful study will certainly assist in keeping open the question for many Americans of what we can and should expect from our government. Because the data under consideration are subject to differing interpretations on the basis of normative and political judgments, this strong defense of the programs and policies of the Great Society is likely to bring a quick response from the prosecution.

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DEAN MACCANNELL. *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*. Pp. 214. New York: Schocken Books, 1976. $5.95.

STANLEY PARKER. *The Sociology of Leisure*. Pp. 157. New York: International Publications Service, 1976. $11.25.

MacCannell's book is a complex, stimulating and yet morbid vision of man and his future world. It emphasizes the sociological view of the interrelationship of man with the institutions of his society and represents him as the captive of his era, with little prospect of subordinating its influences to his personality needs.

MacCannell's analysis of social structural change is based upon Erving Goffman's *front* and *back* regions of the social establishment. Social roles and social performances are acted out within the appropriately staged social facades erected for them by our society. All society is a series of architectural constructs within which we act-out our related roles.

Modern man is a symbol of this era, a post-industrial one, within which he has lost his ability to satisfy his sensibilities and creative energies through work. With the availability of ever more leisure time, he seeks within this to find what he had formerly found in and through his job.

Tourism is manufactured, packaged and sold like a commodity for the (emotionally) starved modern man of all

social and economic classes. It promises, in the viewing and visiting of historical monuments as well as contemporary slums, to satisfy this craving for a "pure" experience; presumably one which is not synthetically manufactured and staged solely for symbolic enjoyment. The past, in the form of the industrial era and its predecessors, is where modern man is encouraged to seek better, more intimate and interpersonally satisfying relationships. Touring is a search for viewing *in sitio* people and relationships where the "real thing" still exists; yet the tourist voyeuristically views but does not intimately contact.

This alienation from one's self and one's contemporaries makes of the tourist a catalytic representative of modernity to all areas he visits. In the process of searching for something "real" he transmits ideas and perceptions of the modern era to those who have not yet achieved it.

The value of touring to the tourist, which includes attending conferences as well as Disneyland spectacles, is not determined by the amount of creative productions resulting from the activity but by the quantity and quality of experience they promise. The successful end result of a series of tours, the author contends, is an immense accumulation of reflexive experiences of reality, and fiction as well, which summed up represents modernity. It is a "totalizing idea," an ethnography of "one world."

It is a fascinating presentation of processes, ends and means, based upon acceptance of his premises. However, he does not allow for the possibility that in the process of "touring" the tourist must in some way be affected by what he experiences. Is it not possible that the tourist is more than a mere transmitter of modernity to those not yet within its asceptic folds and in turn is influenced by those he views who still find personal satisfaction in their lives? Might tourism be the reverse means to keep human values alive? In addition, even though religion has lost a good deal of its former attractiveness to show the way to find Self, is man doomed to a comfortless search for interpersonal contacts?

It is true that psychology, psychiatr and social work are swamped with th problem of alienation presented to then daily, but it is just as true that million more seem to cope adequately with th roles modern society encouraged them t accept within satisfying boundaries o human interrelationships.

The intellectually stimulating an heuristic insights provided by this boo will well repay the patient reader' efforts. It is provided with supportin footnotes and comments on each chapte as well as a useful and comprehensiv index and bibliography.

Parker's slim but informative an thoughtful volume tries to answer th question as to whether we can expect "society of leisure" in the near futur The author does a most competent job i an interesting and most readable fashio supported with an impressive number c objective surveys and research reports

Utilizing material from interdis ciplinary sources, he approaches lei sure as only one of several "interactin spheres of individual life and of society. Appropriately, the book is divided int three major sections. In one he consider various ways in which leisure has de veloped and emphasizes how it is a pa of work and carries characteristic form and meanings. In the second section h examines the relationship between lei sure and other activities of man, includ ing the family, education and religior The third section is devoted to the large concerns of society and its institution with leisure activities, including th need for planning now to meet the need of the immediate future. Overall, Parke makes a most persuasive case for hi conclusions in a reasoned and wel supported presentation of the pertiner evidence.

One of the numerous new insights h brings to the reader's attention is that c the "*time famine*" experienced by thos who are convinced that improve technological products will permit eve increasing leisure time. The auth points to the fact that the time su posedly saved by these products is p back into maintaining and keeping the

in working order. He concludes that when all is considered, it is the continued rise in the standard of living which will be insisted upon by the masses, more than leisure time to pursue activities away from the job.

It is possible that what has been missed in the midst of this engrossing book are the creative needs of man which have been mainly expended in some form of work or related activities. One wonders if man will be satisfied with a life mainly devoted to sports and various cultural activities. Man may not live by bread alone, but through earning his bread, whatever form this activity takes, man has found satisfactions much beyond the diversions suggested by the contemporary definition of the term, "leisure." We have seen that it is only in recent times that leisure has been equated with expending energy unattached to some sort of creative or productive effort. The author supports the view that leisure must include activities which "build meaning and purpose into life."

There is much in this book which leaves the reader with thoughtful insights and heuristic suggestions. It is highly recommended for those who, regardless of disciplinary allegiance, deal with people and their relationship with society.

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CLARENCE N. STONE. *Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent*. Pp. xv, 256. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976. $13.95.

Clarence Stone has presented us with a fascinating account of the progress of urban renewal in Atlanta, Georgia during the period 1950 to 1970. Moving forward from the period of World War II when the altered priorities of war hindered capital improvement and contributed to the aging of residential and commercial structures, Atlanta embarked upon a program of civic renewal aimed at revitalizing the city. In the late 1950s Atlanta developed a reform government apparently dedicated to a style of political conduct which viewed general community well-being as an interest which should dominate over the interests of any specific segment of the community. The reform ethos articulated a viewpoint which dedicated political, business and community leaders to the service of the common good.

While a city in the Deep South, Atlanta earned a reputation for racial moderation. Long an important economic center, Atlanta, while it was certainly dominated by business interests, was also the "home of civil rights organizations, esteemed black institutions of higher learning, and a large black middle class. It prided itself on being a city that did not hate."

Out of this mix of characteristics emerged a vision of Atlanta as the economic capital of the Southeast. Its leaders "believed that the city could become the business and financial hub of the entire Southeast. Indeed they believed that Atlanta could become a city of national prominence." To implement this vision the development of the Central Business District loomed as a vital necessity. And Atlanta's future demanded the development of the residential neighborhoods—black and white—to provide its citizens with a basis for communal living.

Accordingly, in the early 1950s, Atlanta launched a program of urban renewal which, while federally assisted, was controlled by local officials who had wide latitude in making choices and decisions. The overall plan involved the redevelopment of the Central Business District as well as the renewal of nonaffluent neighborhoods through public housing and rehabilitation. The result was, as the author points out:

> Over the past two decades the commercial center of the city has expanded outward and upward. Much of the land and the impetus for the enlarged and rejuvenated central business district has come from the city's urban renewal program. Sites for civic facilities, expansion room for medical and educational institutions, and land for commercial development have all been provided under the aegis of urban renewal . . . downtown re-

vitalization was conceived and executed as a joint public-private venture. For example the city constructed a new civic center and exhibition hall on land acquired through urban renewal. The civic center, in turn, encouraged the private development of nearby hotels. (But) To some segments of the community the new stadium and the civic center were symbols of misplaced priorities . . . the city pursued a policy under which one-seventh of its population was displaced by government action. Some neighborhoods were simply demolished. . . . Relocation activities drastically affected other neighborhoods. . . . Neglect, overcrowding, and unaverted racial tensions changed the character of many areas.

When Atlanta first initiated a redevelopment program in 1950, nonaffluent neighborhoods lacked adequate facilities. Twenty years later, that lack had been studied, documented, and lamented, but not corrected.

In his description of Atlanta's two decades of urban renewal, Stone attempts to explain how this situation developed, that is, the revitalization of the Central Business District at the expense of the rehabilitation of nonaffluent neighborhoods. He details the conflict between the residents of demolished communities and the redevelopment of business and institutional facilities. He pictures the attempt at neighborhood resistence to both public housing and urban redevelopment. From all the details emerges a picture, not of a deliberate attempt to destroy neighborhoods or to ignore citizens' interests, but of local officials making, or not making, decisions on the basis of a built-in bias in favor of business interests. The first phase of Atlanta's urban renewal, the revitalization of the Central Business District, succeeded admirably because it had the support of business leaders who worked closely with local officials. The second phase, the restoration of neighborhoods, was largely a failure, not because of the opposition of business interest, but because of their indifference.

The author, however, attempts more than a description of two decades of urban renewal in Atlanta. He uses the case of Atlanta as a vehicle for revising the pluralistic view of group influences in metropolitan areas as developed by political scientists. In very simplistic terms, the pluralist approach would maintain that the influences upon public officials come from many sources and, since public officials must seek reelection, they are broadly responsive to such influences. Therefore the public official is a neutral power broker who seeks to accommodate the various group influences and implement those policies which are acceptable to the groups most concerned with them.

Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent provides an alternative view wherein public officials are not responsive to all influences impinging upon them. In Atlanta, it is maintained, there is a built-in system bias by means of which public officials are more responsive to business interests. But they are more responsive because of their interconnections with business influences and support, because they see the economic development of the community as more important than other considerations. The public officials are more responsive to business interest because they share the business orientation. The author maintains that the system bias does not always have to be in favor of business but that public officials actively control policies and their implementation and that the direction of such control is strongly influenced by their particular viewpoints.

This is an excellent study of urban renewal in Atlanta as well as the mechanisms of community power and community change.

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GAYLE GRAHAM YATES. *What Women Want: The Ideas of the Movement*. Pp. viii, 230. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. $10.00.

The author of this provocative contribution sees it as a "personal document, a social commentary and an intellectual investigation."

The direction of the investigation is based on the "ideas of the past and

present women's movements," and these are considered to involve three "ideological strands." Written materials are the sources for the presentation. The bibliographical listings of books, special periodical issues and articles from professional journals and popular magazines indicate a broad overview of the words that launched the new feminism in the early 1960s.

The three ideologies are the "feminist ideology," the "women's liberationist ideology," and the "androgynous ideology." Recalling historical feminist efforts as having "failed in America because the early feminists defined their problem too narrowly," the author claims that today the movement in attempting to reinterpret issues and problems affecting women has within it the seeds of its own failure because of its fragmented voices.

On one thing all female activists agree: the "*general social role*" *of women in* America is "unequal to that of men."

In comparing the three ideologies, the author concludes that the "feminist ideology" is an outgrowth of historical efforts by feminists who sought equal property and voting rights, the opening of professional opportunities, and employment equality among others. However, two new concepts challenge the "feminist ideology."

The "women's liberationist" model is perceived as "anti-masculinist"; it maintains that only women can gain their own freedom.

The "androgynous" paradigm represents a picture of women and men equal to each other. Accommodative processes are major in this approach; there is recognition that social values, decisions and ultimately behavior can only be changed by both sexes achieving mutually agreed-upon goals through cooperative action. The enemy facing the solution of sexual inequalities lies in institutional structures and their supportive value systems.

Obviously the three ideologies are in competition; the author says this is her thesis. And as an individual Ms. Yates is attracted to androgyny in the areas of "sexuality, the family, work, politics, society, education, and religion."

Exhortations and the messages from the leaders—Margaret Fuller, Hanna Mather Crocker, Mary Lyon and Catherine Beecher represent the 19th century; Betty Friedan, Caroline Bird, Gloria Steinem, Mary Anderson, Wilma Scott Heide, Helen Gurley Brown are among those who stimulated the contemporary "new feminist consciousness"; and Kate Millet and Shulamith Firestone dominate the liberationist's approach—thread the competitive maze in the movement's growth.

The "future of today's feminism is anybody's guess," and certain backlash reactions in the 1970s are healthy signs of effective gains towards improved women's rights. Let's hope the leaders don't tear themselves apart.

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ECONOMICS

LAWRENCE W. BASS. *Management by Task Force*. Pp. ii, 197. Mt. Airy, Md.: Lomond System, Inc., 1975. $12.50.

ABRAHAM ZALEZNIK and MANFRED F. R. KETS DEVRIES. *Power and the Corporate Mind*. Pp. viii, 288. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975. $10.95.

Lawrence Bass has written a promotional treatise for Lomond Associates, designed to serve the needs of his clients, the new advanced technology enterprises. They are engaged primarily in problem solving at the frontiers of an advancing technology.

It is essentially a management consultant's manual on how to put together the structure of an organization that takes upon itself the solution of global problems. The typical assignment Bass envisages for these organizations is the effectuation of rational developmental programs for newly arrived countries. He

TABLE 2

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF INTERDISCIPLINARY ACTIVITIES

	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Type I Unoriented unstructured discussions	Starting point for more specific concepts; develop better understanding and liaison among disciplines; clarify the roles of disciplines in joint undertakings	Rarely lead directly to specific benefits; because of the discursiveness consume energy and time
Type II Oriented unstructured collaborations	Encourage collaboration among specialists; stimulate initiative and creativity	Focus of activity not well clarified; contributions and timing uncertain
Type III Oriented structured programs without constraints	Provide channels for diverse inputs with common focus; encourage communications among disciplines	Permit divergence from planned objective and scheduled because leadership decisions may not be enforceable
Type IV Oriented structured projects with constraints	Stimulate direct communication and interaction among specialists; result in consensus of competent opinion; performance is regulated by authority of team leader	Program restricted by selection of specialized inputs and managerial style of team leader; adherence to original concept may deter innovation
Type V Projects under executive direction	Lead to direct accomplishment; all inputs under central administrative and operational control	Results depend on ability of executive; initiative and creativity limited by his decisions

hopes to avoid the mistakes of the first generation of developers whose programs have led to a collapse of the agricultural sector and the proliferation of barriers on the borders of their trading and primitive industrial centers.

Bass brings to his task an impressive set of practical credentials. They include a long stint with the prestigious mass consulting firm, Arthur B. Little and Company. Bass emphasizes the interdisciplinary approach to the problem and formulates some rules for putting together these interdisciplinary teams. The instructions are made up of operational formulas for interdisciplinary activities which the author divides into five categories. These groups are organized as task forces made up of personnel furnished by the disciplinary organization in the firm. At the end of the task or even at the end of one phase of the task, some assignees may be detached from the group and more appropriate personnel substituted. The five categories (see "Table 2" above) are: (1) The Unoriented Unstructured Discussion Goup; (2) The Oriented Unstructured Collaboration Group; (3) The Oriented Structured Programs without Constraints; (4) The Oriented Structured Projects with Constraints, and (5) Projects Subject to Executive Interdisciplinary Techniques. The remaining ten chapters are a series of "success stories" justifying the philosophical approaches in chapter II. The fundamental theme song connecting these is the effectiveness of the interdis-

ciplinary approach to complex problem solving. Bass feels that these approaches satisfy the obvious need for a combination of talents for solving major sociotechnical problems, such as environmental pollution and urban decay.

The reviewer has found, unfortunately, that many of these efforts start as well intentioned teams that degenerate into miniature "Towers of Babel" that shake themselves to pieces or come under the domination of strong individually dominated bodies disguising in action, the old hierarchal method of getting things done in the guise of an interdisciplinary concensus.

The volume is valuable because it familiarizes the reader with the current jargon in the field and even endows him with a philosophical rubric when he finds that he has evolved into an ordinary subordinate "order taker" after an elaborate anthropological ceremony in which he was persuaded that he was a member of participation management, engaged in participation decision making.

One is left with the question in his mind—Are these techniques but a new disguise for hierarchal domination? Perhaps this question will always remain unanswered, for man is just too complex and power hungry to organize into a team of "real" equals.

Mr. Zalesnick, this time with an associate, has published still another of his brilliant treatises on industrial psychology from the point of view of the impact of *Power and the Corporate Mind*. Mr. Zalesnick, a psychoanalyst of Freudian persuasion with full credentials, has really written a collection of some twelve essays, each listed as a chapter. Each of these chapters contains a series of sharp insights into the dynamics of organization life. Although the reviewer acknowledges the greatness of Freud—the clinical pioneer who carefully listened to the ravings of his patients instead of dismissing them as meaningless as did so many of his predecessors—he finds himself hard pressed to accept as real the elaborate models of universal man based upon a middle class experience of 1890 Vienna. This world view was tempered by the violent anti-semitism of 1890 Vienna and a rich love of classical Greek literature, making a strange mixture.

Mr. Zalesnick's chapters are loaded with allusions to the theoretical constructs of Freud, but his own insights are so rich and appealing that they offer a relief to the redundant hard behavioral science recitation of platitude nothingness, fortified by pseudo-sophisticated paradigms of pseudo-hard science. Mr. Zalesnick sets the tone of his work when he acknowledges that *Power and the Corporate Mind* is not a prescription for solving leadership problems in corporations. He then goes on to share his mentor's pessimism: "The problem question of how understanding can be used apart from insight really calls upon the intellectual and moral standard of people for whom understanding is often not enough."

No Dale Carnegie vulgarity here, and its semi-respectable academic counterparts from "T-Groups" to sensitivity training to manic encounters. In one grand leap, the authors have taken us from the modest reaches of psychological power to change to the mountain tops of Rabbinic prophecy and warning.

The rest of the book is confined to a clinical examination of the "in between being" reaching for power—the individual's attention to the attempt to cast off unacceptable self images and his fate to remain divided and ill at ease. It is then that the individual's orientation to power becomes a defense as a means for uniting a divided self.

Then follows a series of essays on the dilemma faced by corporate leadership in a variety of roles. The Introduction is followed by: (1) Leadership and Executive Action; (2) Power and Motivation; (3) Power and Human Development; (4) Power and the Fragmented Self; (5) Subordinacy; (6) The Myth and Reality of Entrepreneurship; (7) Minimum Men and Maximum Men; (8) The Capstone, and (9) Philosophers and Kings.

The first sentence of this last chapter may well stand as the basic principle offered by the writers that embodies the human dilemma in a manager evaluating his organization: "Institutional leaders

are usually active people who often show a tendency to avoid reflection. It is therefore unlikely that philosophers will be kings." President Truman put it even more succinctly. He was watching the campaign of Adlai Stevenson, the democratic candidate to succeed him at the White House—and despite all the "thoughtful speeches" adressed to the country's intellectual elite, President Truman observed, "The White House is no place for Hamlet."

There is no more to be gained in reading Zalesnick than a whole host of hard studies whose vigor is inversely proportional to the importance of the problem examined.

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BERNARD BELLUSH. *The Failure of the NRA*. Pp. xiv, 197. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975. $8.95.

In recent years revisionist historians have emphasized the conservatism of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. No better short sample of that interpretation can be found than this volume in the *Norton Essays in American History* series.

Viewed from Bernard Bellush's lectern, Roosevelt was a wealthy conservative seeking to preserve capitalism; National Recovery Administration officials Hugh S. Johnson and Donald R. Richberg were the willing dupes of big business; American workers were held in "virtual servitude" from the Civil War to the 1930s; labor leaders of the early 1930s were timid and disorganized; and Norman Thomas was the "liberal conscience of the nation."

Created in 1933, the NRA's purpose was laudable enough. Business, labor, and government would cooperate to stabilize the economy and increase both production and consumption. The old Herbert Hoover trade associations were ideal for business representation in each industry, but both labor and government lacked sophisticated analysts to counter business expertise. Even the NRA became a haven for businessmen, and labor leaders were not forceful enough to counter the business-government alliance.

The authorship of industrial codes establishing guidelines for fair competition between businesses and equitable treatment for labor was a major NRA project. Corporate executives dominated the code writing, and many of the provisions relieved business of antitrust regulations. After the codes were written, business ignored with impunity unpleasant code requirements.

Labor accepted the NRA codes because Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act asserted labor's right to organize and bargain collectively. Bellush argues that very few labor unions were strong enough to take advantage of this opportunity, and workers often were forced to join company unions. Furthermore, the NRA's Johnson and Richberg undermined Section 7a's benefit to labor by maintaining that individual workers and small groups of workers could bargain with their employers independent of the majority union.

Eventually business domination of the NRA became so obvious that Johnson was driven from his post, and the NRA virtually ceased to function. The 1935 Supreme Court decision which invalidated much of the NIRA was a mercy killing which Bellush applauds. He hints that the NRA's death allowed Roosevelt to move away from business and toward labor as evidenced by the 1935 National Labor Relations Act and the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act.

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WILLIAM H. FORM. *Blue Collar Stratification: Autoworkers in Four Countries*. Pp. xx, 335. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $17.50.

From 1961 through 1966 William Form and four graduate students in industrial sociology under his supervision conducted comparative cross-cultural studies of automobile factory

workers in Argentina, India, Italy and the United States. Fifteen journal articles and monographs have been published on selected aspects of the research. Now Form has synthesized and integrated much of the material around a comparative analysis of attitudinal and behavioral correlates of worker stratification in countries at different levels of industrialization.

In each of the countries a sample of from 250 to 300 workers employed in a single factory, representing the range of blue collar occupations in the industry, was intensively interviewed about work, jobs, occupational history and mobility, political orientation, community and national involvement, rural-urban origins, family life, unions, relations with fellow workers, and belief in the coherence and stability of the moral order. In the report, that touches on many of the current preoccupations of industrialization scholars, Form supplements the interview materials with extensive reference to the work of his colleagues and his own previous studies.

The recurring questions that weave these complex data into an interpretive fabric center around the differential effects, on industrial workers, of the level of industrialization of the country, the level of technology in the factory, and stratification of the workers by skill level, rural-urban origin, education, marital status and age.

There is a secondary analytical theme of testing, informally, alternative but compatible "theoretical frames of reference" for understanding the impact of industrial technology on workers. Form labels these the (1) "cultural" or anthropological approach, that stresses gradual accommodation of industrial and traditional patterns; the (2) "industrialization" hypothesis that predicts relatively rapid and uniform accommodation; and the (3) "development" frame of reference that emphasizes different adaptations at various stages of industrialization.

Form manages successfully to provide direction and continuity in the exploration of this unusually comprehensive set of concerns. He sketches a theoretical framework; examines selected background characteristics of countries, cities and factories where the data were produced; relates community and social involvement to rural-urban origins; discloses relationships between level of technology in the factory and worker interactions; shows how attitudes toward work, the job and industrial employment are affected by the level of industrialization; provides an intensive analysis of the ways in which workers' attitudes about their unions are influenced by skill level and technology; compares community, national and family involvements among the four countries and among the skill levels; displays a new version of an anomie scale and relates scale scores to skill level, political ideology, industrialization, involvement and other factors. He concludes with a discussion of working class social movements. In the appendix there is a brief chapter on the history of the study and an extensive chapter on field problems.

This is a unique and valuable contribution to the literature on industrialization and worker behavior and attitudes. The strong cross-cultural design allows Form to examine a broad range of effects and to illustrate the complexity of the interrelationships among explanatory factors.

Most of the limitations of the study are explicitly recognized by Form. There are the inevitable difficulties in obtaining comparative data. There is the temptation to infer causal relationships from cross-sectional survey findings. There are the mechanical problems in data presentation. And the reader will quickly become aware that Form bases some of his strong generalizations on the study, some on other cited references, and some on his accumulated insights.

Form has produced a bold, assertive, intuitive document, with a multifaceted design and complex analysis. Each page challenges the reader to reconsider commonly held oversimplifications about the worker in industrial society.

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ERIK F. HAITES, JAMES MAK and GARY M. WALTON. *Western River Transportation: The Era of Early Internal Development, 1810–1860*. Pp. 206. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. $12.50.

In their quantitative study of the economics of Mississippi Valley river transportation, the authors do not claim to demolish previous "impressionistic" interpretations. Drawing heavily on such studies as Louis C. Hunter's *Steamboats on the Western Rivers*, they accept prevailing views about the main developments in river shipping. Indeed, they occasionally appear almost uncritical in using contemporaries' and historians' generalizations to supply gaps in quantitative evidence. They do, however, recalculate tonnage to refute Hunter's claim that streamboating was already declining because of rail competition by 1861. Unlike previous scholars, also, they attribute growth in steamboat productivity less to speed increase than to changes which extended the navigation season and reduced cargo-collection time.

The authors' primary task, however, is to discover numerical relationships of efficiency, productivity, and profitability and use them to account for previously-described traffic trends. They conclude that steamboating followed the Kuznets pattern of initial high risk, profits, and growth, leveling off as the industry matured. They argue that successive improvements in boat construction accelerated productivity more than did the initial impact of steam power. They calculate profit differentials to explain why steamboat competition quickly banished keelboating from the Louisville-New Orleans route, but why flatboats there and keelboats on the tributaries long remained competitive.

The authors' painstaking analysis throws much light on the development of river transportation. Its validity largely depends, however, on their intricate calculations of costs, revenues, and profits of the trade at different times. Gaps in the available data introduce some weak links into the chain of argument. Sources on earliest freight rates are sketchy, and data on tributaries come almost entirely from lines serving Louisville. Sometimes the authors must surmise which figures were "typical" or reconstruct costs by inference from other information. Even if their data and methods are the best now attainable, some room for uncertainty remains.

The authors point out that river transportation received little of the public investment which most students of early American transportation emphasize. Their argument for the primacy of private enterprise focuses on economic impact more than on neomercantilism and laissez-faire as norms of public policy. They acknowledge that some federal contributions did improve river shipping measurably, and their discussion lends credence to the thesis that laissez-faire triumphed as the "Jacksonian" response to the post-1837 depression.

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SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL. *The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime*. Pp. xiii, 216. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. $15.00.

RAMÓN EDUARDO RUIZ. *Labor and the Ambivalent Revolutionaries: Mexico, 1911–1923*. Pp. 145. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. $10.50.

These studies have related subject matter though each is very different in approach. However, though each has distinctive goals and focus, the information provided in each volume is more complementary than contradictory.

Ruiz is an historian who dwells on the chronology of development of the labor movement, causes of this development and the labor movement's relationship to Mexican political leaders during the Mexican Revolution and years immediately following. Purcell is a political

scientist whose main interest is in the examination of the Mexican political system from the standpoint of its theoretical relevance for the study of authoritarian regimes and formation of "ideal type" models to distinguish these regimes. Her focus is the public decision-making process, and the information she provides is presented as a case history of one major decision, that is the profit-sharing law of the early 1960s.

Ruiz helps the reader to understand the historical roots of institutionalized patterns that are fundamental to the environment of the decisional process studied by Purcell. For instance, there is a growth of "anti-gringo" feeling in Mexico during the decade prior to the Revolution of 1910. Ruiz treats worker resentment against policies of foreign capital as a major cause of the mining and textile industry strikes that took place at Cananea, Sonora, and Rio Blanco, Veracruz. In doing so he points up an important source of Mexican nationalism and at the same time sets the stage for an account of relations between industrial workers and military-political leaders during the Revolution and after.

Ruiz provides further basis for understanding of the present Mexican political system by calling attention to clashes between peasant revolutionaries and industrial workers during the Revolution. The success of "divide and rule" paternalism discussed by Purcell has one of its dimensions in the early beginning of a schism between urban and rural workers which is described by Ruiz. Ruiz also gives perspective to Purcell's discussion of the patron-client relationship between Mexican organized industrial labor and government under the present regime. He describes the experiences of Madero and Carranza as well as Obregón in handling demands of industrial workers thus giving the basic steps in the process of building labor's dependent relationship to government. At the same time, however, there emerge from Ruiz' account the roots of periodic labor militancy and intransigence under the regime. Madero, Carranza, and to a lesser extent Obregón produced "carrot-stick policies with consequent ambiguity that elicited violently negative reactions from the labor organizations of the time" (Ruiz, pp. 29, 30, 56–61). The same fiery activism which brought defiance of Madero and later Carranza also nourished the famous Red Battalions of workers who so effectively aided Carranza in his drive for power only to bring his downfall and death at a later date. This same activism made it difficult for Obregón to treat American capital in a manner that would facilitate his bid for United States recognition in the early 1920s. Yet, whether it was Madero, Carranza or Obregón there was continued evidence of labor's dependence upon government in recruitment of membership and in negotiations with industrial capital.

In her work Purcell draws on the continuing symbiotic relationship between the Mexican President and the patterns of labor's militancy to underline her classification of Mexico's polity as an "inclusionary authoritarian system" (Purcell, pp. 1–8). She emphasizes a low level of political mobility, the trappings of patrimonial politics (*caudillos, jefes políticos, caciques, intermediarios* or "brokers") with the president at the top of the patrimonial system. She speaks of the PRI (official political party) as an arm of the president, of the "limited autonomy" of all interest groups, and of the "deferential" nature of participation (Purcell, pp. 31–32). "Deferential participation" means that one is active and included in political life in order to work and render service for the higher good as defined *at the top* of the hierarchy of patron-client relationships. At the same time Purcell also underlines what she terms the regime's "essentially non-repressive" character (Purcell, p. 3), and she attributes "non-repressive" and "inclusionary" outcomes to the "deferential" political style and low political mobilization levels referred to above (Purcell, pp. 31–37).

Within this framework Purcell examines the profit sharing decision. She shows it as a presidential initiative with both private sector business organiza-

tions and the major labor leaders dependent and manueverable (pp. 73–93). Of the two, labor is shown to have less resources with which to pursue interest demands autonomously. The pattern of presidential "patrimonial-clientelist rulership" is characterized by a style of "divide-and-rule." She uses the term "incorporation" to discuss this style in the decisional process. "Incorporation only occurs, however, *after* the initial vague version . . . of the decision has been publicly announced" (Purcell, pp. 139–142). Concerned groups are consulted but at first are not allowed to express views in each other's presence and only are brought together after a government mediating body (in this case an *ad hoc* commission) has established bases of agreement which all but eliminate conflict. In joint session the policy decision is agreed to by all interest group representatives.

Purcell does not allow technical aspects of the decision to obstruct her focus upon major decision-making strategy, but there is still much descriptive material that may interest the reader. In fact both Purcell and Ruiz provide goodly amounts of information which may be of service to researchers with quite different theoretical interests. For the reader with a general interest in Mexico the two books combined show with great clarity continuing characteristics of patron-client relationships enduring despite the fires of revolution, the vows of commitment to progress and the exigencies of modernization.

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DAVID A. REISMAN. *Adam Smith's Sociological Economics*. Pp. 274. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976. $21.50.

The Bicentenary has been a notable year. The Tall Ships came to New York on the Fourth of July, Federal troops did not come to Philadelphia, and in universities here and in Great Britain academics paid their respects to Adam Smith whose *The Wealth of Nations* was published in the year of our rebellion *Adam Smith's Sociological Economics* i David A. Reisman's contribution to th celebration and unhappily it does no add much distinction to the occasior Drawing primarily on *The Wealth o Nations* and *The Theory of Mora Sentiments*, Reisman offers us a highl schematic, textual analysis of Smith' economics in six main sections: Methodology, Conduct and Character, Consumer Behavior, the Upper Classe the Lower Classes, and the State. In eac section the argument is authoritativel supported and meticulously cited so tha we get it twice, from Reisman and Adar Smith, and have more than 1400 notes a a testament to the ardor of Reisman' scholarship.

There is no doubt that Reisman know his Smith well, indeed exhaustively. It i all there: the humanism, empiricism, an skepticism; the stages of historical evolu tion; the central importance of th division of labor and self-regulating, com petitive markets in economic develop ment; the polemics against Mercar tilism; the judicious appreciation of th economic role of the state; the ambiva lence and apprehension about the ne economy and society being born tha make *The Wealth of Nations*, in particu lar, a giant in the western economics an social science tradition. The difficulty i not that he has nothing new to say abou Smith—at this late date very few peopl do—but rather that there is little cohe ence to what he does say. Each of th main sections is learnedly examined, bu they do not add up. The book enc without being completed. It is a smö gåsbord that lacks a main course to give focus. In consequence, one reads ploddingly and without that sense verve which is so much a part of Ada Smith's own work.

For a book with 228 pages of text th price—$21.50—is steep and sales wi surely be confined to libraries, wealth ones at that. It would be worth while t pay the price if there were an index tha provided a comprehensive subject ma ter guide to the copious quotations fro Smith's oeuvre. Unfortunately, the inde

consists largely of author citations and is not very useful.

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VICTOR G. REUTHER. *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW*. Pp. xiv, 500. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. $16.95.

Victor Reuther's foreword promises a "personal memoir" of "social activists," "with no pretense of 'objectivity'." *The Brothers Reuther* is all of this, and because of the high commitment and enthusiasm of the author it is good—sometimes exciting—reading.

Walter, Victor, and Roy were in a very real sense the culmination of several generations of worker-socialists. Theirs was a heady mixture of idealism and hard-headed realism. The family history told here is interwoven with the development of industrial unionism, in which these three Reuthers were ever present, and Walter a leading actor. (Brother Ted, an accountant, was not a participant in these labor-organizing activities.)

Interest naturally focuses on the sit-down strikes and the extreme violence—to the point of attempted murders—that marked the early efforts to organize the rank and file in the auto industry. Members of the present younger generation, not born or not old enough to have been reading newspapers in 1937, can have little appreciation of the pervasive social tensions, felt even by far-off observers. This is understandable, because in hindsight it is not easy to realize—or admit—that these terrible events did happen here. They were the growth pangs of industrial unionism in the automobile industry: the United Automobile Workers Union.

Of great long-run significance is the story of Walter's fight to link wages, productivity, and prices in contract settlements and to achieve more complete worker security via a guaranteed annual wage (the latter reflected in the auto industry's system of supplemental unemployment benefits). There are, too, extensive and intimate histories of the struggles of UAW with both militant employers and indifferent or antagonistic city police. At the same time, the Reuthers had to struggle for control of the young union, against Communists who had taken advantage of the turmoil accompanying organization of the industry to achieve top positions in the UAW—at the international level and in locals. Finally, there are several sections on relations of UAW to international labor organizations and on involvement of AFL-CIO and, peripherally, UAW with the Central Intelligence Agency.

All treatment of CIO and of UAW's relation to it is weak, though there are frequent references to aid and encouragement from John L. Lewis when the young UAW was hard pressed. Another unfortunate weakness is the void in Victor Reuther's memoir for the period 1942 to 1946. When the United States entered World War II, Walter, Victor, and Roy were practically conscripted into war-related government functions. During the war period total union membership in the United States and total dues-paying membership in UAW increased by forty percent. This burst of growth put great strain on leadership, especially in the middle echelons and at the local level and UAW was not immune to this problem of growth.

Much of this has been told elsewhere, but much could be found only in newspaper files, if at all—and certainly those sources would lack the intimacy of relation by a participant/victim.

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
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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS

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PREFACE

The first nuclear explosion, in July 1945, prompted Dr. Robert Oppenheimer to recall the lines from the *Bhagavad Gita*, "I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds!"[1] Since that date, the face of Death has been seen on many more occasions, both in the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in the hundreds of tests of nuclear weapons conducted by the United States and other countries. So far, however, the world has not been shattered; in fact, nuclear weapons have not been used in any of the conflicts of the past 30 years.

This fortunate outcome has been due in part to luck, in part to the fact that the five nuclear-armed powers (the United States, USSR, Britain, France, and China) have learned how to adapt their behavior to the requirements of the atomic age. But this age is one of rapid change, not least in the area of nuclear technology. Recent developments make it easier for states to produce nuclear weapons, and the incentives to do so remain high. Thus we may have, in the not-too-distant future, a world of 10, 20, or 30 nuclear powers, with a consequent increase in the complexity of interstate relations and in the likelihood that these may lead to nuclear war.

This issue of the ANNALS addresses itself to three aspects of nuclear proliferation: the prospect that new nuclear powers will come on the scene, the problems that their arrival may create, and ways of coping with those problems. To put the matter in these words implies that proliferation is undesirable—as I, for one, believe. This belief neither justifies the existence of five nuclear powers nor precludes acceptance of a sixth—or a seventh; rather, it reflects a concern about the potential consequences for peace and security of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whether this concern is well-founded, you may judge for yourself as you read further.

However, before you turn to substantive matters, I should like to thank the Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies of the University of Pittsburgh for its support of this endeavor, and most notably for its sponsorship of a workshop wherein authors (and critics) could discuss nuclear proliferation. In this way, good inputs were made even better.

JOSEPH I. COFFEY

1. Sri Krishna, *The Bhagavad Gita*.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 430, March 1977

"Quo Vadimus?"

By JOSEPH I. COFFEY

ABSTRACT: The arguments against nuclear proliferation are numerous and weighty. Further proliferation may increase the likelihood of nuclear war through accident, nuclear blackmail, or escalation of conflicts. Conversely, there are reasons for leaders to support their countries' right to acquire nuclear weapons for security, power status, or economic benefits. It is very likely that additional states will seek to produce nuclear weapons, and the technical information and expertise to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive devise are readily available. Problems of safeguarding nuclear facilities from nuclear diversion and sabotage and theft by terrorists are reasons for curbing nuclear proliferation and searching for ways to reduce incentives to proliferation both through responsible behavior by present nuclear powers and through the UN and international organizations. However, problems of organizational structure and decision-making processes will confront both nations and international organizations. Judgments as to the best way to slow, channel, and limit proliferation differ markedly; however, five suggestions are: (1) the promotion of détente; (2) amelioration of differences likely to induce proliferation, (3) establishment of policies to inhibit acquisition of nuclear energy systems by additional nations while offering alternatives; (4) application of economic sanctions against detonation of nuclear devices; and (5) a greater willingness to accord status to countries on the basis of factors other than nuclear capabilities.

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IN 1974, after a decade wherein the number of nuclear powers had remained at five, the Republic of India, by detonating a nuclear device, raised that number to six. Although India has not conducted further tests, nor taken any of the other steps required to create nuclear-capable forces, her action heightened concerns about the long-term feasibility of preventing nuclear proliferation, concerns which had already been aroused by a number of other factors.[1]

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PRO AND CON

The arguments against "horizontal proliferation" are both numerous and weighty. As Dr. William Epstein points out in his article, further nuclear proliferation may increase the likelihood of nuclear war as a result of attempts at nuclear blackmail, or through the escalation of conventional conflicts involving nuclear-armed powers by accident, inadvertance, or miscalculation. Moreover, proliferation may intensify antagonisms between rival states and lead to shifts in local and regional power balances, creating a less stable and more quarrelsome world. In addition, proliferation may encourage build-ups in other armaments as smaller powers seek to keep or to restore military advantages and larger powers seek to bolster their air and missile defenses or to develop precision guided munitions for preemptive strikes. Since both courses divert resources from urgent social and economic needs, numerous leaders in many states oppose further proliferation.

Conversely, there are reasons why other leaders have supported the right of their countries to acquire nuclear weapons or, at least, to build up a capacity to produce them. As Dr. Epstein points out, one set of these reasons stems from the quest for security, with nuclear weapons offering the possibility of achieving military superiority, of preventing an adversary from gaining it, or of deterring him from attempting to exploit it, should he in fact acquire it. Another set of reasons derives from the desire to achieve or maintain great power status, to be assured of a seat at the "head of the table,"[2] to redress perceived inferiorities in the international hierarchy, or at least to enhance national prestige. Coupled with these are desires to demonstrate political independence and self-reliance and to end discriminatory treatment, such as applies to non-nuclear states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A third set of reasons for proliferation springs from the belief that nuclear weapons technology has potential economic benefits in the form of the development of peaceful nuclear explosives, spin-offs to civilian technology, and perhaps a better bargaining position, both with regard to the transfer of technology

1. As indicated in the introduction to part I, these included the dissatisfactions of many states with the seemingly discriminatory provisions of the NPT, with lack of real progress in SALT, and with the absence of firm guarantees of their security; the oil embargo of 1973, which spurred programs for the construction of nuclear reactors; increased sales of equipment which will enable more countries to build atomic weapons; innovations in nuclear technology, which promised to further enhance that capability; and an upsurge of terrorism, which induced fears lest extremists acquire—and use—nuclear weapons.

2. One could wish that these leaders would emulate the Irish chieftain seated "below the salt" at an Elizabethan banquet, who declaimed proudly, "Where O'Neill sits, there is the head of the table!"

and in negotiations on the terms of trade and the flow of capital from North to South. Thus, economic independence, as much as political independence, may be a major incentive to proliferation on the part of some states in the Third World.

Moreover, domestic factors may reinforce rational analyses of the advantages to be derived from nuclear weapons programs. Scientists and technologists involved in nuclear energy programs may see in such programs an opportunity to increase their power and influence, or an occasion to demonstrate what they can accomplish for the nation. Similarly, political, economic, and military elites may all see in nuclear weapons programs an opportunity to secure cherished group or national goals, ranging from that of controlled modernization to that of building up the armed forces. And governments faced with, or fearing, opposition from such elements may be driven—or tempted—to prolong their political life by endorsing nuclear weapons programs, or at least by keeping open their options to do so.

These are not the only factors affecting decisions to "go nuclear"; were they so, the world would by now be a nuclear-armed one. There are many countervailing considerations: issues of morality, concerns about cost, doubts about the utility of nuclear weapons, fear that their acquisition may again open a Pandora's box out of which newer and larger security problems may emerge. And there are ways of reducing the incentives to proliferation, both by holding out a carrot and by brandishing a stick.[3] Nevertheless, it is very likely that additional states will, over the next decade, seek to produce nuclear weapons or at least create a capacity to do so.

Should they wish to do this, the path is, as Dr. Frank Barnaby points out, both clear and easy to follow. Both the technical information and the expertise necessary to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive device are readily available. Moreover, all types of nuclear reactors generate plutonium (Pu-239), one of the fissile materials used in atomic weapons. (The other fissile material suitable for this purpose, U-235, can only be concentrated to the requisite degree in specialized enrichment facilities.) Thus, the spread of nuclear reactors occasioned by the growing demand for energy automatically spreads the capacity to produce atomic weapons.

This capacity does not depend solely on the availability of power reactors; research reactors also generate plutonium in sufficient quantities and small production reactors, whose output would be sufficient to build two low-yield atomic bombs a year, can be constructed at a cost of about $20 million. Moreover, if breeder reactors which produce plutonium in weapons-grade concentrations are introduced, countries will not even need the chemical processing plants which are now utilized to separate Pu-239 from other elements and isotopes in spent-fuel emissions. As new technologies for uranium enrichment, such as the centrifugal method or the jet nozzle procedure, become more widely disseminated, the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials may receive a further boost. And as one looks further ahead, laser techniques for enriching uranium and laser-induced fusion and fission offer the prospect of not only less expensive but more powerful weapons.

3. See William Epstein, "Why States Go—And Don't Go—Nuclear," and George H. Quester, "Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation."

In brief, many countries can now produce atomic weapons readily and fairly cheaply; the Indian nuclear explosion probably cost less than $500,000. As time goes on, more and more countries will acquire this ability, the cost of crude atomic bombs will go down, and more efficient (and effective) weapons can be built. Since many countries already possess rockets, missiles, and strike aircraft, they have at hand the means of delivering atomic weapons against their neighbors—and perhaps even against others on the same subcontinent. If not, such delivery vehicles can readily be bought or built; as Dr. Barnaby says, "A small but credible nuclear force . . . could be acquired for a few hundred million dollars . . . about the same cost as that of a modern cruiser."

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Furthermore, it is difficult to prevent diversion of fissile materials to the construction of nuclear weapons, even on the part of countries adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and undergoing inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As Dr. Ryukichi Imai points out, "Measurement error alone [in a typical fuel reprocessing plant] will exceed [the amount of plutonium required for] one bomb. . . . " While the current inspection procedures of the IAEA provide for the timely detection of diversion from peaceful nuclear fuel cycles of significant quantities of nuclear materials, the word "significant" may have very different meanings to nuclear "haves" and "have nots." Moreover, the system of inspection covers only certain prescribed facilities in the countries which have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and does not touch any in countries which have not signed it, safeguards there being worked out on a bilateral basis with countries supplying fissile materials and reactors. Accordingly, it is possible for some countries to build, or to utilize for the production of nuclear weapons, facilities which are not monitorable by anyone, as India did. Failing this, countries desirous of making atomic bombs could violate the inspection agreement in the hope that they would not be detected if they did so, nor suffer sanctions if they were detected, or they could abrogate the NPT, as they have a right to do. Thus, the system of safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials is limited both in its application and in its consequences; as Dr. Imai points out, safeguards are not a substitute for political solutions to proliferation.

They are, equally, no substitutes for the physical safeguarding of nuclear facilities against sabotage and theft, which remains a national responsibility, or against the seizure of such facilities by armed gangs. As Dr. David Krieger notes, terrorists could readily acquire radioactive and even fissile materials and could, at some risk to themselves, fabricate crude atomic weapons. (This could be done even more easily by units of the military in revolt against their government or engaged in civil war; by paramilitary elements; or by organized revolutionary groups, such as the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization, or the Argentinian Montañeros.) Both terrorists and revolutionaries could contaminate densely-populated areas with radioactive materials, could threaten the destruction of major targets, and could even wipe out leadership groups. One expert witness estimated that the

detonation of a one-kiloton weapon outside the Capitol building during the delivery of a presidential State of the Union message would kill everyone in "the line of succession to the presidency—all the way to the bottom of the list."[4] Equally, terrorists or revolutionaries could direct atomic weapons, whether stolen, seized, or donated, against foreign targets, with the aim of breaking up a peace conference, disrupting a government, or simply inflicting enormous punishment. (Imagine what might happen at future Olympic Games if terrorists acquire a small-yield nuclear weapon!) Thus, to concern about the implications of proliferation for the behavior of states must be added those about the behavior of other actors in the international environment; as Dr. Krieger concludes, nuclear-armed terrorists or revolutionaries "could provide a significant threat to any society. . . ."

INCENTIVES AGAINST PROLIFERATION

This possibility reinforces other reasons for seeking to curb nuclear proliferation and lends urgency to the search for ways of reducing incentives to proliferation. This is not, however, a simple task, since these incentives are so varied in nature and so uneven in their impact upon potential proliferators.

As Professor George Quester suggests, one way of doing so may be to maintain—and perhaps even to increase—the U.S. commitment to states depending on this country for their security (as do the nations of Western Europe, Japan, Israel, Taiwan, and perhaps Iran) even while minimizing the American presence and American guarantees in areas where these might be both unwelcome and irrelevant to the problem of proliferation, as they would be to many countries in the Third World. Moreover, potential proliferators among such countries are more likely to be inspired by the prospect of political gains than by the necessity for military ones; since this is so, political disincentives should also be emphasized. Measures to be taken could include managing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in such a way as to downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons and remove the glamor attached to them; selectively supporting "no-first-use" policies and nuclear free zones in areas of the world where these are politically desirable, as may be the case in Latin America; ceasing all nuclear tests and deemphasizing peaceful nuclear explosives (PNE); and pressing potential Nth powers not to detonate a nuclear bomb, even if they construct one.

Economic measures may include placing greater emphasis on research and development of non-nuclear sources of energy, such as solar power; pushing alternative reactor designs and uranium enrichment processes which would be easier to monitor or whose end-products could be less readily fabricated into nuclear weapons; and promoting multinational rather than national reprocessing facilities. However, those states which are concerned about nuclear proliferation may also have to consider sanctions against states moving to produce nuclear weapons, sanctions

4. Theodore B. Taylor, Statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 26 February 1976, quoted in David Krieger, "What Happens If . . .? Terrorists, Revolutionaries, and Nuclear Weapons."

ranging from simple condemnation through denial of nuclear equipment or economic aid to military action—though the latter will certainly be more difficult to carry out than the former and may in consequence be less credible.

In all these efforts, the nuclear powers and other advanced industrial states should, according to Dr. Quester, be selective and varied in their approaches, and subtle in their application, thereby suiting the measures adopted to the problem and avoiding confrontations between the advanced and the developing countries. They should also recognize that even if these and other measures do not succeed in preventing further proliferation, they may curb it, slow it, or modify its nature—all of which are ends desirable in and of themselves. As the author says, "If India and Israel and one other country make it into the nuclear club by . . . [1985], this is not yet a world in which 'everyone has the bomb.' "

Whether proliferation can be slowed to such a crawl depends, according to Dr. Ashok Kapur, on a number of major developments, including responsible behavior by the present nuclear powers, a continuation of détente between East and West, some normalization of relations between the PRC and the USSR, as well as between the PRC and Western countries (including formal Chinese participation in SALT) and some amelioration of conflicts and confrontations in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia. Under such circumstances, Pakistan and Iran may not exercise their nuclear options (though Israel may) and Taiwan will probably hold off. South Africa may decide that atomic bombs will not deter black African support of revolutionary movements and hence may not produce them, while Brazil and Argentina may, despite their resentment of the double standard of the great powers, abstain from going nuclear. Even under these circumstances, however, we may see within a decade eight to ten nuclear powers rather than the present six.

Moreover, "normalization" of relations between China and the rest of the world may not promote interdependence among the states of South Asia, some of whom may then view proliferation as desirable. Or normalization may defuse South Asia, at the expense of arousing concerns elsewhere about security, with the result that other Asian states, such as Japan and South Korea, may go nuclear. Furthermore, if some diffusion of power does not take place, if tensions grow rather than shrink, or if improvements in Sino-Soviet relations are bought at the expense of détente, then, Dr. Kapur argues, "Global and continental relations . . . will have radicalized the shifts toward proliferation" and many more nations will acquire nuclear weapons.

Within this context, much depends on whether states which go nuclear simply demonstrate a capability or undertake serious (if technically deficient) programs for the development of nuclear forces. In the latter case, according to Dr. Lewis Dunn, the adverse consequences of even limited proliferation might be enhanced by accident-prone systems, by the possibility that these could be seized by dissident domestic elements, by their marginal survivability against a preemptive strike, and consequently by reliance on a hair-trigger launch-on-warning mode of protecting nuclear forces.

Futhermore, at least some countries acquiring nuclear weapons may look on these as potentially useful means of waging war, or

as instruments for coercion rather than for deterrence, thereby further diminishing stability within several regions of the world. In those regions, one could accordingly expect to see nuclear arms races, small power nuclear wars, and perhaps catalytic wars. On a global basis, one could expect some erosion of existing alliances and possibly deliberate disengagement by the superpowers from associated states which acquired nuclear weapons—with mixed, but predominantly undesirable, consequences for peace.

Equally important is the fact that weapons systems lacking permissive action links (PAL) and other control mechanisms could be stolen and used by terrorists or seized and employed by dissident elements within a country. In some instances, it is conceivable that governments would find it desirable to sell—or to give—weapons to terrorists or to revolutionaries whose actions would further the interests of their countries or advance their own political and ideological objectives. One outcome could be increasing restrictions on individual liberties and group activities, perhaps growing political authoritarianism, and a consequent loss of support by regimes, all of which, according to Dunn, would contribute to the global anarchy which is likely to result anyway from interactions among 20 to 30 nuclear-armed states.

This does not mean that the world would necessarily go to Hades in a handbasket. Much would depend on the number of nuclear powers, their location, and the nature of their weapons program. Dunn suggests, therefore, continuing efforts to prevent proliferation or, failing that, to persuade countries to stay at the lower rung of the nuclear weapons ladder; attempting to influence both the design of systems for the control of weapons and doctrines for their employment by Nth powers; developing codes of nuclear behavior, to include a "no-first-use" policy; supporting regional arms control measures, to include hotlines and emergency verification procedures; seeking understandings among the global powers about their participation in regional conflicts; and continuing efforts to check the "growing risk of nuclear terrorism." Taken together, Dunn asserts, the preceding measures could comprise "the basic components of a strategy for managing in a proliferated world." Since, however, these measures require a changed global political environment and approaches other than business as usual, there may be "a gap between the gravity of the likely threats within a proliferated world and the potential effectiveness of politically acceptable responses to them."

BALANCED PROLIFERATION

Whether and how that gap is to be closed are questions to which no answers are possible, only speculations. One such speculation by Professor Thayer is based on the assumption that, in the short run, an acceleration of nuclear proliferation seems inevitable, that this will take place in a world wherein resources are finite and set limits to growth, and that these two factors, in juxtaposition, argue either for increasingly bitter conflicts over resources, leading to some form of nuclear holocaust, or to a complete social and political transformation into a world order very different from that described earlier by Dr. Dunn. In the near term, this transformation could be promoted by "balanced proliferation," that is, by the dissemination of weapons to another state or states once one

country in a given region becomes an Nth power, accompanied by the concurrent dissociation of the superpowers from countries acquiring nuclear weapons. In short, Dr. Thayer asks us to recognize and accept the position that atomic bombs are essentially terror weapons; that stability depends, as Churchill once said, upon a balance of terror; that new countries possessing nuclear weapons are not likely to be any less sane, trustworthy, or rational than those now holding them; and that, under these circumstances, peace is to be maintained by adroit manipulations of nuclear capabilities.

In the longer run, however, one may find atomic weapons, whether built, bought, or donated, being used to ensure or to safeguard access to materials essential to growth. Governments will engage in economic competition to whose success nuclear weapons are essential, even as they are simultaneously reordering their societies and restructuring their economies into small, self-sufficient units which could better withstand a nuclear war, should deterrence fail or compellance lead to coercion. One may, alternatively, see acceptance of the thesis that in a world of finite resources, these belong to everyone, "to be *shared, distributed, allocated* on some agreed basis." In such a world, small essentially self-sustaining units may also be optimal, but more because such units will place fewer demands on resources than because they constitute more or less viable modules in the event of nuclear war. More importantly, the shared management of resources, both within states and among them, may reduce the need to exploit certain resources, among them nuclear energy, thereby facilitating "balanced deproliferation," in which not only nuclear weapons but also nuclear reactors are phased out. Whether, therefore, one arrives at the pessimistic outcome of nuclear armed autarchies competing for resources or the optimistic one of demilitarized entities cooperating in the management of resources, we are, says Professor Thayer, "fast approaching the demise of the nation-state as we know it."

Whether or not we arrive ultimately at a world in which international actors cooperate or compete, or indeed at any world other than one in which the survivors of a nuclear war scramble for subsistence, depends in part on how we manage affairs over the next decade or so. Dr. Colin Gray agrees with Professor Thayer that large-scale proliferation is inevitable (though not within that next decade), that proliferation may be accompanied by competition for shrinking resources, and that in the twenty-first century "a prime motivation pushing a state toward a nuclear-weapon capability may . . . be . . . a laudable desire to increase its international leverage for the end of ensuring an adequate supply of calories for a swollen population." However, Dr. Gray differs in believing that "the basic structure of world politics will not be radically changed"; that, despite a diffusion of power, the United States and the USSR will continue to outshadow all rivals; and that these two superpowers will, in support of their own interests, seek to impose a minimum of order in regions vital to them and to support valued allies—though not to the extent of accepting responsibility for nuclear actions taken by these allies. Moreover, he believes that both they and other powers, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, will still be concerned with reducing the risk of war and, to the extent

possible, the damage from any war that might occur.

The first objective, Dr. Gray asserts, can be promoted by attempting to slow or to channel proliferation, by considering helping with Nth powers to develop more controllable and, within limits, more secure national nuclear forces, and by improving both warning systems and communication nets available to these powers. He also argues that it is unrealistic—and hence unreasonable—to try to deemphasize nuclear weapons by changing strategic concepts, as to a doctrine of "no-first-use"; by stressing certain conventional capabilities and denying others (such as fighter-bombers which could carry large, first generation atomic bombs); or by issuing nuclear guarantees—a move which would, moreover, run directly counter to the interests of the great powers in war avoidance. Under such circumstances, arms control policy aimed at reducing the risk of war may focus more on prudent actions to deal with particular cases than with sweeping measures of universal applicability. Moreover, policies aimed at reducing the damage from war may be unacceptable to new nuclear powers concerned with deterring (or winning) a local conflict. Thus, Dr. Gray concludes by saying: "Sad to predict, the first genuine opportunity for a non-marginal change for the better in the ways in which human beings provide for their security, will occur not as a consequence of the emergence of a nuclear-armed world, but rather as a consequence of nuclear war."

Professor Abraham Bargman turns his attention to a different way of maintaining peace and enhancing security in a nuclear armed world: through the United Nations. While recognizing the primary responsibility of the superpowers for the maintenance of peace, and the existence of relationships and institutions which compete with the United Nations, he sees the UN as playing a major role in three problem areas: disputes between states on nuclear rights and obligations; nuclear crises; and the reform of international institutions in a world of nuclear powers.

With respect to the first, Dr. Bargman notes both the lack of authority of the United Nations and the limitations on its responsibility, but he also sees it as likely to be involved in problems arising from (1) violations of treaty obligations with respect to proliferation; (2) withdrawals from such a treaty; (3) disputes and tensions stemming from specific nuclear activities; and (4) the development of measures to deal with new problems, such as nuclear terrorism. In his opinion, the Security Council of the United Nations has an important role to play in imposing sanctions on violators of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in clarifying the justifications for withdrawal from that treaty, and in giving (or arranging) assurances against surprise attack to countries bordering on new nuclear powers, and the General Assembly has a similar role to play in developing measures against nuclear terrorism—and terrorists. He suggests that the United Nations can, and should, also play a role in nuclear crises. It can supplement actions taken by the superpowers to implement their "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War" of 22 June 1973; it can provide a framework for decisions in crises involving other nuclear powers; and it can establish peacekeeping and other specialized forces for use in the aftermath of a nuclear crisis or a nuclear war.

Finally, Dr. Bargman points out

that the UN can press for measures which would denuclearize world politics such as nuclear disarmament or the internationalization of the production and stockpiling of fissionable materials. It can also prepare for such measures by concerted study of institutional changes which would make their adoption easier, establishing an international nuclear security planning group to examine the tensions associated with proliferation, to devise and propose measures to ameliorate them, and to carry out on an emergency basis crisis control measures, such as the supervision of nuclear facilities. Bargman says, "Is it not high time for governments to permit some of their best nuclear security experts to become part of an institution concerned only with the international implications of nuclear disputes, tensions, and crises? . . . [Certainly] all people and governments have a supreme interest in the avoidance of nuclear war."

STRUCTURAL AND DECISION-MAKING PROBLEMS

As Professor Michael Brenner points out, problems of organizational structure and decision-making processes will confront nations as well as international organizations. In the case of the United States, these problems will arise from the need to shift from consideration of bilateral stragetic relationships (in larger terms, the East-West conflict) to consideration of "the permutations and combinations of multi-player nuclear games." Among the objectives of these games will be to ensure stable deterrence by: (1) increased attention to defensive systems; (2) changes in strategic doctrine; (3) safer management of nuclear weapons; (4) improved strategic intelligence, and perhaps the pooling of intelligence with the Soviet Union as well as with other countries; (5) avoiding strains on U.S.-Soviet relations, such as might arise from undue emphasis on war-fighting capabilities against Nth powers; (6) projecting strategic images which slow and limit proliferation; (7) and devising both force plans and targeting options which will be suited to a nuclear-armed world.

Achieving these objectives will, Dr. Brenner argues, require a fundamental restructuring of the decision-making process in the United States, in order to achieve both closer synchronization of policy and more consistent implementation. While some version of the National Security Council format (wherein bureaucracies focus on, and develop options around, issues formulated by the president and his assistant for national security affairs) is the most suitable model, it should be modified to enhance the technical competence of central policy-making bodies, to divest these of their operational roles, and to assign to the departments and agencies of government more responsibility (and accountability) for the implementation of policies. It might even be altered to include the establishment of a cabinet-level "Committee on Nuclear Programs" which would: (1) outline national policies on strategic needs, military planning to meet those needs, and political initiatives; (2) exchange views on important strategic issues; and (3) critically evaluate the execution of policies and programs. This committee should also be the prime mechanism for decision making in crisis situations.

To the extent that the work of the committee involves, as it will, force planning and targeting doctrine,

the president must exercise his authority to induce meaningful participation by the joint chiefs of staff; to the extent that its work affects alliance policy, as it also will, efforts should be made to persuade the allies to establish counterparts, such as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Political Planning Group. The aim, in this and other ways, would be to extend into the NATO and other alliances "the hoped-for-logic and coherence of U.S. decision making that will be a requisite for survival in the future."

Where Dr. Brenner dealt with the processes of decision making, Dr. Michael Nacht deals with their substance, commencing with the observation that U.S. policy toward states which have acquired nuclear weapons has tended to be based on previous bilateral relations with those states rather than on any consistent doctrine for coping with the consequences of nuclear proliferation. If the United States wishes to fashion a more coherent policy it has, according to Dr. Nacht, five options:

1. to exercise *malign neglect*, which means taking no effort to prevent proliferation, withdrawing from the international arena, and concentrating on the build-up of a military posture capable of defense as well as of deterrence;

2. to sponsor *nuclear realignment* by creating a ruling elite composed of the nuclear weapons states—augmented by those which subsequently acquire such weapons;

3. to practice *confrontation politics* in an effort to head off proliferation—or even to destroy the facilities and the delivery vehicles of states that have crossed the nuclear threshold;

4. to *promote equality* by closing the gaps between North and South in terms of levels of development, standards of living, and economic power—and hence, in terms of military capabilities and political influence;

5. to practice *adaptive continuity*, that is, to go on doing the same things as now, but to do them better.

As Dr. Nacht sees it, the fifth policy (which is both the most likely one and the preferred one) would be marked by attempts to control the spread of nuclear weapons through political-military strategies and through energy-related strategies. Measures under the former should include strengthening the NPT; pressing for Soviet-U.S. arms limitations; pledging the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, with the caveat that this would not apply to such states or their allies if they assist one or more nuclear-armed states in aggressive actions; adopting a comprehensive test ban treaty; extending and strengthening security guarantees; and imposing nonmilitary sanctions on a selective basis. Measures which might be adopted under energy-related strategies should encompass promoting suppliers' agreements which would further regulate the transfer of nuclear technology; exercising unilateral restraints on U.S. nuclear energy programs (as with respect to plutonium recycling and fast-breeder reactors); establishing multinational nuclear facilities instead of national ones; and increasing financial support to the IAEA.

Even if these measures fail to check proliferation, the United States should continue them, against an N + 1st power as well as against an Nth power. However, ongoing proliferation is likely to make the world a much more dangerous place, as well as to affect adversely United States security interests. If,

therefore, there is a major shock to the system, such as might occur from the sale of a nuclear weapon or the use of one in anger, the United States may move more aggressively to halt further proliferation, employing coercive and military measures where necessary. Whether these, or any of the measures suggested earlier, can suffice to maintain U.S. security in a world of nuclear powers is, Dr. Nacht believes, an open question; nevertheless, he views the option of adaptive continuity as the optimal U.S. response.

SUMMARY

To sum up, nuclear proliferation may be almost inevitable; the question is not whether it will occur but among what countries, to what extent, and at what pace. The countries most likely to go nuclear are those whose security may be threatened in ways with which they cannot cope, either through the build-up of conventional armaments or through the establishment of secure relations with powerful protectors, countries such as Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan. Another set of countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Iran, may be motivated less by military considerations than by political and economic ones, including the desire for increased status and prestige, the wish to enhance their influence in international negotiations, and the belief that nuclear weapons technology will promote economic development and accelerate the process of modernization. And still a third set, to include Japan and West Germany, may not seek nuclear weapons unless the political-military environment changes drastically and adversely—as might be the case if the Cold War were renewed and/or the United States tended to withdraw into itself.

As suggested by these lists, it is possible for the present nuclear powers—and especially for the United States—to influence the choices of some potential Nth powers through their own willingness to help settle disputes, to ameliorate tensions, and to offer both military assistance and security guarantees—though these latter measures may be counterproductive if they are done in competition with other nuclear powers and dangerous if they are extended while disputes persist among rivals who are backed by rival superpowers. In other instances, the potential influence of the nuclear powers upon Nth country choices may be less, either because they can acquire this influence only by deliberately giving up most of their own military and economic power (which is like asking them to commit suicide in order to diminish the risk of being murdered) or because the incentives to proliferation are beyond their control. They can, however, affect in larger degree the extent and the pace of proliferation—if they are willing to pay the price in terms of other objectives.

Judgments as to the best way to slow, channel, and limit proliferation differ markedly; to paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Lovett, whenever three people discuss nuclear proliferation, four different opinions emerge. At the risk of voicing that fourth opinion, I would suggest that the United States and other like-minded countries look to:

1. The promotion of détente, to include the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China and, hopefully, between the PRC and other countries, including the Soviet Union. To the extent that the nuclear powers (and especially the two superpowers) behave responsibly, eschew confrontations, and demonstrate that they can,

despite their differences, live together in some degree of amity, they will both reduce fears that they will misuse their nuclear forces and demonstrate that these are not the ultimate determinants of national behavior.

2. The amelioration of differences likely to induce proliferation, as could those between Israel and her Arab neighbors and between India and other states in South Asia. These, even more than concerns about the armaments and the defense policies of the nuclear powers, are major incentives to proliferation, and their resolution would go far to slow the diffusion of nuclear weapons as well as to make the world a safer place—for other states as well as for those at loggerheads with each other.

3. The establishment of policies which not only would inhibit the acquisition by additional nations of self-contained nuclear energy systems but also would offer them viable alternatives to these systems, such as participation in nuclear research under international auspices, a share in multinational reprocessing plants, and, if necessary, free access to "peaceful nuclear explosives." (Whatever the costs of such measures, in dollars, in commercial advantages, or in other forms, they would be immeasurably less than the costs of adapting to a nuclear-armed world).

4. The concerted application of economic sanctions against states which detonate nuclear devices, which divert fissionable materials to the production of atomic weapons, or which refuse, after due notice, to allow whole-cycle inspection of their nuclear facilities, to include those they themselves have constructed. While the imposition of even limited sanctions may run counter to other national objectives (such as the maintenance of allied solidarity), and hence should not be undertaken lightly, their imposition against an Nth power may be essential if the N + 1st power is to be persuaded to forgo atomic bombs—or if either are to be induced to stop after the first nuclear explosion.

5. A greater willingness to accord status, and influence, to countries on the basis of factors other than nuclear capabilities or even military strength—factors such as economic capacity, level of development, or contributions to peace. In some sense this has already been done, as with Japan; but Brazil, India, Poland, and Sweden, to name just a few countries, have not been treated similarly or even comparably.

Whether these, or any other, policies will succeed even in slowing the pace of proliferation is questionable; as indicated earlier, many of the elements shaping decisions on whether to go nuclear are beyond the control of even the most powerful proponent of non-proliferation. What can be said, without question, is that unless such policies are adopted, proliferation will go on apace. And while one can scarcely argue that it is "right" for the United States (or the Soviet Union) to attempt to check the diffusion of power of which proliferation is both an instance and a symbol, one cannot argue either that it is right for those promoting that diffusion to do so by acquiring nuclear weapons. Surely there are other and less dangerous ways of advancing national interests. And conceivably, if both nuclear and potential nuclear powers look hard enough, they may find them—even if we, the authors of this work, have not.

Part I Introduction: Where We Are . . .

By JOSEPH I. COFFEY

Ever since the end of World War II, the nations of the world have pursued two basic (and inherently contradictory) goals: that of promoting and exploiting "atoms for peace" and that of controlling—and if possible eliminating—"atoms for war." In pursuit of the first goal, they have promoted research on nuclear technology, sponsored the development of nuclear reactors, and disseminated widely both the results of that research and the fruits of that development—thereby supplying knowledge and facilities which can be used to produce nuclear weapons. In pursuit of the second goal, that of controlling these weapons, some nations have sought to eliminate them completely, as the United States proposed in the Baruch Plan of 1946. Failing this, they have sought to prevent both "vertical proliferation,"[1] that is, the further development, accumulation, and deployment of weapons by the power(s) already possessing them, and "horizontal proliferation," the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional powers.

In neither of these efforts have the nations sponsoring them been successful. The United States, which detonated the first atomic device at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, has since then both improved and vastly enlarged its stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In the 31 years since that first test, the Soviet Union (in 1949), the United Kingdom (in 1952), France (in 1960), and China (in 1964) have also "gone nuclear." On May 18, 1974, India set off a "peaceful nuclear explosive," which involves essentially the same technology as an atomic bomb, and became the world's sixth nuclear power, de facto if not de jure. And Israel, according to some reports,[2] has fabricated, though not tested, atomic bombs, thus raising the possibility that it may become the seventh.

These developments took place despite efforts to prevent proliferation, efforts which resulted in the conclusion of a number of international agreements. Among these are the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or PTBT), the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), and, above all, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT). While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), both established in 1957, were not created to prevent nuclear weapons

1. Definitions of these and other exotic terms will be found in the Glossary.
2. *The New York Times*, 15 March 1976, p. 1.

proliferation but rather to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, they must be regarded as parts of the non-proliferation system insofar as they provide safeguards against the diversion of fissionable materials to the manufacture of weapons or nuclear explosive devices. And since the agreements that have been, or may be, reached at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are in part an attempt to implement those provisions of the NPT calling for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, they also can be regarded as part of the network of arrangements intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Several things have combined to bring into question the effectiveness of these arrangements. One was the action of India, which ended a 10-year period wherein no new power had detonated a nuclear device and which high-lighted the dissatisfactions of many states with the seemingly discriminatory provisions of the NPT, with the lack of real progress in SALT, and with the absence of firm guarantees of their security against attack. Another was the oil embargo of 1973, which spurred programs for the construction of power reactors as alternative sources of energy. A third was the fact that some of the developing countries sought (and some of the technically advanced countries were willing to provide) facilities for reprocessing fissionable materials from these reactors which would make these Third World countries independent of the nuclear powers—and which would facilitate their making atomic bombs, should they subsequently choose to do so. A fourth was the prospect that innovations in nuclear technology, such as the development of the fast breeder reactor, would further ease the difficulty of producing nuclear weapons. And a fifth was the upsurge of terrorism, which induced fears lest extremists acquire—and use—radioactive products, fissionable materials, or even nuclear weapons themselves.

In this part of the volume, we will look at the problems presented by these developments, beginning with a discussion of the reasons why states go—or don't go—nuclear, continuing with a description of the ways of fabricating atomic bombs and an examination of the safeguards against the diversion or seizure of fissionable materials, and ending with an inquiry into the prospects for reducing the incentives to proliferation. In this way we should both impart information about the problem of proliferation and suggest some ways of coping with it—thereby achieving the two principal objectives of any volume on public policy issues. Whether we succeed or fail you can judge as you read.

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Why States Go—And Don't Go—Nuclear

By WILLIAM EPSTEIN

ABSTRACT: The incentives and disincentives for countries to go nuclear comprise a combination of military, political, and economic concerns and motivations. These vary over time for different countries. For countries allied to one of the two nuclear superpowers, concern about their military security is not a predominant factor, while it is the decisive one for the non-nuclear countries who are not under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower and who perceive serious threats to their security. For countries without acute security problems, the political and economic motivations are the predominant ones and these include such incentives as strengthening their independence and increasing their status and prestige in the world. The disincentives are largely potential, ranging from effective security guarantees through adequate supplies of conventional armaments to assurances concerning future supplies of fissile materials. Incentives to go nuclear appear to outweigh the disincentives. Only drastic measures by the nuclear powers in the way of security assurances, nuclear disarmament, and the creation of a more just political and economic world order can serve to prevent the emergence of a proliferated world.

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The expression to "go nuclear" is used in this paper to mean the acquisition of a nuclear device, whether by manufacture or otherwise, whose availability has been publicly demonstrated by the carrying out of a nuclear explosion whether for military or peaceful purposes. For other definitions see the Glossary.

THE ESSENCE of the nuclear arms race is power—military, political, and economic. Almost all nations want to enhance their power and thus improve their positions in the world and increase their influence over the behavior of other nations. At the very least, many will wish to diminish their dependence on other states and to increase their freedom of action—outcomes which again may depend on their accretion of power.

The particular forms that this quest for power will take will, of course, vary; however, some states view nuclear proliferation as a means to this end. As spelled out below, they see nuclear weapons as promoting their security, enhancing their prestige, augmenting their influence, and improving their economic conditions. Whether, and to what extent, a given state will act on these views depends in part on its leaders' perceptions of the international environment and on their assessments of the best ways to achieve national objectives in that environment. It depends also, however, on the results of bureaucratic competition and on the pressures of domestic politics. Thus, the incentives and disincentives which are discussed below will apply differently to different countries at different times, according to both external and internal developments. In nuclear proliferation—as in life itself—nothing is simple!

MILITARY SECURITY

The dominant positive and negative incentives to go, or not to go, nuclear are those involving a country's military security. Problems of military security are paramount questions for all governments, and in the absence of any other satisfactory ways of ensuring it, defense based on military force is the customary preferred path. Whether the disincentives to go nuclear can be reinforced and made to outweigh the incentives will, to a large degree, depend on whether satisfactory alternatives can be found to the possession of military power as a means of ensuring security.

The desire to avoid the incalculable dangers and destruction of a nuclear holocaust—either another Hiroshima or a multitude of Hiroshimas—has been the most powerful disincentive to the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are still regarded with abhorrence as weapons of mass destruction. Fears of the open-ended proliferation of nuclear weapons were the main stimuli that led to the successful conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Strong support for the treaty came from two sources: the nuclear powers, who were its architects and chief protagonists, and the non-nuclear countries that had little potential and no likelihood of being able to go nuclear for decades to come (the "never-nuclears"). Because of their perceived common interest in preventing the major industrial states, such as West Germany and Japan, and such Third World countries as India, Israel, and Brazil, from going nuclear, the great and the small powers entered into a tacit alliance in an effort to prevent the near-nuclear and potential nuclear powers from going nuclear.

It was recognized that unless the process of proliferation was stopped all countries that could afford them would eventually acquire nuclear weapons, which would then become almost as common and universal as conventional weapons. Few doubted that this would mean almost inevit-

ably a nuclear war of some kind. The danger lay not only in the possibilities of a nuclear war by deliberate intent and premeditation but, even more, the likelihood of such a war in a proliferated world occurring by accident, miscalculation, human or mechanical failure; ineffective command, control, and communication procedures; nuclear blackmail and terrorism; escalation of a regional conventional or nuclear war; or by sheer madness.

There is little support today for the "Gallois approach" which holds that the possession of nuclear weapons by additional nuclear powers, including adversaries among the smaller hostile ones, might have a mutually deterrent and stabilizing effect, as is claimed in the case of the great nuclear powers. It is because of the broad acceptance of the threat to international peace and security that would be posed by the further proliferation of nuclear weapons that the NPT, despite all its shortcomings, now has 100 signatories.

While the fears of the increased possibilities of a nuclear war with all its unthinkable consequences provided the main disincentive for the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries, it was the tremendous military advantages that flowed from the destructiveness of these weapons that provided the main incentive for both the "vertical" proliferation of their nuclear stockpiles by the nuclear powers and the acquisition of such weapons by additional powers. A list of such advantages which have motivated countries in the past, and may do so to other countries in the future, includes the following:

a. To achieve military superiority over an enemy or potential enemy (for example, the United States against Germany and Japan in World War II).

b. To prevent a perceived or potential enemy from achieving or maintaining superiority over you in either nuclear or conventional weapons (for example, each of the present nuclear powers).

c. To achieve an effective deterrent against a hostile nuclear power (for example, the NATO nuclear powers and possibly such potential nuclear powers as Israel, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan).

d. To ensure that you will have a nuclear weapon capability or at least a nuclear option before an adversary does (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Libya, and Saudi Arabia).

e. To achieve a greater degree of military independence without having to rely on the support of one or more nuclear powers (for example, Britain, France, China, India).

The USSR (in 1949), the UK (in 1952), France (in 1960), and China (in 1964) have each acquired nuclear weapons in part to deter a nuclear attack or threat by one of the nuclear superpowers. Each of these countries proceeded to acquire (more or less) invulnerable strategic nuclear weapons in order to be able to inflict an unacceptable amount of damage on the potential enemy. Once any country has gone nuclear, its rivals or competitors (whether adversary great powers or hostile neighboring small powers) are subjected to powerful pressures also to acquire nuclear weapons.

India, too, which had been one of the strongest and most active proponents of non-proliferation in the 1950s and early sixties, began to think in terms of nuclear deterrence

after China exploded its first atomic bomb. Now that India has gone nuclear, domestic pressures on Pakistan to do so become practically irresistible. As Ali Bhutto remarked a few years ago, Pakistan will "eat grass" if necessary to keep up with India.

If Pakistan should go nuclear in order not to be defenseless against a possible Indian attack, it is hardly likely that Iran and Indonesia will refrain from going nuclear for similar security reasons. What new line or "firebreak" can be invented to keep Iran and Indonesia and eventually Bangladesh from going nuclear? It is easy to outline scenarios whereby Taiwan might feel it necessary to acquire a nuclear deterrent force against China or South Korea against either the USSR or China.

The logic of the "awful arithmetic" of nuclear weaponry is that the same reasons or arguments that led to the emergence of six nuclear powers can be used (whether rightly or wrongly is largely irrelevant) by the seventh, eighth, and ninth nuclear powers. The latter might be third-class nuclear powers who would have no really effective deterrent capacity against either the superpowers or the secondary nuclear powers for many years or decades. But a third-class nuclear power would certainly have an overwhelming military advantage in its own local area or region if it were the sole nuclear power there; it would have a deterrent capability against any local attack even if it lost its monopoly and one or more countries in the region acquired nuclear weapons. And it might believe it had some deterrent capability even against a nuclear power—at least enough to discourage ordinary nuclear threats or blackmail.

The domino theory would seem to have greater applicability to countries going nuclear than to countries falling to a political ideology. Whether it be regarded as the Nth-country problem or as a sort of chain reaction, the fact is that each time a country goes nuclear, it increases the incentives or pressures for its neighbors and other similarly situated countries to do so. So long as there was a sort of firebreak separating the great powers, who were permanent members of the Security Council, from all other powers, there was a chance of holding the line against the further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. But once membership in the club is acquired by a middle or smaller power, the disincentive for other middle or smaller powers is greatly weakened.

If one other country should go nuclear, it would be difficult to keep the dam from bursting. Countries that had ratified the NPT might withdraw on three months' notice. As one country after another went nuclear, it would not take long for some parties to give notice of withdrawal. As the Shah of Iran said in September 1975 in an interview with the *New York Times*: "I am not really thinking of nuclear arms. But if 20 or 30 ridiculous little countries are going to develop nuclear weapons, then I may have to revise my policies. Even Libya is talking about trying to manufacture atomic weapons." There is no way of knowing how firmly he would stand on the figures 20 or 30. Depending on what countries went nuclear, the figures might be reduced to two or three.

The argument of a nuclear deterrent against a massive conventional attack may be perceived as having considerable validity for Israel against the Arab states, South Africa against black Africa, and Argentina

against Brazil. In fact, apart from the example of these near-nuclear states, it can be used by any relatively advanced small state against any large neighbor whom it regards as a potential conventional adversary. It could apply to Cuba, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Turkey and a host of others, including Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union. Looking ahead to the more distant future, some scholars have even speculated about the possibility that some of the small Warsaw Pact powers in Eastern Europe might harbor such thoughts against the Soviet Union.

It was mainly for military reasons that a number of near-nuclear countries with vital security problems did not become parties to the NPT. They and some potential nuclear powers that had similar acute security problems wanted to keep their options open and are the most likely candidates to go nuclear over a period of time. The most important of these countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Other countries that are parties to the NPT, but that have important internal or international security problems, include Iran, Libya, South Korea, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia; under the terms of the NPT they can, if they choose, withdraw on three months' notice.

A major disincentive for such countries going nuclear would be the provision of effective and credible security guarantees. Such guarantees can be provided in a number of ways:

a. By positive guarantees to come to a country's aid if it is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The most effective guarantee is by a treaty of military alliance. Thus, the members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances who come under the nuclear umbrella and defense commitments of one of the superpowers have no particular need or incentive to go nuclear. The same is true of countries having bilateral treaties of alliance such as Mongolia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Short of such formal, public, legal, military commitments, however, it is doubtful whether any country would regard a security guarantee as being sufficient to ensure its security. Even U.S. allies, such as France, South Korea, and Taiwan, have doubts at times about the adequacy and permanence of alliance guarantees. The stationing of American troops on their territories has tended to reinforce the commitment. Except for France, in whose case other incentives were important, none of the U.S. allies has demonstrated any present intention of going nuclear, although several, including Taiwan, have acquired an option to do so.

The resolution of the UN Security Council of June 17, 1968, and the declarations of intention made by the US, USSR, and UK in the council that they would "seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter," to any non-nuclear party to the NPT against which nuclear weapons are used or threatened, are subject to the veto and are not regarded by non-nuclear powers as providing any effective or credible guarantee.

b. By negative security assurances, whereby the nuclear powers would pledge never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers who did not have nuclear weapons on their territories. At one time, during the negotiation of the NPT, the non-nuclear powers

regarded such assurances as important, and they still would prefer to have them. The United States, however, has refused to give such assurances for fear that they would be regarded by its NATO allies as undermining its commitment to them. In any case, the faith of the non-nuclear powers in the usefulness of such assurances has eroded over the years, and they would regard such negative assurances as providing little or no incentive to forbear going nuclear.

c. By the nuclear powers fulfilling their NPT obligations to pursue efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and achieve measures of nuclear disarmament. Here, too, the success of such efforts was at one time regarded as an indirect way of increasing the security of all countries, but faith in such efforts has also been eroded by the failure of the nuclear parties to the NPT to stop testing nuclear weapons or achieve any actual measures of nuclear disarmament. Only drastic nuclear disarmament that would reverse the nuclear arms race might serve to provide any real incentive against nuclear proliferation.[1]

d. By being assured of a supply of conventional arms that would ensure a threatened country's ability to deal with any potential conventional attack. A guarantee of such a supply of arms would clearly help to remove or lessen the need or desire of such beleaguered countries as Israel, South Korea, or Taiwan to go nuclear.

e. If a strong police force was available to the UN Security Council either to defend any country from a nuclear or conventional attack or to take military sanctions against any country that went nuclear in violation of its NPT obligations, and if the nations of the world believed that the UN force would be used for those purposes, this would provide good reasons for a country to forgo nuclear weapons. The possibilities of this occurring in the near future, however, are remote.[2]

POLITICAL PRESTIGE

It has become obvious to all countries that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the technology for making them enhance a nation's prestige and status in the world, not just in military terms, but also in other ways. States possessing these arms are given greater weight in the entire range of foreign policy matters. They are brought into more top level international discussions of all kinds, and their views are treated with greater respect. Because of their nuclear weapon capability, the United Kingdom and France, who have fallen behind Japan and West Germany in economic strength, are still regarded as great powers, and China and India, who are much further down the list, are also treated as having achieved great power status. Brazil and Iran, which regard themselves as potential great powers, may very well be attracted to going nuclear by the larger voice they would receive not only in regional but also in world affairs.

Thus, states may seek, through the acquisition of nuclear weapons:

a. To maintain or achieve great power status. The best examples of the former are the secondary nuclear powers: The UK, France, and China. India at the present time and per-

1. For a contrary view, see George Quester, "Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation."

2. See Abraham Bargman, "The United Nations, the Superpowers, and Proliferation."

haps Brazil and Iran in the future are examples of the latter.

b. To be assured of a seat at the "head table" in international forums. This would apply mainly to the larger and more developed countries.

c. To enhance their prestige within a region or grouping of states.

d. To redress a perceived inferiority in the international hierarchy. This would apply mainly to former colonies that wish to achieve a status of equality with the former colonial powers.

e. To remove discriminatory aspects affecting their status, such as the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers, the ban on conducting peaceful nuclear explosions, or having to accept international safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

f. To demonstrate political independence and self-reliance and to be able to resist political pressures from the nuclear superpowers.

On the other hand, the political pressures exercised in manifold direct and indirect ways by the nuclear powers and by some of the more important developed non-nuclear countries can provide disincentives to a country going nuclear. In addition, a beleaguered country might risk losing the direct and open political and moral support of one or more nuclear powers in world councils and in interstate relations. As indicated above, a country that has the capability to go nuclear can gain some enhanced political stature and prestige by a deliberate decision based on moral grounds to refrain from doing so.

ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Economic considerations are, in large part, a close parallel to or reflection of the political considerations. They affect both the developed and developing countries.

a. It is widely believed that the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly as a source of cheap power, could be a major factor in promoting a country's economic position and improving its standard of living. It is also still believed that there are important "spinoff" benefits in the form of peaceful uses from the technology acquired as a result of know how in the field of nuclear explosions, despite the contrary evidence from the experience of Canada, West Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

b. Although there are growing doubts about the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union and most of the developing countries continue to have great hopes for them, hopes which are fed by the May 13, 1976, US-USSR Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

c. Some countries are interested in building up a peaceful nuclear industry because of the potential military spinoff benefits. Even if they have no present intention of going nuclear, as has been repeatedly stressed by leaders in Brazil, Iran, South Africa, Taiwan, and other countries, they have the good feeling that by developing their nuclear industries they are acquiring a nuclear option in case the time comes when they might want to exercise that option.

Thus, the symbiotic nature of the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy is perceived as providing spinoff benefits in both directions. The military spinoff from peaceful uses appears to have more validity than the reverse.

d. In any case, countries interested in nuclear energy—India, Brazil, and Iran are the best examples—would like to be in the very front rank of technology. They believe that the acquisition of advanced nuclear technological capability will help close the economic gap between themselves and the rich countries and will elevate their economic power and prestige. In this field, as in the political, national nuclear power industries are coming to be regarded somewhat like national airlines.

e. It is generally accepted that, once a country has established a domestic nuclear power industry, it can readily go nuclear at very low cost, since the major costs would have been taken care of in the creation of the nuclear industry. For example, it has been reported that the cost of India's underground explosion was less than $250,000. Nuclear weapons also provide a "bigger bang for a buck," that is to say they yield greater military benefits at much less cost than modern conventional arms and forces. The actual cost of manufacturing the warhead is relatively cheap—in the range of tens of thousands of dollars. This cost benefit is of particular interest to countries that are content to use aircraft and other existing means of delivery. It would not, of course, apply to countries that might want a range of sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

f. Perhaps most important of all the economic incentives is that countries, particularly those that were former colonies, perceive the acquisition of nuclear capability in the economic as well as the military and political field as freeing them from dependence on the superpowers and former colonial powers, giving them a larger degree of economic independence, and avoiding the dangers of some form of nuclear neocolonialism.

g. Finally, some Third World countries that are committed to the creation of a new world economic order may perceive the acquisition of a nuclear option as giving them greater bargaining leverage with the rich industrial countries and greater power to resist nuclear blackmail in the economic as well as in other fields or even to try to exploit their own nuclear blackmail. With problems posed by poverty, population, hunger, energy resources, pollution, and multinational corporations likely to intensify rather than abate in the future, it is not unlikely that this incentive will also increase as time passes.

While it is not popular to discuss disincentives in terms of "carrots" or "sticks," these are the main instruments available to governments for influencing the actions of other governments, and there are a number of these which might induce a country to forgo nuclear weapons:

a. A guaranteed source and supply of nuclear fuel to operate their power reactors can constitute a strong incentive to countries not to go nuclear. If nuclear power provides a significant portion of a country's energy requirements, it is a matter of major economic importance that its supply of nuclear fuel be maintained and not interrupted.

b. Conversely, if a country knew that it would lose its source of supply if it went nuclear, the threat of such an embargo might have the desired effect. It is important, however, that the risk of an embargo be clear and certain. Only Canada terminated its nuclear assistance

program to India after the Indian explosion and, at the time of writing, it is not clear whether the United States and other countries will do so. Failure to impose such economic sanctions, even limited to the nuclear field, can create a presumption against imposing them in the future in other cases.

c. Similarly if a country knew that it could not acquire any nuclear facilities or technology unless it agreed to become a party to the NPT or to accept equivalent restrictions and safeguards, this, too, would provide an important reason for not going nuclear. Apparently, Libya and South Korea were induced to become parties to the NPT in order to obtain nuclear reactors, and South Korea reportedly was persuaded to abandon its plan to acquire a plutonium reprocessing plant from France in order to ensure the continued availability of nuclear and other assistance from the United States. Some observers have argued, however, that these countries joined the NPT in order to be able to obtain nuclear reactors and technology so that they could acquire a nuclear weapons option and go nuclear at some later time if they chose.

d. If the London Suppliers' Club could agree on strict rules and standards for the supply of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology under conditions that would, to the extent that this is possible, prevent nuclear weapon proliferation (which they have not as yet done), this would probably constitute the most powerful feasible incentive for countries not to go nuclear.

e. Since the build-up of stocks of spent fuel can create an environmental hazard, particularly for heavily populated states or small countries, the willingness of supplier states to accept the return of spent nuclear fuel or to arrange for its storage elsewhere could constitute some incentive to such countries to agree not to reprocess their fuel and thus make it more difficult for them to go nuclear.

f. Assurances of economic and financial support extending beyond the nuclear field can provide a strong inducement to countries not to go nuclear. If it were to extend to matters of far-reaching import such as specific elements of a new world economic order, it could become a most important incentive that might help to create a new political and moral climate that would strongly favor the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Here, again, the threat or possibility of discontinuing such support could prevent or inhibit a country from going nuclear.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

There is no way in which to measure or quantify the respective inducements and motivations outlined above with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, certain observations can be made with some degree of confidence. It would appear to be almost axiomatic that considerations of military security are the predominant ones. For countries facing real threats to their survival, independence, or integrity, the paramount and decisive incentive is security, and all others pale into relative insignificance. Such acute problems fortunately afflict only a few countries, and special measures may be necessary with regard to them if, indeed, any measures can be effective for long.

For such countries, it may be necessary to work out or allow for

some special status or category in which they would not be strictly nuclear or non-nuclear. This category would consist of states such as Israel, which is reported to have some assembled or almost completed nuclear weapons that it can explode at any time. It might include such other countries as Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa. It might restrain or slow down the trend of proliferation if such countries developed their capabilities and kept their options open without actually exploding any nuclear device. This category might also include such states as Australia, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, with very advanced nuclear technologies and capabilities, that could easily and quickly go nuclear but have no desire or need to do so at present. They may, however, wish to acquire a nuclear option if a number of other states do so.[3]

Whether a country decides to go nuclear or not depends on reasons that are of particular importance to that country: how it views its needs and interests in the context of the military, political, economic, and moral climate of the world. Governments will be responsive to the reactions and pressures of public opinion in their countries, which will be shaped by developments in neighboring countries rather than by developments in the policies and actions of the nuclear powers that do not directly affect them.

Within each country, there is a whole spectrum of competing and often conflicting opinions, with different groups struggling to make their point of view prevail. It can usually be expected that the military-industrial complex, scientists and bureaucrats associated with it, and the more conservative elements in a country will favor the acquisition of nuclear weapons, while the more liberal elements, peace groups, and scientists in universities and other academic institutions will oppose that course of action. One particular impetus to the acquisition of nuclear weapons has been provided by the scientists and technicians involved in nuclear energy programs. In the cases of France and India, it was these who became the active—and indeed the primary—proponents of nuclear weapons development.

In some circumstances, because of intractable economic and social problems which create internal political dissatisfaction and unrest, domestic politics rather than international considerations may provide the impetus for going nuclear. By exercising that option, a government can win the support of opposing or wavering military, political, and scientific elites and other influential groups, as well as the general public. There is some evidence that the Indian explosion was motivated, at least in part, by the need of that government to gain popular support.

Some success on the part of the nuclear powers in moving toward real nuclear disarmament could at least help to postpone the decisions of non-nuclear countries to acquire a nuclear option and capability. Any time gained in this respect will make possible further debate and reflection; it will allow more time for wiser counsels to prevail and for taking action to manage and shape events so as to reduce the pressures for going nuclear. In short, the achievement of substantial progress toward nuclear disarmament by the

3. See Ashok Kapur, "Nth Powers of the Future."

nuclear powers would provide incentives and pressures for the non-nuclear countries to refrain from going nuclear.

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION[4]

The theory has been advanced by a number of persons that there is, in fact, little or no linkage between vertical and horizontal proliferation. Those who propagate this theory hold that what the great powers, and in particular the superpowers, do or do not do to limit and control the nuclear arms race has little to do with whether any non-nuclear power will or will not go nuclear.

While there might be some force to this argument in terms of logic or of rational behavior, the actions of nations in fact are determined more by political, emotional, and psychological factors than by logic or pure reason. If nuclear powers, and not just the superpowers, proclaim and justify their acquisition and continued possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any attack, conventional as well as nuclear, how can they deny the validity of this theory or concept for the other powers? If the possession of nuclear weapons will deter the Soviet Union and the United States, or the Soviet Union and China, from attacking each other, why would they not also deter any attack in an acute crisis between any other pair of adversary states? Since the posture of the nuclear powers seems to be aimed at the highest level of deterrence, particularly in a qualitative or technological sense, it seems clear that they consider that the possession and continued improvement of these weapons are indispensable. As long as the nuclear powers continue to believe and behave in a way that demonstrates they feel more secure with nuclear weapons than without them, it seems hardly likely that they can persuade the non-nuclear powers of the opposite. Certainly they are not in any strong political position, and even less of a moral position, to urge the benefits and value of non-proliferation on the latter. Their example and precept would, on the contrary, undermine the position of the moderates and provide powerful arguments for military and political groups within any wavering country of the need to go nuclear.

The failure of the two superpowers, despite their commitments in the NPT to agree on a comprehensive test ban (that is, a ban on underground tests) and their agreement on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in July 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty in May 1976 (which permit individual nuclear explosions for both military and peaceful purposes up to a yield of 150 kilotons), serves to highlight the matter. The non-nuclear countries are becoming increasingly disillusioned by what they regard as the blatant cynicism of the superpowers.

Among the nuclear powers, only China has clearly and unequivocally declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and it has called on all other nuclear states to make similar declarations. No other nuclear power has made a similar declaration, though the Soviet Union and France have at different times and in less categorical terms indicated that they would favor such

4. For a more detailed discussion of the subject, see William Epstein, *The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control* (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

a policy if it were agreed by all the nuclear powers. The United States, however, has not only refused to make any such declarations but, in fact, after its withdrawal from Vietnam, expressly reaffirmed the policy of first use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to repel a conventional attack in Europe or against South Korea. This policy could result in heightened incentives in non-nuclear countries to acquire nuclear weapons, not only to deter a local or regional conventional attack, but also as a response to nuclear threats or blackmail against them by nuclear powers. Although they could never hope to match the major nuclear powers, they might well conclude (as did General de Gaulle) that they could achieve some degree of nuclear deterrence against the nuclear powers by counter-threats of "tearing off an arm."

What the nuclear powers and other great powers do determines not only the military but also the political and moral climate in the world. If the superpowers demonstrate that they intend to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and are, in fact, engaged in doing so and in living up to their legal and moral obligations, they will create a climate that favors nuclear arms restraint and that discourages or weakens the elements within other countries that want to go nuclear. Their cessation of the nuclear arms race would have a positive effect on world security and would begin to diminish the aura of prestige that is attached to the possession of vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It might also release human and material resources for scientific and technological development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for making them more safe. It would begin to lessen the central role that these weapons play in the defense systems and power positions of the nuclear states and reduce their psychological involvement and preoccupation with nuclear weaponry. Above all, it would enhance the moral position of the nuclear powers and put them in a better position to urge other states not to go nuclear.

On the other hand, the continuing failure of the nuclear powers to stop nuclear tests, to halt the arms race, and to achieve measures of nuclear disarmament will provide, if not genuine reasons, then at least excuses for other countries to go nuclear. It will certainly strengthen the arguments and positions of the nuclear hawks and weaken those of the doves in the non-nuclear countries. As the nuclear powers militarize the world with both nuclear and conventional weapons, the development of regional arms races and of an arms race climate in the world become inevitable. And such an arms race climate will not stop with the acquisition of conventional armaments.

Even if the link between vertical and horizontal proliferation has been exaggerated or exploited by the non-nuclear powers, there can be little doubt that maintaining the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and of the nuclear arms race will facilitate the further spread of these weapons.

It may be difficult or even impossible to prove that, if the nuclear powers completely fulfilled all of their obligations concerning nuclear disarmament, it would necessarily or even to any important extent prevent other countries from going nuclear. The non-nuclear powers might fall back on other arguments or excuses relative to their security, their prestige, their economic and technological development, or the dis-

criminatory nature of the NPT. On the other hand, it is easier to provide evidence that the failure of the nuclear powers to implement their nuclear disarmament pledges has been a factor in damaging or weakening the NPT. The constant repetition of statements and warnings by near-nuclear and other non-nuclear powers that they cannot or will not give up the option to go nuclear so long as the nuclear powers do not give up the vertical proliferation of these weapons, irrespective of how sincerely it is meant, makes it easier for non-parties to stand apart from the NPT. It might also provide a ready excuse some day for any of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT to withdraw from the treaty under the procedure provided for, and thus lead to the final collapse of the non-proliferation regime.

CONCLUSIONS

It is almost universally accepted, with very few dissenters, that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons reduces everybody's security and poses appalling dangers for humanity. The fact that there are 100 parties to the NPT, despite widespread criticism of the treaty and doubts about its effectiveness, testifies to the belief that it represents an accepted means for at least restraining the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In assessing the continued viability and credibility of the non-proliferation regime, it becomes apparent that the incentives for states to go nuclear seem to far outweigh the disincentives. Countries facing serious threats to their survival or security pose the greatest challenge. Those non-nuclear countries that are not under the nuclear umbrella of any of the nuclear powers and have no alternative means of ensuring their security feel that they may ultimately have to rely on nuclear weapons and in the meantime are developing nuclear weapon options. Other countries, not faced by such security threats, but desiring to reinforce their independence or to increase their political and economic status and prestige also appear to have strong motivations to go nuclear. Past experience and future prospects are that when any state goes nuclear a chain reaction or domino effect compels its potential adversaries to do likewise.

Only strong inducements involving some combinations of tangible military, political, and economic rewards and punishments could provide the necessary disincentives sufficient to override the more immediate perceived benefits of going nuclear.

The implementation of far-reaching measures that would produce such inducements would require the political and moral leadership of the existing nuclear powers in creating a more secure, more disarmed, and more just political and economic world order that could remove or reduce the needs and desires of other states to go nuclear. Up to the present, the weight of the evidence is against that happening and the prospects are for a proliferating world.

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How States Can "Go Nuclear"

By FRANK C. BARNABY

ABSTRACT: As indicated by this article, the processes of nuclear fission are well known, the technology for building nuclear reactors is highly developed, and the demands for energy are inducing the construction of more (and more widely distributed) power reactors. Since each reactor is a source of plutonium, this means that the material needed for atomic weapons will be available in large quantities to many countries. Moreover, the technical information needed to fabricate nuclear weapons can be found in unclassified literature, the experts needed to do this are available, the equipment required can be bought in the open market, and the costs are comparatively small. Hence, any state wishing to "go nuclear" can readily do so, and the means of preventing (or even hampering) this are few indeed.

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NUCLEAR weapons,[1] or their components, may be bought, stolen, acquired as gifts, or produced indigenously. Indigenous production requires a nuclear reactor—research, power, or production—and access to a reprocessing facility, or it requires a uranium-enrichment plant. And it is based on the acquisition, through these means, of one of the two sorts of fissile material used for atomic bombs: plutonium-239 (Pu-239) and uranium-235 (U-235).

FISSILE MATERIALS

A new nuclear-weapon country is most likely to base its atomic-bomb program on plutonium; uranium-enrichment is a complex and expensive process. Thus, an understanding of the process whereby plutonium is produced is essential to an understanding of the ways in which nuclear weapons can be fabricated.

Ordinary uranium consists of a mixture of three kinds of atoms, each with different numbers of neutrons in its nucleus: U-234, U-235, and U-238. But only U-235 and U-238 are of any practical consequence; the percentage of U-234 in natural uranium is exceedingly small.

A neutron can cause fission in U-238 only if its velocity exceeds a certain value. But too few of the neutrons available for sustaining the fission process have this critical velocity and a chain reaction is not possible using only U-238. A nucleus of U-235 will undergo fission when any neutron, even one moving very slowly, collides with it, and a chain reaction is possible using U-235. Consequently, the fission process of greatest practical importance consists of the capture of a neutron by a U-235 nucleus, resulting in the formation of a nucleus of the isotope U-236, which rapidly splits into two fragments, nuclei of elements of medium atomic numbers called fission products.

It invariably happens that the total sum of the masses of the fission products and the fission neutrons is less than the mass of the U-236 nucleus. The energy accompanying fission is equal to this mass difference multiplied by the square of the velocity of light. Although the mass difference involved is very small, the velocity of light squared is an enormous number and, therefore, the amount of energy liberated is very large. In fact, the complete fissioning of one gram of U-235 would release about 23,000 kilowatt-hours of heat.

Pu-239 is produced when U-238 nuclei absorb slow neutrons. The U-239 nuclei so formed do not undergo fission but are ultimately transformed into Pu-239 by radioactive decay. A U-239 nucleus decays by emitting an electron which is, so to speak, shot out of the nucleus like a bullet—a process called beta decay. Beta decay occurs when one of the neutrons in a radioactive nucleus spontaneously changes into a proton. A new element is formed by this event, since the new nucleus contains an additional proton. Thus, when U-239 decays, an isotope with an atomic number of 93 is produced, namely neptunium-239 (Np-239). And Np-239 is also radioac-

1. By "nuclear weapon" we normally mean a weapon based on a nuclear explosive, derived either from the fission or the fusion of atomic nuclei. For further definitions, see the Glossary.

tive, undergoing beta decay to produce Pu-239 (atomic number 94) (figure 1).

In a nuclear reactor, plutonium is produced in steadily increasing quantities as the uranium fuel is consumed by fission; nuclear reactors are, therefore, of fundamental importance for proliferation.

NUCLEAR REACTORS

Nuclear reactors, like atomic bombs, depend for their operation on nuclear fission. The fission process alone is, however, insufficient for the practical utilization of nuclear energy, either in reactors or bombs. This can only be achieved because fission, which is initiated by neutrons, is also accompanied by the emission of neutrons and these are, in turn, able to initiate further fission in neighboring nuclei. Provided that at least one neutron can be made to split another nucleus, a self-sustaining process or chain reaction can be produced and energy generated continuously. In a nuclear reactor, a fission chain reaction is initiated and maintained under control, normally using uranium—either natural uranium or that enriched with uranium-235—as fuel.

A reactor is essentially a furnace where a self-sustaining chain reaction can be controlled and the heat produced put to useful work—usually the production of electricity. Natural uranium by itself cannot be used to produce the chain reaction because of the large proportion of U-238 contained in it. But there is a solution to this problem. This is to mix natural uranium with a substance—called a moderator—whose nuclei are small in size so that if a fast neutron collides with




FIGURE 1

The chain reaction—showing the fission of uranium-235 and the subsequent capture of neutrons by uranium-238 leading to the production of plutonium.

one of them it will lose a large fraction of its velocity, just as a billiard ball will lose velocity when it collides with another one. The neutron's velocity is, thus, rapidly "moderated" down to the low velocity at which it can be efficiently captured by a U-235 nucleus, producing fission, and at which it will have a relatively high probability of avoiding capture by a U-238 nucleus (figure 1).

In a typical power reactor, the fuel, moderator, and coolant are enclosed in a pressure vessel. Heat is removed from the fuel elements in the reactor core by the coolant, which flows over them. The coolant

then flows through a heat exchanger where it turns water in a secondary circuit into steam, used to drive a turbine generator which produces electricity.

Several hundred types of reactors have been built or suggested—based on possible permutations of alternative fuels, moderator materials, and coolant materials. But only three types of power reactors (all of which are fueled by uranium) have significant commercial importance. Each is characterized by: the material used as the moderator—graphite, light water (ordinary water), or heavy water (in which the hydrogen is replaced by deuterium)—and the material used as the coolant—gas, light water, or heavy water.

Light-water reactors, by far the world's most common power reactors, have been developed mainly in the United States; in them, ordinary water is used both as the moderator and the coolant. Graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors have received most attention in the UK and France, mainly because they were first adopted for plutonium production for the nuclear-weapon programs of these countries. Heavy-water moderated power reactors are much less common than the other two types, mainly because their development was inhibited by the scarcity and relatively high cost of heavy water. Canada, in particular, has based its nuclear program on these reactors.

Currently under development is a fast-breeder reactor, which differs from other types in that it produces more fuel than it consumes. It is possible, by a suitable design, to convert U-238 in the core of the reactor and U-238 placed in a "blanket" around the core into plutonium. "Breeding" occurs because the chain reaction proceeds with a greater neutron surplus than is possible in an ordinary reactor. The stockpile of fissile material is, therefore, steadily increased, and about every 10 years an amount of fuel equal to twice that put in initially is accumulated. Thus, enough fuel becomes available not only to keep the reactor operating but also to fuel a new one of the same size.

Some exploratory work has been carried out on the possibility of using thorium in fast-breeder reactors. If the naturally-occurring isotope Th-232 is introduced into the reactor, some of the nuclei will capture neutrons, producing atoms of the isotope Th-233 which decays to protactinium-233. Protactinium-233 decays, in turn, to U-233. The nuclei of U-233 are fissionable by slow neutrons and, therefore, it is a potentially valuable fissile material like U-235 and Pu-239. U-233 could be, but has so far not been, used to produce atomic bombs.

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION FROM NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

The uranium fuel is normally put into a reactor in the form of cylindrical metal-clad elements. When nuclear power reactors are operated for the most economical production of electricity, the plutonium they produce is not suitable for use as the fissile material for very efficient atomic bombs because the fissile isotope of plutonium—Pu-239—is contaminated by the presence of other isotopes of the element, particularly Pu-240. "Weapons-grade" plutonium should contain no more than 10 percent of these other isotopes, and preferably less.

Under normal operating conditions, the fuel elements are left

in the reactor for periods of between three and four years, and the plutonium recovered from the spent fuel elements then typically has a Pu-239 content of about 70 percent.[2] This plutonium would be usable in atomic bombs, though relatively large amounts would be needed for a given explosive yield and the physical size of the weapon would be comparatively large. Moreover, Pu-240 is an extremely unstable isotope and undergoes fission spontaneously. Therefore, steps would have to be taken to prevent the device from overheating due to this spontaneous fission. More seriously, because of the likelihood of pre-detonation, the yield of the device would be unpredictable. For these and other reasons, the construction of such a weapon would be a relatively complex task, but the result would be an effective weapon nonetheless.

The operational parameters of nuclear power reactors vary according to type, but it is possible to calculate crudely the world's plutonium production. The net conversion ratio—Pu-239 extracted/U-235 destroyed—for the total mix of reactors expected in the world over the next decade, is likely to be about 0.35. And an average thermal-to-electric conversion efficiency of about 30 percent can be reasonably assumed. This means that about 2.97 grams of U-235 will be destroyed and about 1.04 grams of Pu-239 produced for each megawatt-day of electricity generated. Nuclear power plants will be generally operated for 255 days per year. Therefore, on the average, one megawatt of nuclear capacity will produce annually about 265 grams (255 × 1.04) of Pu-239 for extraction.

The total nuclear electrical capacity in 1980 (taking this year as an example) will be about 300 GWe (gigawatts of electricity), and this will produce about 80,000 kilograms (265 × 300) or 80 tons of Pu-239. This plutonium could become available in 1983—the three-year delay being the time during which the fuel is kept in the reactor and the time needed for the extraction of plutonium from the spent reactor fuel elements. About 40 percent of this plutonium will be produced in the countries which do not now have nuclear weapons. This amount of plutonium corresponds in theory to the production of about 50 atomic bombs, each with a yield equivalent to that of 20,000 tons of TNT, per week in these countries. By 1980, the world will have accumulated about 300,000 kilograms of plutonium—enough for some 9,000 to 10,000 low-yield atomic bombs.[3]

ATOMIC WEAPONS

Any country with a nuclear power reactor has in its territory, in continuously increasing amounts, the basic fissile material for effective

2. If a nuclear power reactor were to be used to produce "weapons-grade" plutonium, the fuel elements would have to be removed after only a few weeks so that the amount of Pu-240 produced would be suitably limited.

3. Few people have a clear idea of how extensive the spread of nuclear technology around the world has already become or how rapidly it will most probably continue. At the end of 1975, 168 nuclear power reactors with a generating capacity greater than 20 million watts of electricity (MWe) were producing a total of about 75,000 MWe in 19 countries (table 1).

By 1980, 29 countries are expected to have installed nuclear power reactors with a total electrical generating capacity of about 220 MWe, about 11 times the 1970 figure. Looking further ahead, it is probable, according to the latest predictions, that the 1980 figure will be multiplied more than 16-fold by the year 2000. By this time, if the present trend continues, nuclear-power reactors will be commonplace on all continents.

TABLE 1

WORLD NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY IN OPERATION, AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1975 AND PROJECTED FOR 1980

COUNTRY	TOTAL NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY 1975 MWE (NET)	NUMBER OF POWER REACTORS 1975 (>20 MWE)	TOTAL NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY 1980 MWE (NET)	NUMBER OF POWER REACTORS 1980* (>20 MWE)	THEORETICAL CAPACITY FOR 20 KT ATOMIC BOMB PRODUCTION 1980 (BOMBS/YEAR)
Argentina	319	1	919	2	25
Austria	—	—	692	1	15
Belgium	1,650	3	3,446	5 (1)	85
Brazil	—	—	626	1	15
Bulgaria	864	2	1,728	4	45
Canada	2,539	7	7,802	15	200
Czechoslovakia	110	1	1,838	5 (3)	45
Finland	—	—	1,500	3	35
France	2,706	10	14,462	22	—
German DR	926	3	1,786	5	45
Germany, FR	4,060	8	13,320	18	330
Hungary	—	—	864	2	20
India	587	3	1,229	6	30
Iran	—	—	1,200	1	30
Italy	542	3	1,422	5	35
Japan	6,287	12	19,066	28 (4)	450
Korea, South	—	—	1,769	3 (2)	45
Mexico	—	—	1,308	2	30
Netherlands	499	2	499	2	12
Pakistan	125	1	125	1	3
Romania	—	—	432	1 (1)	10
Spain	1,073	3	8,365	11 (1)	210
Sweden	3,184	5	8,264	11 (1)	210
Switzerland	1,006	3	5,933	8 (4)	150
Taiwan	—	—	2,158	3	50
UK	4,539	29	10,697	39	—
USA	36,593	54	86,690	103 (5)	—
USSR	5,464	18	19,624	36	—
Yugoslavia	—	—	1,400	2 (1)	35

Totals	1975	1980	Total theoretical bomb production capacity in non-nuclear-weapon countries 1980	2–200 bombs/year
Countries†	19	29		
Reactors	168	345		
Capacity (*MWe*)	73,073	219,164		

SOURCE: *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1976), p. 42.

* The numbers in brackets indicate the number of reactors included in the total figure for reactors planned for operation in 1980 but not under construction as of 31 December 1975.

† The People's Republic of China has constructed one or two power reactors but only to supply electricity for its military uranium-enrichment plant.

atomic bomb production and the capacity to produce the fissile material for very efficient atomic bombs. But plutonium can also be produced in some research reactors. A research reactor is designed primarily to supply neutrons for experimental purposes or for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical, agricultural, or industrial use. It may also be used for training, materials testing, and so on.

Israel is an example of a country which does not have a power reactor but which has accumulated a stockpile of plutonium produced in a research reactor. Other countries which have large enough research reactors to produce significant quantities of plutonium include Australia, Denmark, Norway, and South Africa.

If breeder reactors are widely used, plutonium will become correspondingly more widespread. The elements from the breeder blanket, in which U-238 is converted into plutonium, will normally contain weapons-grade plutonium (95 to 98 percent Pu-239). The plutonium in the spent fuel elements from the core of the reactor will, moreover, usually contain almost 70 percent of Pu-239, which is about the same constituency as the plutonium in the spent fuel elements from a typical thermal reactor. Second and subsequent generations of breeder reactors may actually be fueled with weapons-grade plutonium.

The plutonium produced in reactor fuel elements is removed in a chemical reprocessing plant. The current worldwide capacity for reprocessing reactor fuel is relatively small (table 2). But the nuclear industries in many countries with significant nuclear-power programs are now demanding new reprocessing plants. The main argument given for this demand is that plutonium is needed to fuel future breeder reactors. The main reason against reprocessing is that it increases the chance of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Irrespective of its peaceful nuclear program, a country may decide to acquire and operate clandestinely a reactor specifically for military purposes. The components for a nuclear reactor capable of producing enough plutonium annually for, say, two atomic bombs with yields of 20 kilotons can be obtained easily (and secretly) on the open market. A graphite (or heavy water)-moderated reactor of about 120 megawatts thermal (equivalent to 40 MWe), producing about 20 kilograms of plutonium-239 per year, would be sufficient for this purpose.

The reactor could use natural uranium as fuel, so that no uranium-enrichment facility would be required. So many countries have domestic supplies of uranium which is easily mined and milled, that access to uranium should be no difficulty. The cost of constructing a reactor of this type would not exceed $20 million. The plutonium produced in the reactor fuel elements could be removed in a small, laboratory-scale plant so that access to a commercial reprocessing plant would not be necessary.

In summary, weapon-grade plutonium for an atomic-bomb program may be obtained from (*a*) a power reactor by removing fuel elements in time, (*b*) a research reactor of suitable size, (*c*) the blanket elements of a breeder reactor and, (*d*) the core elements of a later-generation breeder (figure 2). Plutonium for effective atomic bombs may be obtained from a power reactor operated under normal conditions for electricity production or from the core elements of a first-generation breeder reactor. Other than for (*d*) above, access to a reprocessing plant would be necessary to remove the plutonium from the reactor fuel elements. But for low production rates, equivalent to that necessary for a few bombs per year, a small reprocessing unit would certainly suffice. Not only are the construction plans for such a reprocessing unit in the open literature, but the materials

SUMMARY OF THE NUCLEAR STATUS OF COUNTRIES HAVING AT LEAST ONE NUCLEAR REACTOR OR ONE ELEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ON THEIR TERRITORY

COUNTRY	POWER REACTORS 1975	POWER REACTORS 1980	URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY*	FUEL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY*	URANIUM RESOURCES <$30/LB	URANIUM PRODUCER 1975–76	RESEARCH REACTOR IN OPERATION†	BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM	NPT STATUS§	NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT**	NON-NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH IAEA‡	MEMBER OF IAEA‡	MEMBER OF EURATOM††	MEMBER OF NEA‡‡
Algeria					+							+		
Angola					+									
Argentina	+	+			+	+	+				+	+		
Australia			P		+	+	+		R	*		+		+
Austria		+					+		R	*		+		+
Belgium	+	+		p§§			+		R	S		+	+	+
Brazil		+	P	P	+		+				+	+		
Bulgaria	+	+					+		R	*		+		
Canada	+	+	P		+	+	+		R	*		+		+
Central African Republic					+				R					
Chile							+				+	+		
Columbia					+		+		S		+	+		
Czechoslovakia	+	+			+		+		R	*		+		
Denmark					+		+		R	*		+	+	+
Egypt							+		S			+		
Finland		+			+		+		R	*		+		
France	+	+	O/C/Pp	O/C/Pp	+	+	+	+		nw		+	+	+
Gabon					+	+			R			+		
German DR	+	+					+		R	*		+		
Germany, FR	+	+	O/C	O/C/P	+	+	+	+	R	S		+	+	+
Greece							+		R	*		+		+
Hungary		+					+		R	*		+		
India	+	+		O/C	+	+	+	+			+	+		
Indonesia							+		S		+	+		
Iran		+					+		R	*		+		
Iraq							+		R	*		+		
Israel							+				+	+		
Italy	+	+		Pp	+		+	+	R	S		+	+	+
Japan	+	+	P	O/C/P	+	+	+	+	S		+	+		+
Korea, South		+					+		R	*		+		

Mauritania					+									
Mexico		+			+	+	+		R			+		
Netherlands	+	+	O/p				+		R	S		+	+	+
Niger					+	+						+		
Norway							+		R	*		+		+
Pakistan	+	+		P			+				+	+		
Philippines							+		R	*		+		
Poland							+		R	*				
Portugal					+	+	+				+	+		+
Romania		+					+		R	*		+		
South Africa			O/P		+	+	+				+	+		
Spain	+	+		O	+	+	+				+	+		+
Sweden	+	+	P	P	+		+		R	*		+		+
Switzerland	+	+					+		S		+	+		+
Taiwan		+					+		R		+			
Thailand							+		R	*		+		
Turkey					+		+		S		+	+		+
UK	+	+	O/p	O/C/p	+		+	+	R	nw		+	+	+
Uruguay							+		R	S	+	+		
USA	+	+	O/Pp	C/Pp	+	+	+	+	R	nw		+		
USSR	+	+	O	O	+	+	+	+	R	nw		+		
Venezuela			P				+		R		+	+		
Yugoslavia		+			+		+		R	*		+		
Zaire			P		+		+		R	*		+		

SOURCE: *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1976), pp. 46–7.

* Commercial- or pilot-scale facility on country's territory: O = in operation; C = under construction; P = facility planned or under consideration; *p* = additional capacity planned for existing facility.

† The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has defined world uranium resources in two ways: first according to the type of resource in geological terms, second according to a hypothetical market price. Geologically, ore deposits are classified as *reasonably assured resources* (RAR) or *estimated additional resources* (EAR), the difference being the reliability of the geological estimate. There are three price categories (per pound U_3O_8): (a) less than $15; (b) $15 to $30; and (c) $30 to $100 (these categories correspond to $10, $10–15 and $15–30 in the NEA's 1973 report). The recent escalation of the market price of uranium emphasizes that the NEA price levels should not be interpreted too literally in making economic assessments of nuclear power costs but they nevertheless serve as a useful indication of the competitive value of a country's uranium resources.

‡ As of 31 December 1975.

§ As of 31 December 1975. R = ratified: S = signed.

** As of 31 December 1975. * = in force; S = signed; nw = nuclear-weapon state.

†† Euratom = European Atomic Energy Community.

‡‡ NEA = Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

§§ The Eurochemic reprocessing plant in Mol has been shut down and future reopening is doubtful, but under consideration.

SOURCES: See sources to table 1B.1. page 33: *Facts on Nuclear Proliferation*, a handbook prepared for the committee on Government Operations, US Senate, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, US Printing Office, 1975) pp. 105–107 and 127–129. *Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Energy—International Proliferation of Nuclear Technology*. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, US House of Representatives, 21, 22 and 24 July 1975 (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1975) pp. 42–43; Poole, L. G., "World Uranium Resources", *Nuclear Engineering International*, Vol. 20, No. 224, February 1975, pp. 95–100; "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle", *Nuclear Engineering International*, Vol. 20, No. 237, December 1975, pp. 1015–1020; Rippon, S., "Reprocessing—What Went Wrong", *Nuclear Engineering International*, Vol. 21, No. 239, February 1976, pp. 21–27.




FIGURE 2

Direct Routes to Atomic Weapons. All these operations may be done under military ıtrol on a small scale and secretly at a cost of about a million dollars per weapon for a ıple of dozen weapons.

ndirect Routes to Atomic Weapons. Nuclear explosives may be produced as by-›ducts of a peaceful nuclear-power program. The cost of so producing a nuclear explosive vice may be no more than a few hundred thousand dollars.

quired to build one are also readily ailable.

Although a country with a large ·aceful nuclear program may be able to divert clandestinely, over time, enough plutonium for a modest number of atomic bombs if it were intent on doing so, the risk of de-

tection would be considerably less if a small reactor and reprocessing unit were bought secretly for military purposes. It would, however, be difficult to hide the rapid production of enough plutonium for a large number of atomic bombs. Such an operation would require the use of large reactors and of a large reprocessing plant, and would probably be embarked upon without any attempt at secrecy.

THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS

A thermonuclear weapon has, as its core, a mass of fissile material—in effect, an atomic bomb. This core is surrounded by a quantity of lithium deuteride and all of this is usually enclosed in an outer shell of uranium. For reasons that have not so far been made public, U-235 is the preferred (if not the essential) fissile material for efficient thermonuclear weapons—it seems that Pu-239 is much inferior for this purpose. When the fissile material in the core explodes, much heat and many neutrons are released (as in an atomic bomb). The neutrons convert some of the lithium-6 surrounding the core to tritium, and the heat causes some of the deuterium nuclei to fuse both with tritium nuclei and with other deuterium nuclei. These deuterium-tritium and deuterium-deuterium fusion (or thermonuclear) reactions are accompanied by the release of a large amount of energy and the production of high-speed neutrons. These neutrons are fast enough to cause some of the U-238 in the outer shell of the weapon to fission, thus releasing still more energy and more neutrons. A typical thermonuclear weapon is, thus, a fission-fusion-fission device.

The central fission trigger is required to provide the enormous temperature required to ensure that thermonuclear reactions take place. And access to a uranium-enrichment facility is necessary to obtain the material for this trigger. For use in nuclear weapons, the concentration of U-235 has to be increased from its natural value of 0.72 percent in uranium ore to a value of over 40 percent. For use as reactor fuel, uranium is normally enriched to values of less than 4 percent.

Because U-235 and U-238 are chemically identical, it is necessary to use a physical method to separate and enrich them. Three methods are feasible for large-scale uranium enrichment: the gaseous diffusion, the gas centrifuge, and the jet nozzle techniques.

The gaseous diffusion method is based upon the fact that in a gaseous mixture of two isotopic molecules, the molecules of the lighter isotope will diffuse more rapidly through a porous barrier than those of the heavier one. Seven diffusion plants now exist: three in the United States and one in each of the USSR, the UK, France, and China. These plants were all originally built for military purposes but, apart from the Chinese one, they are now mainly used to produce enriched uranium for power reactors. No plant has been built outside the present nuclear weapon countries.

The centrifugal method of separating isotopes in gaseous form is based on the principle that the gravitational force on a particle is proportional to its mass. Significant separation can be achieved by the use of a centrifuge, which provides a field of force analogous to gravity but much more powerful. Gas centrifuge technology has been de-

eloped mainly in the UK, the 'etherlands, and the Federal Re- ublic of Germany.

A third technology being adopted ›r large-scale uranium enrichment the jet nozzle procedure, based n pressure diffusion in a gaseous iixture of uranium hexafluoride and n additional light gas (helium or ydrogen) flowing at high speed ırough nozzles along curved walls. 'he heavier molecules are less de- ected and enriched in the stream /ith the largest curvature. A small 0-stage pilot plant was built at :arlsruhe (Federal Republic of Ger- ıany) and has been operating at ull-scale capacity since 1967. It is ›robable that the jet nozzle tech- ıique is the basis of the South ıfrican enrichment plant.

Because of the association of ıighly-enriched uranium with ther- ıonuclear weapons and its use, vith plutonium, in the most ef- icient atomic bombs, the spread ›f uranium-enrichment plants has cquired much significance. Atten- ion has so far been mainly focused ›n plants large enough for commer- ial use. But a small enrichment acility—a dozen or so centrifuges, or example—would be adequate to ›roduce the kilogram quantities of uitably enriched uranium per year ıeeded for the development of a nodest nuclear-weapon program. The high degree of enrichment ıecessary would be obtained by re- :ycling the uranium again and ıgain through the system.

NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

The atomic bomb dropped on Iiroshima had an explosive yield quivalent to about 12,000 tons of 'NT (12kt) and it weighed about tons. The yield-to-weight ratio—a measure of the efficiency of a bomb—was, therefore, about 3,000. A modern U.S. nuclear warhead—the Minuteman-III independently targetable re-entry vehicle, for example—has a yield of about 200 kt and weighs about 0.1 tons. The yield-to-weight ratio is, therefore, about 2 million—almost the maximum theoretically attainable with a thermonuclear weapon.

A new nuclear-weapon power should today have little difficulty in producing an atomic bomb with a yield-to-weight ratio of about 20,000, even at an early stage in its nuclear weapon program. Such a weapon with a yield of about 20 kt would weigh about 1,000 kilograms. A warhead with these characteristics could be transported by any of the delivery systems listed in table 3. To take a few examples: the A-4 Skyhawk has a maximum weapon load of about 4,500 kilograms, the F-104 Starfighter about 2,000 kilograms, the F-4 Phantom about 7,000 kilograms, the Mirage V about 4,000 kilograms, the Canberra and Buccaneer about 3,600 kilograms, and the Ilyushin-28 about 2,200 kilograms. Surface-to-surface missiles like the U.S. Lance and Pershing, the USSR Scud, and the Israeli Jericho are all nuclear capable. Moreover, the technology of a peaceful space program could produce, as by-products, guided missiles suitable for short, medium, and long-range delivery of nuclear warheads. And even atmosphere-sounding rockets could be modified to short-range ballistic missiles.

Few, if any, countries would have difficulty in acquiring one of the delivery systems in the table. It should also be remembered that most civilian airlines have aircraft—like the Boeing 707, for example—more sophisticated than the B-29

TABLE 3

SOME OF THE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES IN THE ARSENALS OF COUNTRIES WITH ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

COUNTRY	NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Argentina	Aircarft: A-4 Skyhawk, Canberra, Mirage III E
Belgium	Aircraft: F-104G Starfighter, Mirage V SSM: Honest John
Brazil	Aircraft: Mirage III E
Bulgaria	Aircraft: Ilyushin-28, MiG-21 MF Fishbed SSM: Scud, Frog
Canada	Aircraft: F-104D Starfighter
Czechoslovakia	Aircraft: Ilyushin-28, SU-7 Fitter SSM: Scud, Frog
FR Germany	Aircraft: F-104G Starfighter, F-4F Phantom II SSM: Honest John, Pershing, Sergeant
German DR	Aircraft: MiG-21 MF Fishbed, SU-7 Fitter SSM: Scud, Frog
Hungary	Aircraft: SU-7 Fitter, Ilyushin-28 SSM: Scud, Frog
India	Aircraft: Canberra, SU-7 Fitter, MiG-21 MF Fishbed
Israel	Aircraft: F-4E Phantom II, A-4 E/H Skyhawk, Mirage III/Kfir SSM: Jericho
Italy	Aircraft: F-104G/S Starfighter SSM: Honest John, Lance
Japan	Aircraft: F-4E Phantom II, F-104J Starfighter
South Korea	Aircraft: F-4D Phantom II SSM: Honest John
Netherlands	Aircraft: F-104G Starfighter SSM: Honest John
Pakistan	Aircraft: Canberra, Mirage V, Mirage III E
South Africa	Aircraft: Canberra, Buccaneer, Mirage F-1, Mirage III E
Spain	Aircraft: F-4C Phantom II, Mirage III E, Mirage F-1
Taiwan	Aircraft: F-100 A/D Super Sabre, F-104G Starfighter

NOTE: Aircraft combat radii (kilometers): 3,000–6,000: Canberra, Buccaneer, A-4 Skyhawk; 1,000–3,000: F-4 Phantom, Su-7 Fitter, F-104G Starfighter, Mirage III E, Ilyushin-28; remainder under 1,000.
Surface-to-surface missile ranges (kilometers): Jericho 1,000, Pershing 720, Scud B 280, Lance 139, Sergeant 135, Frog 75, Honest John 40.

bomber which dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These could be provided with the avionics needed to convert them into effective long-range bombers capable of delivering even very crude (that is, heavy) atomic bombs. Thus, even without turning to exotic weap-

ons like the cruise missile, almost every country capable of making atomic bombs is capable of delivering them, at least against neighboring states.

COST OF NUCLEAR FORCES

The development and production of even modest nuclear forces used to be a costly enterprise. The British and French nuclear forces, for example, cost well over $10 billion. The development of the nuclear warheads was a major part of this cost.

The 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, however, is said to have cost only about $500,000, including the cost of the plutonium and preparation of the test site. The Indian event showed that a country with a significant peaceful nuclear program can, by the diversion of relatively small financial and manpower resources, produce nuclear explosive devices as, so to speak, a byproduct of its peaceful nuclear activity. The nuclear-weapon powers —the U.S., the USSR, the UK, France, and China—began their nuclear programs specifically for military purposes and only later initiated peaceful nuclear programs. Today, as the Indian example shows, this procedure is likely to be reversed.

Cost is clearly no longer a significant barrier to the acquisition of atomic bombs based on plutonium, even if a reactor is bought specifically and solely for the purpose. The production of highly-enriched uranium for use as the trigger material for hydrogen bombs would be much more costly because of the expense of developing even a small uranium-enrichment facility. For many countries, however, particularly the smaller ones, an atomic warhead with a yield of about 20 kt is adequate against most strategic military targets provided that the delivery system is relatively accurate—and against cities, even if it is not. (For tactical purposes, accurately delivered warheads of much lower yield are normally sufficient.) Since such delivery systems are comparatively cheap and easy to acquire, a small but credible nuclear force based on indigenously-produced atomic bombs could be acquired for a few hundred million dollars—about the price of a modern cruiser.

CONCLUSIONS

The technical information required to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive device is now readily available and so is the necessary expertise. Many people, numbering in the thousands, have direct knowledge of nuclear-weapon design and this number inevitably grows continuously. All the operations leading to the manufacture of nuclear weapons by governments could, as we have seen, be performed on a small scale and in secret, separately from a peaceful nuclear power program. For these reasons, effective and credible control of fissile material is very difficult.

International safeguards, of the type operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), cannot prevent the diversion of nuclear material even from safeguarded facilities; they can only detect it, after the event. Using the best technology available, no safeguards system can be perfect. There will soon be so much plutonium produced in each of many countries that if a very small percentage is unaccounted for, this would still amount to enough plu-

tonium to make theoretically a large number of atomic bombs. We will soon reach the point at which enough plutonium could be diverted clandestinely to produce a "bomb-a-week"—though not, fortunately, by a single country.

To prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons is obviously going to be an extremely difficult task. It will even be difficult to slow it down appreciably. There are, however, some technical measures which could hinder proliferation, including a moratorium on the construction of reprocessing plants and breeder reactors (at least until the necessity for these reactors has been definitely demonstrated) and the multinational ownership of uranium-enrichment plants under IAEA control.

Looking further ahead, the application of such developments as laser techniques and rotating plasmas for uranium enrichment, and laser-induced fusion and fission, should be avoided unless shown to be absolutely necessary. Laser enrichment, now in the research state, may turn out to be the cheapest method of separating uranium isotopes, at least on a relatively small scale. And laser-induced fusion, if developed to the point at which it could be used in weapons, may prove to be the most dangerous development of all, so far as nuclear-weapon proliferation is concerned. Hence, controls over nuclear technology may be essential if one is seeking to control proliferation.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 430, March 1977

What Happens If . . .? Terrorists, Revolutionaries, and Nuclear Weapons

By DAVID KRIEGER

ABSTRACT: This paper explores what may happen if terrorists or revolutionaries are able to develop nuclear explosives or the ability to dispense radioactive materials. Continued proliferation of so-called peaceful nuclear technology will increase the likelihood of this happening. The consequences are substantial, since nuclear technology would provide terrorists or revolutionaries with a lever for threatening or carrying out acts of mass destruction against a society. Deterrence would be ineffective against terrorists who are unidentified and/or unlocatable, or at least believe themselves to be so. Complications would arise, which could potentially trigger an international war, if nuclear-armed terrorists or revolutionaries deliberately misidentify themselves. The solution to the problem would require perfect safeguarding of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials on a global scale. The record in the United States, a technologically advanced nation with an established nuclear program, suggests that perfect safeguards are unlikely to be achieved. Thus, future policy-makers may face a significantly enhanced threat from terrorists or revolutionaries in possession of a nuclear weapon.

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TERRORIST and revolutionary activities spring from deep wells of social and personal discontent, and it seems unlikely that these wells will dry up of their own accord, or that social changes will soon cap them. Thus, we can predict with a high degree of certainty that terrorist and revolutionary activity will continue.

THE FUTURE OF TERRORIST AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Terrorism is nongovernmental public violence or its threat performed by an individual or small group and aimed at achieving social or political goals which may be subnational, national, or international. Revolutionaries have the specific goal of bringing down a government, and to this end their actions may range from nonviolent to terrorist to organized military activities.

The victims of terrorist activity may be:

—victims of convenience (that is, easy targets) such as passengers aboard a hijacked airliner
—newsworthy victims such as Olympic athletes
—representatives of groups perceived to be exploitative, such as, diplomats, industrialists, politicians, or even tourists from a given nation
—individuals or groups believed to provide an effective "bargaining chip." For example, any of the above could be held hostage in order to extort money, have prisoners released, change government or corporate policies, and so forth.

Terrorists may also threaten inanimate objects. They may target social or political symbols; for example, attempting to bomb the Washington Monument or Independence Hall. They may also seek to control or destroy vulnerable functioning technologies, such as computer centers, communication systems, or power generating stations. Any of these events could result in the death of innocent people who happened to be "in the wrong place at the wrong time."

Terrorist activities seem to have increasingly taken on an international character in the past decade. The U.S. State Department has published a memorandum stating:

> . . . since 1968 there has been a marked increase in international terrorism as a means for the attainment of political goals. Simultaneously, there has been a major development of intelligence, training, financial and operational collaboration among terrorist groups in different parts of the world. . . . Technological advances afford the terrorist opportunities he never had before: an instant world-wide audience . . . new types of weapons, a plethora of vulnerable targets.[1]

Thus, at least in the eyes of the State Department, international terrorism is becoming better organized, with better financing and weapons, and plenty of targets.

Based on past incidents, certain general motivations for terrorism can be suggested:

—to attain national or global publicity for a cause
—to achieve certain limited political and/or financial goals
—to demonstrate the weakness of an established government

1. Fahey Black, "Terrorism," *GIST* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 1976).

—to manipulate a government into an unnecessary and discreditable use of force
—to create a situation where one can be hunted, killed, or put on trial with notoriety and excitement

Motives range from clear political objectives to hazy quasi-suicidal propensities. Globally, it would appear that there is a large body of persons whose lack of sufficient satisfaction and excitement in their lives makes them potential criminals or terrorists. We cannot say with certainty what catalysts will convert individual dissatisfaction and thirst for adventure into political terrorism. We can only suggest that we have no valid reason to believe that the discontent from which terrorism arises will soon diminish or that terrorism will decline in the foreseeable future.

Revolutionaries may be defined as individuals and groups acting with the primary intention of bringing down a government and replacing the fallen government with one more in accord with their own value system. Revolutionaries may, of course, act from either a left or right perspective and may be comprised of poor and maltreated elements of society or of well-to-do and well-established elements discontented with government policies. In the latter case, national military forces or a branch thereof will often play a major role in overthrowing an existing government. Most Latin American nations, for example, are now governed by military regimes which forcibly supplanted preexisting governments. Naturally, a large, well-organized revolutionary movement, which included a trained military force could pose a greater threat to take possession of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon materials than could a smaller, less powerful terrorist organization. Also, nuclear weapons may come into the possession of former revolutionaries who become legitimized by the assumption of power within a state and who persist in their revolutionary aims and aspirations, thereby transforming the threat from a national to an international one.

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

It is the specific purpose of this paper to explore what may happen if terrorists and revolutionaries are able to develop nuclear explosive or dispersal capabilities. Thus far, only a few national governments possess nuclear weapons, and each has taken strong (although possibly insufficient) precautionary measures to prevent their nuclear bombs or special nuclear materials which are convertible to explosives from falling into unauthorized hands.

Whether terrorists and revolutionaries of the future will be able to achieve a nuclear weapon capability depends upon several factors. These include:

—the sympathies and political stability of regimes possessing a nuclear weapon capability
—safeguards applied by regimes possessing uranium enrichment and/or nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and their political stability
—the durability of safeguarding procedures for special nuclear material nationally and internationally over time

At the present time, only five nations are acknowledged members of the nuclear weapon club: the United States, USSR, UK, France and China. India tested what it described as a "peaceful" nuclear

explosive in 1974, having created it with materials originally supplied by the United States and Canada for its nuclear power program. India's example illustrates how, under poor safeguards, nuclear electricity generation can lead to nuclear weapons.[2]

The stability of regimes possessing nuclear weapons is important, since opportunities for terrorists or revolutionaries to take possession of stockpiled nuclear weapons could arise as a result of a coup or revolution. The nations currently possessing nuclear weapons appear stable enough at present, but will this always be so? Imagine, for example, the government of China being unable to continue to assert control over the entire country after repeated, devastating earthquakes and factional struggles. A splinter group of army officers seizes control of a few nuclear missiles and (*a*) threatens to employ them against Japan unless a large sum is paid; (*b*) uses the weapons without warning against the USSR which is suspected of having caused the earthquakes in China by geological warfare; or (*c*) is convinced by a revolutionary student group to turn over the weapons to it to prevent capitalists from regaining a foothold in China.

Should there be a rapid proliferation of nuclear-weapon states, which at this time seems rather likely, future nuclear-weapon states may be less stable than current nuclear powers and thus more likely to lose their nuclear weapons to terrorists or revolutionaries. Nevertheless, of the various ways for terrorists or revolutionaries to gain nuclear weapons, taking them forcibly from a government would be relatively difficult unless the power of the revolutionary force approached that of the government. Far simpler would be to convince a sympathetic government to give one or more weapons away. We can imagine, for example, another Middle Eastern nation clandestinely creating nuclear weapons in the same way Israel is purported to have done and then turning some of them over to a terrorist group with whom its leader sympathizes. Or the nuclear weapon may be given to the terrorist group as payment for other activities the national leader wants accomplished. In either case, the agreement would most likely be secret, so that the national donor would not be held culpable for the terrorist use of the weapon. The situation could become even more confused and dangerous if the terrorist group claimed publicly to have received the nuclear weapon from an innocent party, thereby generating a retaliatory response against the innocent party. In certain cases, this could conceivably result in international war.

The above example, as with others, points out the difficulty of drawing a hard line between national goals and terrorist goals. In the future, as in the past, national leaders may work clandestinely to achieve certain goals through the activities of terrorist groups. Some of these goals may involve the use of nuclear weapons, and others may involve the trade of nuclear weapons for terrorist services rendered. Based on past performance, can we doubt that certain national leaders would be capable of such behavior? Moreover, we cannot safely dismiss

2. In addition to the five nuclear-weapon nations and India, Israel is widely thought also to possess nuclear weapons developed from its nuclear reactors.

the possibility that these leaders will eventually acquire nuclear weapons or that other leaders of this disposition will come to power in nuclear-weapon states of the future.

Nations possessing nuclear spent fuel reprocessing plants will have at hand the plutonium necessary for constructing nuclear weapons. Reprocessing plants will make it possible for nations possessing them to develop nuclear weapons or, depending upon the degree of safeguarding applied, for terrorists to obtain bomb-grade materials from the reprocessing facility. Since a certain amount of material is unaccounted for in processing, it is impossible to know with certainty whether it was in fact, diverted. Uranium enrichment plants would offer less opportunity for diversion by terrorists or revolutionaries unless highly enriched uranium was being produced, and most enriched uranium for power plants is not weapons-grade.

It is widely acknowledged by the experts in this area that a sophisticated terrorist group would be capable of constructing nuclear weapons with information and equipment publicly available, once sufficient plutonium or highly enriched uranium had been obtained. Former nuclear weapons designer Theodore Taylor, for example, and his co-author, Mason Willrich, stated in their Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project study:

> It is difficult to imagine that a determined terrorist group could not acquire a nuclear weapon manufacturing capability once it had the required nuclear weapon materials. In this regard, a terrorist's willingness to take chances with his own health and safety, and to use coercion to obtain information or services from others, should be contrasted with the probably more conservative approach of persons engaged in crime for money.[3]

Agreements are currently being pursued by France and West Germany to sell nuclear reprocessing facilities to less developed countries, including Brazil and Pakistan. The United States has opposed such technology transfers as promotive of nuclear weapons proliferation, but other nuclear exporting countries have not been ready to forgo the potential profits.

Regardless of the apparent present stability of national regimes acquiring reprocessing facilities, it remains impossible to assure that in the future such countries will not have leaders with terrorist sympathies or that, in the chaos of a civil war, nuclear materials would not fall into the hands of avowed terrorist groups. Similar considerations may be applied to nations with nuclear power facilities.

Nuclear power plants, while not prime potential sources of special nuclear materials, are major potential targets for terrorist attack; in effect, they are huge radiological weapons which terrorists could sabotage, spreading deadly radioactivity far downwind. We will discuss this possibility further in a separate section of this paper.

SAFEGUARDING SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS

A major factor in determining the ease with which terrorist groups may attain nuclear weapons will be the extent to which effective national and international safeguards over special nuclear materials are

3. Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), p. 115.

devised and enforced. The issue of nuclear safeguards became a subject of public and congressional concern in the United States largely through the persistent efforts of a former nuclear weapons designer Theodore B. Taylor. In his Ford Foundation study with Mason Willrich, it was argued forcibly that "without effective safeguards to prevent nuclear theft, the development of nuclear power will create substantial risks to the security and safety of the American people and people generally."[4]

Elsewhere in their study, the authors considered the possibility of terrorists gaining nuclear materials. They wrote:

> One wonders how in the long run nuclear power industries can develop and prosper in a world where terrorist activities are widespread and persistent. For if present trends continue, it seems only a question of time before some terrorist organization exploits the possibilities for coercion which are inherent in nuclear fuel.[5]

The study by Willrich and Taylor was published in early 1974. Congressional interest was stirred, but little action was taken. In early 1976, the Director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Division of Safeguards, Carl H. Builder, wrote a memorandum, which subsequently became public, in which he expressed concern that ". . . some or even many of our currently licensed facilities may not have safeguards adequate against the lowest levels of design threat [of theft] we are considering. . . ."[6] This level was defined as one insider and three outsiders. And the House Subcommittee o Energy and the Environment, i February 1976, summarizing testi mony presented to it, noted tha "although the witnesses differe on the severity of the threat, it i obvious there is insufficient securit against threats the NRC consider plausible."[7]

Thus, more than two years afte Taylor and Willrich called nationa attention to nuclear safeguardin inadequacies, the problems remai far from being solved. Taylor him self provided rather extraordinar testimony at the subcommittee hea ings mentioned above. Rather tha offering confident answers to safe guarding problems, Taylor indicate that he found himself faced wit certain questions he was unable t answer after years of effort to d so. Specifically, regarding safe guards, he asked:

> What levels of risks of nuclear violenc whether caused by nations or crimin groups, are acceptable to society worl wide, and who should decide wh these levels should be? By wh process is the worldwide public to b assured that international and domesti safeguards against purposeful nucle violence will, in fact, be effective, i the sense that residual risks will b both known and considered acceptabl by the public?[8]

Taylor's questions speak el quently to the intractability of th problems of potential nuclear vi lence and nuclear safeguards. Th

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 169.
6. Carl H. Builder, "Adequacy of Current Safeguards," Memorandum to R. A. Brightsen, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 19 January 1976.

7. "House Subcommittee Chairman Cal for Improved Nuclear Security," Subcon mittee on Energy and the Environmer House Committee on Interior and Insul Affairs, news release of 3 March 1976.
8. Theodore B. Taylor, Statement befo the Subcommittee on Energy and the E vironment of the House Committee on I terior and Insular Affairs, 26 February 197

safeguarding problems which Taylor was instrumental in raising seem further from solution now than when he initially raised them.

I have concentrated on U.S. safeguarding difficulties because it seems a valid assumption that if the world's richest and most technologically advanced nation cannot adequately deal with these problems, then other nations will be even more likely to fail. The supposed safeguards provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are basically an inventory accounting system administered by the agency's small technical staff. The IAEA is able to recognize diversions after they occur, but is helpless to prevent diversions. It provides no physical security against diversion, nor does it have any capability to track down and recover diverted materials.

It appears that neither national nor international safeguards will prove adequate to prevent terrorists from going nuclear. In the following sections, we will consider what sort of world we may expect with nuclear armed terrorists.

WHAT TERRORISTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES CAN DO WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

With a nuclear weapon at their disposal, the coercive leverage of a terrorist or revolutionary group is multiplied enormously. Terrorists could threaten the destruction of any number of key targets, including a nation's capital city, a major dam, or a nuclear power generating station. Nuclear threats against any of these targets could cause widespread panic and intense pressure on the government to accede to terrorist demands.

The government involved would be in the difficult position of not knowing with certainty whether the terrorists were bluffing. One wonders how much risk a government would take if the terrorists publicly presented a credible description and photographs of their nuclear weapon and a small sample of special nuclear material. As a matter of policy, the U.S. government refuses to negotiate for the release of Americans who have been kidnapped. Would it adopt a similar no-negotiation policy for the "release" of Americans who were in effect being held hostage by a nuclear bomb threat to New York or Chicago?

Nuclear terrorists would have the advantage of choosing whether or not to identify themselves for publicity purposes. But even while identifying themselves, they could remain unlocatable and thus untargetable for retaliation. This, of course, nullifies the basic premise of deterrence theory, namely that a nuclear attack can be prevented by fear of retaliation. Clearly, if terrorists cannot be located, they have no need to fear retaliation, and thus deterrence in this context becomes meaningless. Further, some terrorists may be assumed to be so alienated that they would not be deterred even if located and certain to die if they carried out their threat. Of course, a nuclear bomb could be detonated remotely, even in another city, by telephone signal.

An interesting variant of the above would be for the atomic terrorists to claim to be a group on which they desired to bring public enmity, or upon which they desired to inflict the retaliatory might of the threatened nation. When terrorists have deliberately misidentified themselves, one wonders whether or not

national leaders would be capable of responding intelligently, under possibly panic conditions.

Were the terrorists to have more than one nuclear weapon, their position would be even more powerful. After they exploded one, it would be virtually impossible to reject their subsequent demands. Even if they had only one weapon which they used and bluffed a second weapon, it would be extremely difficult to attempt calling the bluff in the face of their already demonstrated capability and the likely overriding public sentiment to avoid further destruction at virtually any price. One successful nuclear extortion threat, or one actual nuclear bombing, would also undoubtedly instigate many similar threats. Distinguishing credible extortionists from hoaxers would increase in difficulty.

The sorts of situations we are now considering would very likely result in state-of-emergency declarations and the assumption of unlimited police powers by the threatened government. Responding to nuclear threats could undermine civil liberties and put democratic governments to their severest test.

Revolutionaries within a given nation would be unlikely to use nuclear tactics against a population center of their own people. They might, however, be willing to act against a military target or a government symbol. Revolutionaries could also act without identifying themselves if they perceived the action to be in their interest. Revolutionaries would probably be less inhibited in terrorizing a foreign government they desired overthrown. Theodore Taylor has pointed out that a nuclear weapon with a one-fiftieth kiloton yield (1,000 times less powerful than the yield at Hiroshima) detonated in a car on Pennsylvania Avenue would produce sufficient radiation to kill anyone above basement level in the White House, and that a one kiloton weapon (still 20 times less powerful than the Hiroshima bomb) if exploded just outside the exclusion area during a State of the Union message, would kill everyone inside the Capitol building.[9] Taylor states of the latter possibility:

> It's hard for me to think of a higher leverage target, at least in the United States. The bomb would destroy the heads of all branches of the United States government—all Supreme Court justices, the entire cabinet, all legislators, and, for what it's worth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the exception of anyone who happened to be sick in bed, it would kill the line of succession to the Presidency—all the way to the bottom of the list. A fizzle-yield, low-efficiency, basically lousy fission bomb could do this.[10]

The situation referred to by Dr. Taylor would involve no threat, no warning—simply the explosion, the death and destruction, and the ensuing chaos and panic. Terrorists or revolutionaries in possession of a nuclear weapon would have the option of exploding it without warning. Some groups might find this preferable both to avoid identification with the act and to avoid capture. By deliberately misidentifying themselves, terrorists might be able to catalyze domestic repression and/or international war.

RADIATION DISPERSAL DEVICES

To construct a nuclear bomb requires either about 11 pounds of plutonium or about 45 pounds of

9. John McPhee, *The Curve of Binding Energy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1973), pp. 221–22.
10. Ibid., p. 222.

highly enriched uranium. It also requires some expertise and at least several weeks of work by a small well-trained team. With lesser amounts of time, expertise, and plutonium, terrorists could prepare radiological weapons which could be used for extortion or contamination of chosen targets.

Plutonium is an extremely toxic carcinogen. In a study done by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, it was calculated that the release of 4.4 pounds of plutonium oxide as a fine powder would entail 100 percent probability of developing bone or lung cancer up to 1,800 feet downwind from the point of release, and a 1 percent risk as far as 40 miles downwind.[11]

The immediate impact in terms of deaths and recognizable injury would be far less with a radiological weapon than a nuclear bomb, but the psychological and economic impact of forcing the evacuation of a large area and the costly and lengthy decontamination procedures involved could make radiological weapons attractive to terrorist and revolutionary groups. Additionally, radiation dispersal devices would be far easier to prepare than a nuclear bomb, requiring only a basic knowledge of nuclear chemistry. Terrorists who threatened the release of plutonium oxide in a population center would have to be negotiated with seriously, particularly if they included a sample of plutonium with their threat letter. It would be virtually impossible for authorities to prevent the release of plutonium oxide when it could be done by simply attaching a leaking container of the material to a city taxicab or dropping it from the window of a tall building.

Dr. Edward Martell, a nuclear chemist with the National Center for Atmospheric Research, has stated: "in the not too unlikely event of a major plutonium release, the resulting contamination could require large-scale evacuation of the affected area, the leveling of buildings and homes, the deep plowing and removal of topsoil and an unpredictable number of radiation casualties."[12] The evident potential for creating the economic and social chaos—of forcing evacuation of a major city, say New York or Washington, D.C.—might prove a substantial lure for political terrorists in possession of plutonium. They might feel safer putting the diverted plutonium to immediate use rather than running the risk of organizing the talent and taking the necessary time to construct a nuclear bomb.

Radiation dispersal devices could also be used against more specific targets, particularly ventilated buildings. Feasible targets might include legislative chambers, stock exchanges, embassies, corporate headquarters, political conventions, power plants, and communication centers. Willrich and Taylor have calculated that the indoor release of one gram of powdered plutonium oxide could provide lethal dosages for inhabitants within a 500 square meter area and significant contamination requiring some evacuation and clean-up over a 50,000 square meter area. The indoor release of 100 grams of plutonium, about one-quarter pound, would give lethal inhalation dosages for 50,000 square meters and sig-

11. "Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuel" (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission WASH-1327, August 1974), vol. 4, p. v-48.

12. Edward H. Martell, cited in Roger Rapoport, *The Great American Bomb Machine* (New York: Ballantine, 1972), p. 47.

nificant contamination over 5 million square meters.[13]

The above calculations are for an oxide of plutonium-239, the most common isotope of plutonium produced as a by-product of the nuclear fission process. A 1,000-megawatt light-water nuclear power reactor produces approximately 440 pounds of plutonium annually. A less common isotope of plutonium produced by the fission process is plutonium-238. This isotope decays at a rate approximately 280 times faster than plutonium-239, having an 87 year half-life rather than 24,400 years, and thus is approximately 280 times as toxic. Plutonium-238 is worthy of our attention, since it is being used to power cardiac pacemakers. Each pacemaker contains approximately one-quarter gram of plutonium-238. Extrapolating from the figures given by Willrich and Taylor, the one-quarter gram of plutonium-238 in a single pacemaker could provide lethal dosages over an indoor area of 37,500 square meters and provide significant contamination requiring some evacuation and clean-up to an area of 3,750,000 square meters. It would seem imprudent at best to dismiss the possibility of terrorists gaining a significant radiological weapon by the removal of an implanted nuclear heart pacemaker from a hapless victim, particularly when the recipients of nuclear pacemakers are periodically mentioned in the press.[14] At the present time, 20 such pacemakers are being manufactured and implanted monthly in the United States. A decision is pending on whether or not to proceed with nuclear heart pacemakers on a larger scale.

Since the major radiotoxic danger of plutonium derives from inhalation, sophisticated terrorists could theoretically contain the plutonium without hazard to themselves until they are ready to release it. If they chose to release it by time-bomb, they could be out of the area when the release occurred.

Douglas DeNike, a long-time scholar of nuclear terrorism, has painted this frightening scenario for the use of radiological weapons by terrorists:

> Perhaps the end will come with a whimper rather than a bang. Covert radiological warfare could cripple any nation without its immediate awareness. The downtown cores of the hundred largest American cities, for example, could be made uninhabitable by two foreign students on their summer vacation. The whole job would require roughly 100 pounds of power-reactor-grade plutonium or strontium-90 particles. A pound of either one, tied to the underside of a taxicab in a leaking container, would create an insidious cancer-induction hazard over several square miles.[15]

While the health effects of the radiological contamination might not be felt for many years, the psychological and economic effects of announcing the contamination, as the terrorists would surely do, would be substantial, particularly if evacuation and decontamination were necessitated.

As with a nuclear bomb, the leverage of terrorists generally would

13. Willrich and Taylor, *Nuclear Theft*, p. 25.

14. See, for example, "Government Owns Part of His Heart," *Santa Barbara News Press*, 26 February 1976. For a fictional account of nuclear terrorism with a cardiac pacemaker, see my story, "The Ordeal of Harry Dalton: A Parable for Our Times," *Science Forum*, vol. 8, no. 6 (December 1975), pp. 3–7.

15. L. Douglas DeNike, "Nuclear Terror," *Sierra Club Bulletin*, November-December 1975.

increase after the initial terrorist release of radionuclides. It would be extremely difficult for officials of a threatened city to resist terrorist demands when another city had already been required to evacuate.

NUCLEAR FACILITIES AS TARGETS FOR TERRORISTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES

As we enter the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, nuclear power plants are being increasingly relied upon to supply electric power. While a majority of people probably continue to view nuclear power as a great technological achievement, a growing minority see nuclear power as a symbol of technological arrogance. It is becoming increasingly widely understood that a meltdown of a nuclear reactor core could result in the release of volatile radioactive materials which could take thousands of lives and cause billions of dollars in property damage. The amount of potential damage remains a hotly debated issue, but the most recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) document on this issue, the "Reactor Safety Study" (Rasmussen Report), estimates a worst-case accident would cause 3,300 early fatalities, 45,000 cases of early illnesses, and $14 billion in property damage.[16] This study argues that the chances of a nuclear accident killing more than 1,000 people are extremely low, the likelihood of occurrence being once in a million reactor-years for 100 nuclear plants, about the same risk as this number of people being killed by a meteorite. The study, however, excludes consideration of intentional destruction of a nuclear reactor which could set the probability of a core meltdown at unity.

In 1972 airline hijackers threatened to crash a Boeing 727 into the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, nuclear installation. The site was evacuated, and the terrorists did not carry out their threat. James R. Schlesinger, who was at that time U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman, commented on the incident that

> . . . if one intends to crash a plane into a facility and one is able to persuade the pilot that that is the best way to go, there is, I suspect, little that can be done about that problem. The nuclear plants that we are building today are designed carefully to take the impact of, I believe, a 200,000 pound aircraft arriving at something on the order of 150 miles per hour. They will not take the impact of a larger aircraft.[17]

A Boeing 747 is nearly twice as heavy as the aircraft the power plants are designed to withstand, and a smaller aircraft carrying conventional explosives would probably penetrate a reactor containment structure. This approach to radiation release would, of course, be suicidal, but demonstrably there are terrorists fanatical enough to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be a greater goal.

There are simpler ways for terrorists to effect a radiation release at a nuclear power plant. A former U.S. navy demolition specialist testified before Congress that

> . . . as one trained in special warfare and demolitions, I feel certain that I could pick three to five ex-underwater

16. "Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Main Report" (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WASH-1400, October 1975).

17. Cited in *Mike Gravel Newsletter*, 31 October 1973.

demolition Marine Reconnaissance, or Green Beret men at random and sabotage virtually any nuclear reactor in the country. It would not be essential for more than one of these men to have had such specialized training. . . . The engineered safeguards would be minimally effective and the amount of radioactivity released could be of catastrophic proportions.[18]

A 1974 Government Accounting Office (GAO) survey of security systems at nuclear plants drew attention to the vulnerability of the spent fuel storage pools located at reactor sites. In a letter to then AEC Chairman Dixy Lee Ray, a GAO official noted:

According to AEC and licensee officials, the used-fuel storage facility at a nuclear power plant is more accessible and vulnerable to sabotage than is the reactor core. Such a storage facility generally is an uncovered pool of water near the reactor. The highly radioactive used fuel does not have the same degree of physical protection as that provided to the reactor core by the reactor containment vessel.[19]

Terrorists might consider the spent fuel storage pool of a nuclear reactor as an inviting target. Dropping a waterproof bomb in this storage pool would probably result in high-level radioactive contamination of the power plant itself, making its evacuation necessary.

Nuclear power plants may justifiably be considered military equalizers. Locating a nuclear power plant near a metropolitan area gives terrorists or revolutionaries (or small enemy nations) a target which in effect can disrupt an entire city by radioactive contamination, necessitating precipitate evacuation. This concept of military equalizer is one which, to the best of my knowledge, no national department of defense has yet recognized. The GAO study referred to above also pointed out that at U.S. nuclear facilities "there has been no specific coordination with other Federal Agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to protect against or respond to attacks by paramilitary groups."[20] Moreover, federal regulations specifically exempt the nuclear industry from responsibility for defending against sophisticated attacks on nuclear plants.[21]

Other areas of the nuclear fuel cycle could conceivably be targets for terrorist attack as well. These would include spent fuels being transported by rail or truck, and waste storage sites. In either case, a terrorist attack would involve the penetration of the transport cask with explosives and the consequent release of radioactive materials into the environment. This clearly would not be a strategy for terrorists or revolutionaries desirous of impressing a local population with their benevolence. Conceivably, though, the terrorists could perceive themselves as benevolent if they believed their action to be the only way to stop a dangerous technology (such

18. B. L. Welch, Statement before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 28 March 1974.

19. Henry Eschwege, letter to AEC Chairman Dixy Lee Ray, 16 October 1974, p. 2.

20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. IOCFR 50.13: "An applicant for a license to construct and operate a production or utilization facility, or for an amendment to such license, is not required to provide for design features or other measures for the specific purpose of protection against the effects of (a) attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person, or (b) use or deployment of weapons incident to U.S. defense activities."

as nuclear power) before industrial societies became too dependent upon it.

In the United States, between April 1969 and July 1976, there were 235 threats of violence or acts of violence toward nuclear facilities, and the frequency of such actions is increasing—there were 55 just in the first eight months of 1976.[22] As far as is known, none has yet succeeded in the loss of nuclear material or in causing damage to nuclear equipment or the general public, but the likelihood that one will soon succeed is not trivial.

BRIEF SCENARIOS FOR U.S. POLICY-MAKERS

To give some idea of the difficulties which policy-makers may face in the future, let us consider the following brief scenarios.

—A U.S. army base is destroyed without warning by a low yield nuclear weapon with no clues as to who is responsible.

—The U.S. embassy in India is destroyed in the same manner.

—A cadre of revolutionaries, including a nuclear engineer, take over a nuclear power plant and threaten to initiate a core meltdown if their demands for policy change are not met.

—An American-owned factory in France is discovered to have been saturated with plutonium oxide, and threats are received that the same will happen to other American corporations if certain government policy changes are not made.

22. A complete listing of threats and acts of violence to licensed and unlicensed nuclear facilities may be obtained from the Energy Resources Division Administration and/or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

—Japanese extremists divebomb an American nuclear reactor causing a core meltdown.

—A German terrorist group threatens the nuclear bombing of an unspecified U.S. target in Europe unless the Netherlands releases certain political prisoners.

—A multinational terrorist group, in possession of plutonium oxide, begins contaminating U.S. targets in Latin America and Asia, each time reiterating a demand for the United States to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe.

CONCLUSIONS

—Nuclear or radiological weapons in the hands of terrorists or revolutionaries could provide a significant threat to any society, particularly urban and industrial societies.

—Terrorists or revolutionaries can use nuclear or radiological weapons to extort money or extract political concessions from a government.

—Once a nuclear or radiological weapon is used by a terrorist or revolutionary group, other such groups will be more likely to threaten this approach and also more likely to be successful in having their demands met.

—Since retaliation will be difficult if not impossible against possibly unlocatable and even unidentifiable terrorists or revolutionaries, it will be necessary to prevent any diversion of nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials anywhere in the world. As yet, no criteria have been established as to how nuclear safeguards can be assured for the present, let alone for a conceivable future with many more nuclear weapon and nuclear power states.

—The threat of nuclear terrorism could precipitate restrictions on

civil liberties. Policy-makers of the future will have to make some hard decisions in this area, particularly if nuclear power continues to expand as an energy source.

—It is not inconceivable that nuclear terrorism could intensify international tensions and catalyze international wars, particularly if the terrorists are not identifiable or are misidentified.

—The serious nature of the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism demands equally serious policy decisions by current government policy-makers. A starting point is an evaluation of the consequences of continued development and exportation of nuclear technology and a realistic assessment of how effective nuclear safeguards can be expected to be on a worldwide basis.

—The solution to the problem of potential nuclear violence by terrorists or revolutionaries must be founded in a broad international context if it is to be effective.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 430, March 1977

Safeguards against Diversion of Nuclear Material: An Overview

By RYUKICHI IMAI

ABSTRACT: Non-proliferation is basically a political objective, which because of the technical nature of the problem and because the world is faced with the likelihood of the rapid spread of nuclear technology, requires technical means of implementation. It should be obvious that technology as such cannot solve what is essentially an issue of international politics, but the two have to complement each other. This point has not been well understood by the world's arms control community. International safeguards, as currently administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, have a number of definite—and expected—technical limitations. Moreover, if the system of safeguards is to be effective, answers will have to be found for a number of political questions, such as "What is a meaningful level of nuclear armament for a country?" or "What international sanctions would be available in the event of the diversion of nuclear material?" At the same time, unlike other verification measures in various arms control agreements, the system of nuclear safeguards has special features which make it uniquely feasible if applied under correct circumstances. Safeguards can be a meaningful and powerful tool of an international non-proliferation regime if combined with political and other considerations and properly orchestrated.

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THERE are definite limitations to the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those of us who participated in the original formulation of the safeguards system had known it from the outset, and have been saying so, long before the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rediscovered it recently. In fact, many people had the impression that U.S. official interpretation had consistently rejected this point of view. Many of the limitations come from technical, legal, or institutional reasons. On the other hand, there are factors which make nuclear safeguards uniquely feasible compared to other technological innovations, for which the separation of potential risks from benefits through international control pose increasingly difficult problems.

Although originated by the spread of nuclear technology,[1] proliferation is essentially a political issue and safeguards are no more than technical means which contribute to its solution; they are not substitutes for a political solution. If this point is accepted, the combination of IAEA safeguards with other political and economic tools will effectively reduce the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons to an acceptable level. In such an exercise, it is important to weigh properly the comparative risks arising from the expansion of peaceful nuclear technology to the Third World, the somewhat related problem of terrorists' access to plutonium, and the real danger involved in the existing arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the superpowers.

1. For expected growth of nuclear power and its implications, see, for example, the Atlantic Council of the United States, "Nuclear Fuels Policy" (Washington, D.C., 1976).

ROLE OF POLITICS AND ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

Non-proliferation is a politica objective, whereas safeguards are technical means to help achieve it For any political objective, detailed and precise definition is not eas because the changing political cli mate tends to render definitions ob solete over time. On the other hand a technical system cannot effectivel function unless boundary condition are set in unmistakable technica language. The major cause of dif ficulties in the application of inter national safeguards has been tha only a handful of people paid an attention to the job of interpretin vague and general political require ments of non-proliferation into pre cise definitions of technical bound ary conditions. The technical com munity regarded the job a primarily in the political domai and went ahead with a set of fairl conventional assumptions whic happened to suit their technica capabilities, whereas the politician did not even realize that the prob lem existed and simply assume that the technical people must hav eased their headaches. Communica tion between technical and politica worlds has not improved very much

A technical system which aims a the direct prevention of proliferatio differs from one whose objective i to detect early indications of pro liferation. The former involves po lice type direct intervention bot for prevention before the fact an for pursuit and recovery after th fact. The latter is a network c surveillance which can detect anom alies in industrial activities of peace ful nuclear application. Roughl speaking, the two systems refle

the difference between "physical protection" and "international safeguards," a difference whose legal implications are clear. Under the normal understanding of international law, only the latter system can be imposed on sovereign states, with their consent, while physical protection is primarily a sovereign act.

"Indication of proliferation" is difficult to define in an objective manner. The following are some examples of how it may be defined:

a. diversion of nuclear material from a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle in an amount sufficient to produce one fission bomb (But over what period of time?)

b. unexplainable disappearance of 20 or 30 bombs' worth of nuclear material from peaceful fuel cycle (including normal operating loss and measurement inaccuracies)

c. unusual activities within a country's industrial or research facilities which traditionally would be regarded as weapons-oriented (What if a country invented an unusual route to nuclear weapons?)

d. signs of inexplicable irregularities in or deviations from normal industrial activities (In addition to the difficulties of defining what is normal, novel research and development projects almost always involve off-normal activities.)

The necessary and sufficient indication of weapons proliferation will also be governed by such other considerations as:

1. How does one actually go about manufacturing a bomb? (There are a number of popular theories regarding this technical know-how.)[2]

2. What are a country's industrial and technical capabilities for the manufacture of nuclear warheads or their delivery systems? (This involves an assessment of combined capabilities either with or without assumptions concerning facilities unknown to the inspectorate.)

3. Type and degree of nuclear armament which serves national interest best. (This might range from a crude fission bomb to a sophisticated combination of very complicated warheads and long-range precision delivery systems.)

Item one is the essential ingredient of safeguards, yet it is one of the closest-held secrets in the world. Item two is a matter of technical judgment, whereas the third item involves essentially a subjective judgment regarding military and political trade-offs between the costs and benefits of nuclear armaments, as well as of the policy intent of the country. It is difficult to find a formulation which is universally applicable to all the cases.

EVOLUTION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS

The current IAEA safeguards (which are outlined in document INFCIRC/153) represent a major revision from past practices, in order to accommodate the requirements of Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[3] Its basic logic may be described as follows:

a. it provides for *timely detection* capabilities

2. Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor, "Nuclear Theft, Risks and Safeguards" (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), is an example of such popular theory but without technical justification or persuasion.

3. For general discussion of the INFCIRC/153 system, see, for example, Ryukichi Imai, "Nuclear Safeguards" (Adelphi Paper no. 86, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 1972), and Benjamin Sanders, "Safeguards against Nuclear Proliferation," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1975.

b. of *diversion* from *peaceful nuclear fuel cycles*
c. of *significant quantities* of *nuclear material*
d. so that such capabilities will serve as a *deterrent* against
e. nuclear *proliferation*, because either
f. detection leads to international *sanction* or
g. lack of detection means *verification* of no diversion.

From the time the term "safeguards" was initially used in the General Assembly resolution establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee back in 1945, it has come a very long way. Throughout the initial period, it was nothing very much more than a vague idea to prevent the military use of atomic power, as originally proposed in the Acheson/Lilienthal report regarding international control and monopoly of atomic energy. Very little had been known or understood in the international community about the technology of atomic power itself or its possible implications.

When the International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1957, its statute stated that the agency should "ensure so far as able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purposes" (Article II). The provision that the agency may administer safeguards on a non-agency project if so requested by member states (NPT safeguards fall into this category) was almost an afterthought at the time. From its later history, it is amusing to realize that it was Japan who insisted that safeguards should be internationally administered and inserted in her Agreement for Cooperation with the United States of 1958 a provision that bilateral safeguards be transferred to IAEA as soon as possible (Article II).

The first document by the agency which spelled out safeguard procedures was prepared in 1961 and dealt with reactors with less than 100 megawatts thermal output. By 1965, after extensive discussion among international experts, the agency adopted a more generalized safeguards system known as INFCIRC/66/ Rev 2. Although this was a well-organized first attempt, INFCIRC/66 contained two controversial points:

1. a provision which allowed IAEA inspectors to have access at all times to all places within the national fuel cycle in most of the cases;
2. lack of specific technical criteria to determine whether there has or has not been diversion.

The first point was related to the protection of commercial secrets from misuse by IAEA inspectors, as well as to the undue disturbance of commercial operations. The second item meant an open-ended system which left the final determination of diversion to subjective judgment by individual inspectors. The implications of charges of diversion are too serious to be based on a single individual's opinion. Because of the failure to weigh properly implications of the safeguards within the fuel cycle for IAEA resources, it tended to be inefficient and the number of inspectors estimated for the year 1980 was in the thousands, which is clearly unrealistic in view of the other IAEA activities.

After considerable discussions both at IAEA and among the member states, what emerged as a major modification was the document

INFCIRC/153, the so-called Model Agreement under NPT. It has been worked out at the IAEA's Safeguards Committee of 1970, which lasted almost for a year and in which representatives of 48 states participated. What was presented at the outset of this section embodying the logical chain from (*a*) to (*g*) is a shorthand description of the new system, which is much more satisfying as an objective technical system. As long as the words in italics can be clearly defined, the system does not require any more subjective judgment. Furthermore, a technical tool was provided in the form of a theory of statistical sampling, which limits the inspectors' access requirements to minimum predetermined locations in the fuel cycle, and which, through predetermined calculations of sample size and other factors, allows IAEA to come out with objective statements such as "we have verified that there has [not] been a diversion of more than X kg of nuclear material within the past six months and the probability that this statement is correct [confidence level] is 95%."[4]

One may note that as far as the technical system is concerned diversion, not proliferation, becomes the central theme, and safeguards are no longer concerned with whether the diverted material is immediately turned into bombs or simply stored away somewhere or may even reflect an accounting error in nuclear material management.

4. For technical discussion of the system as well as its evolution, see, for example, Wolfgang Häfele, "Systems Analysis in Safeguards of Nuclear Material," Fourth United Nations International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, A/CONC/49/P771, 1971.

LIMITATIONS OF THE SYSTEM

Referring to the issue of diversion threshold criteria, it would seem a lot simpler if one could adopt "the amount of nuclear material needed for a fission bomb" as an alarm level for the system. This will evidently cover any other possible definition of the criteria and will be the most thoroughgoing. Unfortunately, this cannot be accepted for two reasons.

As of the end of 1975, IAEA had 84 safeguards agreements covering 133 facilities. The agency's safeguards-related staff numbered 116, of whom 75 were professionals. Diversion criteria in use for that year were less stringent than those required to detect the loss of materials which could produce one bomb per year for any one country, yet, even on that basis, of the amount of inspection works which the agency had been authorized to carry out in 1975, it could fulfill only about one-third of the load with the existing staff.[5] Practically, this means that the most stringent, and therefore most thoroughgoing, diversion criteria could not be adopted, and it will become increasingly so with the expansion of the world's nuclear power program.

A more fundamental reason for inadequacy of the one bomb criterion is technical. In today's technology, the highest degree of accuracy currently possible in the measurement of the amount of plutonium in a reprocessing plant is plus or minus 1 percent. A typical commercial fuel reprocessing plant will handle 1,000 tons of fuel a year, which would contain six to seven tons of fissile pluto-

5. From an internal IAEA document.

nium. It is then easy to see that 1 percent of this is about 10 times the requirement of a single fission bomb. In other words, measurement error alone will exceed a one bomb threshold without anyone attempting to divert plutonium intentionally. In a somewhat simplistic presentation, diversion criteria for a country with a reprocessing plant handling 1,000 tons of fuel a year has to be at least 10 bombs worth.

Instead of rushing to the hasty conclusion that nobody should be allowed to operate a fuel reprocessing plant, let us examine other intrinsic limitations contained in the current safeguards system.

a. Safeguards systems can only function as effective deterrents if international sanctions against unauthorized diversion are spelled out in advance. This, unfortunately, is not the case and the reaction of the major powers to the Indian test of 1974, although India may not have violated any written pact, was nevertheless a frustrating experience for those genuinely concerned about proliferation. Even if the international community could agree on measures of sanction, it would then face difficult legal questions such as "Can one exercise sanction on the basis of a probablistic statement which may be 95 percent right but 5 percent wrong?" or "Why should a country be punished for the diversion of 10 bombs worth of nuclear material when it may be at perfect liberty to divert nine?"

b. Another important question relates to the definition of the national fuel cycle. Nations are obliged at the start of IAEA safeguards application to declare the entire nuclear facilities and nuclear materials within the country, to be updated every time changes take place. In the application of safeguards, should one assume the existence of a clandestine fuel reprocessing plant? If not, for a country without a declared reprocessing facility, monitoring plutonium presents a relatively easy problem because the country cannot extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel. If one has to assume the existence of a processing plant, the problem becomes infinitely more complicated, because then the system has to deal with unknown and unspecified elements and this means that detailed control on low enriched uranium will be required as a starting point for plutonium production. In general, there is a "cops-and-robbers" game played between imaginative adversaries unless IAEA can limit the extent of exotic diversion scenarios beforehand. (Permanent stationing of inspectors at nuclear facilities will not solve the problem, because one can easily create a technically consistent scenario which beats any defense even under that condition.)

c. Between NPT safeguards and previous IAEA practice, there is a definite discrepancy in definitions as to what it is that constitutes proliferation. A good example is a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), which is prohibited under the NPT because it is an explosion, but not prohibited under the previous system because it is peaceful. On the other hand, a naval propulsion reactor is allowed under NPT because it is not explosive but has been prohibited under bilateral agreements (and therefore under IAEA safeguards based on transfer agreements) because it is military. In the actual safeguards applications, what is at issue is only diversion. Incompatibility in defini-

tions may be further illustrated if one imagines an IAEA inspector who is looking at a laboratory in which metallic plutonium is worked on, appearing very much like weapons development but without a weapons assembly line. All the nuclear material is correctly reported and there is no diversion. The work is explained as development of a new plutonium fuel concept for fast breeder reactors. Under NPT, states are free to conduct research and development for peaceful purposes. The most the inspector can do is to write a footnote in his inspection report, and the agency in Vienna might have to wonder whether the incident should be reported to the board of governors and, if so, under which provision of the safeguards agreement.

The problem of diversion thresholds, and the three additional examples mentioned here, make it clear that safeguards cannot be a mechanical process either technically or legally and that combinations of worst-case-assumptions will only lead to impossible situations. If one assumes a country possesses the technical capabilities to convert plutonium nitrate into a fission bomb within 90 days, then to require that the safeguards system detect diversion more than 90 days before the bomb production is an absurdity. What the current system under INFCIRC/153 does is to identify the logical relationship among the proliferation problems and to separate technical and political components so that the system can function effectively within the well-identified limits.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The technical effectiveness of IAEA safeguards has been taken up for discussion on a number of occasions recently, including the latest meeting of the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group for Safeguards Implementation, an international committee of experts to advise the Secretary General. Taken at the cops-and-robbers game level, one can imagine several cases in which IAEA would not have detected diversion if nations followed very complicated and prohibitively expensive diversion schemes. On the other hand, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger has argued that "since the inception of safeguards, we know of no nation that has acquired nuclear weapons through any diversion of nuclear material subject to either bilateral or IAEA safeguards."[6] (India's CIRUS reactor is not under safeguards.)

Both of the above are true, and it becomes a matter of judgment as to which one of the two points of view one would like to adopt. This, in turn, is governed by one's conception of the mechanism for proliferation as well as the incentives to proliferation. What is more important than an assessment of past performance is the evaluation of the effectiveness of safeguards in the future, especially with rapid expansion of the world's nuclear capacities and the seeming desire of many LDCs to acquire this technology for energy generation. It is also important to look at the broader significance of the role of safeguards, for a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion today seems to come from a simplistic approach which regards safeguards as an instrument for the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

6. Statement by Henry Kissinger to the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 9 March 1976.

Any major technology has good and evil sides, and this is particularly true in the case of nuclear power. On the one hand, generation of electricity and heat through nuclear fission promises a practically unlimited supply of energy, especially when the era of fast breeder reactors materializes. The oil crisis of 1973 highlighted in many people's minds the basic problems of too heavy a reliance on oil. Since the higher oil prices made the relative economic position of nuclear power favorable, there are many countries that would like to increase the nuclear portion of their national energy supply. This is particularly true as the intrinsic limitations in other energy alternatives become clear and people have come to realize that the wide-scale utilization of solar power or fusion energy will have to wait at least until the next century. The negative side of nuclear power includes the spread of artificial radiation, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a possible increase in unrest due to concern about increasing amounts of plutonium. (This precisely would be the case in the days of fast-breeder reactors.)

For some time, attempts had been made to resolve this dilemma through the application of risk/benefit analysis until it was discovered that finding a common measuring unit for the risk of proliferation as against the benefit from energy supply is virtually impossible. People are discovering that they live in a multiple-value society in which some regard a continued supply of energy as the most important thing while others consider increased consumption of energy and further economic growth as the most undesirable. If nuclear proliferation is to be prevented at any cost, then the solution is simply to stop having any more nuclear power. It is a philosophical issue beyond reprocessing or safeguards, on which, however, it will be very difficult to arrive at a universal consensus. Like the problem of nuclear safety, the safest reactor is no reactor, because technology cannot assure absolute safety under any circumstances. A technology is safe when the probability of large-consequence accident is very low. Similarly, in whatever formulation it may be presented, the safeguards system is also an exercise in probability which, by definition, cannot give absolute assurance against proliferation. At best, it represents a reasonable compromise which tries to derive as much benefit as may be practicable from the novel and large technology called nuclear power, while at the same time it tries to hold the undesirable risk from the same technology to the minimum acceptable.

MORE THAN MEANS OF VERIFICATION

In this regard, nuclear safeguards are very different from other means of verification accompanying international agreements on arms control and disarmament. Conceptual application of safeguards technology may be found in such things as pollution control on a worldwide scale. (There are already attempts in the technical community to extend the basic concepts of IAEA safeguards to international control of air and ocean pollution.)[7]

Differences from other cases of verification may be examined in the following way. The verification pro-

7. Some of the works by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Luxemburg, are related to this subject.

vision in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I Agreement refers to satellite observation of ICBM silos or the construction of new SLBM launchers. Procedures as well as objects of surveillance are very well defined. It is a process of counting numbers of existing weapons and of assuring that the number does not increase beyond the threshold. It is clear that in the current conception of the technology there is no such thing as a peaceful ICBM or peaceful SLBM, so that any unauthorized increase is a violation of the SALT Agreement. The same is true with nuclear test ban treaties, except for the case of peaceful nuclear explosions. The United States and USSR had to go to the trouble of drawing up a separate PNE treaty to accompany the underground test ban treaty of 1974 (TTBT) with a long and complicated protocol which spells out the definition of PNEs. PNE, however, is a great deal easier to regulate because such explosives are still far from becoming practical engineering tools, and in any event the technology is held only by the nuclear weapon states.

The verification of the existence of chemical weapons is, in many ways, similar to nuclear safeguards. As far as the technological base is concerned, chemical engineering serves both peaceful and military purposes, with the peaceful portion dominating. As the participants in the CCD are discovering, meaningful verification has to start with a definition of the chemical agents to be placed under surveillance, then they must be located among the vast industrial activities of the nations concerned. With due respect to the efforts being displayed in Geneva, such an exercise is an extremely difficult one, to say the least.

What has made nuclear safeguards feasible is a lucky combination of two situations. One is the fact that people started talking about safeguards long before nuclear power became an industrial reality, so that there has been sufficient time for planning. Another important element is that there are only two ingredients in the nuclear fuel cycle, namely uranium and plutonium. Both give off various kinds (and levels) of nuclear radiation, which requires the two materials to be handled in isolation from other industrial activities. Also, radiation-emitting substances are so easy to find even in a very minute quantity that they are often employed as tracers in chemical, physical, or biological analysis.

Without the two characteristics mentioned here, nuclear safeguards would have been very difficult. At the same time, one needs to be reminded of the fact that nuclear energy as a whole is suffering from excessive and much too detailed technology assessment before it has ever had an opportunity to prove itself industrially. It is often said that if the same approach to any other technology had been adopted, and all the possible adverse effects had been brought to social attention in advance, the world would never have seen wide-scale utilization of electricity, motorcars, or airplanes. There is some similarity to this in the way nuclear safeguards are being discussed today, not as actual experience or likely expectation but in anticipation of exotic diversion schemes.

COMPROMISE AMONG CONFLICTING FACTORS

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that nuclear safeguards cannot be ends in themselves. They

play a role in conjunction with other political and technical tools to reduce the probability of nuclear weapons proliferation. A number of important factors need to be considered in this regard.

a. Instead of applying uniform procedures to all the countries of the world, there will have to be an optimum deployment of available safeguards resources according to the different requirements. Technically advanced countries usually cannot expect to enhance their national security by manufacturing a couple of fission bombs. At the same time, the very large volume of nuclear material handled annually in their fuel cycles makes low diversion detection threshold unrealistic. Either a much higher threshold should be adopted, or, instead of an inspection program based on nuclear material accountancy control, IAEA should choose other and more elaborate technical means and keep the level and pattern of national nuclear activities under constant surveillance.

b. Less developed countries, which claim an interest in nuclear power, may be in a totally different situation. On the other hand, the starting scale of their nuclear activities will be small and thus amenable to somewhat detailed inspection schemes without requiring too much in the way of resources. (In spite of popular reactions, it will take quite some time before the nuclear programs of Brazil or Iran would build up to a large scale.)[8] On the other hand, it is argued that the LDC's prevailing interest in changing the status quo of the world's political, military, or economic order may provide opportunities for a small number of crude nuclear weapons to serve what may be their definitions of national interest. However, these countries will have to rely on the outside industrial centers for the supply of nuclear technology and major nuclear components as well as for various necessary services. Thus, it may make practical sense to apply different approaches and different standards of diversion detection in the case of LDCs. One possible way to solve the problems (*a*) and (*b*) simultaneously would be to adopt a diversion detection threshold which is proportional to the annual throughput of nuclear material within the national fuel cycle.

c. For quite some time to come, an indigenous commercial fuel reprocessing plant in countries with, say, less than 30 nuclear power stations, would not make economic sense. Some people argue, on the basis of the estimated reserve of available uranium resources and of the economics of the fuel cycle, that fuel reprocessing and subsequent transition into a plutonium-fueled energy system can only promise a very uncertain future. Although it is premature to base long-term policy on today's understanding of technology and economics, internationally controlled spent fuel storage or fuel reprocessing may make sense under certain conditions. Some of the features that would make such a proposition attractive may include, in not necessarily mutually consistent fashion, the provision of construction capital which is compatible with the technological and commercial risk of reprocessing, the provision of technology with some performance guarantee, or making a much needed plant site available with radioactive waste handling capabilities. Without tak-

8. Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Danger for All," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1976.

ing any of these steps, insistence on the concept of regional reprocessing merely on the merit of its safeguards will not convince the world's nuclear community. To deny reprocessing (thereby denying chances of plutonium fuel) without providing for uranium resources and uranium enrichment service, and yet at the same time to vigorously market nuclear reactors, will only invite the world's antagonism. One cannot place safeguards above nuclear power and still pay lip-service to the world energy problem.

d. Nuclear industry requires very large investment and very long lead time both for the development of technology and of manufacturing capabilities. This fact together with the somewhat restricted geographic concentration of major uranium reserves make international trade in nuclear power inevitable. Even the United States is finding out that she cannot support the complete industry with her domestic demands alone. The need for overseas markets is much more acute for European countries and Japan. To discourage nuclear trade as leading to proliferation would be neither wise nor practical.[9] The supplying countries' agreement worked out by seven nations through the secret London meeting of 1975 seems to be a promising first step toward striking a proper balance between the need for promoting trade and the requirement for protecting technology against weapons proliferation.[10]

e. There seems to be an exaggerated fear of terrorists' use of nuclear material, either for the manufacture of bombs or for the contamination of the environment. Although the importance of correct physical security measures cannot be overemphasized, this exaggeration can only do harm. It is difficult to assume that terrorists would find the nuclear route to be the optimum way of applying threats to society and thereby publicizing their respective causes.[11] Because one can never deny the possibility of complete social madness, and because measures for physical security are a useful supplement to effective safeguards by providing necessary containment and surveillance over nuclear material of critical nature, a physical protection program needs encouragement. At the same time it should be always kept in mind that physical protection by definition is a sovereign act for the maintenance of domestic social order, whereas safeguards are administered within sovereign states by international organizations. As important as the physical protection of nuclear material is the positive step of assurance by nuclear weapons states to the rest of the world that weapons in their possession will neither be stolen nor misused.

f. It seems very clear as far as the amount of risk is concerned that one should be more afraid of the tens of thousands of megatons that already exist in the hands of the superpowers than of the yet nonexistent potential bomb in the hands of unidentified states. Unless this is kept in proper perspective, and unless the basic under-

9. Donald Avery and Ryukichi Imai, "The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Market," American Nuclear Society/European Nuclear Society meeting, November 1976.

10. Not much has been published regarding this secret accord. See, for instance, "Strategic Survey, 1975," the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1976.

11. Roberta Wohlstetter, "Terror on a Grand Scale," reprinted in *Survival* (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May/June 1976).

taking for nuclear arms control and eventual disarmament is faithfully pursued, insistence on non-proliferation alone would invite the charge that those so doing are displaying the arrogance of self-appointed God's custodians of nuclear technology. It is also very important to realize that the non-proliferation situation of the past years did not arise merely from general acceptance of the superpowers' concern over nuclear weapons, but much more from the lack of need and incentives. If the Indian test increased the needs and incentives of some emerging powers for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, political measures to remove or reduce such incentives should precede any amount of technical safeguards.

Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation

By GEORGE H. QUESTER

ABSTRACT: There are two very different kinds of incentives to nuclear proliferation. We are used to seeing nations deter potential enemies and win political concessions with such weapons. A newer, very different, kind of incentive stems from the economic overlap between peaceful electric power reactors and the production of weapons-grade plutonium or enriched uranium; there may now be an economic cost to steering away from the bomb, rather than a cost to making it. Reducing the political-military incentives to proliferation will require a case-by-case approach. Some of these incentives can be decreased by extending the American nuclear umbrella, as for Europe and Japan. But a serious problem can then emerge in preventing proliferation by such "outlaw states" as South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan. For much of the world, moreover, the bomb will be more of a political-prestige item than a military tool, so that a superpower nuclear umbrella would be redundant or counter-productive. Reducing the economic incentives will also require a case-by-case approach. This cannot be achieved by simply cutting off technological assistance in the nuclear field. Rather, it must be done by using such assistance as a subtle "carrot" or "stick," to persuade the leaders of countries like Brazil and Japan to stay away from bombs.

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WHY indeed are there any incentives to nuclear proliferation? Given all the hardships and hostility that may be produced by a move to nuclear weapons, shouldn't it be apparent to one and all that the existing nuclear club is large enough?

Students of traditional international politics and realpolitik would respond all too quickly here that the incentives are obvious, for an additional weapon gives additional power, and power pays off in this anarchic world. A nation possessing nuclear weapons may be able to compel other nations to make concessions. At the least, a nation possessing such weapons can very plausibly deter the most objectionable actions of another state. Would the Russians have invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 if the Czechs had possessed nuclear weapons? The elementary logic of mutual deterrence suggests that they would not.[1]

Apart from incentives based on such straightforward military considerations, one could also see some indirect advantages and incentives at the level of political prestige. Hasn't the world taken Britain and France more seriously because of their nuclear stockpiles? Wouldn't the world have lost interest in China after the internal tumult of the Great Cultural Revolution, except for the fact that China had detonated an A-bomb and an H-bomb? Even when the possession of nuclear weapons cannot be translated into any meaningful military scenarios, it hovers in the background as a symbol of national power, changing the way prestige and status are distributed by th public opinions of the world, chang ing the way political negotiation may be settled.

A second kind of incentive ma be more surprising, for it come in the realm of economics. Mos of us have expected nuclear weap ons to be expensive, and are thu appalled that India could waste mil lions on such a bomb or that Irai could be contemplating squandei ing its oil riches in copying India Yet the economic factor here is mor subtle and perverse, such tha bombs could become very cheap such that avoiding nuclear weapon could even be expensive.[2]

We are all quite justified in dis trusting spin-off arguments as the are used to justify most militar programs. We are told civilian good are developed as a nice by-produc of military research programs, suc that we should not be so critica of the high costs of the militar programs; yet this is often mis leading propaganda, for the sam civilian goods could be develope at far lower costs if they were pu sued directly, rather than as th supposed spin-off by-product of weapons program.

The difficulty in the nuclear cas is that the spin-off phenomeno works in exactly the opposite direc tion and may not be bogus at al To produce electricity by means c nuclear reactors may make perfec sense today, after the price of o has risen so much. Yet the opera tion of such reactors quite naturall will put countries into contact wit plutonium and enriched uraniun the materials needed for atomi bombs. Staying away from the bom

1. For a classic statement of this kind of analysis, see Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961).

2. See Mason Willrich, ed., *Internation Safeguards and Nuclear Industry* (Baltimor Johns Hopkins Press, 1973).

might thus be optimal for arms control and neighborly understanding among the countries involved, but staying away from the bomb might require staying away from the most cost-effective source of energy. Alas, therefore, one has thus found another powerful incentive or drive toward nuclear weapons proliferation.

What can one then hope to do to decouple such incentives, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons from going on and on?[3] There is indeed hope that proliferation can yet be contained. The hope in part is based on some "lucky breaks" in the political and economic environment that may partially compensate for the bad luck we have described above. The hope must additionally be based, however, on some important policy choices which will confront all of us in the future. If these choices are handled wisely, proliferation will be easier to stop; if they are handled badly, our troubles may increase.

DECOUPLING MILITARY INCENTIVES

To turn first to the military incentives to proliferation, how does one shape policy to deemphasize these? Some analysts have predicted that the halting of nuclear proliferation will require the United States to play the role of "world policeman" again, extending its own nuclear umbrella to provide protection comparable to what any erstwhile proliferator would find in a national nuclear weapons program.[4] Much has been written to contend, however, that the existing nuclear-weapons states, or most especially the United States and USSR (the two superpowers), must now greatly limit their own possession, deployment, and brandishment of nuclear weapons, to avoid setting up the irritation between have and have-not that could make Nth countries look for an "equalizer."[5]

The first prediction seems strategically sound; the second would seem to make moral and symbolic sense. Examples can be found to support either prognosis. Denmark is a nation that shows no signs of feeling an incentive to proliferation, even though it wishes very much not to be liberated by the Soviet army; the counter-threat that the United States would escalate to the use of its own nuclear forces has since 1945 been an important reassurance to Danes and to many other West Europeans that they will not be thus "liberated." Brazilians, by contrast, may become furious at the implication that Moscow and

3. For basic treatments of the shape of the nuclear proliferation problem, see Richard N. Rosecrance, ed., *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Johan Jorgen Holst, ed., *Security, Order, and the Bomb* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972); Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1974); and Ciro Zoppo, *Trends in Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Security* (Santa Monica: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1975).

4. For a well-balanced statement of these kinds of positions, see William B. Bader, *The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Pegasus, 1968), pp. 110–19.

5. For examples, see William Epstein, "The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *Scientific American*, April 1975, pp. 18–33; and Elizabeth Young, *The Control of Proliferation: The 1968 Treaty in Hindsight and Forecast*, Adelphi Papers no. 56 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969). A balanced overview of the two kinds of position can be found in Joseph I. Coffey, "Nuclear Guarantees and Nonproliferation," *International Organization*, vol. 25 (Autumn 1971), pp. 836–44.

Washington can be trusted with the latest in nuclear weapons while Brasilia can not.

What follows will be an attempt to sort out these conflicting arguments for the categories of situations to which they appropriately apply. There is indeed a zone of the world covered by the American nuclear umbrella where nothing much should be changed. For Western Europe and for Japan, the likely American escalation to the use of nuclear weapons has been an important stabilizing factor in the background, and this explains Bonn's and Tokyo's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There is no point to having the United States "brandish nuclear weapons less" for these cases. Indeed, to begin any well-publicized American withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, or to open any extended discussion of "nuclear free zones" for these areas, risks upsetting the balance of feelings which have so nicely negated the incentive to proliferation here. For Europe and Japan, in summary, proliferation is not a problem, and peace is not a problem, precisely because the United States is remaining around as a nuclear policeman.

There is another category of countries for which the military impact of a nuclear weapons program is real, but where the American commitment has not so comfortably been settled into place and where proliferation will be more of a problem. These basically are the "outlaw" states of the 1970s, insufficiently covered by the American nuclear umbrella, where a more obtrusive American presence would be welcome but may not be available, where proliferation may thus occur as the regimes in question hunt for alternatives. The list here includes Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan, all states in the bad graces of world opinion as expressed in the United Nations General Assembly; over time it could also come to include South Korea and perhaps even Iran. Each of such states may tend to see an indigenous nuclear weapons option as the necessary ultimate veto, in the face of hostile states that would like to put the regime or state in question out of existence.

However one feels about the regime in Taipei or Pretoria or Seoul, it cannot be denied that a greater American commitment to the status quo here would ease rather than worsen the proliferation problem. If an American guarantee to Israel or Iran could be made airtight, it might simultaneously end the military incentive for a move toward nuclear weapons by these states.

Yet the world does not consist only of regimes like Copenhagen and like Pretoria. There is indeed a third category of countries for which the military possibilities of nuclear escalation or nuclear deterrence play much less of a role, and here the diminution suggested for the visible presence of superpowers may indeed make sense. Happily enough, this is the bulk of the world. Unhappily, proliferation among the short list of threatened nations above may upset the equanimity of these other states as well.

One can dismiss most of the military cases preferred by bomb advocates and professional military officers in this kind of Nth country. The bomb is in truth more of a political symbol here than an operational tool. The major issue for the future of proliferation here will thus not concern scenarios for battle situations and deterrence crises.

Nor will non-proliferation be heavily dependent on substantial disarmament by the two superpowers. There are many grounds for being critical of the way the United States and Soviet Union have conducted the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Yet one does not need to worry that bad handling of the talks threatens the world with a World War III. However much or however little SALT now accomplishes in heading off new rounds of the Soviet-American arms race, it is not likely to undo the stability resulting from previous rounds of that race. The atmosphere of SALT moreover is at least so stage-managed as to suggest to the world that Russians and Americans are not contemplating making nuclear war against each other. All of this, thus, reinforces a pattern that can only be categorized as world boredom with bombs, as the publics of the world have become uninterested in keeping count of numbers of missiles and numbers of nuclear powers and have become resentful of anyone boorish enough to force them to dwell on the subject again.

A substantively more ambitious SALT negotiation may be very desirable in its own right, but it may not have an greater impact for discouraging further proliferation than what is already underway. At the worst, if the more ambitious negotiations led to a great deal of discourse on the details of missile postures and first-strike scenarios, it could be counter-productive to the intention of taking away the glamor and incentive of going nuclear.

DOWNGRADING POLITICAL INCENTIVES

A most appropriate yardstick for anti-proliferation policy with reference to this third category of countries might simply be to "keep nuclears out of the news." SALT and other arms control discussions should be managed so as to maintain the impression that weapons cannot make any crucial difference anymore, that there are no "revolutionary weapons breakthroughs" coming over the horizon, that serious problems and serious solutions are to be found elsewhere, far removed from the possibilities of nuclear weapons.

Part of the goal here is of course to remove whatever glamor is attached to the possession of nuclear weapons. Another part is to remove any invidious feelings or irritation that might occur because states like the United States and Soviet Union get to keep their nuclear arsenals. If image and prestige are the bulk of what the proliferation problem is about for this third class of nations, the problem may have to be managed more in terms of political image than substantive arms control.

Similar ambivalence must, thus, be expressed about the desirability of supporting nuclear no-first-use policies or nuclear free zones as a way of reducing the incentives to nuclear proliferation. As elsewhere, an excessively abstract analysis can be a problem here rather than a help.

On a quiet, de facto basis, the United States has indeed indicated that it will not be brandishing or deploying nuclear weapons in much of the world. There is, in effect, a no-first-use policy for Southeast Asia and for other regions of the underdeveloped world, regions where the conventional force advantage of the Soviet Union has never frightened the publics that matter. Whether this quiet, de facto approach should be upgraded to explicit statements and treaty signa-

tures is another matter. When the countries of a region put together something like the new Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, it might indeed be well for the United States to avoid quibbling with it and opposing it.[6] The tougher overall problem will come in keeping the logic of nuclear free zones and no-first-use from casting into question the American commitments to nuclear escalation in defense of Western Europe and Japan.

There are some other political policy steps which the United States might consider to further the deglamorization of nuclear weapons. A termination of underground nuclear testing by the two superpowers would surely have a beneficial impact, as long as it was not achieved through an overly visible and tortured and litigated negotiation process. A deemphasis of earlier talk of "peaceful nuclear expositions" would be similarly beneficial, again if the projects can be dropped quietly. As suggested above, any achievement of the substance of SALT, without amplifying the procedural visibility of SALT, would be altogether beneficial.

However, compared to the possible signals to be extracted from a more meaningful SALT negotiation, or even a nuclear free zone, a far greater impact to halting proliferation in this third zone can be achieved by keeping nations in the second group above—the seriously-threatened nations—from actually moving to detonate a bomb.

Israel may supply the model here, generally thought to be in possession of such weapons but never quite punctuating this assumption by detonating such a bomb. South Africa now seems to be pursuing a parallel policy. In each case, one gets repeated official denials, typically worded so as to be less than categorical. In each case, one also gets rumors and off-the-cuff remarks hinting that a nuclear weapons stockpile is being collected.

The states pursuing such a policy clearly obtain some of the gains of outright proliferation, while avoiding some of the costs for themselves and for the world. Subliminally or otherwise, the message must be reaching Arab leaders that they can not hope anymore to attain their dream of pushing Zionist Israel into the sea. Even if victory could be won on the conventional battlefield, Israel would presumably destroy Cairo and Damascus and Mecca as part of its last-gasp retaliation, and Arabs must know this now. Knowing it over time will produce what nothing else could produce, the acceptance of something called Israel. South African leaders can aspire to something similar, erasing the hope of black African leaders that somehow all the whites can be forced to leave.

At the same time, the posture of asymptotically approaching the bomb, of never openly announcing possession, and never test-detonating it, markedly reduces outside public arousal about proliferation. In a funny and illogical way, the world only counts what has been detonated. India is rated inside the club while Israel is rated out. If proliferation to Argentina and Brazil and Japan and Australia is to some extent causally linked by what the publics sense about the prior extent of proliferation, keeping the detonation from occurring in Israel or South Africa will be terribly important.

6. For basic material on Latin America, see John R. Redick, *The Military Potential of Latin American Nuclear Energy Programs* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972).

RESPONDING TO ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

We must now turn to the other of our initial list of kinds of incentives, the economic overlap between peaceful programs and military programs, with the discouraging wave of suspicions and tensions it creates. Will economic considerations in the net spell the undoing of the effort to halt proliferation? Or are there some helpful breaks from nature, and astute policies, that can be harnessed here as well?

One form of economic problem was widely forecast eight years ago, and has not materialized, specifically the simple economic cost of the inspection safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), safeguards which will be required by terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or are required otherwise under the bilateral contracts negotiated between seller and purchaser of nuclear reactors.[7] Significant breakthroughs have been made in introducing techniques of automation and in conceptually redesigning the future reactor complexes, to make possible inspection systems of higher reliability and lower cost. The fears expressed that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have difficulty in finding competent personnel to serve as inspectors has thus far not materialized. While the agency has been behind schedule in developing the inspectorate required, the growth of power reactors has also been continually behind schedule, so that the two are basically in phase. The fears often voiced in the past of incipient commercial espionage have also been substantially quieted.

A related form of economic problem stemmed from the fact that countries already having nuclear weapons would not logically come under inspection under the NPT system, thus perhaps allowing them an unfair advantage in escaping the costs of such inspection. Much of the steam has also now gone out of this issue.

As a public relations gesture of sorts, the United States and Britain in 1968 voluntarily offered to place their civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection, thus to equalize the impression of economic burdens and of risks of commercial espionage. Skeptics here were quick to note that the IAEA was certainly not likely to waste its time and manpower on inspecting the United States as thoroughly as West Germany or Japan or Libya. The United States already had the bomb, why would it want to produce a clandestine bomb in some reactor system as well?

Yet the apparent logic of this difference has also now been muffled by the growing fear of theft of plutonium by criminal or terrorist groups.[8] For reasons having little or nothing to do with Nth-country proliferation, the United States and Britain are now also going to have to subject their peaceful nuclear power industries to the costs and rigors of tighter safeguards against theft and inversion. The periodic visits of IAEA inspectors, originally seen as a publicity stunt, may now even be welcome in functional terms for keeping the local inspectorate

7. See Lawrence Scheinman, "Safeguarding Nuclear Materials," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 30, no. 4 (April 1974), pp. 34–6.

8. See Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974).

on its toes. Some of the risks of commercial espionage will now be run as much by General Electric as by Siemens; the inspector from the International Atomic Energy Agency may be no more prone to secretly conducting such espionage for Westinghouse than would be the inspector for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The major economic problem for the halting of proliferation is thus not one of inequity of burdens, although the anti-NPT propaganda voiced in 1968 at times made it seem that way. The major problem is, instead, as stated above: that innocent pursuit of peaceful economic advantages will still pull countries like West Germany and Australia and Iran and South Korea perilously close to the bomb. What if reactors and uranium enrichment plants and plutonium reprocessing plants all prove to be cost-effective in civilian terms for such countries, now that the price of energy has gone so high? It will be more difficult to question the motives of the countries involved, and more difficult to deny them the equipment they seek.

The margin for safety in such a world will be thin, and one might thus very much wish that the entire dilemma could somehow be headed off. But even here a policy of subtlety will be in order. We will, with good reason, remain uncertain for some time further into the future whether nuclear electric power production will really be as cost-effective as its proponents claim. If it is not, much of the arms control problem would be eased, for there would be no reason for Nth nations to come "innocently" so close to the bomb. The United States, thus, should certainly not be in the position of subsidizing and pushing nuclear power ahead of other less dangerous possibilities, for example, ahead of solar energy. The United States, in supporting nuclear technology, should moreover consider the relative monitorability of alternative reactor designs and uranium enrichment processes, perhaps in the end subsidizing one and trying to stifle another, so that the IAEA's safeguards task will at least be made easier. Active support might be given to multinational facilities ahead of the purely national, and the United States might offer to maintain the most sensitive plutonium reprocessing facilities on its own territory.

Yet again, all this should be offered in a soft-sell manner, lest someone in an Nth country be handed a demagogic argument that U.S. desire for a nuclear weapons oligopoly has vetoed something of great economic benefit to the poorer nations of the world. If nuclear power production is to be rejected for ecological and safety reasons, for example, it would be far better if Sweden and France and Australia were allowed the lead in reaching this conclusion. Most of the worrisome power reactors will not go into operation as early as scheduled, and some may never go into operation at all. The cause of halting proliferation will be made far easier politically if it, however, does not appear that such slowdowns and cancellations were the result of pressure from Washington.

THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS

But what then if technology nonetheless breaks in the wrong way, so that national nuclear programs involving the entire fuel cycle turn out to be economically desirable for a great number of countries?

The remaining options for United States non-proliferation policy sometimes get discussed in terms of sanctions and other times more broadly in terms of disincentives. If there is a difference between the two concepts, it is probably only in that the latter list can be broader, including carrots withheld as well as sticks brought to bear. Sanctions smell of threats, threats which may be difficult to execute. Sanctions may, thus, have to be declared openly to be effective, with all the irritation this produces. What follows is a typology of disincentives which the United States and other anti-proliferation states can apply, including a few deliberate sanctions:

a. simple political condemnation—that is, the minimum implied in statements that the United States or any other state would view a move toward the bomb with the "utmost seriousness"

b. the denial of any additional nuclear equipment in the future

c. the withdrawal of all trained American personnel

d. the denial of all forms of economic assistance—including even the non-nuclear

e. the termination of military alliance support

f. the forcible removal of any nuclear facilities which have been diverted from their promised peaceful purposes to the production of explosives

g. the outright use of military force against the state which is moving to the bomb, or has made the bomb.

We are all tempted to snicker at option (*a*), the simple condemnation of another act of proliferation at the political level. Yet this should not be discounted too totally. For many nations in the world, prestige and outside admiration will be the only reason to reach for the bomb. If attitudes have changed, so that condemnation rather than admiration can be directed at the Nth nuclear power, U.S. policy will have something to work with here.

Leaping ahead to matters of military policy and military action, each of the last three options, (*e*), (*f*), and (*g*), are also plagued with credibility problems. How much can one threaten to terminate alliances because of a move to nuclears? After the debacle of Vietnam, who would propose to send in the marines to try to recover an American reactor or a French plutonium separation plant, simply because the recipient nation had announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or its abrogation of the solemn contracts by which such facilities had been purchased in the first place? More particularly, if the offending state has already got a few rudimentary nuclear weapons into its arsenal, who will be in the mood to begin a war about this?

None of these threats lack all punch, of course. The threat that leaves something to chance can still be very useful in international politics. For example, we do not know exactly what we will do if the USSR invades Western Europe; but because Moscow does not know exactly what we will do, it remains deterred from starting such an invasion in the first place. We do not know exactly what we will do if a state violates its commitments and manufactures a nuclear weapon. But if that state does not know what we will do, it may still be deterred from making the move.

Yet much of the credibility and punch of what the United States can do will stem from the economic portion of the array, just as much of the proliferation problem begins here. Option (*b*), the denial of additional nuclear equipment in the future, might look like "locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen," but this is misleading, for most of the worrisome countries we are considering will feel a continual need for further expansion, further improvement and renovation, and so forth, all of which will depend on new inputs of American technology. Countries like Brazil have a bomb lobby and an industrial-expansion lobby. The essence of U.S. policy here must, thus, be to use the second to defeat the first.

Option (*c*) will have particular impact in countries like Iran, which have economic-expansion programs running far ahead of the supply of trained manpower. American and French and German nuclear engineers will be essential to the Iranian program for decades into the future, and for the programs of many other countries. It should not be impossible for the United States and its fellow nuclear suppliers to pass laws forbidding their nationals to work for nuclear programs which are producing explosives, just as they pass laws forbidding their citizens to fight in foreign armed forces. A nation defying the NPT or its contracts could, of course, try to hold foreign engineers in the country as captive labor, but the entire prospect is cumbersome enough to suggest a disincentive to a bomb decision.

Option (*d*) is a more farfetched and difficult response to apply. Cutting off economic aid in general, not just nuclear assistance, might have been impossible in the Indian case, if only because the newspapers of the world within a week would have shown photographs of starving babies. Where the Nth country is a little less hard-pressed economically, however—for example Brazil or Iran—this may be a much more credible sanction or disincentive. The United States and many other countries may quite naturally want to terminate economic cooperation with anyone who upsets the tranquility of a region by acquiring atomic bombs.

In the application of economic pressures, the recommendation, as before, will again have to be for a policy which does not advertise its logical clarity, which does not try to treat all countries the same way, which is subtle and low-key.

As noted, many of the Nth countries we are so concerned about will have a continuing need for American and other technological imports, as part of a continuing appetite for additional energy and additional technology. Many of such states will, thus, be ready to accommodate to the halting of weapons proliferation in various ways, as long as it seems that this is required to speed or maintain the availability of such American inputs. Perhaps they will be willing to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Japan's ratification of the NPT is an example of this.[9] Other states perhaps will be willing to do more, or to do other things, to reassure the outside world that bombs are not being made, for example by submitting to IAEA safe-

9. For a comprehensive overview of Japanese attitudes on nuclear proliferation, see Daniel I. Okimoto, "Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy: The Problem of the NPT," *Asian Survey*, vol. 15 (April 1975), pp. 313–27.

guards even if the NPT is not signed, or by making unilateral declarations that nuclear technology will not be used for weapons manufacture.

The leverage here will be derived directly from these nations' dependence on the advanced technology of the United States and of five or six supplier states. The linkages should not ever be stated too baldly or explicitly, however, for this would run the risk of enraging the public opinions of the less-developed Nth-countries involved. As an analogous model, one might note the treatment one is subjected to at airline check-in stations, where ticketed-passengers get to move right through while the unticketed may be asked to "please step aside for a moment"—with all the traumas of missed flights this implies. The airlines never threaten, but they make one very cooperative nonetheless.

Economic considerations are powerful. In large part this is why we have a nuclear proliferation problem. In countries like Japan and Brazil and Australia and Iran, such powerful considerations may, however, outweigh the whims of anyone who wanted a bomb option just for "the fun of it," just for the national stature it would produce. If the United States can win the cooperation of the ministries of economics and commerce and industry in each of such nations, some powerful leverage indeed will be at hand.

The organization of the Nuclear Supplier's Conference in 1975 and 1976 fits this model of policy very well. The periodic bursts of outrage about the threat of proliferation in the U.S. Congress, on the other hand, may be far too unsubtle.

SOME OPTIMISM ABOUT AN APPROACH

The overall drift of the argument here has been that the halting of nuclear proliferation will require a low-key and subtle approach, masking what some would see as internal inconsistencies but perhaps nonetheless succeeding in containing the spread of nuclear weapons. The desirable political message for Germany may, thus, differ from the optimal one for Brazil. The correct economic approach for Iran may differ from that for Japan. How can the United States and other states opposed to proliferation expect to get away with this?

The approach is made possible by the lowered visibility of nuclear matters around the world. As the world pays less attention to nuclear matters, its inherent desire for weapons is decreased, and its irritation with alleged great-power inconsistencies is decreased. A subtle approach can maintain this kind of low visibility. Excessive abstraction and clarity can lose it.

Excessive abstraction also sometimes produces needless pessimism about whether anything can be done about nuclear proliferation, making the halting of the spread of such weapons seem a once-and-for-all question. Nothing in this paper should be taken to read that proliferation is overstated as a problem; but it can easily be misstated as a problem.

Nuclear proliferation is somewhat comparable to population growth, in that only half of the rate projected by the alarmist commentators still may produce an unacceptable crowding, even if this crowding comes a little later. Populations, moreover, can go down if the birth rate simply falls below the replace-

ment rate, as indeed may happen in some industrialized countries. On the nuclear side, however, no real tendency toward deproliferation seems in evidence. British fervor for opting out of the nuclear club seems to have cooled, and the merger of British and French nuclear forces into a single nuclear-weapons entity (defined, that is, as an entity whereby a single veto on all nuclear firings from the unit was established in either Paris or London) also seems unlikely.

Yet the analogy between population bomb and nuclear proliferation also suggests some reassurance. No one can claim to be content with endless growth in either category, and thus some action has to be taken. Yet panic on either front can be outflanked by saying that a freeze as of 1985 is just as acceptable as a freeze as of 1965. If India and Israel and one other country make it into the nuclear club by then, this is not yet a world in which everyone has the bomb.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 430, March 1977

Part II Introduction: . . . and Where We May Go

By JOSEPH I. COFFEY

It is, of course, possible that the reluctance of many states to "go nuclear" may mean that another decade will elapse before a seventh country does so. The likelihood of this outcome may be increased if the nuclear powers combine stronger controls over the transfer of technology with measures to improve security guarantees and to reduce their own armaments. It might be further increased if they and the other industrially-advanced states accelerate the flow of capital to the underdeveloped countries, improve their terms of trade, and otherwise give indications that these countries need neither fear continuing exploitation nor rely on their own resources to achieve their social and economic objectives. Thus, it is conceivable that this dangerous world may be only a little more dangerous 10 years hence—at least so far as nuclear proliferation contributes to danger.

However, we can count neither upon the wisdom of statesmen nor upon the effectiveness of the policies they adopt and must recognize that, under certain circumstances, the world may become a more dangerous place. If India goes beyond the detonation of a single nuclear device to the creation of a nuclear force, Pakistan may be even more inclined to develop a countervailing capability then she now is. If Israel, facing defeat or dismemberment, actually uses the atomic bombs she allegedly possesses, then potential proliferators among the Arab states may push ahead with nuclear weapons of their own. Or if other states, though not directly threatened, continue to believe that prestige, influence, and even power, can be enhanced through the acquisition of nuclear weapons, they, too, may produce them, with consequent impact on nations still hesitant to go nuclear. Hence, it is by no means unlikely that we may have, by the middle of the next decade, 10 or 12 nuclear powers rather than six and a half, as is now the case.

In the longer run, the prospect is even gloomier, in that many more nuclear reactors will be in operation, and much more fissionable material available for weapons; innovations in nuclear technology will make it easier to produce that material and fabricate those weapons; and the "multiplier effect" already noted may intensify other pressures to go nuclear. In fact, barring a radical transformation in the international system which will reduce threats to security and minimize the importance of power as a means of attaining national objectives, it is conceivable that we may, in the words of the late President Kennedy, see a world "in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons . . . [a situation of] the greatest possible danger and hazard."[1]

1. *The New York Times*, 23 May 1963.

Even if a world of 10 nuclear powers, or 20, were unlikely, it might be worth examining its implications—if only to persuade ourselves of the desirability of taking steps to prevent its emergence. As it is, we cannot say with assurance that such a world *is* unlikely: the incentives to proliferation outlined above are very strong and the disincentives both difficult to apply and far-reaching in their consequences. Accordingly, we will, in the second part of this volume, look first of all at "The Nth Powers of the Future" and at the structure of the international system and the characteristics of the actors in a world of (many more) nuclear powers. Next, we will consider a number of issues which might arise in such a world, as with respect to arms control policy, to the role of international organizations, and to the process and nature of decision making.

Finally, since this journal is addressed primarily to an American audience, we will sketch some policies which might commend themselves to an administration taking office, say, on January 20, 1989. To this, let us proceed.

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Nth Powers of the Future

By ASHOK KAPUR

ABSTRACT: Acceptance of the NPT by a majority of states after 1968 created an impression that the danger of further proliferation beyond the five nuclear weapon states (US, USSR, China, UK, and France) had been put to rest. India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" shattered this impression and pointed up the danger of proliferating nuclear options, if not nuclear weapons. The list of potential proliferators has changed from the 1950s to the 1970s and may continue to change in the 1980s. Israel and, by some views, India are on the list, but others like Japan, Australia, South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and Argentina are being added. This paper asserts that proliferation, while unstoppable, is slow, not because the NPT is necessarily working, but because the military and economic security perceptions of potential proliferators do not dictate a faster rate of proliferation. Yet the possible deterioration of the strategic environment in the 1980s may induce faster proliferation. The new stress may not be on the acquisition of nuclear arms but, because nuclear arms are becoming militarily less useful, it may be on development of nuclear options coupled with a strategy of their non-use or nonconversion into weapons.

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PREDICTING proliferation trends is a hazardous activity because national intelligence estimates of capabilities and particularly of intentions are imprecise, our conceptions and images[1] are culture-bound, and ambiguities not only characterize the world order but, furthermore, are deliberately fostered in the negotiating behavior of the major military powers. Still the exercise must be undertaken if the margin of uncertainty is to be reduced and if realistic solutions are to be found which appeal both to the major military powers and to potential Nth powers.

Incentives and disincentives to "go nuclear" vary from one state to another. For our purpose, incentives to explode a device or to possess one in an untested form could be any of the following: to achieve a deterrent against a potential nuclear enemy; to neutralize the conventional military superiority of an enemy; to gain international, regional, or domestic prestige; to participate in international or regional security policy making; to reduce dependence on a great power; to stay abreast of modern technology so that scientific-technological dependence on great powers is avoided or minimized; to create ambiguity in an enemy's calculations; to induce the enemy of a potential proliferator not to force the latter to decide in favor of making nuclear weapons; to experiment with the potential economic prospects of peaceful nuclear explosions; and so on.[2]

1. Images are loosely defined to mean one's view of the other side's expected behavior and its expected consequences. Included also in the definition is one's self-image: what we are, what we want, what we can do, and what the likely effects of our actions are.

2. For a further discussion of incentives and disincentives, see William Epstein, "Why States Go—And Don't Go—Nuclear."

Disincentives against going nuclear (defined as developing and deploying nuclear weapons systems) could be any of the following: premature decisions to produce and deploy nuclear weapons could increase regional and international tension and could interfere with normalization of relations; there are budgetary and political advantages in the noncommitment implied in continuing nuclear research and development without moving toward weapons production; if nuclear weapons are becoming less useful militarily, weapons with long lead-times may be obsolescence-prone and costly for national development and yet may not add to national security; threats to proliferate can aid negotiations of conventional arms transfers; and so on. This paper assumes that security assurances by great powers are worthless in the perceptions of Nth powers. The prospects of nuclear disarmament (defined as zero level of arms) are nonexistent at present and perhaps even undesirable in contemporary international relations. Finally, morality has practically no role in a highly nuclearized, militarized, and commercialized world.

Overall, at present the incentives to go nuclear exceed the disincentives. The message of the paper is that no one is really interested in negotiating disarmament because states, even the developed ones, continue to be dissatisfied, politically, militarily, and economically. While militarily powerful states want to negotiate arms control (meaning stable military relations with no necessary reduction of arms), to regulate the dangers of unlimited competition rather than to reduce their arsenals, many of the Nth powers want to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis their

competitors by altering the structure of contemporary international society. This means a desire to diffuse further the distribution of power and influence in the world today. So long as nuclear power is an element of power and influence, its growth will continue to be motivated by political and security considerations, irrespective of how the growth is rationalized. It may or may not be important for the evolution of world order that many of the Nth powers are located, or are likely to be located, in the southern half of the globe.

In a sense then, the problem of slowing proliferation in the less satisfied states in the Third World requires a prior understanding of the policy perceptions in these societies and the effects of the behavior of the industrialized and westernized societies in the Third World. The problem is not merely one of educating or reeducating Third World elites. It is also one of expanding the range of public education and reeducating the elites in the developed societies. Conceptualizing the relationship between horizontal and vertical proliferation using detailed case studies is, therefore, a desired underpinning of scholarly and policy activities. It is not our point that Nth powers will seek nuclear explosives capacity just because five states have nuclear weapons. It is our point that, if nuclear weapons remain useful as military and diplomatic instruments for five nuclear weapon states, the nuclear factor may enter the in-house bureaucratic debates of Nth powers in a big way in the 1980s. Many societies share the goal of slowing vertical and horizontal proliferation, but how one negotiates desired outcomes depends in part on how one perceives the issues.

SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURE

As indicated previously, the future will be shaped by a number of factors, many of which are unrelated to nuclear proliferation. Even in that context, not all relevant factors may be desirable, and those that are may have diverse and sometimes contradictory impacts; for example, a normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC may make strategic arms limitations (and hence acceptance of curbs on proliferation) more likely, but it may also arouse fears among the Japanese which could induce them to seek nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is possible both to define active trends which could slow proliferation and, in the light of these, to assess the likelihood of proliferation, just as it is possible to assess that likelihood under other and less favorable circumstances. To this task, then, we will proceed.

AN OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

The central lesson about proliferation to be learnt from a study of French, Chinese, and Indian behavior is that proud and powerful societies are unwilling to exempt themselves from the opportunities and obligations of power politics. This motive has the potentiality of creating stability or instability, depending on whether the superpowers are willing to share their prerogatives or whether their policy is to exclude other major military powers from the decision-making process in strategic affairs, for example, in SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and the CCD (Conference of the Committee on Disarmament). A primary assumption underlying this optimistic scenario is, therefore, that the global powers

begin to recognize the implications for proliferation of their efforts to duopolize power and to determine outcomes by virtue of that power. If so, it may be that potential Nth powers will decide to slow or to abandon attempts to acquire a nuclear option, on the grounds that they can obtain the political benefits of proliferation without incurring the political (and other) costs.

Another (and equally debatable) assumption underlying the optimistic scenario is that China is brought into closer and more beneficial contact with the rest of the world. At least one superpower now recognizes the importance of bringing China into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Thus, L. I. Brezhnev states the following:

> Certainly the time will inevitably come when the question of associating other nuclear powers with the process of strategic arms limitation will come up on the agenda. Any powers that refuse to join would be assuming a grave responsibility before the peoples.[3]

If this statement is seriously intended, one implication is that the future of SALT depends on Chinese participation. Another implication is that eventually both superpowers may desire Chinese participation in the SALT dialogue and thereby pave the way toward involvement of the major military powers. This may even lead to a merger of the SALT dialogue and the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva in the 1980s. This scenario assumes that some sort of normalization between Moscow and Peking may occur, and if the frontier dispute is bypassed, if Sino-Soviet trade and military ties are restored to an extent, China may become willing and able to participate constructively first in the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 and then in the SALT dialogue in the 1980s.

If Moscow and Peking can mediate their rivalry through bilateral means, the normalization process (according to this optimistic view) is likely to aid normalization in regions neighboring the USSR and China, particularly in South Asia. Thus, if Sino-Soviet normalization occurs, if it leads to (or is preceded by) Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani normalization, some of the incentives to go nuclear (beyond exploding a nuclear device) are reduced. Here, the nexus of China-India-Pakistan normalization is held to account for slow and controlled proliferation of nuclear options in South Asia, with the implication that complete normalization (an ideal state) could conceivably lead to no proliferation. Likewise, the prospect of China's active participation in the disarmament dialogue at the UN Special Session in 1978 could result in arms reductions by the great powers, and thereby improve the climate for further slowing of proliferation among at least some of the Nth powers. Overall, in this scenario, once China's entry into the superpowers' nuclear dialogue has been arranged, a momentum toward arms reduction may grow because the underlying security issues, or at least some of these, will have been resolved. A spillover effect of this dramatic change will be to induce other major military powers to avoid complicating the international security agenda by continuing pro-

3. Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Domestic and Foreign Policy* (25th Congress of the CPSU, 24 February 1976).

grams for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Another factor in the optimistic scenario is the expectation that France can be induced to alter its present position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its present policy of promoting nuclear sales of reprocessing plants and other sensitive technology to potential proliferators in the Third World. Because of the French position in the London Agreement (1976), three issues are at stake: first, to explore the prospects of upgrading the safeguards requirements with a view to moving toward full scope safeguards which apply to the entire peaceful nuclear industry of states which are not presently nuclear weapon powers; second, to question the political wisdom of sales of sensitive items like reprocessing plants; third, inasmuch as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is held to be hiding behind the French position, a shift in the latter could conceivably induce a shift in the former as well, so that there is no repeat of the FRG-Brazil nuclear deal. This scenario is optimistic inasmuch as there is a hope, if not an expectation, that the French position has evolved and may continue to evolve to an extent that it coincides with policies of the United States and Canada. Optimism is warranted inasmuch as further technological barriers can be realistically created against the Nth powers in current and future nuclear sales.

A fourth factor is rooted in the view that select Third World societies may be credited with innovative strategic thought and behavior. This scenario suggests that analytically it is possible to differentiate among three types of nuclear strategies for states to follow. The first type, as practiced by the superpowers, is to engage in constant arms racing on the assumption that incremental change in the adversaries' capacities has the potential of shifting the balance or of increasing the uncertainties. The second type may be the one China appears to follow: namely, to avoid arms racing, to seek a minimum deterrent but not to endeavor (deliberately or inadvertently) to bridge the gap in capabilities because bridging is difficult and/or unnecessary. The third type, which India is probably practicing, is to engage in nonconversion of its nuclear option into a weapons system. If the first type expresses a preference for non-use of nuclear weapons, the third type expresses a preference for nonconversion of an option into deployable weapons.

A fifth factor is the perception that select Nth powers are beginning to tone down their enthusiasm for nuclear proliferation and have become receptive to some extent to Western discussions about the dangers of proliferation. Whether this shift in attitudes will continue depends in part on these countries' continuing efforts to educate, coupled with efforts to create more technological and political barriers against sensitive nuclear exports. Thus, the impact of this factor on proliferation, like that of others, is dependent on deliberate policy choices by both existing and potential nuclear powers.

REGIONAL OUTCOMES UNDER AN OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

If proliferation is seen as a process rather than a terminal condition, five regions bear scrutiny: South and Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Latin America. Because

the range of inquiry is vast and each society has its own set of perceptions and circumstances, what follows is a rash attempt to paint a picture in bold brushes. Our task is to provide a sense of the future and to leave detailed case studies for future research.

South and Southwest Asia

India is a useful starting point, not because it is actually the sixth proliferator in the world, but because it appears so to many observers. Proliferation in Pakistan will validate the theory of nuclear chains. Western thinking is somewhat as follows: Just because India tested one peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), this will induce Pakistan to copy India. It is noted that Pakistan reacted in many ways to India's test: (*a*) by developing its indigenous nuclear option; (*b*) by seeking external guarantees against nuclear threat or aggression; (*c*) by seeking conventional arms as a trade-off to a threat to go nuclear, and so on. But the implications of alternative strategies are not spelled out in these analyses. Secondly, India tested a nuclear device to demonstrate its political will. Its purpose was not achieved and hence India will need more nuclear tests. Hence Pakistan will need to continue to copy India until Pakistan and India have a mutual deterrent. It is assumed that, given technological momentum, Indian PNEs will gradually and eventually become nuclear weapons, if they already are not so at present.

There are problems with the foregoing. If "action-reaction" is central to explaining Indo-Pakistan nuclear relations, why was Pakistan's nuclear development stifled or slowed during 1958–72 when Pakistan's diplomats actively argued about the dangers of Indian proliferation? Plainly, President Ayub Khan was more interested in Pakistan's economic and military development. Thus, the domestic-political barriers to proliferation must be noted in the case of Pakistan up to 1972, if not later. True, Mr. Bhutto may want to be innovative by renouncing Ayub Khan's policies, and thereby to impress public opinion. But surely today someone in Pakistan is arguing about the utility of having more rigs to tap oil versus having more nuclear reactors.

Admittedly, Pakistan's atomic energy talent is now first rate. With the French sale of a nuclear reprocessing plant, and/or if Pakistan is able to secure a reprocessing laboratory from a West European source, or if Pakistan gains through clandestine contacts with South Africa (which South Africans deny), Pakistan can be assumed to have by 1980–81 a capacity to explode a device. Yet someone in Islamabad may be arguing today that it is sufficient to have a capacity to explode a device but not to use it, since Pakistan, unlike India, does not distinguish between peaceful and military explosions; that leaking information about that capacity through the pages of *Pakistan Times* will be sufficient to induce Indian restraint; since the reprocessing capability will be heavily safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the burden and the opportunity for violating the safeguards should rest on Indian action which threatens Pakistan's national security, for instance, an Indian invasion of Pakistan. In other words, it may make sense for Pakistan to follow Israel's example rather than India's.

There is also a problem with

those who argue that Pakistan will need to go nuclear because India will continue to test, because India's first test failed in its primary goal—to impress the major powers who needed impressing. But who is to say that the test was not an exercise in political signaling? Instead of arguing that a nuclear test by a poor country devalues the impact of a test, perhaps the reasoning should be as follows: India's test proves that an unevenly developed society, with food-population problems but with a first-rate scientific establishment and a fine diplomatic machinery, can explode a device. Testing a device still requires much political commitment and scientific/technological prowess. India's test proves that the major powers were impressed with the fact that India would dare to flout their prescriptions in such a subtle and yet explicit fashion, and damage the NPT.

In other words, if the message was sent and received, the acknowledgment implies two things. First, India is not going to be in a hurry to keep exploding nuclear devices unnecessarily. Secondly, if the message is converted into action by the receiver, the result is a search for normalizing subcontinental relations. The question at present is not if there will be normalization, or if there is normalization. Rather it is about its speed, scope, and permanence. In Indian thinking, the sense is strong that protecting Pakistan as a strategic buffer is in India's self-interest and India has no wish to seek common borders with the Soviet Union and Iran, a sentiment which Iranians probably share. As such, advocates of nuclear explosions in Islamabad will need to carefully assess the foreign policy implications. This does not mean that India is against Pakistani proliferation. It means that India prefers a pace of proliferation in Pakistan which is slow, as is India's, and predictable, as it should be, so that South Asia's constituents abroad have a chance to fully comprehend the geo-strategic realities and to adjust their sanctimonious perceptions to realities.

If the Indo-Pakistan nuclear chain is at best a slow process, the addition of Iran to this chain is even more difficult to assess. Iran has adhered to the NPT. This means little, since the Shah of Iran has already declared the possibility of changing the policy should circumstances change. Iran has a modest atomic energy program, and it imports nuclear items from the United States, France, and West Germany, among others. Neither India nor Iran can benefit from the disintegration of Pakistan, but Iranian nuclear arms (or an option) could relate to two contingencies: to deter a troublesome Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, and/or to catch up with India and Pakistan if these countries acquire a nuclear weapons status. The Shah's plan to make Iran the world's fifth great power could be a motive.

However, both motives are not real at present. Given anti-Soviet fears in Iran, its conventional capacities are better means to police the Persian Gulf. The role of status is important if the Shah perceives India as the emerging dominant power in the region. Yet, this is not an issue now. The Shah's concern with India's nuclear status, however, may become meaningful if the Indo-Iranian détente fails and if the two regional powers come to disagree about the future of the Indian Ocean.

But if Iran, unlike India and Pakistan, is still at the prenuclear option stage, it nevertheless has strong nuclear concerns. At present,

these are expressed in its disarmament diplomacy. If they are not clarified, they could conceivably enter the Iranian bureaucratic debate in a big way, as they could in debates in select Arab societies during the 1980s. At present, Iran does not need PNEs. But at the same time, it does not want its hands to be tied with extensive rules. Israel's nuclear bombs do not bother Iran. Still it prefers a Middle Eastern nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) to become a steppingstone toward the NPT, with a view to induce Israel to join the NWFZ.

Talk about an Indian-Pakistani-Iranian nuclear chain is considered highly speculative at this stage. Instead, the Iranian stress is to get the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to accept in principle a willingness to discuss security guarantees. The exact details, or sequence of moves, or the eventual outcome of moves is imprecise. For instance, what are the geographical limits of a Middle East NWFZ? Does it include North Africa and South Asia? Conceivably, Iran's NWFZ diplomacy implies probing on Pakistan's behalf also, and a linkage is implied between a quest for NWS's security guarantees and the definitions in an NWFZ. The arguments about NWFZ are directed to the nuclear superpowers but also to bureaucratic debates in Middle Eastern societies. If the United States could come out with a stand that it will provide a strategic umbrella, this would neutralize the advocates of nuclear weapons.

Instead, the superpowers' attitude is to stonewall. While the United States appears to be more forthcoming than the USSR, neither is prepared to play the game on any other terms than its own. While paying lip service to the idea of an NWFZ, neither superpower is really willing to let an NWFZ hinder freedom of action. At least the sup powers are not sure that an NWI will not hinder that freedom. I instance, until Sino-Soviet relatic improve, the USSR is not even w ing to consider a no-threat pledg

Given such tendencies, Irania conclude as follows: The wh exercise of finding NWFZs in t Middle East and South Asia may too late and India, Israel, and Eg remain suspicious. Still, the d armament process is a long one, a quick progress should not be pected, even if some progress made that may be worthwhile. Mo over, at present for Iran there is real alternative except to talk ab disarmament. The superpowers m come to a point that having NWFZ could serve their strate purpose. But until that happe Iran needs to resist U.S. pressure seek more control through propos such as regional reprocessing plan

The Pacific region

The foregoing scenario sugge that slow proliferation is tied to expectation of a slow normalizati in Sino-Soviet affairs, accompani by Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakist Iran normalization. This process buy time, just as the implemen tion of safeguards under the Lond Agreement can buy time. Buyi time is useful if the time is to be to constructive use to educate eli in developed and developing soc ties. The strategy of talking ab non-proliferation should be c carded because posturing produ counterposturing. A more constr tive strategy might be to stop talk about non-proliferation publicly quietly stressing, for instance, economic and technical proble of buying and selling reprocess

plants. Or better still, the odium of discrimination can be removed if all nuclear exports are similarly safeguarded, irrespective of the status of the buyer in terms of the NPT.

If a strategy of buying time makes sense for South Asia, normalization in Central Asian relations may have adverse implications for Japan in the 1980s. At present, Japanese views stress the following: Seoul does not face a nuclear threat from North Korea. If Seoul acquires nuclear weapons, they would look provocative to North Korea and Japan. Seoul is not likely to acquire nuclear weapons and, if it has nuclear ambitions, Washington is likely to check these. Nuclear weapons for Taiwan is not a probability even though Taiwan, more than Seoul, can develop these. According to Japan, there is no speedy solution for disarmament; it is still trying to create an atmosphere for disarmament.

Japan is clearly the key to proliferation in the Pacific area, not because it is more influential than China but because it is more unpredictable. True, Japan participates in the London Agreement. Still, its position should be noted. The positions of Canada, the USSR, the UK, and the US are similar (though the United States has a greater recognition of obstacles). They seek safeguards on the entire fuel cycle, and if possible, on all peaceful nuclear industry of a recipient state. France and West Germany seek only safeguards on their supplies, and this represents the supplier's consensus. Japan is somewhere in between these positions. It has traditionally mistrusted standards unless these apply to all their competitors. This may change after Japan's ratification of the NPT.

Several circumstances make Japan's nuclear abstention chancy in the 1980s. The logic and argument against nuclear proliferation are not really clearcut. As NPT safeguards requirements are constantly upgraded, the NPT safeguards will be used increasingly to interpret the work of the IAEA. This may increase resentment among IAEA members who resent IAEA/NPT safeguards. So far, the NPT regime has barely survived despite the superpowers' effort to insulate the IAEA and the NPT from criticism in the NPT Review Conference. If nothing tangible happens in the field of disarmament by the early 1980s, the NPT regime could collapse. Some states have already threatened withdrawal. In such a tenuous setting, a trend toward Sino-Soviet normalization could create doubts about Japan's future, about the credibility of the U.S commitments in the Pacific region, and about the effect of a shift of the Asian balance in favor of the Communist states. Furthermore, the prospect of Sino-Soviet normalization could conceivably induce the USSR to take a harder line against the United States. In such circumstances, it may make sense for the Japanese to make their nuclear option visible, with or without tacit U.S. concurrence. And if Japan defects from the U.S. alliance, Australia may find itself preparing its nuclear option, if it already does not have one at present.

Latin America and South Africa

The national circumstances of Brazil/Argentina and South Africa vary with regard to proliferation. South Africa's future in Africa is bedeviled by the pressure of black Africa. Argentina and Brazil carry no such burden of racism. Still, there is merit in examining these societies

collectively. South Africa and Brazil are economic giants among pygmies. Brazil and Argentina are most active in disarmament diplomacy. Brazil and Argentina adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (with reservations) but not to the NPT; South Africa rejects the NPT at present but officially is keeping the matter of adherence under review. All three have positions on the NPT similar to India's, and Brazil and Argentina have expressed themselves in favor of the PNEs. South Africa has first-rate enriched uranium technology but not reprocessing technology, whereas Brazil has gained access to German jet nozzle technology. South Africa participated in the Zangger Committee discussions but is not a party to the London Agreement.

The real impact of these societies lies not in the probability that they will develop nuclear weapons, but rather in their revisionist views about nuclear safeguards and their impact on the disarmament debate. The FRG-Brazil nuclear deal is not viewed in Argentina as the first step toward a Brazilian bomb. Neither are South African nuclear bombs of much use against fanatical black guerrillas. The real point about Brazil and Argentina (and Mexico) is that they think the superpowers are playing a double game: to consolidate their hold on the structure of power in the world and to express phony concerns about horizontal proliferation. That is, the great powers agree on marginal disarmament issues or issues which can be safely ignored but not on issues which threaten the present structure of power. It is argued by Latin Americans that if NWFZs are to be promoted, there should be common treatment for all such zones; the rights and obligations should be identical or equivalent. The Tlatelolco Treaty is a useful model, but it is not *the* model. Even this treaty shows how the NWFZ concept cannot really be implemented until the views and interests of all involved parties are taken into account.[4]

A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO

Even under the optimistic scenario, we might see eight or ten nuclear powers a decade hence rather than the five (or six) now extant. The pessimistic scenario does not envision a rapid and uncontrollable increase in the number of proliferators, partly because the Third World societies most likely to proliferate have paid constant and careful attention to the external environment. It does, however, recognize that because these countries are relatively immune to Western pleading about the dangers or proliferation, there are likely to be considerable difficulties in negotiating non-proliferation in a complex international environment.

If, therefore, Sino-Soviet-Indo-Pakistani normalization fails to establish interdependencies in the political, security, trade, commercial, and cultural areas, if intergovernmental and intersocial habits of cooperation and interdependency fail to emerge within 5 to 10 years, the weaker parties are likely to make visible their need to seek security through conventional and nuclear means, that is, to practice self-reliance and to seek minimal dependency on external partners. In this case, there may be controlled proliferation among continental (or sub-

4. John R. Redick, "Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin America," *International Organisation*, vol. 29, no. 2 (Spring 1975), p. 438.

continental) Asian societies while the process is less pronounced or marginal in insular Asian countries, including Australia.

Even if normalization succeeds in Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian, and Indo-Pakistani relations (that is, among continental Asian states) this does not mean an end to proliferation. If these countries are able to negotiate and moderate their rivalries in a decade or so, given the long lead-time for nuclear weapons development, will U.S. allies (namely, Japan, Australia, Iran, and perhaps even the Federal Republic of Germany) find themselves constrained to rethink their nuclear options? As a corollary, will Taiwan and South Korea be tempted to make their nuclear options visible, either to follow the lead of the other U.S. allies or to strengthen their negotiating stance vis-à-vis the United States? In short, will proliferation among the U.S. allies be a function of normalization between two Communist states and India?

Even if it is not, one may see a trend toward a multi-polar world, because the danger of superpower nuclear conflict has lessened and because new centers of regional and international power and influence have emerged. From a Third World and a third party perspective, this is a desirable and an inevitable trend. However, the superpowers' loss of political and economic control over third parties means also a loss of control over their decisions to create nuclear options or to build nuclear weapons. Hence, while some incentives to proliferation may diminish, so will some disincentives, and one may, for a variety of reasons, see the emergence of 10 or 20 new nuclear powers, if not during the eighties, at least in the nineties.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUPERPOWERS

A firm conclusion about the outcome of the relationship between slow, controlled proliferation and non-proliferation processes cannot be offered because future foreign policy alignments are unpredictable. Still, superpowers' reactions to the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios may be briefly noted as well as policies which they might follow to bring about what each power may regard as an optimistic future for itself.

To date, non-proliferation has been regarded as a goal shared by the superpowers since at least the mid-1960s. There are doubts over whether the superpowers' commitment is real or bilateral and regional priorities signal a limited defection from non-proliferation and arms control. Thus, the USSR could not, and did not, complain too much about India's test because the USSR still needs India against China. Likewise, the United States, unlike Canada, chose not to terminate its nuclear supply relationship with India because that would mean a loss of leverage and of political and technological intelligence. It is debatable whether unwillingness to punish India reflects a superpower preference to tacitly support India or a recognition that punishment would serve no use. Overall, superpowers' reactions are seemingly guided by a joint concern to slow proliferation. This identity of views exists at the level of rhetoric and, to an extent, in the Nuclear Suppliers' Club meetings. But the identity is not total. The USSR believes in, and adheres to, a policy of "full scope" safeguards in its supply policy. The United States believes in safeguards for items

supplied, that is, the end use of those items must be according to the supply contract but the entire nuclear industry of the recipient is not safeguarded. Therefore, Soviet safeguards are more demanding than U.S. ones. Aside from this, if Sino-Soviet relations do not improve, the superpowers are likely to continue to defend the NPT, to seek improvements in the IAEA, to stress the need to safeguard or prevent the export of sensitive technology, and so on.

However, a real question exists of whether or not the USSR would abandon its commitment to nonproliferation and arms control if the bait was the prospect of Sino-Soviet normalization in the 1980s, where both the USSR and China adopted a give-and-take policy. In such a hypothetical situation, the joint anti-proliferation strategy of the superpowers could change. The USSR, China, and France could begin to pave the way for a merger of the SALT and the CCD dialogues. And such an optimistic situation for the USSR and its partners can only be pessimistic for the United States and its allies, if this meant a reduced emphasis on superpower détente, that is, keeping China out of SALT.

The policy implications for the United States are troublesome for the 1980s. To encourage a slowdown of proliferation, for example in South and Southwest Asia, the United States ought to encourage the Sino-Soviet-India-Pakistan normalization process. But normalization and nonproliferation in South Asia are marginal to U.S. security, whereas Sino-Soviet normalization is central to U.S. security. Consequently, it makes sense for the United States to tolerate South and Southwest Asian nuclear proliferation as well as proliferation elsewhere, except perhaps among allies whose assistance and dependence is needed to promote U.S. interests. It may make sense for the United States to debate publicly the underlying interests rather than to harp endlessly on a goal which may, in select circumstances, be counter to U.S. interests.

Finally, it should be recognized that issues deemed to have been solved or shelved could appear actively on the agenda again in the 1980s. It must never be forgotten that détente is a highly tenuous activity in terms of what is sought and what is achieved. Neither must it be forgotten that there is a constant interaction between Europe and Central and East Asia in the foreign strategies of the major powers.[5] The NPT emerged in the context of a superpower concern to keep the lid on Bonn's nuclear aspirations and to keep Germany divided. Whether or not the concerns are justified is beside the point. If Sino-Soviet normalization takes root, the German-Soviet Ostpolitik may become unhinged, with or without the tacit approval of the United States. In such circumstances in Europe and in Asia, global and continental relations rather than regional or local ones will have radicalized the shifts toward proliferation on a scale much larger, and with many ominous implications, compared to the effects of a controlled Indian test.

5. Lionel Gelber, *Crisis in the West: American Leadership and the Global Balance* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1975), p. 118.

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Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics

By LEWIS A. DUNN

ABSTRACT: Varying technical deficiencies are likely to characterize the nuclear forces of many new proliferators. Regional interactions within a proliferated world probably would include increased nuclear arms racing, inadvertant or calculated nuclear-weapon use, and outside involvement in domestic nuclear coups d'état. In turn, the possible global repercussions of local proliferation are likely to include: a partial erosion of existing alliances, or, to the degree that present superpower ties remain unchanged, the risk of escalating conflict; growing nuclear "black and gray marketeering"; the spread of nuclear terrorism; a corrosion of political authority and legitimacy; and, ultimately, even growing global anarchy. Whether or not this initial assessment proves accurate will depend upon the difficulties of designing and implementing a proliferation-management strategy. Such a strategy might attempt, on the one hand, to affect which proliferated world emerged and, on the other, to influence Nth countries' nuclear postures, contribute to regional stability, and circumscribe the global repercussions of local proliferation. The gap between the gravity of a proliferated world's varied threats and the probable effectiveness of politically acceptable policy responses supports the fear that the initial depiction may be more than a nightmare scenario.

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WITHIN the coming decades, a growing number of countries could decide to acquire nuclear weapons.[1] Should such a second wave of proliferation occur, among its distinguishing features would be the spread of nuclear weapons to less developed, politically unstable Third World countries, the nuclearization of existing regional confrontations, and eventual access to nuclear weapons by subnational groups. Some observers regard the possibility of more widespread nuclear proliferation with relative equanimity. They argue either that present Western fears of proliferation are based upon an erroneous, if not racist, charge of Third World irresponsibility[2] or that the diffusion of nuclear weapons would contribute in some cases to increased regional stability.[3] Several of these persons go so far as to contend that widespread proliferation could result in the outlawing of large-scale violence.[4] On the contrary, a proliferated world is likely to be a nasty and dangerous place, entailing threats to the security and domestic well-being of virtually all nations and posing a serious possibility of a longer-term decay of global political order. To see why this may be so, it is necessary first to consider briefly the varied meanings of "going nuclear."

1. See Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, *Trends in Nuclear Proliferation*, Report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, HI-2336/3-RR, 15 May 1976), pts. I and II.

2. See K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Nuclear Policy," in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975), p. 131.

3. In addition to the chapter by Fred Thayer in this volume, see, for example, Steven Rosen, "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East," in Marwah and Schulz, *Nuclear Proliferation*, p. 157.

4. See Pierre M. Gallois, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 113. For a more recent version, emphasizing proliferation of low-yield battlefield nuclear capabilities, see R. Robert Sandoval, "Consider the Porcupine: Another View of Nuclear Proliferation," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1976, p. 19.

GOING NUCLEAR

The often-used characterization "going nuclear" telescopes a range of important proliferation choices and outcomes. But depending upon the specific characteristics of possible future Nth country nuclear weapon programs and postures, the distinguishing features and risks of a proliferated world would vary. For our present purposes, it suffices to note the following probable critical characteristics.[5]

"In the business" v. "serious but technically deficient" programs

At least initially, some future proliferators are likely to seek only "in the business" nuclear-weapon capabilities, that is, their purpose would be to demonstrate that they, too, could detonate a nuclear explosive device. Perhaps motivated by prestige considerations, or at a latter stage of proliferation by fashion, these countries would not seek a militarily operational nuclear force.

A greater number of prospective proliferators, however, could be expected to do otherwise. They are likely instead to attempt to develop serious nuclear forces, combining a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons; delivery systems; command, control, and communica-

5. For elaboration, see Dunn and Kahn, *Trends in Nuclear Proliferation*, pt. III.

tion procedures; protection against surprise attack; and strategic doctrine. In many of these cases, the resultant nuclear force may be characterized by significant technical deficiencies.

Although development of relatively well-packaged fission weapons, deliverable by a range of readily accessible weapon systems, should not pose a major problem for nearly all potential proliferators, their early-generation nuclear warheads might lack adequate safety design mechanisms. Moreover, if insufficient attention is paid to the risk of a nuclear-weapon accident, even later-generation weapons could be accident prone.[6]

Comparable concern about possibly inadequate provisions for control against unauthorized seizure and use of nuclear weapons by a dissident domestic group, a cabal of officers, or even an isolated military man also is warranted. Within existing nuclear-weapon states, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, development of sophisticated electronic permissive action link (PAL) systems has permitted them to purchase tight control without sacrificing operational readiness or accepting an increased vulnerability to surprise attack. Conversely, taken together, fear of surprise attack by a local nuclear rival and limited technological sophistication could force even such coup-vulnerable prospective proliferators as, for example, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, South Korea, Pakistan, Argentina, and Brazil *not* to follow their likely initial preference for tight control of their nuclear arsenal. More generally, development of a reliable and survivable command, control, and communication network may exceed the capabilities of the many low-to-medium technology prospective proliferators.

As for protection against an opponent's surprise disarming attack, crude mutual survivability should not be presumed to be the expected outcome of nuclearizing regional confrontations. Depending upon the specific opponents, the stage of proliferation, and their prior technical choices, reciprocal vulnerability, survivability against each other but not against a superpower, or unilateral vulnerability are as likely to be the resultant strategic balances. Moreover, in some cases whatever survivability does exist is likely to have been purchased by reliance upon a hair trigger, launch-on-warning (LOW) mode of protecting the nuclear force. These are yet additional reasons for skepticism about the technical characteristics of many new nuclear forces, for believing that not infrequently such forces probably would be characterized by what once was termed a high "propensity for war."[7]

Doctrinal perceptions of nuclear weapons' utility

The mainstream of Western strategic studies increasingly has argued that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons should be to deter the use or threatened use of other nuclear weapons. It would be false to presume, however, that the initial strategic thinking of all future proliferators would honor this conception of nuclear weapons' pur-

6. Current American weapons can be dropped accidently without producing a nuclear yield and can survive the heat and impact of air crashes. Achieving this degree of safety, however, necessitated a considerable expenditure of money and thought in the early to mid-1950s.

7. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 234.

poses and utility. On the contrary, some possible proliferators, especially where geography serves to provide natural invasion corridors, as in the case of Taiwan, South Korea, and perhaps Iran, appear more likely to look upon nuclear weapons as potentially useful battlefield weapons. Others must be expected to consider seriously these weapons' possible limited and coercive use or threatened use, either within a war-fighting defensive strategy or in support of expansionist, non-status quo oriented objectives. An Israel contemplating responses to a breakdown of its conventional defenses in a sixth Arab-Israeli war could contemplate the former; a nuclear-armed Iran seeking hegemony in the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s the latter.

Longer-term doctrinal development and perceptions of nuclear weapons' utility probably would be influenced heavily by the specific characteristics and consequences of the first use of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki. Successful use or threatened use by a new proliferator would erode the nuclear taboo and encourage others to reappraise upward their assessment of the military utility of nuclear weapons. Conversely, unsuccessful use, accidental use, or unauthorized use—perhaps during an internal political struggle—would have the opposite effect. Thus, the first nuclear use clearly would be a proliferation turning point. And, as the next section indicates, the probability that that will occur has to be evaluated as high.

REGIONAL INTERACTION IN A PROLIFERATED WORLD

If efforts to control proliferation prove inadequate, a world of 30 or more nuclear-weapon states, many locked in hostile confrontations, could emerge by the late 1980s–early 1990s. Even though in isolated cases such nuclearization of regional confrontations could prove locally stabilizing,[8] most frequently the outcome would be increased political and military competitiveness, confrontation, and probably conflict. Moreover, the destructiveness of future small-power nuclear wars would be significantly greater than that of either past local wars or manmade or natural disasters.

Patterns of regional nuclear arms racing

Nuclear proliferation is likely to be accompanied frequently, at least initially, by fairly intense qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms races. There is no reason to believe that the major countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf, for example, would acquiesce readily to second-class non-nuclear status or to a position of marked nuclear inferiority vis-à-vis their regional opponents.

Such regional nuclear arms racing would be fueled by several factors. Regional insecurity, competition for regional status, and traditional hostility all would play a part. In addition, in those arms races where each side's decisions were highly sensitive to estimates of the opponent's capabilities and intentions, for example, in the Middle East and South Asia, limited intelligence

8. Possible future Taiwanese acquisition might facilitate the emergence of more stable relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China by precluding invasion and strengthening domestic morale on Taiwan. Against that positive effect, nonetheless, would have to be balanced the adverse impact upon proliferation momentum and pressures for proliferation in Asia that probably would follow Taiwan's emergence as a nuclear-weapon state. Thus, it may not be possible to pick and choose which proliferation to oppose.

on those factors might intensify initial arms "spurts." Fears, and in some cases the reality, of the opponent acquiring a first-strike capability also would exacerbate arms race pressures. Finally, if nuclear weapons were used successfully in any region, that too would stimulate arms race efforts.

Nonetheless, it must be added that in some regional strategic situations, resource availability could become a serious constraint once such arms racing began. In South Asia, for example, Pakistan without outside assistance might find itself unable to keep up with India in a nuclear arms race. Thus, some regional nuclear arms races might begin, spurt, and then end with the weaker side reluctantly accepting an inferior position. In fact, where prior recent history of intense political and military conflict is absent, a combination of resource-constraint and a limited sense of threat could foster at the outset a more leisurely arms-race pattern. A possible future Argentinian-Brazilian nuclear arms race could be a case in point, although even here competition for regional influence and mutual uncertainty might result in more active arms racing.

Thus, a mixture of arms racing effects, skewed at least initially toward more intense regional competition, should be expected. Such nuclear arms racing would entail a costly diversion of scarce technical, economic, and organizational resources. Moreover, in regions that already are or could become arenas of politico-military conflict, existing hostility probably would be exacerbated and efforts to achieve a regional modus vivendi hindered. Further, in the ensuing political climate, the risk of inadvertent nuclear war, as discussed next, would be magnified commensurately.

Small power nuclear wars

Inherent to the nuclearization of existing confrontations in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf in all probability would be a high risk of inadvertent or calculated nuclear weapon use. Either or both governmental or nongovernmental action might be involved.[9]

To begin, given the likely technical deficiencies of many Nth country nuclear forces, discussed earlier, unintended nuclear exchanges erupting out of an intense crisis or low-level conventional conflict could occur. For example, if reciprocal vulnerability to surprise nuclear attack characterizes, as it may, the initial stages of nuclear strategic interaction between India and Pakistan and Israel and Egypt, strong preemptive pressures and growing reciprocal fears of surprise attack can be expected. Moreover, within such a strategic situation, the occurrence of a nuclear weapon accident, an unauthorized launch by a cabal of lower-level officers, anonymous nuclear detonation by a PLO-type group, or a warning system malfunction—any of which, for reasons already noted, would be possible—might trigger that inadvertent nuclear exchange.

However, concern about the outbreak of small-power nuclear wars is not based solely on an assessment of the potential propensity to war of particular Nth country nuclear forces. Some countries, to

9. "Local Munichs" and nuclear blackmail, involving threatened use of nuclear weapons, also can be expected to occur.

'epeat, are likely to be attracted o nuclear weapons because of their)ossible military uses and conciously could decide to escalate o the employment of nuclear weap›ns rather than accept a conven-ional military defeat. Pakistani tacical use of nuclear weapons against nvading Indian military formations n a hypothetical late-1980s conflict vould be one possibility; Israeli :oercive nuclear attacks against Arab nilitary targets and high-value Egyptian targets such as the Aswan Dam, in response to an Arab breakhrough on the battlefield, would)e another.

Another case of a conscious and :alculated use of nuclear weapons vould be an attempt by one new)roliferator—or, following their unauthorized access to nuclear weap›ns, by members of its military —to trigger a nuclear exchange beween two other hostile Nth counries. The risk of such a catalytic nuclear war erupting out of an inense crisis or low-level conflict in he early stages of Middle East nuclearization has to be taken seriously.

Nor can the risk of local anonynous use of nuclear weapons be lismissed. To illustrate, again with 'eference to a nuclearized Middle East, a more radical Arab governnent might conclude that a successful anonymous attack against Israel n the midst of serious peace nego:iations was the only way to ensure :hose negotiations' collapse. It probably would succeed, if only because Israeli public opinion could be expected to preclude the governnent making any political-military concessions in the wake of such an Arab action. And, given the prospect of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, the perpetrators here, too, could be a cabal of middle-ranking, fanatic officers.

The danger of preemptive nuclear wars also exists. Should proliferation occur, some countries are likely already to have deployed rudimentary nuclear forces by the time their opponents begin to do so, for example, Iran versus Iraq or Saudi Arabia or India versus Pakistan. To these earlier entrants, a preemptive attack against a potentially dangerous budding rival may not be unattractive. Or, assuming that nuclear use were thought too dangerous—perhaps for fear of a superpower response—a preemptive attack against the opponent's nuclear facilities using precision-guided conventional weapons still might be contemplated.

Even though the level of destruction in such small-power nuclear wars would vary with the specific case, the spread of nuclear weapons would bring an upward leap in the expected consequences of regional military conflicts. To illustrate, detonation of a single nominal-yield nuclear weapon in a Middle Eastern city might kill upwards of 100,000 people, while a counter-city exchange between small Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces could cause 10 million fatalities on each side. In contrast, the death toll in past Arab-Israeli wars has been counted in the thousands, while approximately 1 million persons, virtually all civilians, lost their lives in the 1971 Pakistani civil war. As for natural disasters, their death toll has only rarely been counted in the hundreds of thousands, let alone the potential millions of a local nuclear war.[10]

10. This estimate assumes the use of relatively low-yield fission weapons; the ad-

The regional consequences of nuclear coups d'état

Widespread nuclear proliferation is likely to be accompanied not only by increased competitiveness and more destructive regional clashes, but also by intensified domestic political conflict. In the many politically unstable future proliferators with their previous histories of military intervention in domestic politics, nuclear coups d'état may occur. Two aspects of this phenomenon, as well as its implications for regional stability, warrant brief attention.[11]

On the one hand, just as denying the government access to the radio station and neutralizing pro-government military formations outside of the capital have been critical elements of successful past coups, future Nth-country coup-makers may have to deny the government access to its nuclear force. Failure to do so might permit a leader who had survived the initial assault to use his access to nuclear weapons to rally his supporters and demoralize his opponents and their potential civilian allies; to threaten civil war; and, in essence, to change the situation from a military clash to a confrontation marked by coercive bargaining.

On the other hand, efforts by military factions within future coup-vulnerable proliferators to seize control of nuclear weapons also can be expected. By doing so, such a faction could hope to trigger a more widespread uprising, to force a loyal military leadership to meet its demands, to deter the use of force against them, or otherwise to use the threat of nuclear conflict to support their own coup. And, of greater significance, their access to nuclear weapons probably would make the difference between success and failure for some future factional coup-makers.

The implications for regional stability of such nuclear coups d'état should not be missed. Buttressed by their possession of nuclear weapons, more radical and romantic military men than might have been able previously to do so could gain power. And, *once in full control of* their country's nuclear arsenal, manifold opportunities for nuclear mischief would become evident to them. Alternatively, fearing that eventual control of nuclear weapons by more radical and romantic coup-makers, neighboring countries might intervene militarily. If time permitted, such intervention could involve support for the existing government. Or, to keep that country's nuclear weapons from falling into the "wrong hands," a disarming attack against its nuclear force and stockpile might be launched. For this reason, as well, continuing nuclear proliferation probably would result in increased and intensified local instability.

GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS OF LOCAL PROLIFERATION

The longer-run consequences for global political life of widespread proliferation could be equally serious. Local proliferation might contribute to the emergence of disruptive new transnational forces and set in motion long-term trends, both of which could culminate in a cor-

vent of fusion weapons could result in an additional upward leap in expected destructiveness.

11. For elaboration, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Military Politics, Nuclear Proliferation, and the 'Nuclear Coup d'État,'" (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, HI-2392/2-P, 20 April 1976).

rosion of domestic political authority and legitimacy and growing global anarchy.

An erosion of existing alliances?

If existing patterns of Soviet and American global involvement continue, most future confrontations between hostile proliferators would be characterized at least initially by some degree of superpower entanglement. Depending upon the specific situation, either superpower could be a reluctant guarantor, a committed ally, a partly disengaged ally, a patron, or an aspiring suitor of one of the hostile parties. More important, in many cases the two superpowers might find themselves involved on opposite sides of a hostile local confrontation. Inherent to that situation is the risk of a direct Soviet-American confrontation, high-level crisis, and even outright military conflict.

But, because of that risk of conflict, initial superpower entanglement gradually might give way to efforts to put political distance between themselves and at least some new nuclear-weapon states.[12] That is, both superpowers would be likely to reassess carefully their vital interests, those warranting continued acceptance of the risk of confrontation. In the United States, strong pressures to disengage might emerge, for example, if Taiwan and South Korea or perhaps even Israel and Iran overtly acquired nuclear weapons.[13] And, even where traditional vital American interests were seen to exist—as in the case of West Germany and Japan—if sufficient influence over these countries' nuclear postures were unobtainable, such pressures could grow.

An erosion or breakup of existing alliances, should it occur, would remove one important source of postwar order. To begin, in light of the earlier discussion of regional interaction, the stability of such a loosely structured global system may be questioned. Moreover, in some regions—both halves of Europe come to mind—superpower involvement may have served to prevent the recrudescence of past hostilities and tensions. And, at least in Western Europe, the American alliance structure by doing so has provided a necessary framework for regional political and economic cooperation. Further, dependence upon outside allied support has required at least some countries to moderate their regional behavior and could be expected to have a comparable future restraining impact.

Thus, local proliferation could trigger superpower disengagement and the partial erosion of existing alliances. That, in turn, would contribute to growing global disorder. Conversely, to the extent that present patterns of superpower entanglement remained unchanged, the risk of spreading conflict from small-power nuclear confrontations and wars cannot be discounted.

Nuclear "black and gray marketeering"

Much recent attention has focused upon the possible emergence of

12. The not necessarily negligible risk of nuclear attack or retaliation by a local proliferator also might increase pressures for reduced superpower involvement in unstable newly nuclearized regions.

13. Particularly in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, partial American disengagement probably would have preceded these countries' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. It would be a question, therefore, of undoing residual, though perhaps not insignificant, American ties.

nuclear black markĕteering, entailing the sale of stolen fissile material or nuclear weapons themselves.[14] An equally disruptive potential global repercussion of increasing local proliferation would be the growth of nuclear "gray marketeering." A spectrum of transactions and activities might be involved. These range from covert government to government transfer of critical technical assistance for a nuclear weapon program to the actual sale or barter of nuclear weapons or their critical components. Also encompassed would be the ready availability of nuclear mercenaries willing to sell their knowledge and services to countries attempting to develop nuclear weapons.

Various economic, political, and ideological pressures might foster such gray marketeering. Selling technical assistance, or even the weapons themselves or their components, would be one way for a new nuclear-weapon state to reduce the financial burden of its own nuclear weapon program. Or, under certain conditions, a country might come to regard its nuclear weapon expertise as a service good to be bartered in exchange for needed vital raw materials or oil. Such economic motivations clearly would be an important factor in the hiring of nuclear mercenaries. As for ad hoc political pressures, to a possible future nuclear-armed Pakistan, provision of technical assistance or the transfer of special nuclear material and design information could appear an attractive way to acquire or solidify Arab or Iranian political support or at least to persuade them not to support its Indian opponent. Finally, broader ideological and political perspectives also might contribute to these activities' emergence. To illustrate, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan are likely to be increasingly isolated in world politics as time passes. They might come to comprise a "pariah international," among whose activities could include nuclear weapon cooperation. An eventual Muslim nuclear weapon cooperative would be another, though less likely, example.

The growth of black and gray marketeering would change the characteristics of a future proliferated world. Not only would an expanding number of countries be able to develop nuclear weapons and to do so sooner; but, in particular, both very-low technology countries and nongovernmental organizations that otherwise would have been unable to do so increasingly would be able to acquire rudimentary nuclear-weapon capabilities.[15] Consequently, the problems of managing in a proliferated world would become more intractable, further heightening the risk of growing disorder.

Spreading nuclear terrorism

Further contributing to the erosion of global order would be the spreading of nuclear terrorism. Not only would widespread local proliferation increase the likelihood of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, but it cannot be assumed that future terrorists would have no rational motive for using or threatening to use nuclear weapons.

A terrorist group might obtain a

14. See Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 107–20.

15. For elaboration, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Nuclear 'Gray Marketeering,'" *International Security* (forthcoming).

nuclear weapon in several ways. If plutonium recycling is practiced widely in the 1980s, physical security measures might not suffice to prevent the theft of fissile material with which they might fabricate their own device. Alternatively, the opportunities for stealing a nuclear weapon would be increased by widespread local proliferation. Furthermore, a radical government or an alienated military faction might arrange for a terrorist group to steal one of its nuclear weapons, thinking that its own purposes would be served by resultant terrorist use with a lessened risk of suffering the consequences of that action. Finally, if a black market emerges, the sale of special nuclear materials or of the weapons themselves would provide an additional source.

Possession of one or more nuclear weapons could be especially valuable for a terrorist group. To illustrate, consider a future successor group to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Such a group might threaten local action as a means of deterring hostile military action against it and of establishing a protected sanctuary for its activities. Intranation deterrence could be pursued, that is, against future equivalents of "Black September" in Jordan and current Syrian intervention in Lebanon. Actual use of a nuclear weapon by such a hypothetical successor to the PLO also could occur. Assuming movement in the late 1980s toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement damaging to Palestinian interests, anonymous detonation of a nuclear weapon in Israel might be regarded as the only way to block such a settlement.

Moreover, the target of future terrorist use need not be local. Such a prospective radical Arab terrorist group could threaten anonymously, for example, to detonate clandestinely-inserted nuclear devices within American cities unless the United States stopped shipping arms to Israel. If the United States failed to heed this warning, then a device could be exploded. Or the target could be a West European ally of the United States whose ports were being used to ship NATO military stocks to Israel during a sixth Arab-Israeli war. Alternatively, for a future terrorist group whose objective was bringing down Western bourgeois society—just as the Japanese Red Army and the Baader-Meinhof Gang now propose—use of an externally procured nuclear weapon might be regarded as an appropriate means.

This prospect of spreading nuclear terrorism is a cause for concern partly because of its direct consequences. To note one, a single terrorist nuclear detonation within a Middle Eastern, American, or West European city probably would kill upwards of 100,000 persons. However, of equal concern is the danger that spreading nuclear terrorism would contribute to that corrosion of governmental authority and legitimacy discussed next.[16]

Corrosion of political authority and legitimacy

The initial result of attempts to manage both the specific problems of a proliferated world and the pressures inherent in living in a world of 30 or more nuclear-weapon states could be a global authoritarian political shift. Two sources of that authoritarian shift should be noted.

16. For a more complete discussion of terrorism's other possible implications, see the paper by David Krieger in this volume.

On the one hand, controlling against nuclear theft, nuclear terrorism, and other proliferation threats could be seen within existing democratic societies to require and justify the adoption of measures inconsistent with liberal values and procedural norms. For example, restrictions over government power in such civil liberties areas as search and seizure, arrest and questioning of suspects, surveillance methods, individual privacy, and the collection and computer storage of dossiers all might be eroded. Similarly, restrictions on movement in and out of these countries as well as on internal movement could increase markedly. At the same time, the leadership within more authoritarian societies probably would find in these specific threats a useful pretext for even more extensive domestic repression and control. That is, just as President Park of South Korea has used the threat of a North Korean invasion to crack down on domestic dissidents, future leaders within similar countries could use similarly the threat of anonymous or terrorist nuclear attack.

On the other hand, the increased insecurity, hostility, and competitiveness of a world with upwards of 30 nuclear-weapon states probably in itself would create pressures for increased political authoritarianism. A siege mentality, fueled by a perception of the world as a much more dangerous and inhospitable environment and by political leaders' efforts to cope as best as possible with the manifold threats of that world might emerge. That siege mentality could manifest itself in a growing insularity, an intolerance of others, and in a national paranoia, all of which probably would have domestic counterparts.

Such an intensification of political authoritarianism might be, however, only a temporary phenomenon. If governments, even after adopting more authoritarian measures, proved unable to ensure national security, they might lose their authority and legitimacy. Popular and elite opinion, believing that governments were not meeting their obligations to "provide for the common defense," no longer would support them. Managing even domestic concerns could become increasingly difficult. Particularly in Western democracies, compromises, ambiguities, and partial solutions previously accepted as a matter of course in democratic political life might no longer be tolerated in the general climate of insecurity and reduced confidence in governmental capacity.

Moreover, even though such a loss of legitimacy and crisis of confidence might be more pronounced in industrialized countries, governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the elite probably would be eroded within less developed ones as well. In both cases, the outcome could be a growing inability to govern and perhaps the rise of new chiliastic mass movements within which individuals would seek a restored sense of security.

Growing global anarchy?

A world of several dozen nuclear-weapon states, therefore, would in all probability be a nasty and dangerous place, variously threatening the national security and domestic political well-being of virtually all nations. Should it prove impossible to defuse these varied threats, the resultant regional and global disorder could lead to purposive na-

tional efforts on the part of the strong to pull inward, reducing contacts with an increasingly anarchic environment. Over the long-term, a renewed insularity and domestic authoritarianism partly could replace today's interdependence. However, many weaker, politically unstable less developed nations not only might be unable to seal themselves off from a hostile world, but are also likely to confront growing threats to their domestic political integrity. Their viability as sovereign political entities could become even more tenuous as subnational groups and military factions gained access to nuclear weapons.[17] Thus, increasingly isolated bastions of authoritarian stability might well exist in the midst of recurring small-power nuclear wars; terrorist threats; "local Munichs"; and nuclear coups d'état, separatist struggles, and civil wars.

MANAGING IN A PROLIFERATED WORLD

But is the preceding not simply an implausible nightmare scenario? Is it not likely to become a self-denying prophecy, one proved false by future efforts to manage and reduce those very dangers it depicts? Much would depend upon the difficulties of designing and implementing a strategy for managing in a proliferated world. Although space precludes a thorough discussion of that here, the main dimensions of a proliferation-management strategy at least should be noted.[18]

Which proliferated world?

Notwithstanding preceding references to *a* proliferated world, different proliferated worlds, distinguished by the number of states that had gone nuclear and the types of nuclear-weapon programs pursued, are theoretically possible. That is, a prospective 1990s' proliferated world could have anywhere from several to several dozen overt new nuclear-weapon states. Concomitantly, these countries' nuclear weapon programs might range from a small "in the business" detonation of a nuclear explosive device to acquisition of reliable, stable second-strike forces, with many, however, clustered at the "serious but technically deficient" rung of the nuclear-weapon-program ladder. The problems and dangers of proliferation would be more or less severe from world to world. Put simply, to the extent that there are fewer new nuclear-weapon states and more of these remain at the lower rungs of the nuclear-weapon-program ladder, the burden upon other proliferation-management policies would be reduced.

Two policy implications of this proposition—particularly given occasional statements that the time has come to begin thinking about living with proliferation—should be made explicit. First, even assuming that a growing number of states decide to go nuclear, non-proliferation measures definitely would

17. See, also, George H. Quester, "The Politics of Twenty Nuclear Powers," in Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 67–70. Quester's analysis, however, underestimates the impact of widespread proliferation upon interstate, as opposed to intrastate, relations.

18. For elaboration, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Managing in a Proliferated World" (Aspen Workshop in Arms Control, forthcoming), pp. 24–38.

remain necessary.[19] Given the importance of influencing which proliferated world emerges, such measures would comprise the most critical near-term management tactic. Second, should proliferation occur, measures to pressure or persuade countries to stay at the lower rungs of the nuclear-weapon-program ladder would be required.

Some specific approaches

One approach, even for different proliferated worlds, might seek to influence Nth countries' nuclear postures. On the one hand, given the likely technical deficiencies—and their potential consequences—of some, if not many, such forces, prudence at some point might require assisting future proliferators to develop more stable and controllable nuclear forces, such as by transferring PAL systems. On the other, proliferation-management strategy might attempt to influence the strategic doctrine of new proliferators. Notwithstanding the obstacles involved—for example, determining what desirable doctrine is—attempts to establish suitable institutional mechanisms (such as regional equivalents of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group) within which to influence at the margin doctrinal debate within new proliferators and to encourage them to think through the varied implications of their new status and reflect upon whatever "nuclear learning" has occurred in the past decades still might be valuable.

Pursuit of a code of nuclear behavior and support for regional nuclear arms control agreements could comprise key elements of a second approach, efforts to enhance regional stability in a proliferated world. One proposed code would proscribe the first use of nuclear weapons regardless of how grave the provocation. Based upon the principle of lex talionis, it would be enforced ultimately by the threat of equal and proportional nuclear retaliation by one or both superpowers against the first user. Before concluding that agreement upon and implementation of any such code would be a priori implausible, the possible impact upon superpower policies of a dramatic systemic shock, such as one or more local nuclear exchanges, should not be overlooked. As for possible arms control measures in certain regional situations, both verifiable force-size agreements and the establishment of mini hotlines usefully could be pursued. Furthermore, the possible strategic education role of local arms control talks should not be overlooked.

A third broad category of management strategy would entail measures to circumscribe the possible global repercussions of local proliferation. Thus, circumscribing the continuing risk of Soviet-American confrontation might require superpower agreement upon rules of engagement in local nuclear confrontations. Here, too, the possible impact of a future dramatic shock in fostering such agreements should be considered. Also, from the perspectives of both superpowers the adoption of measures such as improvements in damage-limiting systems, which could reduce the direct military threat to them that future proliferators might pose, could be seen as a necessary management tactic. Finally, policies to check the grow-

19. For suggestions to this end, see George Quester, "Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation," and Michael Nacht, "The United States in a World of Nuclear Powers," elsewhere in this volume.

ing risk of nuclear terrorism also would be required. In addition to efforts to reduce the chances of successful terrorist access to fissile material or nuclear weapons, a readiness both to hold other governments responsible for nuclear terrorists operating from their territories and to engage in "black activities" against the nuclear terrorists themselves could be warranted.

A nightmare scenario?

Taken together, the preceding sets of measures—along with efforts to influence which proliferated world might emerge—could comprise the basic components of a strategy for managing in a proliferated world. But adoption of many of the most important measures, such as agreement upon a code of nuclear behavior or upon superpower rules of engagement, would presuppose at the least a changed global political climate and other than a business-as-usual approach. And even after a dramatic systemic shock, agreement upon such fundamental reforms still might not be politically feasible. Conversely, those more readily politically feasible measures, such as providing limited technical assistance to Nth countries or supporting regional arms control, might be only palliatives. That is, there would appear to be a gap between the gravity of the likely threats within a proliferated world and the probable effectiveness of politically acceptable responses to them. Ultimately, it is this tension which most causes concern about the long-term character of world politics in a future world of widespread proliferation and lends support to the fear that this discussion's initial depiction of life in such a world is not merely an implausible nightmare scenario.

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Arms Control in a Nuclear Armed World?

By COLIN GRAY

ABSTRACT: Beyond a continuing effort to inhibit further nuclear proliferation, the proper shape and direction of arms control policies for a nuclear-armed world are not at all apparent. Many of the more popular arms control ideas that are discussed in the hypothetical context of a nuclear-armed world do not fare well under close critical examination. Specifically, the arms control value of attempts by well-established nuclear-weapon states at nuclear deemphasis, of issuing broad nuclear guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states, and of proffering advanced conventional weaponry in lieu of nuclear weapons are not viable save under very restricted conditions. Probably the most challenging arms control question for a nuclear-armed world will pertain to the area of nuclear weapon safety. Technical assistance to new nuclear-weapon states could greatly reduce the risks of accident or the anxieties that must attend recognized first-strike vulnerabilities, but such assistance would also, unfortunately, remove an important argument discouraging proliferation and render a crude capability more ready—for a wide variety of possible policy ends. The arms control challenge in a nuclear-armed world will be a need to accommodate some nuclear use and a readiness to exploit the reactions to such use for the end of greater international stability.

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THE MANDATE for this article presumes a nuclear-armed world. Such a world must contain many nuclear powers; the precise number is not important, what matters is the appreciation that this is a world considerably different from that of 1976, in that 20-plus states have acquired nuclear weapons and the (minimal, at least) means of delivery.

A major difficulty attendant upon an exercise directed toward the identification of the role of arms control in a nuclear-armed world is the near-impossibility of separating the effect of nuclear proliferation from other trends. More likely than not, trends will function synergistically. For an obvious example, it is not excessively pessimistic to foresee a vast increase in the population of less-industrialized countries, a substantial shrinkage in the amount of food available for export from such a critical food-producing area as North America (because of the growth of the indigenous population and a highly probable deterioration in climate), and—in part, therefore—a rapid increase in the number of nuclear-weapon states. In the twenty-first century a prime motivation pushing a state toward a nuclear weapon capability may not be a quest for status or even security (understood in its standard politico-military context), but rather a laudable desire to increase its international leverage toward the end of ensuring an adequate supply of calories for a swollen population.

The food question was cited above simply as illustration of the point that our comprehension of the nature of a nuclear-armed world almost certainly is inhibited as much by the fact that this world does lie 20, 30 years or more into the future as by the unfamiliar complexity of an international system encompassing 20-plus nuclear-weapon states.

Despite this, it is necessary to specify some minimal assumptions concerning the nature of a nuclear-armed world. As working hypotheses, the following premises are persuasive to this author:

1. Power and authority will be more fragmented in the international system than is the case in the 1970s. But, as rival poles of influence and security provision, the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to far outdistance any challengers.
2. In military terms, the current superpowers will far outshadow all rivals. There are no shortcuts to equal military status—not a nuclear strike capability per se, not precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and certainly not access to American cruise-missile technology.[1]
3. Because of their continuing contest for influence, the superpowers will impose a minimum of order (as often as not through the latent threat of the use of force) in regions long deemed vital to their interests.
4. But the proliferation of new nuclear-weapon states (NNWS)[2] will cause each superpower to examine

1. See Alexander R. Vershbow, "The Cruise Missile: The End of Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 55 (October 1976), pp. 141–42.

2. NNWS is employed in the text with reference to those states which acquire nuclear weapons after the time of writing (October 1976). NNWS is intended to imply possession of a nuclear striking force that is very unsophisticated by comparison with the superpowers (and even the British and the French). As a catchall category, NNWS does, of course, blur distinctions that could be very important. Where important distinctions exist, they are made—elsewhere, NNWS was found to be useful.

very critically the character of its interests in each particular foreign security connection.

5. Notwithstanding the continuing primacy of East-West competitive interests over nuclear proliferation questions for the superpowers, there will be general recognition of a dictum of state policy which has, thus far, not received very explicit expression. Precisely, no state should be expected to accept responsibility for the nuclear actions taken by another—unless very close prior consultation has occurred (and even then some distance might be sought).[3] The case of an Israel facing defeat employing nuclear weapons is one possible exception.

OF RISKS AND COMMITMENTS

It is improbable that a nuclear-armed world will differ dramatically from that of the 1970s. The superpowers should not be expected to eschew alliance with all nuclear-armed states, and a general atomization of what occasionally is termed international society seems unlikely. However, there is a strong probability that a heavily nuclear-armed world will be subject to some nuclear terrorism and will witness (but not generally participate in) the conduct of nuclear warfare both between and within states—on a local level.

Because of the enhanced nuclear risks that the superpowers will run as a consequence of distant security connections, one should anticipate (1) the attenuation and abrogation of the more marginal ties; (2) some tacit agreement, or at least protracted discussion, among the major nuclear powers on the subject of nuclear rules of engagement. Both of these processes will be affected by the continuing competition of the superpowers, by the order in which proliferation occurs, and by the uses (or presumed uses) to which Nth countries will put their newly-developed nuclear forces.

The ways in which these forces are used could be affected by the technical characteristics of NNWS' nuclear strike capabilities. In other words, while the local presence of locally controlled nuclear forces should serve to revise upward official definitions of war-worthy provocations, both sides to a dispute could be acutely aware of the proposition that "he who does not fire first, probably does not fire at all."[4] Following a nuclear first-strike that was intelligently executed, many countries would not be in a good position even to wage sustained conventional combat.

Under these circumstances, many Western arms control notions will not transfer well, if at all, to the intellectual frameworks of the officials of some NNWS, who may not be overly-concerned with what Americans and Western Europeans mean by order and stability. Indeed, one can envisage countries perceiving a nuclear arsenal as an instrument for the effecting of change—for the ends of gain or justice (among a host of possibilities). The extraordinary qualities of nuclear weapons that have caused the officials of the nuclear-weapon states, thus far, to see those weapons as offering use options only of last resort, may be precisely the qual-

3. This dictum falls well short of the now long-standing French proposition that a nuclear-armed world means the end of alliances.

4. In terms of theory, the definitive statement remains "The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack," in Thomas C. Shelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 1960), ch. 9.

ities that officials in some NNWS would feel they could exploit in order to extort beneficial changes in their environments. The central question for this article is how, if at all, arms control instrumentalities might function (*a*) to reduce the risk of the occurrence of war, and (*b*) (scarcely less important in the context of this discussion) to reduce the likely damage should war occur.

SOME TECHNICAL STABILITY ISSUES

It may be argued that wars tend to occur, when they do, for political rather than military-technical reasons[5] and that measures enhancing the technical stability of the strategic environment are not all that helpful in reducing the risk of war. Nevertheless, arms controllers have, perhaps for "lack of a better hoss," paid considerable attention to them.

Nuclear disarmament, a special case of arms control, is unlikely to have a widespread appeal intended to restore stability to a precariously balanced world. The nuclear genie could not be put back in the bottle: disarmament would merely replace fears of immediate hostile nuclear use in a crisis with fears of hostile nuclear use following a period of nuclear mobilization (not to mention the suspicion that would be prevalent concerning concealed weapons).

The acceptability to NNWS of many of the arms control measures aimed at improving stability which are voiced by Western (and Soviet) commentators and officials would be a function of technical competence and economic strength rather than intellectual absorption. Almost regardless of the blend of motives that moved a state into the column of nuclear-weapon powers, there is unlikely to be much local opposition to the ideas that (*a*) secure second-strike forces are preferable to vulnerable first-strike (only) forces; (*b*) a flexible war plan is preferable to an inflexible one; or that (*c*) nuclear weapons should be protected against seizure by unauthorized groups. The problem for the transnational arms control community is less one of education than one of ensuring technical feasibility. The first purpose of arms control, to reduce the risk of war, might be served were NNWS to be granted access to the technology that diminishes vulnerability to a first strike.

Unfortunately, NNWS that achieved a security in second-strike potential would, almost by definition, pose a far more serious latent threat to the interests of major nuclear-weapon states than would NNWS that did not. But even if major powers did not ease NNWS acquisition of launch vehicles that could be protected by hardening or mobility, they could certainly vastly improve strategic and tactical warning time of attack. The provision of data from satellites and high-altitude aircraft overflights would be a conveniently private way in which the quantity and quality of the strategic response of an NNWS could be upgraded. However, any NNWS that came to rely upon Soviet or American intelligence of this kind would have slipped (back) into a form of strategic dependence—and the superpowers themselves might deem such technical assistance to be too committing.

Scarcely less important to many NNWS than the problem of ensuring some second-strike capability will

5. See Colin S. Gray, "New Weapons and the Resort to Force," *International Journal*, vol. 30 (Spring 1975), pp. 238–58.

be the need to protect nuclear weapons against unauthorized seizure and use. Nuclear weapon safety is probably the least controversial, and arguably is the most important, field for arms control effort in a nuclear-armed world. Whereas most arms control subjects (force level reductions, qualitative constraints, rules of engagement) will be thwarted, substantially, by the operation of the arms control paradox—the political hostility that makes arms control necessary, also makes it very difficult to accomplish—questions of weapons' safety are virtually (but not totally) nonpolitical. If NNWS do not avail themselves of the technical knowledge and experience available from some existing nuclear-weapon states, they will face an unpleasant dilemma.

Force survival must rest upon an instant readiness to strike—there will be little prospect of riding out a surprise attack. But, instant readiness implies that nuclear weapons are co-located, fully assembled, with their means of delivery. For countries with a stable domestic order and, possibly, a long (or, at least, very firm) tradition of apolitical armed forces, there is no problem. But a nuclear-armed world is going to see the emergence of nuclear-weapon states wherein the chief executives will believe, probably with good reason, that the only safe place for their countries' nuclear weapons is in the basements of their presidential palaces.[6] Consideration of deterrent efficacy and protection against seizure will be severely at odds.

6. See Lewis A. Dunn, *Military Politics, Nuclear Proliferation, and the Nuclear Coup d'État* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, HI-2392/2-P, 20 April 1976).

Technical Assistance and Strategic Competence

It should be apparent from the above discussion that the transfer of technical data on, for example, permissive action link (PAL) technology, need not be an unmitigated blessing for the international community. In the absence of PAL-type safety systems, an NNWS might be compelled to keep its nuclear weapon components well separated and disassembled—for fear of unauthorized military or terrorist seizure.* Similarly, though more generally, it is not self-evident that the major nuclear powers should look with favor upon technically stable local nuclear-weapon balances (heretical though this thought may appear at first glance). Vulnerable first-strike nuclear forces are likely to be scarcely less vulnerable to conventional than to nuclear surprise attack. Both local damage and the probability of the involvement of outside nuclear-armed powers would likely be greater, were each side to possess secure second-strike forces.[7] With a technically unstable balance between first-strike forces, it is much more likely than not that (*a*) one side will win a clear victory in a brief span of time, and (*b*) if nuclear weapons are used at all, their principal targets will be of a military character. Naturally, no military force has inherently first- or second-strike characteristics: those characteristics derive from an assessment of the probable weight and quality of the threat.

If a potential NNWS was confident that, following construction of a

7. But, and it is a substantial but, countries with secure second-strike forces should not wage nuclear war against each other.

fairly minimal nuclear strike force, one or more well-established nuclear-weapon states would provide technical assistance of many varieties designed both to ensure weapon safety and to ease the path to a secure second-strike capability, the attractions of nuclear-weapon status should be more difficult to resist. The policy dilemma for a country such as the United States is clearly predictable. A very general policy of technical assistance, widely appreciated to be in force, would be folly. Some potential NNWS may seek nuclear weapons quite regardless of the fact that they would have to choose between maintaining a ready force and a force secure against illegal domestic seizure. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to anticipate contexts wherein many potential NNWS see some strong (external) security reason for acquiring nuclear weapons, but are strongly discouraged by the thought that dissident generals might seize them or that their first-strike character would impose a very unattractive rigidity upon policy in time of crisis.

The considerations raised and argued above may seem to have an air of unreality about them, in 1976, but in a nuclear-armed world they would be of major importance. Most of the nuclear strike forces in the column of 20-plus nuclear-weapon states would be small, prone to unauthorized seizure and use, and vulnerable to surprise attack. To render nuclear use less likely, a primary aim of arms control, the major nuclear powers should consider very selective technical assistance. But, unless that assistance is very selective and is hedged about with as many restrictions as feasible (given the assistance-providing power's interest in retaining its freedom of action in the event of local hostilities), transition to a world of 30-plus nuclear-weapon states would be encouraged.

The design of intrinsically worthy arms control regimes for the safer regulation of a nuclear-armed world is not that difficult an assignment. What is difficult is to specify just how each particular system of order is to be introduced and maintained. For a world wherein no power, or set of powers, is prepared to act as a self-appointed guardian of the status quo, arms control can aspire to little more than the registration and implicit endorsement of (very mixed) state intentions. A comprehensive ban on nuclear tests might be useful to reduce the confidence felt by governments in the military efficacy of their nuclear arsenals. But, in the absence of fairly painful sanctions, those countries most vulnerable to the potential impact of such a ban could simply, possibly with public regret, decline to accede.

NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has pointed to the fact that a very large number of nuclear-capable jet aircraft (*a*) have been supplied to potential NNWS, and (*b*) will become surplus in major air forces over the next decade.[8] However, it would be an error to presume that the availability of systems such as the F-104 or the F-4 means that serious nuclear delivery problems for some NNWS would not arise. While F-104s and F-4s, Mirage IIIs and (for a later generation) Mirage F-1s can deliver

8. *Strategic Survey*, 1974 (London: IISS, 1975), pp. 37–8.

a single standard NATO nuclear weapon (of 1960s' vintage), they certainly would not be appropriate for the delivery of first-generation NNWS nuclear weapons (weighing 6,000 pounds and more). It is relevant to note that out of the IISS list of 13 "nuclear-capable aircraft deployed by threshold states," only one—the Canberra—has the kind of bomb-bay and load carrying potential that would be needed to deliver a first-generation atomic weapon. Major nuclear-weapon states cannot deny NNWS access to nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, but they can retard (for a few years, at most) the acquisition of delivery vehicles that match the "state of the art" of NNWS nuclear weapons design.

Two conclusions are appropriate concerning the merits of an attempt to help manage the risks in a nuclear-armed world by means of impeding access to nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. First, with respect to the ability to deliver 2,000–3,000 pound reasonably advanced weapons, any arms control effort is too late (even as of 1976, let alone 1986 or 1996 or beyond). However, by their own unaided efforts—which may be an unrealistic assumption—countries such as Libya, Pakistan, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and so forth will not find it easy to design weapons that could be carried by F-4s, F-5s, F-104s, or MIG-21s. Second, given strong political determination, even countries with little technical infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program should be able to design nuclear weapons in the 1,000–2,000 pound range within a five-year period. Overall, there would not appear, at present, to be any very promising arms control action that might be taken with respect to nuclear-capable delivery vehicles.

In principle, the proliferation of SALT-like fora and SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements involving NNWS could make constructive contributions to political and military stability in regions that are enduring the early stages of local nuclear arms competition. Candidates for nuclear arms limitation attention would be the nuclear strike forces of regional rivals—when neither party, really, wishes to achieve more than a demonstrated nuclear-weapon capacity, and a capability perceived to be not inferior to that of the other. It is possible that political ambitions may grow as a nuclear force takes shape, but the economic attractions of an arms limitation pact conveniently might interdict such a process. Arms limitations, essentially to freeze strictly nominal capabilities, should be eminently negotiable—given the absence of military anxieties pointed out above. However, it is not difficult to see how arms limitation agreements could be of negative utility between many hostile pairs of NNWS. Arms limitation agreements of substance would, in all probability, tend to freeze the deficiencies of immature nuclear strike forces. If strategic offensive forces were frozen at low levels of delivery vehicles (or warheads), then the premium upon cheating would be fairly high. In other words, the attractions and value of SALT-type agreements between NNWS would depend critically upon the purposes the individual NNWS saw as being served by their nuclear forces. For states seeking serious military capabilities in their nuclear weapon programs, arms limitation agreements of a non-cosmetic

variety would probably be both non-negotiable (for roughly the same set of reasons that the Soviet-American SALT exercise has failed to cut deeply into capabilities or program intentions), and undesirable (in that continued unrestricted competition should lead the contestants into technically more survivable postures).

If arms limitation agreements between NNWS were to be verifiable, the contracting parties probably would have to have recourse to the good offices of those very few powers that maintained surveillance satellites. As with the provision of potential early warning data, such dependence would be both demeaning to the local powers concerned and entangling for the providers of the verification data. To cross the boundary of this article's mandate, it is worth noting the point that a large number of potential NNWS probably will not acquire nuclear strike forces on the model (though much scaled-down) of the superpowers, or of Britain, France, and China. Instead, with or without nuclear testing, many NNWS will let it be known—in very low key—that they are in the column of nuclear-weapons states, with the weapons being accumulated in disassembled forms (probably after the pattern of Israeli practice in the 1970s). In this way, states may benefit from whatever advantages flow from nuclear-weapons status, without actually having gone nuclear or deployed nuclear strike forces in ways which might maximally encourage emulation by neighbors. This tactic—of letting the world know that one is, say, probably two days away from an operational nuclear weapon capability—would have local arms race implications that have, as yet, been unplumbed by social scientists. To be politically useful, such a capability would have to be advertised (discreetly), while the secrecy as to the size and character of the stockpile should fuel worst (or bad)-case analysis on the part of rivals; but that very secrecy should also serve to dampen the force of arguments for matching responses on the part of neighbors.

By way of summary, a somewhat agnostic stance would seem to be appropriate on the subject of arms limitation agreements between NNWS. For states seeking simply to be recognized as nuclear-weapon powers, and as being not inferior to their regional rivals, such agreements could well be attractive and might offer ample excuse for the eschewal of familiar arms race tactics. But for states whose political cultures and/or security situations impose critical military duties upon emerging nuclear strike forces, arms limitation agreements might prove to be a dangerous irrelevance.

NUCLEAR DEEMPHASIS AND NON-NUCLEAR ARMS

Among the alternative means likely to be available for the promotion of arms control in a nuclear-armed world, policies of nuclear deemphasis by major nuclear-weapon states are probably the least likely to succeed. An American no-first-use doctrine would not find easy acceptance on the part of putative adversaries (how could they be certain?) while it probably would serve to promote much greater interest in nationally-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the part of allies. In short, one probably would suffer the worst of both worlds. The prospective utility of a

no-first-use declaration upon incentives to proliferate, to threaten nuclear use, and actually to engage in nuclear warfare is not encouraging. It is difficult to see the moral force behind such a declaration when it would be offered by a country with an arsenal of nuclear weapons probably in excess of 20,000, and which still saw great utility in their deterrent (and even defensive) potential. However, American adoption of a no-first-use doctrine could be interpreted as evidence of a secondary concern (proliferation) dominating a primary one (the security of vital allies). No-first-use might well rest upon many worthy motives, but allies could be excused for interpreting it as meaning that the United States (for example) would rather they were overrun than that a single nuclear weapon be used. A policy more likely to encourage nuclear proliferation among allies and friends would be difficult to devise.

Although nuclear proliferation should, with few if any exceptions, be discouraged, it is reasonably certain that an attempt by the existing nuclear-weapon states to deemphasize the roles of nuclear weapons in their strategies is not a profitable path to follow. The whole world knows that nuclear weapons are important and different, and fairly cosmetic attempts to demonstrate the contrary are unlikely to find a receptive and credulous audience. The limited utility of nuclear weapons in day-by-day diplomacy is really beside the point. Some countries may feel that in their regional security contexts, a nuclear capability would forward their political ambitions. Also, since the U.S. cavalry may not arrive to the rescue in time (or, more likely, may not even be dispatched), some countries will feel that there is no close substitute for the locally-controlled nuclear weapon as a credible policy instrument of last resort (for example, Israel, Taiwan, Pakistan, South Korea—perhaps Yugoslavia).

To discourage proliferation on the part of those relatively few states which do genuinely face (what they see as) total threats to their national security, the United States needs to emphasize the reliability of its nuclear guarantee—even in the face of non-nuclear invasion. This, admittedly, is not easy to accomplish. As minimal policy advice, nuclear weapons should not be deployed where there is no robust intention to use them, in extremis. Simple, or even overly simple, as it may sound, the most effective way to enhance credibility in international politics is to say what one means, to mean what one says, and to have the capability to act. Credibility is not, and can never be, an either/or quality.An American president could state, firmly and without elaboration (or qualification), that, "if necessary," he would resort to nuclear weapons to defend (say) South Korea. Skeptics might question the sincerity of such a statement, but the statement, supported by the known presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, would almost certainly be taken at face value by potential aggressors against South Korea. However, the credibility of this American commitment could be weakened by domestic debate in the United States.

As an arms control device, the flow of sophisticated conventional weapons might be employed as a lever for the discouragement of nuclear proliferation. This idea has already attained policy status in a very inchoate form, but its limitations are very severe. First, while a truly magnificent non-nuclear defense should indeed diminish local

interest in the uncertain benefits of a national nuclear weapons program, such a defense should greatly increase the interest of more (and more vulnerable) neighbors in nuclear weapons. Second, unless the flow of conventional weapons is monitored very carefully, there is a very real danger that one would be providing the vital military infrastructure—not to mention the delivery vehicles—for a nuclear weapons program. In the unacknowledged name of nuclear non-proliferation, the supplier countries of non-nuclear weapons might innocently (or knowingly—with resignation) provide a diverse arsenal of eminently nuclear-capable systems. Third, to supply advanced conventional weapons essentially as a bribe designed to appease the proliferation impulse is to leave oneself open to blackmail. While the United States, inter alia, does not favor nuclear proliferation, neither does it (nor would it) accord non-proliferation so high a policy priority that it will fuel regional non-nuclear arms races around the globe at a pace determined by the credibility of threats to go nuclear on the part of local powers. The possibility of judiciously supplying conventional military equipment to selected countries, with a mind to dampening local enthusiasm for nuclear weapons, should not totally be dismissed. However, as a major arms control instrument, it would appear to be fraught with so many hazards that it should not be pursued (the cure might prove no less harmful than the disease).

ARMS CONTROL POLICY—A SENSE OF PROPORTION

It may appear unkind to say so, given the humane motives involved, but the beginning of wisdom with respect to thinking about arms co trol for a nuclear-armed world to recognize that very little can l done that would be politically a ceptable. So unacceptable is t prospect of proliferation that p liferators, the issuers of nucle threats, and certainly the perpet tors of nuclear use should be pu ished according to the severity their offense—so the argume goes. International society, an c timistic fiction, will be in no po tion to restrain, let alone puni the users of nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed world. The domin motive should be expected to sauve qui peut. Because of the ris involved, and because of the versity of interests that are p dictable, behavior in a nucle armed world will not be restrain in anticipation of the operation o primitive nuclear collective se rity system. Collective security d not work in a politically-divid world—and would not work even the event of nuclear use by a mi power.[9]

The first instance of nuclear u in war since 1945 will undoubte have an effect upon internatio behavior—but that effect will pro bly amount in sum to an accel ation of trends that were alrea clearly in evidence. It is appeal to speculate that a nuclear v confined to the Middle East or So Asia would function as did the li on the road to Damascus, wherea all things become possible; bu more somber prediction is in ord It is more likely than not tha local nuclear war would be won the initiator of nuclear use. Desp the near-universal disapproval t would follow actual nuclear u

9. See the discussion in Colin S. G *Strategic Doctrine for a Proliferated W* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Instit HI-2490-DP, 23 August 1976).

such use by a state, if it were in extremis, would be justifiable and would not lack for apologists abroad. After all, the NATO countries plan on employing nuclear weapons if they deem such use necessary—so why not South Korea, Israel, Taiwan, Pakistan, and others? In the event, it is predictable that official condemnations of nuclear use would be very closely associated with state political interests.

A quasi-arms control device which periodically attracts interest with respect to behavior in a nuclear-armed world, is the nuclear guarantee. Although much of this article has been phrased in a rather tentative way, hedged about with qualifications, on the subject of nuclear guarantees a more categorical form of expression is called for. Just as no state will accept responsibility for the genuinely independent nuclear decisions of another, so no state will accept responsibility for the defense of another that is threatened with nuclear use, unless vital national interests are believed to be at stake. Moreover, in a nuclear-armed world, the scope of vital (that is, worth fighting for) national interests is likely to shrink quite noticeably. Certainly no state will stand as nuclear guarantor on behalf of non-nuclear states threatened by nuclear-armed-neighbors—on a point of principle or in defense of a general rule of order for a proliferated world.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: MAINLY SHADOWS, SOME LIGHT

Arms control in a nuclear-armed world is a vast and fortunately totally speculative field of inquiry. By way of a terse conclusion and as one set of pointers to debate and future research, the following brief statements are offered:

1. Even in a nuclear-armed world, it will still be worthwhile to attempt to interdict putative nuclear proliferation chains.

2. Nuclear disarmament will not be of interest to NNWS, just as measures of substantial arms reduction lack appeal to American, NATO-European, and Soviet officials in the contexts of SALT and Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

3. Nuclear weapons safety must be a matter of major international arms control concern. But the arguments for improving the safety features of the nuclear weapons of NNWS will be offset, in minor key, by the considerations that the ready provision of technical assistance in this area may (*a*) render existing nuclear forces more immediately usable, and (*b*) remove an important argument in some candidate NNWS against nuclear proliferation.

4. To attempt to preempt regional nuclear arms competition by means of fueling regional conventional arms competition will be a policy of very, very restricted utility.

5. Attempts at nuclear deemphasis through the careful manipulation of declaratory policy will not work: if anything, such endeavors will encourage rather than discourage proliferation.

6. General nuclear guarantees offered in defense of any and all non-nuclear states threatened by nuclear-armed neighbors would be lacking in credibility, for excellent reasons.

7. Regional nuclear wars almost certainly will occur. For reasons of

prudence, fear, and plain selfishness (that is, one does not take needless risks on behalf of others), such wars need not, and should not, mean the end of human history.

8. Attempts to discourage further proliferation, or to limit the utility of nuclear weapon stockpiles, by means of restricting access to nuclear-capable delivery vehicles are very likely to fail. There has been, and will be much further, a democratization in understanding of nuclear weapons design, such that NNWS should progress from nominal weapons weighing 6,000 pounds and more down to weapons of 1,000–2,000 pounds in a very few years of development.

9. The mere fact of a nuclear-armed world will not prompt drastic changes in international behavior, any more than it will in the forms of political organization. However, the evidence of the consequences of nuclear use could be a very different matter. Sad to predict, the first genuine opportunity for a nonmarginal change for the better in the ways in which human beings provide for their security will occur not as a consequence of the emergence of a nuclear-armed world, but rather as a consequence of nuclear war.

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The United Nations, the Superpowers, and Proliferation

By ABRAHAM BARGMAN

ABSTRACT: Although nuclear weapons are likely to spread to small and medium powers, the main problem for international security will be the effect of proliferation on the avoidance of nuclear war between the superpowers. It is therefore from their vantage point that this essay assesses the role of international organizations in a nuclear-armed world. A new class of disputes caused by violations of IAEA safeguards and permissible withdrawals from the NPT is destined to be placed on the Security Council agenda. These disputes, moreover, may provide the superpowers with the opportunity to cement their common interests in controlling the effects of proliferation. Further periodic Soviet-American confrontations of nuclear-crisis proportions are to be expected, albeit in a new political context complicated by proliferation. The UN can help resolve these, as it has past crises, by providing an organ of last resort, registering, implementing particular provisions of these agreements, and above all capitalizing on them to advance new resources for the promotion of international security. All of these roles could be better played if the UN established an International Nuclear Security Planning Group, to devise, plan for, and supervise the execution of measures which command great support—and superpower agreement. Anything more radical, unfortunately, would require a significant upsurge of insecurity which could only result from a boundary event such as the first use of nuclear weapons.

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THE NEW phase of nuclear proliferation has awakened a concern about the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. It has done so, however, at a time when there is a deeply implanted conventional wisdom which holds that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union is virtually impossible. This sense of international security is attributed not to the United Nations, and certainly not to UN disarmament deliberations; rather it is associated with the sanction inherent in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons on each side. There also seems to exist a profound faith in the ability of the national security managers to cope with periodic superpower confrontations. This public faith places a great burden on "supermen," who are always playing the world's game with the expectation of pulling back from the nuclear brink. This will be possible, they think, because in the moment of crisis international security values, and in particular those exemplified by and reflected in the United Nations, provide rationalizations for withdrawal. They are neither too big nor too proud to avail themselves of UN mechanisms in such circumstances.

The supreme responsibility for international security from nuclear war still remains theirs, notwithstanding the democratization of nuclear power through proliferation and other tendencies in the international system which have distributed influence (if not power) over a larger area and among a greater number of states than was true during the heyday of the Cold War. The granting of this special responsibility to the United States and USSR in an age of proliferation is not so much a compliment as a critical reflection of the fact that they are and will continue to be in the dual position of arsonists and firefighters; their forceful competition for control of key areas of the world can be expected to continue notwithstanding proliferation and notwithstanding détente.

As an international peace and security mechanism, the UN no longer has the field to itself; bilateral relationships, regional organizations, and permanent conferences of ideologically kindred states now also represent the interests of its members. It has also become fashionable in some quarters to become disenchanted with, if not hostile to, the United Nations. Nevertheless, all problems still seem to end up at the East River, especially when they directly affect the superpowers, who alone have the resources and potential influence to make the maintenance of nuclear peace and security a reality.

Despite this, it is unrealistic to anticipate substantial change in the UN's authority at this time. In fundamental matters, UN members appear to prize their freedom from collective decisions, in other words, their independence. That the UN is what the environment and its members allow it to be is a truism; the dynamic interaction between its political process and the debates which take place within major governments on the meaning of national interest and international responsibility is not as well understood.

The contributions of the UN and of other peace and security organizations will depend in part on the intrinsic ability of these organizations to function under the circumstances noted above and in part on the problems governments place before them. Three problems seem to be likely to surface in an age of

proliferation. A new type of dispute between states centered on nuclear rights and obligations which could test the traditional peaceful settlement practices of the UN is a most likely problem. The second problem goes beyond nuclear disputes and even nuclear tensions; it reaches the point of nuclear crisis. Direct or indirect confrontation between superpowers or other states with nuclear weapons constitute a severely threatening problem, because in nuclear crises the nuclear weapons are placed on alert and, as in Cuba in 1962, the world stands immobilized as the governments involved try to defuse the critical threat to nuclear peace. The third problem will arise from proposals to reform existing international institutions as the best—if not the sole—means of assuring international security in the midst of proliferation.

NUCLEAR DISPUTES AND TENSIONS

The UN Charter assumes that it is the responsibility of the parties to a dispute to find a way out of their difficulty without jeopardizing the peace and that disuasion in the form of sanctions is called for only when the Security Council determines that a threat to or an actual breach of the peace exists. In the UN system, as we can see, there are few foolish expectations regarding third-party influence on sovereign states. The UN's procedures provide for fact-finding, conciliation, and even the recommendation of terms of settlement, but it was never expected that all disputes must or would be settled, only that they would not be allowed to develop into threats to international peace and security. This is the institutional context within which potential nuclear disputes and problems will have to be considered.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) constitutes an attempt to supersede the "laws" of power politics through international law. In the past, the periodic elevation of a great power into the ranks of the nuclear powers had been met by a fatalistic attitude based on the assumption that governments have a right, if not a moral obligation, to provide for their nations' security. Non-proliferation diplomacy, however, is based on an opposing element introduced by the NPT, that further additions to the nuclear club are not legitimate and are expressly prohibited to its parties. Even a non-party such as India may have been influenced by the new element, since it has not proudly avowed that the main purpose of the nuclear explosion carried out in 1974 was a military one.

Further proliferation will nonetheless create tense situations and international disputes. Among the potential nuclear disputes and tensions which are likely to come before international organizations are (1) violations of treaty obligations; (2) legal withdrawals from a treaty; (3) disputes and tensions stemming from specific nuclear activity; and (4) the development of new laws and general principles to deal with new problems, such as nuclear terrorism.

When disputes arise, it is one thing for an international organization and its members to live with the disputes rather than to attempt the difficult task of imposing solutions; it is quite a different matter when a treaty whose continuance depends on sanctions being applied is at issue in the dispute. Non-nuclear NPT states must now permit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in-

spection of all their nuclear facilities. In the future, certain non-parties will probably have to accept the same conditions as the price for nuclear imports. Should an agency inspector suspect or detect a violation, a report is filed with the IAEA Governing Board which, in turn, can take provisional measures through the IAEA. Serious cases of diversion of nuclear materials would be reported to the Security Council as the organ of last resort after the provisional measures and fact-finding procedures of the agency had been completed.

Should the agency fail to report the matter to the Security Council, it is likely that another party to the NPT would do so because it would feel sufficiently concerned about potential pressures on its own policy process. The matter would be reported by the member nation just as any other dispute or situation the continuation of which might endanger peace would be reported. In any event, the problem would be one of how to apply sanctions rather than whether to apply sanctions. This seems to have been the spirit in which Henry Kissinger addressed the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Any violation of IAEA safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties."[1] Although past experience with Security Council sanctions points out the difficulty in getting unanimity among the great powers and, beyond that, the almost impossible task of bringing about actual sacrifice of political and commercial interests for the sake of the collective decision, in the case of such a violation the superpowers would at least share a common interest in the application of unilateral and multilateral measures.

For example, following the 1974 Indian explosion, the United States awakened from one of its periodic proliferation slumbers to create the ad hoc conference of nuclear suppliers. While what is known about this secret institution of some 15 countries does not suggest a rush on the part of all suppliers to impose "immediate and drastic penalties," the conference is a mechanism through which the United States, either alone or in combination with the Soviet Union, could attempt to coordinate sanctions against violators of IAEA safeguards. Whereas in ordinary disputes the superpowers may drag their heels along with the rest, in this case they have so much to gain from keeping the proliferation tendencies under control that there is a good chance of joint action with or without the legitimation of the Security Council or the Suppliers Conference.

A different issue would arise if a state party to the NPT should decide to withdraw from the treaty. To balance the discriminatory nature of the treaty, the superpowers agreed to include in Article X the right of a party to withdraw provided it gives three months notice to the Security Council and submits "a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." The fact that withdrawal is permitted does not affect the political consequences for neighboring states and perhaps for the regime as a whole. The three months could serve as a cooling-off period if the action results from dissatisfaction over some other issue; the period might be used for intensive bargain-

1. Address by Secretary of State Kissinger before the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 30 September 1976, Press Release USUN—109(76).

ing between the party and the superpowers, particularly the United States, assuming that they define their common interest in opposition to the state attempting to withdraw.

Security Council deliberations may serve ancillary purposes, such as offering remaining parties new assurances if they feel that their security is jeopardized as a result of the withdrawal. Despite the legality of withdrawal, all the measures canvassed in relation to violations of the IAEA may be appropriate from a political standpoint in the case of withdrawal, but the legitimacy of any such measures would be enhanced by UN action. Finally, when a case of withdrawal does come before the Security Council, the statement explaining how the country's supreme interests have been jeopardized could lead to both a legal and political consideration of what is meant by the term "supreme interests"—one that is found in almost every arms control agreement. On the political side, the council would probably have to debate the significance of the extraordinary events. The deliberations might serve to clarify the tensions between, on the one hand, the undeniable sovereign right of the party to withdraw and, on the other hand, the supreme interest of the community in the avoidance of nuclear war. If time-honored vital interests have been inflated into supreme interests owing to the nuclear threat, the charter's concern for international security should also be given a higher priority for the same reason.

Speaking of legal approaches—something that went out of fashion along with the League Covenant or perhaps with the Hague Conventions of the turn of the century—there is a precedent for bringing nuclear disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) even in cases in which a country is not a party to the relevant treaty. The reference is to the complaints brought by Australia and New Zealand against France in 1974 because of its atmospheric nuclear tests. Since France is not a party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the two countries relied on the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, from which France withdrew as a result of this case. What is of interest here is not only the fact that the ICJ presents another mechanism for dealing with nuclear disputes, but also that such action could have a political impact on the policy discussions within the government.[2]

As a result of a wave of proliferation, the Security Council is likely to be confronted with tensions inherent in the deployment of nuclear weapons. In the arms control literature, this phenomenon is referred to as the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.[3] Proliferation opens up new sources not only of disputes but of tensions as well, tensions being deeply implanted, long-lived "unformulated conflicts of power."[4] Take the case, for example, that was placed before the Security Council in 1958 by the Soviet Union charging that the flights of American bombers armed with nuclear weapons con-

2. See Thomas M. Franck, "Word Made Law: The Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Test Cases," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 69 (July 1975), p. 612.

3. See Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 4.

4. For the distinction between disputes and tensions, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972), ch. 25.

stituted a potential threat to the peace.[5] Although the council could do little more than air the complaint, discuss the problems of surprise attack and miscalculations, and encourage other members and the Secretary General to implore the parties to agree to partial measures designed to relax tensions, the effect on internal debates within the respective governments was probably salubrious. Not long after the council debate, the parties agreed to convene a conference on surprise attack which, despite its failure, laid the first foundation stone for Stategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The point here is that nuclear disputes embedded in tensions created by asymmetrical nuclear deployments may require of the Security Council, not the usual combination of pressures for peaceful settlements and sanctions, but rather support for arms control measures.

Finally, we have the General Assembly's responsibility for general principles and new international law. There is, for instance, considerable interest in the problem of nuclear terrorism, but most governments have no official reason to address this potential source of domestic as well as international tension. This situation would change if the issue were brought to the General Assembly in the same way that West Germany isolated the issue of the taking of innocent hostages and requested the legal committee of the thirty-first assembly to draft a convention outlawing this particular form of terrorism. Although the problem of terrorism is usually anathema to the leaders of the Third World because it focuses on symptoms rather than on what they consider to be root causes, the problem of nuclear terrorism might command enough interest and support to win the approval of the majority. At the very least, an initiative would compel governments to address the issue and perhaps thereby raise everyone's consciousness.

It is, thus, possible to anticipate that a new group of disputes and tensions will appear on the agendas of international organizations as a result of nuclear proliferation and of the superpowers' desire to maintain the non-proliferation regime or at least to prevent breaches of the nuclear peace. Even in the absence of effective persuasion backed by sanctions, the fact that a state will have the opportunity of going to the Security Council or some other body already provides the dovish forces within the government with arguments against the worst case assumptions. From the standpoint of the responsibility of the superpowers, such submissions will be a test of the degree of their common interest in non-proliferation. One can assume that the superpowers will be particularly concerned with those nuclear disputes and tensions that could lead to their embroilment in a nuclear crisis.

NUCLEAR CRISES

A nuclear crisis is a confrontation in which nuclear forces are placed on alert status and miscalculation leading to the actual use of nuclear weapons is therefore a distinct possibility. The dynamics of a nuclear crisis have been demonstrated first in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and less menacingly during the Middle East War of 1973. Although the superpowers prudently managed to resolve the confrontation

5. See in particular Security Council *Official Records*, 815th meeting, 29 April 1958.

between them in these two cases, in a world of many nuclear powers this responsibility will most probably have to be shared.

From the standpoint of international organizations, the two examples of nuclear crisis can be compared in relation to three factors: (1) tension background, (2) management of crisis, and (3) implementation of mutual concessions.

The Cuban Crisis developed in a context marked by severe Cold War tensions while the Middle East War broke out after the European status quo had been legitimated, several arms control agreements had been achieved, and the two powers had signed the "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War" of June 22, 1973.[6] In 1962 the UN was fully integrated into superpower relations, especially on issues affecting nuclear arms control. The 1973 agreement, as illustrated below, formalized the increasingly separate relationship that had developed with the aid of the Hot Line and SALT and relegated the UN to an afterthought: "Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations . . . of the progress and outcome of consultations . . ." (Article V).

If one conceives of the UN in terms of its principles and purposes rather than as a practical instrument of diplomacy, then the 1973 agreement reflects the parties' recognition that "the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons" (Article I) places their responsibility for "the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security" (Article VI) in a very special context. Moreover, the 1973 agreement did not mean that tensions between the superpowers had been relaxed to the point where they were no longer a concern. On the contrary, the agreement reflected acute apprehension that their alliances could lead to nuclear crises "if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war . . ." (Article IV). In any event, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War reflected a radically changed perception of the role of the United Nations in the relationship between the superpowers; nonetheless, the United States and the USSR found the UN to be indispensable in October 1973.

Agreements such as this one are easily faulted in view of what happened in October 1973, but their worth should not be judged solely in terms of unenforceable declarations of good intentions. Rather, one must keep in mind that they provide the process whereby nuclear adversaries can arrive at a reinterpretation of their particular and special responsibility to the overarching charter purpose, namely, the avoidance of war among the great powers. All states with whom the superpowers are oppositely entangled should undergo the same process.

When we come to the actual management of nuclear crises, the role of the UN or of regional organizations is conditioned by whether the superpowers are directly or indirectly engaged and whether it is an issue which has previously been resolved collectively through the UN. In the 1962 "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation, the crisis was grounded in a nuclear dispute—whether the Soviet Union could deploy nuclear weapon systems in Cuba, albeit under Russian control. Crisis management involved a carefully gradu-

6. For complete text of Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, see *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 67 (October 1973), p. 833.

ated show of force in the form of a quarantine and intensive, if not always coordinated, bilateral negotiations. The Security Council's function was simply to receive mutually exclusive resolutions from the parties, to publicize the dramatic facts, and, because of the status of the disputants, to discourage third-party meddling. The fact that the General Assembly happened to be in session apparently led the nonaligned diplomats to encourage the Secretary General to propose a freeze on actions by both sides, a measure which was finessed because a cooling-off period would have neutralized American pressure for the removal of the missiles.[7]

Were a similar situation to arise between two less powerful nuclear states, and provided that the superpowers were not taking opposite sides, the Security Council might not be as passive as it was forced to be in the Cuban case. In such cases, should China, France, or Britain wish to prevent action which the superpowers favor, the latter will have their aforementioned agreement on the prevention of nuclear war as a basis for enforcing a return to the status quo ante. In cases where the superpowers are on opposite sides, the situation will be similar to that of the Middle East War, with the significant exception that the local disputants might then also be nuclear powers.

The Organization of American States (OAS) was a key institution in the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although it, along with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League, has authority to settle disputes between members, and therefore a third-party function, in this crisis it served to legitimate the quarantine. This is particularly noteworthy because one can imagine circumstances in a proliferated world in which regional organizations might, instead, legitimate the dissemination of nuclear weapons (when a majority of its members are in a confrontation with a hostile nuclear power). In 1973 the dispute was not a nuclear one, although the involvement gradually escalated to the point where both sides apparently unsheathed their nuclear weapons.[8] This crisis developed out of an act of war for which a cease-fire arrangement would normally be worked out in the Security Council. The dispute involved the superpowers as the chief negotiators since the local parties could not even meet bilaterally at the UN because the question of direct negotiations was itself a matter in dispute. Thus, the Security Council became little more than a mechanism for registering the cease-fire agreements reached in bilateral negotiations, which in turn reflected the fortunes on the battlefields. But the execution of the cease-fires, as this case dramatically illustrated, is not easily accomplished without the combination of great-power pressure and some third-party presence to symbolize the accord, which brings in the third factor—the implementation of mutual concessions.

In the Middle East Crisis of 1973, the UN peacekeeping force was in part a response to a Soviet threat to intervene to enforce the cease-fire. For the first time, the possibility of reliance on a Soviet-American

7. This account is based on Abram Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

8. This account is based mainly on Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1975), chs. 16–19.

peacekeeping force, with or without UN blessing, was considered. While this was unacceptable to the United States at the time, it is an idea that might surface again in future nuclear crises, especially if other permanent members should not be willing to support a UN force.

In 1962, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the UN should carry out on-site inspection to verify the removal of Soviet missiles. But Cuba refused to permit UN inspection and the United States instead relied on unilateral means of verifying compliance. There are two noteworthy aspects to this abortive role. One is the fact that, in the heat of the crisis, Khrushchev proposed on-site inspection and that the Office of the Secretary General should carry it out; both had previously been denounced by the Russians on ideological grounds. When the chances of miscalculation are great and the time for military decision is compressed into hours, the problem for powers caught up in a nuclear crisis is how to communicate signals that can be expected to register without much analysis. The fact that such key phrases as "on-site inspection" and "the Secretary General" had been well worked over in acrimonious debates made them particularly useful signals. By analogy, new nuclear powers should be encouraged to engage in seemingly fruitless arms control negotiations so that they, too, may have signals with similar potential effect should they be forced to rely on their own means for resolving a nuclear crisis.

The second aspect that is relevant for a proliferated world is the subsequent unwillingness of Cuba to accept UN on-site inspection which had been agreed to by the superpowers. One has only to imagine a situation in which other nuclear powers are involved to appreciate the kind of resistance the UN and the great powers are likely to encounter.

In both crises the superpowers had full command of crisis diplomacy; that may not be possible once proliferation takes place. This is what concerned William Jordan of the UN Secretariat as he reflected on the significance for the UN of the Cuban Missile Crisis:

> Should further nuclear powers emerge, and should therefore the bilateral dialogue in moments of crisis be replaced by a confused exchange of views between the sundry wielders of nuclear power, the likelihood of an outcome without resort to the actual use of nuclear weapons would seem diminished.[9]

In the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, the superpowers distinguish between nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. It may well be that as nuclear proliferation evolves, they will adapt their crisis management practices to include the likelihood that sooner or later nuclear weapons will be used. As in the past, the UN role is destined to be whatever is required to implement the superpowers' arrangement. In the event of the use of nuclear weapons, this might range from disaster relief to supervising the enforced dismantling of a nuclear weapon system. Perhaps this is a matter which could be studied

9. Quoted from an unpublished memorandum, "Nuclear Crises and the United Nations," written during the Cuban Missile Crisis by the late Dr. Jordan when he was director of the UN's Political Affairs Division.

within the UN Secretariat in anticipation of nuclear proliferation.

A nuclear crisis can also be viewed as an opportunity camouflaged by pervasive insecurity. One of the positive consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the movement to prevent the further proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons. The first achievement was the Partial Test Ban of 1963; several years later, a nuclear free zone was created with its own Organization for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). Though the general Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 left the nuclear powers free to engage in dissemination, it did inhibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states not then possessing them. The point is that a nuclear crisis can lead to some substantial positive achievement, with the assistance of the UN. Although the parallel consequence of the Middle East Crisis of 1973 has still to emerge, one can detect a pronounced shift from a total reliance on UN peacekeeping to a strong movement for a political settlement.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The experience of the superpowers has some limited value as the only guide to future nuclear crises in a world of many nuclear-armed states. However, the democratization of power relations that is taking place means that fewer governments will accept the hierarchical notion of superpower supremacy and the premise that the avoidance of nuclear war between them is the supreme interest of all countries. Moreover, in the present nationalistic environment, the superpowers cannot expect states with a nuclear potential to sacrifice their own conception of national security on the altar of the high ideal of common security without concrete evidence of sacrifices.

The fact is, however, that in recent years the superpowers have not supported, nor have they been under great pressure at the UN to support, measures which would denuclearize world politics. They have, instead, learned to satisfy public opinion with limited arms control measures. That each General Assembly devotes most of its political agenda to disarmament items is a tribute to customary practice rather than to the commitment to arms control of the majority of states. Third World countries have so far not made denuclearization an integral part of their new world order. Since they control the General Assembly, which in the past has been the main mechanism for maintaining pressure on the superpowers, it will be they who will decide whether denuclearization measures will be incorporated into their negotiations with the industrialized world.

Although the superpowers are already committed by the NPT to embark upon denuclearization, they are fearful of tampering with a security structure that has at least enforced prudence even as it has created tensions and nuclear crises. Given their fear and the absence of effective Third-World leadership, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which they might entertain Richard Falk's demand that denuclearization replace nonproliferation as the UN objective as part of a movement for "structural change by which is meant a fundamental rearrangement of institutional arrangements and authority

patterns that currently give shape to international relations."[10]

The reforms of Leonard Beaton, on the other hand, would continue to place the primary responsibility for international security upon the superpowers. Starting with the premise that a stabilized posture of nuclear deterrence would be advantageous in a proliferated world, Beaton proposes to diffuse among all nuclear states the kind of "cognisance" that has developed between the superpowers.[11] My own view is that, unfortunately, governments are likely to follow this path rather than that of denuclearization.

Nevertheless, in this context, the UN might well adapt some of Beaton's ideas for institutional reform and, in particular, establish an International Nuclear Security Planning Group. The aim of this group, which might have the same relationship to the Security Council as the moribund Military Staff Committee, would be to anticipate and study the disputes and tensions that will arise as additional states acquire nuclear weapons. Another function would be to carry out, on a temporary basis, emergency measures for dampening a crisis, such as the special inspection or supervision of nuclear facilities or the monitoring of nuclear force deployments; the group would be a kind of nuclear peacekeeping cadre. A third function would be to help leaders of new nuclear states to understand the tensions associated with their new status and ways of ameliorating them. Finally, the group might also be responsible for planning and evaluating measures for partial denuclearization, such as the establishment of nuclear free zones.

Hopefully, these nuclear peacekeepers would be encouraged by the superpowers to persist in their specialized work in the midst of proliferation and active disputes on other issues. Given the interest of the superpowers in a stable nuclear environment, they might wish to use the group as the vehicle for the dissemination of procedures and technology designed to minimize the chances of miscalculation and nuclear accidents. Is it not high time for governments spending more than $300 billion each year on military power and security to permit a few citizens to serve exclusively an institution concerned only with the international implications of nuclear disputes, tensions, and crises?

More radical reforms of a supranational nature which would enhance the operational authority of international organizations are not likely to prove acceptable in the absence of deep and pervasive insecurity. Had it not been for two general wars which left the world emotionally and physically crippled, the League of Nations and the United Nations would probably not have been created. Perhaps only another boundary event—the first use of nuclear weapons—could tap the latent supranational impulses of some 150 governments. Until then, leaders must heed the imperative of proliferation: the international security symbols and mechanisms of the United Nations must be protected because all people and governments have a supreme interest in the avoidance of nuclear war.

10. Richard Falk, "A World Order Analysis of Nuclear Proliferation," *Forum for Correspondence and Contact*, vol. 8, no. 2 (October 1976), p. 111.

11. Leonard Beaton, *The Reform of Power* (New York: The Viking Press, 1972); see, also, the proposals for reform in William Epstein, *The Last Chance* (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

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Proliferation and the Future: Destruction or Transformation?

By FREDERICK C. THAYER

ABSTRACT: We must recognize that proliferation includes both nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons, the latter being only a follow-on to the former. The first step toward coping with proliferation is to accept that nuclear weapons are essentially political weapons of terror, not military weapons, even if we have convinced ourselves otherwise. For the near term, proliferation can enhance international stability if it occurs in balanced, rather than unbalanced, fashion. Over the long term, the issues are different. The critical global problem is finite limits to natural resources. Nuclear weapons are becoming both the cheapest and the only way of waging war. This faces us with a stark choice between alternative futures: (1) A world of iron or totalitarian governments, in which each state blackmails others so as to acquire scarce resources. The continuing shortages lead to rigid internal management and unending nuclear war. (2) A world in which shortages are recognized and we develop global agreements for resource distribution. The concept of sharing replaces property (both individual and state), social hierarchies (including the state) are transformed into other social systems we cannot yet describe in detail, and the social institution of war has no meaning. If we choose the first, there is no future. If we choose the second, we must soon begin a program of balanced deproliferation, in which we abandon both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

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WE LIVE in an era of galloping nuclear proliferation, an era in which the spread of nuclear weapons is tied closely to the spread of nuclear power plants; many nation-states see nuclear energy as the only feasible near-term replacement for petroleum, which, before the end of the century, will be either largely depleted everywhere or well past the point of peak production. The connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy gives us an exciting opportunity to take the broadest possible approach to issues of proliferation. If we can transcend the narrowly military way in which we, especially in the United States, have dealt with these issues in the past, perhaps we can provide a basis for meaningful speculation about future political and economic relationships on a global scale. With that in mind, this essay first explores two general themes, each of them generally in disagreement with those of my colleagues in this volume; I then turn to a brief exposition of two possible world futures, our major task (as I see it) being to consciously choose between them.

As to the general themes:

1. Nuclear proliferation already has reached a point where it is long past the time to dispel most of the mythology with which we have surrounded nuclear questions. In particular, we must recognize that nuclear weapons remain the weapons of terror they were when we first used them. They transform all warfare into the immediate destruction of civilian populations, and it is nonsense to continue to pretend otherwise.

2. For the very near term, accelerated proliferation seems inevitable. For practical purposes, we cannot discourage proliferation without insisting that other countries give up not only the idea of arming themselves with nuclear weapons, but also expansion of their energy production for peaceful purposes. This being immediately impossible, we have no choice but to seek forms of proliferation which might retard the expansion of instability if not actually produce greater stability. It makes no sense to cling to a stance which simply condemns all proliferation as bad.

Each of the two likely world futures is based on a premise which, despite its increasing prominence, is less influential than it should be. The world's natural resources are finite, and we fast approach the limits to those resources, in particular those that are nonrenewable. We face an apocalyptic choice, each course frightening—if for different reasons:

1. Some now predict that recognition of the finite limits to resources will lead to ever more authoritarian control of all social activity by "iron governments" which will struggle bitterly against each other for possession of whatever is left. The primary use of nuclear weapons, whether in the hands of governments or terrorist groups, will be to blackmail others to hand over the resources in their possession or, alternatively, to protect one's own resources from blackmail. Almost inevitably, this will lead to some form of nuclear holocaust.

2. Others predict that a profound and peaceful social transformation is possible, the first of such magnitude since the shift from hunting to agricultural societies approximately 5,000 years ago. The transformation will include the demise of social hierarchies and economic market systems and the development of

global networks for reaching agreement as to how and to whom available resources will be distributed. Once we recognize that resources are limited, the moral justification for property (individual or national) will vanish, sharing will be the only possible mode of existence, and such social institutions as war will have no legitimacy.

I shall attempt to make a plausible argument that we have some reason for optimism. It turns out, for example, that even if we consciously proceed in accordance with the pessimistic scenario (1), the policy decisions we take will actively, if inadvertently, lead to the realization of the optimistic scenario. Before getting to these scenarios, however, I turn to a reassessment of the immediate past.

THE DEMYTHOLOGIZING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

While the nuclear superpowers are reluctant to admit as much, the expansion of nuclear capability to very small states, and to terrorist groups as well, will lead over time to a profound and necessary demythologizing of nuclear weapons. The United States and the USSR have attempted, and attempt now, to maintain the fiction that nuclear weapons are fundamentally military, not political, weapons. We have gone to great lengths to avoid admitting what we demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; nuclear weapons (like fire bombs) are most effective when they are used against civilian population centers. It is worth recalling some of the scenarios we have developed in a forlorn attempt to conceal the obvious.

—We developed doctrines of rational war, including the assumption that any first strike would make sense only if directed against an opponent's weapons, even though we included the phrase "bonus effect" to describe the substantial damage any such strike would do to nearby population centers. From the standpoint of justifying military budgets, this was a useful doctrine, because a very large number of missiles are needed if one seeks to ensure he will be able to destroy an enemy's entire missile force. In outlining these doctrines, which had to assume rationality on both sides, we conveniently overlooked a basic internal contradiction; a rational war could be conducted only if each side had two or three times as many missiles as the other, a bit unlikely to say the least.[1] In pursuing the doctrine, we even planned at one time to locate all missile complexes in very isolated areas so as to ensure our civilian population would not be damaged in a rational first strike. This proved logistically unmanageable, but we retained the imagery anyway.

—We developed some of the silliest civil defense theories imaginable. One prominent strategic theorist argued that if the Soviets misbehaved, we should evacuate our urban populations to the countryside, issue the Soviets an ultimatum, launch a first strike against Soviet missiles if they disobeyed, accept whatever insignificant second strike they could launch against our cities, wait until the fallout had subsided,

1. Only now, when MIRV (Multiple Independent Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles) enable each side to deploy more warheads than the other side has launched vehicles is such a war conceivable—and even then, disarming strikes could not reach important elements of the strategic nuclear forces, such as missile submarines at sea.

and then repopulate the cities. This approach to rational war seemingly justified a U.S. first strike, the book in which it appeared became an all-time best seller, but the theorist conveniently ignored the elaborate evidence put together within the government as to the utter impossibility of total evacuation of the cities.

The government itself, in the early 1960s, adopted an opposite approach, one based upon a Soviet first strike (a bit more morally comforting). Because the Soviets would (rationally) attack only missiles, not cities, we designated downtown buildings as suitable for fallout shelters and urged other citizens to install them in their backyards. While also a neat budgetary trick (blast shelters would be prohibitively expensive in cities), this program had both tragic and amusing side effects:

1. At one press conference during which he urged citizens to add fallout shelters to their homes (a business which underwent a fast cycle of boom and bust), then Secretary of Defense McNamara was asked why he had not installed such a shelter in his home. His response? "I rent a home in Washington; I do not own it."

2. Assuming an imbalance of fallout capability in nonwork hours (most of the space was located in downtown areas), the government developed the "freight-car" concept. Many citizens were expected to travel toward the center city so as to make the shelters closest to their homes available to those living still farther away from the downtown areas. This assumed a willingness on everyone's part to ignore the shelter closest to him, and it also assumed a massive traffic jam. At one legislative hearing, a congresswoman from Michigan was incredulous; the policy, she said, meant that if Soviet missiles arrived at night, only the pimps, prostitutes, and drunks of downtown Detroit would be saved.

3. Quite a few citizens, among those who installed residential fallout shelters, prepared to shoot neighbors who demanded access to those shelters. If a shelter were overcrowded, its occupants might have to exit before the fallout had subsided, hence shooting one's neighbor seemed morally justifiable. The national discussion of this issue was at best ugly.

When civil defense was a major item on the public agenda, the fundamentally contradictory nature of the first strike and second strike theories was never made clear, principally, I think, because those advocating first strike approaches did not wish to be too forthright in their advocacy. Both sides, however, deluded all of us by implying that fallout would be the only substantial problem of a U.S.-USSR nuclear exchange.

—We developed various theories about "clean" and "dirty" missiles, arguing that, if both sides would only agree to refrain from developing dirty ones, relatively clean and undamaging nuclear wars could be fought.

—We emphasized the need for a wide range of tactical nuclear weapons. These would give us, so we heard, a "spectrum of capabilities," and it would easily be possible to conduct "sanitary" strikes against very small targets (bridges, for example), thus further ensuring no damage to nearby civilian populations (as in Europe).

—We developed a fascination

with "blue water deterrents," the notion that if the United States would rely on missile-carrying submarines, any Soviet first strike would completely avoid the United States. Some carried this further, suggesting that if both sides relied on submarines, there might be no damage to civil societies at all.

Given our policy-makers insistence that our nuclear stockpile was military, not political, in nature, an unresolvable debate was inevitable. Those who understood the basically terroristic character of nuclear weapons shouted "Overkill!"; but those justifying the weapons saw only a continuing need to stockpile enough missiles to knock out enemy missiles (and there could never be enough). As the stockpiles on both sides grew and grew to levels none of us can comprehend even now, we tried to tell ourselves that we could maintain those old distinctions between combatant and noncombatant, military and civilian, thus protecting the nonmilitary parts of society from destruction. We even denied our own experience, in that we conveniently chose not to remember that during World War II, we increasingly had turned to the terror (fire) bombing of cities even as we continued to speak vaguely of precision bombing.

Once in a great while, the press of events compelled us to admit (if only implicitly) that our strategic doctrines, taken together, amounted to nonsense. This was especially the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the president undertook to explain on national television the precise nature of the Soviet threat. His position was that the Soviets had placed offensive missiles in Cuba, but he then described the threat in terms of the precise distances between those Soviet missiles and a number of American cities. In the doctrine of rational war, of course, offensive missiles would be aimed at American missiles, not cities, but few noticed that in a time of real crisis, the first casualty was the doctrine of rational war. The missiles were, simply stated, a clear notice from the Soviets that any further U.S. attempt to overthrow Castro would bring the Soviets to his defense, and the notice was heeded when the United States guaranteed to protect Castro.

This criticism of the way we have handled nuclear issues cannot be confined to policy-makers. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, for example, there emerged in the United States a substantial academic community devoted to full-time teaching and research on issues of national security. Doctrines of rational war provided a basis for endless treatises about "throw weight," "CEPs," and "risk calculus." Given the underlying premises, the larger political and moral issues hardly were addressed at all and, to this day, many attempt to hold the line against the introduction of such issues. Almost instinctively, they reject what might be called "the French view," which argues in effect that nuclear weapons are basically political, or terrorist, in nature, hence a modest nuclear force can be highly effective. To that, our policymakers and defense intellectuals respond that a small force cannot be effective precisely because it is too small to be militarily effective.

The result of all this is that many approaches to the issue of proliferation, including some in this volume, seem inherently contradictory. If the issue is a serious enough one to warrant publication of this volume, it can only be because the

French view is fundamentally correct. Were the long-term U.S. approach to be taken as valid, the acquisition of modest nuclear capabilities by many countries would not be significant enough militarily to worry about. Clearly, we are worried about proliferation, even as we generally continue to avoid discussing the associated political and moral issues. This makes most of the arguments against proliferation largely irrelevant to the countries to which we address them, and it generally blinds us to the possibility that in the world as now constituted, proliferation may not always be politically destabilizing. To that question I now turn.

BALANCED PROLIFERATION: A SHORT-TERM HOPE

The present trend toward proliferation should demonstrate once and for all that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was never anything but a pious hope based upon illogical premises. Two such premises never received the attention they deserved: one was the concept of nuclear umbrellas supposedly erected by nuclear superpowers, the other was the nature of the NPT as something of a military alliance.

Inherent to the NPT was the notion that the United States and USSR would separately guarantee to protect their allies, friends, or client states from nuclear blackmail or attack by the other. Many states that were non-nuclear at the time, whether or not they joined the NPT, had little faith in such guarantees, and it was foolish to expect otherwise. The umbrella concept depended, of course, upon the fallacious nuclear doctrines outlined above. To clearly recognize nuclear weapons as fundamentally terroristic and most effective when used against civilian populations is to see the absurdity in attempts to convince a U.S. ally that we would make our civilian population the hostages of that ally's foreign policy. Further, the umbrella approach ignored the old dictum that nation-states may have permanent interests but not permanent allies. An umbrella concept logically requires that nuclear guarantees be extended or withdrawn as various countries change sides. Suppose, for example, that China had sought the protection of an umbrella; could the United States logically have been expected, in recent years, to guarantee reprisal against the Soviets if they attacked China?

Also inherent to the NPT was the implicit premise that the nuclear superpowers should jointly undertake to destroy, by direct attack if necessary, any other country's attempt to develop nuclear weapons. I do not suggest that immediate destruction of an emerging nuclear capability is the only possible sanction or disincentive that can be used in any given situation, but I do suggest that the logic of the NPT required such joint action if the superpowers were serious about preventing proliferation and if nothing else worked. The general absurdity of such joint U.S.-USSR action led me to label the NPT as an impossible alliance which could never be implemented.

Even if alliance always has been impossible, however, U.S. and USSR nuclear capabilities have led to positive developments, indeed to an important form of global stability. The nuclear superpowers have developed, over more than a decade, elaborate rituals and detailed precautions designed to avoid direct confrontation between them.

These have included the now-famous hotline, explicit signals and personal reassurances about the meanings of specific foreign policy actions, a formal agreement to avoid war, and even a willingness to virtually ignore any action that might lead to direct confrontation. We were careful to avoid any action when the Soviets erected the Berlin Wall, we rejected the alternative (favored by some) of destroying Soviet missile emplacements in Cuba (which would have led to the deaths of many Soviet technicians), and the Soviets were quiet when we mined the harbors of North Vietnam. In many other crises, both sides have dispatched both explicit and implicit signals to reassure each other. All these activities, of course, demonstrated the poverty of our strategic doctrines. Leaders understood, if they did not announce, that any U.S.-Soviet engagement would lead immediately to all-out nuclear exchange, with no pauses along the way. Few would argue now that a conventional war involving the nuclear superpowers could be managed so as to avoid nuclear exchange.

There is something to be said, then, for balanced proliferation as an improvement over unbalanced proliferation. Whatever the United States might like to believe about its own peaceful intentions in international politics, it is plausible to argue that relationships between the United States and USSR are more stable than they would have been if the latter never had acquired nuclear weapons. Given any situation involving more or less continuous high tension within a group of nation-states, as in the case of Israel and other countries in the Middle East, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by only one of these states may be more destabilizing than acquisition by all. If, as some evidence indicates, the Israelis have gone nuclear, a case can be made that the superpowers have an interest in encouraging, or at least not discouraging, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israeli opponents.

The United States cannot effectively pursue a policy of balanced proliferation by itself. At the minimum, specific implementation on a case-by-case basis would have to be jointly worked out with the Soviets, and perhaps with others as well. This is because an important part of the policy would have to be the specific withdrawal of all implicit or explicit understandings concerning umbrella protection. If it makes sense, for example, for the United States and the Soviets to promote balanced proliferation in the Middle East, or in the case of India and Pakistan, it makes just as much sense to make clear to the proliferating countries that they cannot expect any further military support from the superpowers. Balanced proliferation, in other words, would turn out to be a form of disengagement of the superpowers from regional conflicts.

It follows that a concept of balanced proliferation depends upon complete acceptance of the arguments proliferating countries have made against the NPT and the nuclear superpowers, just as it also depends upon the experience the superpowers have acquired. Other countries have discounted the usefulness of umbrellas, so they cannot have it both ways. Once a country acquires a nuclear military capability, it must admit it cannot expect a nuclear superpower to provide an unwilling umbrella. The long experience of the United States and the Soviets in managing nu-

clear weaponry can only be interpreted as a mutual understanding that all direct military action against each other must be avoided if nuclear war is to be avoided. This experience suggests, some commentators notwithstanding, that limited wars between nuclear-armed countries are impossible.

I do not suggest for a moment that balanced proliferation can be expected to delay proliferation, but the premises underlying this policy would not include an assumption that a slowdown in proliferation is always preferable to a speed-up, the general assumption of most authors in this symposium. Indeed, the logic of balanced proliferation suggests that once proliferation is seen to be inevitable, little is gained by attempting to retard it. Hence, balanced proliferation would be a policy of conscious acceleration of proliferation, and this just might work over the short term.

This is a less startling assertion than it seems at first glance. Our present approach to proliferation disguises a great deal of proliferation by labeling it as peaceful in nature. We engage in nuclear proliferation when we export the technology for building nuclear power plants, and it is foolish to pretend otherwise. A policy of balanced proliferation would merely recognize this phenomenon for what it is and carry it to its logical conclusion.

It follows that balanced proliferation would have a profound effect upon the international system. The withdrawal by the superpowers of all nuclear guarantees to proliferating countries would have the effect of terminating alliances as we have come to know them. Each nuclear state would have to fend for itself in a world of nuclear states, knowing that its friends could not afford to risk their own populations as the price of maintaining that friendship. I suggest this already is widely understood, because it is the most logical explanation for the attempts that are made to keep secret the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We should not conspire to keep proliferation a secret; we should openly recognize it every time it occurs, and make clear at the time of the announcement that we can no longer lend our support to the proliferating country.

Balanced proliferation would not be an ideal policy, nor even a good policy in any moral sense, only a better policy than the ones usually advocated. At its best, it could provide only an incremental improvement in stability over a more unbalanced form of proliferation. Over the long term, of course, we cannot sensibly define as stable any world in which many countries have terror weapons at their disposal, let alone a world in which terrorist groups also are able to acquire terror weapons. But it is equally foolish to pretend that even a world in which only the United States and the Soviets had such weapons could be forever stable, yet that has been, and remains, both the central thrust of our nuclear policy and the central thrust of most analyses of that policy.

For the short term, then, it is time to abandon the notion that those now possessing nuclear weapons are somehow more sane, trustworthy, or rational than other countries likely to acquire such weapons. We can make no plausible argument in behalf of this notion, and we never have been prepared to implement it by destroying new nuclear capabilities. So it becomes necessary to speculate about longer-term trends. What are the possibilities?

PROLIFERATION AND THE FUTURE: TWO SCENARIOS

In a 1976 speech to the United Nations, former Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized a major paradox of the times. Nationalism, as he put it, had become a more powerful force in the world than ever before. (As I have argued above, nuclear proliferation contributes to this by making alliances decreasingly effective or even credible, thus transforming the international system into the most atomistic system imaginable.) Kissinger also noted that even as nationalism had become more significant, there was increasing recognition of interdependence within the international system. He implied that acknowledgement of interdependence would require, sooner or later, substantial modifications to our definitions of sovereignty and independence, the hallmarks of nationalism. An example from the recent past can be used to highlight the possibilities.

The British Broadcasting Corporation produced a few years ago a series of documentaries on "The Energy Crunch" and, in the documentary concerning petroleum reserves, introduced a startling speculation. As the BBC put it, an important reason for the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam may have been the increasing realization that large-scale conventional warfare, especially aerial bombing, could no longer be sustained because of oil shortages. While this factor never was mentioned by U.S. policy-makers, it is interesting to ask what might have occurred in the United States if, at the time of the OPEC oil embargo, we had been conducting large-scale bombing raids on North Vietnam. U.S. citizens might not have been content to wait two hours or more to purchase $3 worth of automobile gasoline, knowing that large amounts of petroleum were being refined into aviation fuel to keep the bombers in the air.

As I suggested at the outset, the fast approaching depletion of petroleum resources is a major cause of the peaceful nuclear proliferation now underway. It is not yet widely acknowledged that we already are in an era where nuclear war is not only the cheapest but perhaps the only form of warfare available to any state. The superpowers continue to maintain huge conventional forces, and they continue to supply their client states with all sorts of petroleum-powered equipment (land and air), but there is little likelihood this equipment can be used on a sustained basis. As I also suggested in an earlier section, nuclear war is, in virtually all cases, likely to be terroristic, city-busting attacks on civilian populations. Generally speaking, it is likely to be impossible for any state to protect itself against all such attacks. As one scholar suggested quite a few years ago, reliance on nuclear weapons implies a mutual inability on the part of all states to preserve their territoriality, the further implication being that the nation-state was approaching its demise.

This becomes more of a possibility now than it was at the time he first predicted this demise, primarily because of the increasing inability to fight conventional wars. In both of the scenarios I briefly outline here, I assume to begin with that not only are we fast running out of oil, but also of many other natural resources which, taken together, have sustained the social institution of war within manageable economic pa-

rameters. I believe the evidence is overwhelming on this score, but it is not my purpose to convince doubters. I suggest only that proliferation would be less an issue than it is if economical substitutes for nuclear energy were easily available. Given this fundamental assumption, pessimistic and optimistic scenarios seem possible.

A pessimistic scenario

We already are partly the prisoners of a pessimistic scenario, beginning with the embargo levied against the United States by the petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) in 1973. Shortly thereafter, the president and the secretary of state announced that if at any time in the future a further OPEC embargo or excessive price rise threatened the United States with "economic strangulation," the United States would seriously consider taking military action. Serious students of foreign policy suggested that it was both possible and desirable for the United States to capture the largest pool of remaining oil (in Saudi Arabia) and then set fair prices for its sale. During the presidential campaign of 1976, the successful candidate announced that he would consider any future OPEC oil embargo the equivalent of an economic declaration of war on the United States and would respond accordingly.

In a world of fast-diminishing resources, with each state attempting to secure as much as it can of the available supply of each resource, and with conventional warfare increasingly ruled out because of the lack of resources to support it, nuclear weapons become increasingly attractive for the purposes of (1) protecting one's natural resources from blackmail threats by other nuclear states or terrorist groups; (2) making such threats credible when they must be used to secure resources from other states possessing them; and (3) generally protecting national security in the only way left to any state to do so.

In this scenario, each state is committed to the maximum possible economic growth, and the achievements of society as a whole and all the organizations and individuals within it are measured on that basis. Growth in the Gross National Product and per capita income are considered extremely important, and long-term doubts are usually resolved in favor of maximum growth. Where some might argue against continued reliance on nuclear energy because of the possibility of nuclear accidents or because of the difficulties in isolating nuclear wastes from the environment for hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of years, these arguments are cast aside on grounds that they are overstated or, alternatively, that technology will enable us to overcome any problems in the long run.

While the national actors in this scenario pay some attention to such problems as overpopulation, they seek technical solutions. One, already widely proposed, is the colonization of outer space. Perceived as only the newest of many frontiers conquered heretofore, outer space seems to offer great possibilities for building new communities in the form of space stations. These might be capable of absorbing a good deal of the world's overpopulation, and it is thus assumed that growth need not be limited to the planet Earth.

In this atomistic world of nuclear-armed states, each state turns more and more to "iron government" (the phrase used by one

serious analyst of the future) to maintain rigid discipline within its borders and organize the defense of its national fortress—beset by the possibility of nuclear threat and/or attack from any and all directions. An iron government in the United States, for example, might have to respond to a demand (tied to a nuclear threat) for food needed to feed starving populations. To sustain a suitable defense posture over the long term, each state is compelled to substantially restructure the national map.

A highly developed society such as the United States is an intricate web of networks, transactions, and interactions. Were any major U.S. city to be destroyed today by a nuclear missile, that destruction would have an immediate effect upon much of the rest of the country. Were our cities more self-sufficient, and at the same time more decentralized, the loss of any one city or several of them would have much less effect. It follows that a policy of national defense against nuclear attack requires an intensive long-term program of self-sufficiency, community by community, plus a program of extensive relocation so as to minimize the damage from nuclear attack. People must live within walking distance of their work, the distance between the production and consumption of goods must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and even cities must grow as much of their own food supplies as humanly possible.

Having forcibly reconstructed the national society into a group of more or less self-sufficient, modular communities, the function of national iron government becomes the management of international bargaining in a world of many iron governments (and iron terrorist groups). Depending upon the precise nature of the threats being exchanged, a government (in the United States or elsewhere) would have to decide whether to deprive some of its communities of resources so as to respond to a nuclear threat, whether to accept the nuclear destruction of one or more communities as the best bargain that could be struck, and so forth. The scenario simply continues in this vein until all the actors are no longer able to continue. Nation-states, existing in a Hobbesean state of nature, fight each other to the bitter end for the control of the remaining resources.

An optimistic scenario

Once recognized, finite limits to resources lead all states to conclude that they can no longer assume that their resources are their possessions, to be distributed as they (individually) see fit. To recognize finite limits to resources, in other words, is to remove the moral justification for property, especially as we have defined it in the West. We have justified property largely on the premise that natural resources are generally available to all on the basis of hard work. Once it is understood that this is impossible, property becomes the equivalent of theft.

The acceptance of the notion of finite limits to resources makes it possible to give an operational and concrete meaning to interdependence. All resources become everyone's resources, to be shared, distributed, allocated on some agreed basis, and "might makes right" cannot be the basis of decision making.

Oddly enough, recognition of limits to resources leads to the same sort of societal restructuring as does the pessimistic scenario outlined

above. Those who argue for social change on the basis of limits to growth predict and urge development of self-sustaining communities, even neighborhoods. One distinguished group of British scientists suggests that the building block of this social redesign (on a global scale) should be communites of some 500 citizens. These communities, while as self-sustaining as possible, are then linked together in decision-making networks which allow for global management (without central authority) of such things as food production and distribution, population control, energy production and consumption, allocation of seabed resources, and the like.

As we are already partly into the pessimistic scenario, so are we partly into its optimistic counterpart. In recent conferences seeking to resolve the law of the sea, especially in the context of deep seabed mining of minerals, developing countries insisted upon an international regime that could distribute profits around the world. Industrialized countries, especially the United States, argue for a more free-enterprise approach, but deeper issues came increasingly close to the surface. It seemed implicitly understood, for example, that any organizational design which allows for any international regulation of deep seabed mining will lead, almost automatically, to international regulation of all such mineral production. If country A, for example, has the market for one of its primary resources threatened by the exploitation of that same resource in the seabed, then the international community must protect country A's economy by either direct subsidy to country A or by restricting the mining of that resource in the sea. We are getting close, that is to say, to comprehensive global management of production and distribution.

In the optimistic scenario, long-term survival of the planet and its inhabitants takes precedence over economic growth. Doubts about the effects of particular actions are resolved in favor of long-term, not short-term, considerations. This leads to abandonment of nuclear energy on grounds that the long-term dangers surrounding its use may even exceed the dangers associated with nuclear weapons. There being no way to assure political, organizational, and geological stability in the long-term management of nuclear waste materials, the world adjusts the operation of economic systems on that basis.

Given the assumptions of this scenario, the social institution of war becomes impossible to sustain, not only because we cannot afford to waste resources in that manner but also because once the concept of interdependence is operationalized, sovereignty and independence can have no meaning. While I label this scenario optimistic, the degree of social change needed to realize it is painful and frightening to most of us. Global agreements on the distribution of resources are likely to require a lowering of material living standards in the most industrialized countries. The management and, perhaps, reduction in world population is likely to profoundly alter, even possibly remove, the family as a basic social institution, in that the central function of procreation would be denied many families. The disappearance of the conventional definition of property seems, at first glance, to remove the most fundamental motivation for an individual to work, but, as some

argue, the same phenomenon might enable us to experience work as something we do because we wish to do it, not merely because we must do it to survive. And, of course, the separation of work from income and the distribution of resources according to agreement leads to a major diminution in the functions of social hierarchies.

If the pessimistic scenario leads to some form of socialism, much more authoritarian than democratic, the optimistic scenario transcends all known forms of capitalist market systems and socialist planning systems. There is no way to suggest in detail how the political and organizational systems in such a world actually would function, beyond the impressionistic outline already attempted. The extent of the change can only be imagined, as by speculating on the nature of a presidential election campaign in which both candidates (assuming the conventional two-party U.S. system) were pledged to reduce the Gross National Product for the sake of planetary survival. It remains only to briefly summarize the likelihood of realizing each scenario.

THE APOCALYPTIC CHOICE

The combination of nuclear issues and limits to resources provides us with a choice between stark alternatives. The present international system, as extrapolated in the pessimistic scenario above, seems to lead inexorably to something approaching global destruction; if not from nuclear war, destruction may occur from thermal pollution, for example, as everyone pursues unlimited economic growth. The change inherent in the optimistic scenario, conversely, would be the first social transformation of such magnitude since the shift from hunting to agricultural societies (and the rise of urbanism) some 5,000 years ago. Even if the optimistic scenario is assumed the most desirable of the two, there remains the question of whether it can be achieved through relatively comfortable means or only after profound crisis and perhaps total destruction of the system we know.

Perhaps it is typical of the apocalyptic choice we face that the two scenarios share at least one major factor—the shift to modular, self-sufficient communities—and perhaps some associated implications are worth further exploration. It seems likely that self-sufficient communities, even if they remain attached to conventional nation-states, will not consent to being used as bargaining chips in international confrontations between their parent states and other states. By the same token, a largely self-sufficient community (we might even call it a "city-state") would have a decreasing need to blackmail any other community in an attempt to capture its resources. If a community did feel the need to ensure its own survival, it seems likely the community would insist on having its nuclear weapons under its control.

I conclude that whether one takes a pessimistic or an optimistic approach, we are fast approaching the demise of the nation-state as we know it. This leads me to suggest, perhaps only as a form of wishful thinking, that the optimistic scenario is the more likely outcome. The legitimation of interstate violence has been legitimized or constitutionalized only within our various approaches to international law, and these doctrines are vastly different from what many of us accept

within a nation-state. It might require a massive constitutional change to legitimize the use of any weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, in what might be called "intercity war." Until the demise of the nation-state is widely recognized, therefore, it is likely to retain its status as the only social actor with legitimate authority to wage war on its contemporaries. By the time the demise is recognized, we may be sensible enough to avoid legitimizing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by individual communities.

If, over the short term, balanced proliferation seems preferable to what is happening now, balanced deproliferation seems even more important if the planet is to survive. Deproliferation is an issue that cannot be approached solely from a military perspective, in that it is just as important—perhaps even more important—to abandon nuclear energy as to abandon nuclear weapons. Balanced deproliferation requires, then, that groups of countries in direct conflict with each other must reach agreements to phase out both nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons. This is nowhere more important than in the case of the United States and USSR which, if the world is to survive, must soon move well beyond such relatively meaningless issues as strategic arms limitation.

Serious students of public policy have, for the most part, been trained to expect and prefer evolutionary, even incremental, approaches to policy-making. They often resent and reject any argument which seems based on apocalyptic choices, and they dislike agreeing with any proposal requiring a quantum leap into an uncharted future. Given that understandable reaction, it is enough to suggest for now only that we accept the complete intertwining of all nuclear issues. If we are serious about proliferation, surely we must recognize that we cannot deal separately with weapons and power plants. We are at a point where we cannot affort to permit the march of modern science to continue simply because we know the next step. If we cannot begin to reverse the trend, at least within the next decade, there can be little hope over the long term.

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Decision Making in a Nuclear-Armed World

By MICHAEL BRENNER

ABSTRACT: Strategic analysis for the next generation promises to be preoccupied with the permutations and combinations of multi-player nuclear games. The spread of nuclear arms to several new states will appreciably complicate the efforts of the two superpowers to maintain a high level of stability in their bilateral relationship, while posing further challenges to military planning and crisis management. The new strategic environment will place an unprecedented burden on the capacity of the U.S. government to integrate the several facets of national security policy; to execute it in a consistent, coordinated manner; and to take swift, informed action in crisis situations. This is the case whether one speaks of programming force options to assure presidential control over operational use; making necessary reconciliations between Soviet-oriented military planning and the requirements for addressing third country nuclear threats; or institutionalizing a closer cooperation with allies on such diverse issues as export regulations and concerted contingency plans. There are three key ingredients to any plan for achieving a greater degree of coordination in making and implementing strategic policy: technical competence must be combined with decisional authority; senior national security officials should share a fund of ideas about the preferred direction of policy and the effective means for conducting it; an interagency committee of principals is needed that serves as the prime instrument for making executive departments effective contributors to, and executors of, policy.

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SPECULATION about national security decision making in a world where nuclear arms have become common military currency can begin with two presuppositions. First, American policy will experience a profound failure—due in large measure to the weaknesses and inadequacies of a disjointed, segmental policy process. Second, thinking about nuclear strategy, military planning, and governmental procedures for formulating and conducting foreign policy will have to be significantly revised. Past tolerance of laissez-faire attitudes within the Executive branch would underscore the crucial need for a renovation of policy-making formats under the new, proliferated conditions that former practices have permitted. A further assumption is that those acculturated to the old system will resist reform of either the process or substance of U.S. national security policy in a nuclear-armed world.

The advent of nuclear weapons forced dramatic changes in conventional military doctrine, the statecraft that employs them as instruments of national power, and the means for their control. They have imparted a very special by-play to the normal procedures for managing weaponry—placing premiums on centralized command and instilling deeply conservative attitudes about crisis management and the operational utility of armaments. The terms of the bilateral strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, as it came to express the logic of nuclear stalemate and common interest, has been the principal concern of officials and analysts for a quarter-century.[1] Strategic analysis for the next generation promises to be preoccupied with the permutations and combinations of multi-player nuclear games and the exacerbated problems of achieving an equivalent level of nuclear stability.

An analytic excursion into the futuristic realm of nuclear decision making among 12, 15, or 20 nations runs the danger of being overwhelmed by the multitude of new considerations that will enter into the calculations of governments and by the complications of devising national strategies in an international environment populated by new military powers that transform political alliances and security systems. It is unavoidable that this brief article concentrates on a few of the issues raised by proliferation. The discussion will deal primarily with problems of military planning and crisis-management for the U.S. government at some unspecified date in the future when, as is conjectured, most of today's prospective powers would have acquired some substantial nuclear capability. The intensity of the effects noted, and the saliency of the policy questions presented, will

1. The adaptation of military doctrine and national security planning to the nuclear realities of a world with five powers is a necessary background to the discussion of decision making in a proliferated global environment.

Among the several works recounting the post-war nuclear diplomacy of the U.S. and USSR, two deserve special mention. George Quester, *Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years* (New York: Dunellen, 1970); Jerome Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

There have been a number of perceptive accounts of modern strategy in the nuclear age. They include: *Problems of Modern Strategy, Part I* (IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 54, February 1969), contributions by Raymond Aron and Michael Howard; Richard Rosecrance, *Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered* (Adelphi Paper No. 116, spring 1975).

vary according to the scope and pace of proliferation. Other major powers will face analagous problems arising out of the new military and diplomatic circumstance, although they will be cast somewhat differently for each, and the range of available responses will also differ.

DECISION-MAKING ADAPTATIONS IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

Protecting deterrent stability

The overriding purpose of American and Soviet nuclear policy is, in Raymond Aron's words, "not in ruling together over the world . . . but in not destroying each other."[2] Tomorrow a principal concern will be to avoid being involved in a nuclear war not of their own making. Each makes enormous expenditures of fortune, technical skill, and diplomatic effort to safeguard itself against nuclear attack. Together, they have taken practical steps to reduce the hazards of misperceived intent or faulty communication. Their first priority in a world of proliferated nuclear arms will be devising measures to protect their common stake in nuclear stability against new menaces. Above all, that will entail: (1) reinforcing command and control mechanisms and (2) refining communications between the leadership of the two leading nuclear powers. The threat of attack from unforeseen, or unforeseeable directions, perhaps with no diplomatic or military forewarning, underscores the common need for precautionary action.

The impact on strategic decision making probably will take several forms:

Means will be sought to improve strategic intelligence and to monitor the origin and scope of any hypothetical attack on one of the superpowers or its allies—whether launched by missile, aircraft, or otherwise, the Defense Department already has given public indication that future threats beyond that posed by the Soviet Union warrant improvement in U.S. surveillance capabilities. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote in the *Annual Defense Department Report* (FY 1977), "the future threat posed by third countries, whether the Chinese or an emerging nuclear nation, requires a continued emphasis on surveillance and warning, together with R & D on light area defense."[3] Among the projects noted were the light CONUS bomber air defense, extension of the AWACS airborne surveillance system to allies abroad, as well as exploration of new interception techniques.

The appearance of nuclear threats from new sources is likely to give renewed impetus to research and development of an effective Ballistic Missile System. One of the arguments made by early advocates of BMD was the protection it could afford against a crude attack from a reckless government in possession of a rudimentary nuclear force. Of course, any proposal for deployment would run up against the prohibitions written into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) records and would require Soviet-American agreement on its revision—with the accompanying reopening of the debate over ABM's potential for destabilizing the stra-

2. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966), p. 11.

3. Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1977* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 59.

tegic balance between the superpowers.

The fear of an unprovoked attack by a reckless government or imperfectly controlled military establishment (undeterred by the retaliatory threat) might well also revive the idea of "launch on warning"—that is, programming U.S. ICBMs so that they could be launched upon receipt of signal from satellite surveillance or forward radar nets reporting what appears to be an incoming missile or salvo of missiles. The distaste that policy-makers have always felt about installing hair-trigger response mechanisms is due to its irrevocability—the fear that an unretrievable missile might be launched on inaccurate or incomplete information, or that the response was out of proportion to the actual attack. Launch-on-warning arrangements qualitatively change decision making in a fundamental way, insofar as they deny political authorities some portion of their discretionary authority to determine the character and magnitude of response to an attack. It introduces that element of automatism, the "Doomsday effect," that national leaders so deeply wish to avoid. Logically, there would be an interest in reconciling the desire for quick response with some measure of insurance against the loss of control—and, hence, incentives created for technical investigation of systems that would extend the time after launch during which an ICBM might be destroyed in flight.

As a practical matter, the logic of launch-on-warning itself might well be less pursuasive than some commentaries on the consequences of proliferation suggest. The principal problems raised by the existence of several possible attackers are:

1. how effectively to deter a host of variously motivated potential enemies under a variety of circumstances;
2. how to inform oneself of the source of an attack.

The capability to retaliate would seem to be the least vulnerable factor in the equation. It is knowing whom to retaliate against and preparing a response proportional to the threat (which might be a relatively small one) that are the truly vexing questions.

Whether or not serious thought is given launch-on-warning techniques, proliferation almost surely will provide a new spur to Soviet-American efforts at facilitating safe management of nuclear weapons. Accustomed to the relative security that gradually has come to characterize their bilateral nuclear dealings, they can only look with dread on the arrival of potentially disruptive new nuclear players. The paramount need will be to maintain crisis stability. More extensive and routine use of special communications links, the hotline, certainly would seem in order—with the necessary technical and administrative steps taken to ensure unimpaired communication. One innovation could involve installation of secondary lines between strategic command headquarters, to speed up the transfer and exchange of information that might indicate the source of an attack of uncertain origin.

A more far-reaching and radical innovation would be the creation of formal or quasi-formal arrangements for the pooling of intelligence in nonemergency as well as emergency situations. While each country surely will continue to conduct satellite surveillance and use other meth-

ods for collecting as much data as it could about the operational capabilities and strategic plans of third-nation nuclear forces (as no doubt both now do with regard to China, and the Soviets with regard to the United Kingdom and France), confidence would be increased to some immeasurable degree by the availability of corroborating or supplementary data. Moreover, a perceived threat from unofficial, terrorist groups liable to use unconventional means of delivery would create a strong incentive for pooling political intelligence—although here there might be appreciable differences in the weight accorded the problem by the two governments.

Agreement to coordinate intelligence activities, while exceptional, does follow the logic of earlier joint efforts at corking the nuclear genie. Making the necessary adjustments in organizational procedures, intra-governmentally, could prove a more formidable obstacle. All bureaucracies guard their unique mission and are jealous of sharing their privileged information. Government intelligence agencies feel most strongly on this score. It probably would require a clear presidential mandate firmly stating the U.S. national interest of treating with the enemy on those sensitive matters, assiduously enforced, to set the process in motion. Equally strenuous follow-up by representatives of the White House staff or Foreign Intelligence Board would probably be in order to assure active compliance with the directive. This innovation, as with most of the decision-making changes called for by the new condition of generalized proliferation, would place premiums on the interagency coordination and highlight the importance of devising the means for coherent, logically consistent policy making.

Strain conflicts

Certain aspects of proliferation emphasize the parallelism of Soviet and American interests and point toward a further concertation of their nuclear policies. Others will place strains on superpower condominium that could jeopardize the stability of their carefully nurtured strategic modus vivendi. Probably the most disruptive consequences would flow from the perceived need to plan for multiple contingencies against an array of possible opponents. In particular, impetus will be given to programs for improving the accuracy of delivery systems and enhancing their targeting flexibility.

Secretary Schlesinger's public announcement in January 1974 of plans to revise the United States' Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) "to ensure that American policy-makers had [options] for the discriminate and controlled use of nuclear weapons" is accompanied by the revival of counterforce doctrines that envisage nuclear exchanges with the USSR of varying scope, intensity, and duration.[4] All these scenarios share the conceptual premise that it is possible and in some instances is desirable for the United States to prepare to fight a nuclear war to determine a victor and loser. The direction of present official thinking and policies is summarized in the following paragraph from the 1977 Posture Statement.

4. Paraphrased by Lynn Etheridge Davis in *Limited Nuclear Options, Deterrence and the New American Doctrine* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 122, winter 1975/76), p. 1.

The most explicit statement of Dr. Schles-

At the same time, selected portions of our offensive forces are acquiring the flexibility to respond to more discriminating attacks. Not only is our inventory of preplanned options increasing; we are acquiring the retargeting and command-control capabilities to respond rapidly to unforeseen events. No hostile and reckless power can assume that our hands will be tied because our only choices in response to a limited nuclear attack are inactivity or the holocaust. More appropriate options now exist. We propose to go on refining them—and making systems improvements such as increased accuracy—so as to ensure that any attack can be met by a deliberate and credible response.[5]

Arguments for developing a more diverse array of more accurate weapons, programmed to cover a wide range of readily adjustable targets, gain new credence in a nuclearized world. The number of potential targets increases markedly as those in new nuclear countries are added to sites in the Soviet Union and China accorded some measure of priority. Accuracy, prized because it allows enemy military targets (especially ICBM silos) to be attacked with negligible civilian damage, thus presumably lowering the odds on a massive retaliation, acquires a new attraction since it permits (*a*) a preemptive attack against the nuclear forces of a minor power that gives indication of preparing a first strike; or (*b*) retaliation in honor of a pledge, unilaterally or jointly given, to a non-nuclear nation (for example, as in exchange for adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty) that then becomes the victim of a nuclear attack or threat by a belligerent neighbor. Flexibility in targeting, of course, simplifies the task of shifting available forces from one mission to another.

A commitment to achieving higher levels of accuracy, flexibility, and diversity implies specific policies on weapons development and deployment, strategic doctrine, and approaches to extending limitations on offensive weapons in phase two of SALT with the USSR. This is not the place to tackle the controversial and very significant issues that have been introduced by the renewed emphasis in American policy on counterforce concepts and weaponry.

The point to be emphasized with reference to proliferation is that, with the arrival on the nuclear stage of new actors, the decision-making process within the U.S. government will be biased in favor of proceeding with those programs and policies keyed to counterforce objectives. This holds true on weapon systems: MARV (Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle), the new generation of ICBM (the "MX"); on doctrine: the emphasis on targeting military sites in a counterforce mode; and on arms control bargaining strategies, that is, fighting shy of any restrictions on qualitative improvements, ascribing military virtues to cruise missiles, resisting a lowering of the threshold on underground nuclear tests. In sum, the proliferation factor could well shift the burden of proof in intramural debates strongly against the arms-control advocates, making the success of their position all the more dependent on active political

inger's own views, which now permeate much of the U.S. defense establishment, is in J. R. Schlesinger, "US-USSR Strategic Policies," hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 4 March 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1-17.

5. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report*, p. 14.

intervention by the White House. (We should also be reminded that a not dissimilar process probably will be occurring within the Kremlin, hardening positions on their side.)

Projecting strategic images

A collateral result of orienting contingency plans toward minor nuclear powers in an inherently unstable strategic environment would be to give new prominence, and support, to war fighting scenarios—with possibly unfortunate side-effects on Soviet-American perceptions of threat and deterrent credibility. The two spheres of strategic planning cannot readily be kept in idea-tight intellectual compartments.

The projection of strategic images is not so refined an art, nor statesman so adept practitioners of it, for there to be a realistic hope that thinking and preparation for preemptive and/or counterforce attacks by the United States or USSR against a minor nuclear power would not color attitudes about the possible uses to which their nuclear forces might be put against each other. To a very substantial degree, nuclear doctrines and plans are guided by a desire to project certain conceptions, attitudes, ideas—about objectives, capabilities, and tolerances—and expectations. If two quite different and perhaps divergent sets of images are being conveyed, there are the ever-present dangers of (*a*) tangled communications, and (*b*) introducing force structures and procedures that are appropriate in one case, but seriously disruptive in the other.

Calculated image manipulation, always a skill whose subtlety tends to elude governments, demands truly virtuoso talent under these new conditions. To those governments who are wavering on the nuclear brink, the United States will emphasize the inutility of the weapon and the formidable technical and economic costs of establishing a credible deterrent. Yet to the government that has built a relatively small number of weapons, and has an unsophisticated delivery system, the preferred message is just the opposite: that is, what you have is enough for your purposes (especially where there is no obvious, nuclear-armed antagonist in mind with a disproportionately larger force—the unstable asymmetrical relationship); nuclear status is not a function of numbers; deterrence is a flexible concept and countries will be inhibited about attacking any nuclear-armed state—however elementary its retaliatory forces. The risk is that counsel intended for the ears of country B will be overheard by country A.

Somewhere along the way, a loss of doctrinal credibility is unavoidable. Public action and statements will either have to be drawn from a clearer pool of strategic concepts—with a resulting loss of diplomatic flexibility—or a truly diabolical cunning achieved in the recondite art of confecting and manipulating ideas about the ends and means of nuclear military power.

Targeting and force planning

The accentuated interest in nuclear war fighting, along with the imperative to scrutinize all facets of strategic doctrine and force planning, will increase the pressure on the president and his appointed deputies to become directly involved in drawing nuclear options and in SIOP's (and tactical nuclear

weapon) programming. One of the more slowly emerging truths about American nuclear strategy since World War II is that actual control over targeting and the design of operational plans has lain with the military services. To put the matter bluntly, the orientation and format of the system produced has been largely impervious to shifts and turns in the official doctrines promulgated by presidents and secretaries of defense. Operational planning and weapons technology have moved along one set of tracks, political-military strategy along another—at times parallel, at times divergent, and only on rare occasions in tandem. There are three fundamental organizational and policy problems that will have to be confronted in an attempt to make targeting decisions and contingency plans more in tune with centrally conceived diplomatic and military strategy. (The proposals we make for reform of decision-making structures in the next section will address the issues they highlight.)

1. The competence for formulating realistic scenarios encompassing the several possible uses of nuclear weapons is dispersed in bureaus and departments throughout government. Yet to bring their opinions to bear on targeting and operational planning decisions means opening up an ultrasensitive area that has been an exclusive military preserve. Just to suggest such an innovation raises a host of security problems, not to speak of questions of bureaucratic prerogative or the challenge of fashioning an efficient, manageable arrangement for giving civilians a say in, if not ultimate control over, nuclear options.[6]

2. Targeting and planning issues are inseparable from (*a*) the military research and development program; and (*b*) deployment decisions. A more active role for the president and his civilian advisers in the former field would have two far-reaching consequences. First, it would place a burden on the White House staff and Pentagon civilians that they never have borne successfully in the past—requiring that knowledgeable, intelligent judgments be made at far earlier stages in the process of technical innovation and exploitation than they are now. Second, it would vastly increase their leverage on the entire process wherein the need, desirability, design, and cost-effectiveness of new weapons systems are largely determined.

3. Procedures for crisis management of nuclear weapons will also be complicated in a world where nuclear weapons are widely proliferated. Present formats and communication systems were designed with a certain picture in mind of what the situation would be like. The enemy would be the USSR (conceivably China); the circumstances a grave international crisis; the constellation of forces well understood; the options relatively limited. By contrast, a crisis involving a minor nuclear power, or powers, with numerous and not easily separable ramifications for the Soviet-American or Sino-American nuclear connection, creates a definitely more ambiguous and fluid situation where the chances of miscalculations and mistakes are commensurately greater. What setup would make most effective use of

6. The practical problems of reforming the present military-controlled procedures for SIOP's programming are given informed, perceptive analysis by Davis, *Limited Nuclear Options*, pp. 17–18.

the specialists in nuclear planning, the country or regime experts, as well as cabinet officials, the joint chiefs, and presidential advisers? How do you reasonably prepare for so many contingencies while avoiding both over-formalized planning and ad hoc crisis consultation?

DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES

There has been one recurrent theme in our sketch of the medley of policy problems created for U.S. government decision-makers by the proliferation of nuclear weapons—the unprecedented challenge to our capacity to plan coherent policies; to execute them in a consistent, coordinated manner; and to take swift, informed action in crisis situations. Conditions in a nuclearized world will be less forgiving of policy disjunction than in the past whether one speaks of programming nuclear options and assuring presidential control over operational use; making the necessary reconciliations between Soviet-oriented military planning (and arms control objectives), and the requirements for addressing third-country nuclear threats; synchronizing regulations (unilateral or multilateral) governing the export of nuclear and related technologies with diplomatic strategies; or institutionalizing a closer cooperation with allies on issues ranging from crisis management to commercial policies. Certainly, the erratic performance of government agencies in recent years while the genie of nuclear proliferation elusively slipped through the groping fingers of policy-makers underscores the dangers of segmental policy making. It calls for an overhaul of existing procedures, such as they are, for interdepartmental coordination.

At the risk of gross oversimplification, there appear four basic functions for which the present organizational setup is inadequate:[7]

1. to integrate systematically the several facets of strategic policy arising from the complex interplay among major and minor nuclear powers;
2. to bring political considerations to bear more directly on military planning and weapons development programs;
3. to manage crises that hold the potential for nuclear exchanges;
4. to coordinate diplomatic strategies and military planning with allies in NATO (and with Japan).

The case for policy integration and consistent implementation is as easy to make as reform is difficult. Getting on top of the foreign and defense bureaucracies has been the elusive goal of every post-war administration; success, where achieved, has been episodic or ephemeral.

The most conscientious and successful attempt has been the national security system installed by Henry Kissinger under President Nixon. The Kissinger format has had worthy objectives and many virtues that should be incorporated into any structural arrangements designed to favor coherent policy making based on a well-defined set of ideas. It created pressures on the bureaucracies to focus on issues as stated and formu-

7. This is an exercise in speculative assessment of decision making in a hypothetical future that already has seen widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons. If we were writing about today's world, the main emphasis would be on what has to be done to contain proliferation, especially the wedding of economic policies and technology transfer to political purposes.

lated by the president and his chief foreign policy assistant; it effectively centralized decision making; and it sought to establish the connection between immediate problems and longer-term considerations. Its weaknesses have been equally manifest, and much commented upon:

1. The task of policy planning has been gradually squeezed out by a deepening involvement in operational matters.
2. The secretariat function of developing options and structuring choices has been in conflict with the National Security Advisor's role as advocate, and later principal formulator, of policy.
3. It failed to devise a strategy for making the bureaucracy a willing and effective instrument for implementing foreign and defense policy.[8]

Whatever one's personal scorecard of the National Security Council's (NSC) performance under Dr. Kissinger, some version of the NSC format is the most suitable model for organizing the decision-making process in the future, whether the deliberation is in the council itself or elsewhere. What follows are a few ideas on how it might be adapted to perform the four functions listed above.

A. I begin with the conviction that a high level of centralization is necessary, desirable, and possible. Alternative arrangements that stress decentralization and overlapping jurisdictions have in the past demonstrated glaring deficiencies that would be all too apparent, and dangerous, in the more demanding environment of a nuclearized world. Compartmentalization of responsibility and specialization of role, as with the military's independent determination of targeting objectives and force programming, would be unacceptable to a president and cabinet who want to integrate military plans with the diplomacy of nuclear crisis management. Policy making as an interminable group-grope—where ends as well as means are in a constant state of negotiation among bureaucratic baronies—is as unavailing of intelligent policy as it is inefficient in performance.

B. The trick is to achieve a coherent design and coordinated effort, on the one hand, while, on the other, benefiting in the shaping of policy from wide participation by agencies with specialized competences, a participation that both encourages a hearing for diverse views and favors informed, flexible implementation. Execution of centrally-plotted policy certainly would suffer if there were no prior consultation with area experts who could best evaluate approaches aimed at influencing the national and personal sensitivities of a government considering use of its small nuclear arsenal or if Washington denied itself well-prepared communication with officials on the spot during such a crisis.

C. At first look, the NSC seems the proper forum through which to prepare major policy choices, to deliberate on them, and to draw the guidelines for policy. It stands closest to the president and is relatively unencumbered by the rigid organizational structures and entrenched preferences of the State

8. Among the more insightful critiques of Kissinger's NSC system are: I. M. Destler, *Pesidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972). Also, John P. Leacacos, "The Nixon NSC: Kissinger's Apparat," *Foreign Policy*, no. 5 (1971).

Department, Pentagon, CIA, and the other foreign policy bureaucracies. Successive post-war presidents have found it a convenient instrument for exercising a measure of control over national security policy and programs and leverage on intramural policy debates.

The NSC approach, though, has been perhaps too convenient. Reliance on a personal national security advisor—and his small, loyal staff—has served as an avoidance device that releases the chief executive from his responsibility to get a handle on recalcitrant agencies whose outlook and performance were often self-serving and inefficient. The effort to expedite communication and improve coordination between the White House and the departments of government has reduced the incentive for department heads to make their agencies effective contributors to, and executors of, policy. The failure to build organizational strength down through the executive departments limits the capacity of the United States to attend to several major issues simultaneously, leaves important sources of competence and expertise untapped, and makes the successful conduct of policy and its coordination excessively dependent on the stamina and virtuosity of a few individuals.

Without pretending to offer a blueprint for recasting the U.S. national security apparatus, or specifying exact formats, a number of conditions can be identified that must be met if we are to have the capacity to fulfill the policy obligations discussed above:

First, the technical competence of central policy-making bodies must be enhanced. Under Dr. Kissinger, the NSC did not have the expertise to pass judgment on such matters as the dissemination of nuclear reactor and fuel processing technology. In other spheres, it had to fight strenuously to pry out of the Pentagon critical data about weapons performance and targeting. Technical information, and the competence to evaluate it, must be brought to where the decisional responsibility is.

Second, it is essential that there be a clarification and delineation of responsibilities between the national security adviser and department secretaries. The NSC is best suited to serve two key roles. First, it must act as the agent of the president in structuring the policy debate (and, in exceptional instances, mediating conflicting agency views—especially at the implementation stage). Second, it could do the intellectual side of the planning function, that is, projecting current analyses, plotting linkages, mapping strategies. The former task is a natural for the NSC as part of the executive office of the president. The latter might well be passed to the State Department's renascent Policy Planning Office, which has been instrumental in forcing attention onto the connections between exports of nuclear facilities and fuels and arms control considerations. Most important, the NSC should be relieved of operational responsibilities and the diplomatic action left to others.

Third, organizational structure per se makes little difference unless there is the conviction to make it work. Policy coherence ultimately depends on high-level officials, backed and inspired by the president, who share a fund of ideas about the preferred direction of policy and the effective means for conducting it. Diverse perspective and multiple advocacy have their

virtues. But clashes over fundamentals and failure to settle basic disputes over policy premises and objectives extract a high price in internal dissonance.[9]

It is hard to see how anything remotely resembling a coherent policy could emanate from an administration where basic conflicts would exist between the secretaries of state and defense over whether, for example, it was in the American interest for country X on the Soviet border to acquire a Y-level nuclear capability. On the other hand, it is easy to see how circuits could be crossed (as they are today) so that approval is given for the export of a sophisticated nuclear or launcher technology contrary to the preferences of the State Department.

From 1974 through 1976, the Working Group on Proliferation of the NSC's Verification Panel served as the clearinghouse for the administration's preparations on the NPT Review Conference and subsequent matters pertaining to the spread of nuclear weapons generally. In the view of many participants, though, its performance has been inconsistent and it never has succeeded in establishing itself as the vehicle for making and overseeing execution of administration policy.[10]

Reconstituted as a cabinet committee, however, and retitled to indicate a wider range of responsibility (Committee on Nuclear Programs is one properly innocuous name), such a body could serve as the president's steering committee on principal matters nuclear. Chaired personally by the president, or in his absence by the national security adviser (accorded cabinet rank to obey diplomatic etiquette), its membership would be composed of the heads of the major departments and agencies. The committee should be backstopped by a Committee of Deputies (under and deputy secretaries) to provide for administrative follow-through. Staff of the National Security Council would provide the secretariat services of scheduling, agenda preparation, and coordinating interagency communication.

The committee would be the instrument through which: (*a*) senior officials would join in drawing the outline of national policies on strategic needs, military planning, and political initiatives; (*b*) issues of current importance would be brought to decision; and, periodically, (*c*) the execution of agreed policies and programs would be critically evaluated. Thus, the responsibility for substantive policy direction would shift from the national security adviser to the department secretaries and agency directors acting collectively under presidential direction.

It follows logically that the com-

9. The cost of disjunction is high. The Nixon-Ford administration's inability to decide, and make stick, its judgment as to whether the logic of rough equivalence (as expressed in SALT) or more subtle counterforce conceptions were to serve as reference for U.S. defense planning has produced contradictory policies and has frustrated the completion of a second round agreement.

10. In good part, the VP-WGP's activities were supplanted by an informal network of younger, middle-level officials in ERDA, Policy Planning and Political Military Affairs in State, and elsewhere. The shortcomings of devolving policy planning and instigation onto such an unstructured group are obvious: its lack of decision-making authority, its impermanency, and its inadequacy as a vehicle for implementation when it succeeds in winning approval for any collective proposal emanating from it.

mittee also should be the prime mechanism for decision making in crisis situations—being best qualified to provide the president with pertinent information and to appraise contingency plans. Policy direction and crisis-management are, though, two distinct if not separable activities. For both, expert staff support is critical, our fourth condition of effective reform of nuclear policy-making institutions.

Particular attention should be given to creating a staff planning group for the proposed Committee on Nuclear Programs (located for convenience within the NSC apparatus), whose prime task would be to prepare contingency plans for all emergency situations involving the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons—whether the protagonists be hostile or friendly, major or minor nuclear states. A Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, chaired by an assistant to the secretary of state, already is in existence. Its jurisdiction covers actions by unofficial groups involving nuclear or non-nuclear threats. Planning analyses could be conducted, under the administrative direction of the national security adviser, by a select group of council officials combining technical, political, and communications talents. It is preferable that they should be selected from agencies such as the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; the Secretary of Defense's Offices of Atomic Energy Intelligence, International Security Affairs, and Net Assessments; the Program Analyses Office of the NSC; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) Non-Proliferation and Advanced Technology Bureau; and the CIA. The advantage of having a high-powered staff drawn from, but organizationally separate from, the executive departments is that it could not be identified with any one agency and its status jeopardized by the shifting currents of bureaucratic politics and the personal fortunes of that body's director.

Two points regarding the staff's work should be emphasized: (1) there should be absolutely no restriction on their access to military or diplomatic information; (2) their plans should be periodically discussed and assessed by the parent working group, to ensure that the work does not degenerate into sterile paper exercises and that the agencies are in an informed position to meet the requirements for implementing the plans that are drafted.

Clearly, a principal aspect of the planning group's work will be to elaborate scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons under a variety of circumstances. For their analyses to be of practical utility, they should be done in conjunction with the targeting planning of the joint chiefs of staff and incorporated in the SIOP. It is to be expected that the military will fight any proposal to relinquish their control over the actual programming—for reasons of both organizational integrity and concern for secrecy. A president convinced of the value of the organizational reform, as outlined here, can take two tacks to assuage the military's anxieties. First, he can affirm his prerogative as commander-in-chief and declare the essential importance of bringing political judgments to bear on military plans that directly affect his power to provide for the national security in a crisis. Second, he can address the secrecy problem and the valid concern that the process for making targeting decisions may get out of

hand by stressing the smallness of the special NSC group and by exercising scrupulous care in choosing people of the greatest probity and highest caliber.

D. Innovations would also be called for in present arrangements for consultation and collaboration with allies. The multiple uncertainties attendant upon nuclear proliferation, the greater plausibility given war-fighting scenarios, the reviving of doubts about the credibility of the American deterrent and defense pledges, and joint participation in what, hopefully, will be a permanent Suppliers Club to utilize whatever control remains on the dissemination of nuclear technologies—all will place strains on the U.S. alliance with Western Europe and Japan.

Many of the problems that arise can best be dealt with through bilateral diplomacy, informal discussions, and quiet understandings, for example, common political strategies to be taken vis-à-vis a prospective nuclear power, and how to dampen the interest in nuclear weapons shown by a non-nuclear member of the alliance. Others appropriately should be considered and acted on in established regional and international forums, for example, the Suppliers Club's implementing guidelines governing the provision of nuclear fuels, the technology presumably having already been widely diffused, and the possibility that the International Atomic Energy Agency might monitor multilateral arms control agreements which restrict weapons deployments. However, a category of issues remains to be handled within the alliance, and it requires a regular consultative mechanism.

Two types of problems stand out. The first concerns the sorts of targeting and contingency planning questions we discussed in the American policy context. They will also pose dilemmas for intra-alliance coordination. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) now exists for the explicit purpose of assuring that our allies have a voice in military planning, in coordinating the deployment and possible use of the three national nuclear forces, and in providing easy communication in crisis situations. What will be in order in the future is a thorough review of the present arrangement, with a critical look at the effectiveness of NPG procedures and plans for the contingencies of a post-proliferation world. Serious thought also should be given to the creation of an analogous consultative body with the Japanese.

The alliance is less well prepared to address the political and diplomatic challenge of managing the volatile affairs of an international system in which nuclear arms have become widely distributed. Influencing the spread of weapons, moderating regional conflicts in adjacent areas between new nuclear powers, shaping imaginative arms control proposals, the several tasks aimed at preventing a lowering of nuclear thresholds around the world, would be the common responsibility of all the alliance members and cannot be effectively dispensed by the United States alone. We assume that the strains of a proliferated world will not produce a siege mentality and inward-looking American policies. Certainly, success in handling these problems is impossible when allies act at cross-purposes, intentionally or inadvertently.

The need is for a political counterpart to the NPG, a Political Policy Group (PPG). It would be a perma-

nent body, capable of sustained effort, one that does not smack of a political directorate, and one that has the expressed mandate to handle the politico-military problems arising from nuclear proliferation. The model might well be the NPG, with a different mix of competences, with greater stress on the coordination of active diplomatic strategies. A Political Policy Group, unlikely in itself to create unity out of diverse interests and opinions or to resolve the problems that will be placed in its care, nonetheless would be an essential means of extending into the alliance the hoped for logic and coherence of U.S. decision making that will be a requisite for survival in the future.

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The United States in a World of Nuclear Powers

By MICHAEL NACHT

ABSTRACT: There is little consistency in American policy toward those states that have obtained independent nuclear weapons capabilities. Bilateral relations between the United States and the new nuclear state prior to weapons acquisition have proven to be far more accurate indicators of future trends in U.S. policy than the acquisition by the state of nuclear weapons per se. In the future, five basic options confront the United States: malign neglect, nuclear realignment, confrontation politics, equality promotion, and adaptive continuity. The last option, which involves the implementation of a variety of political-military and energy-related strategies, is the most likely one to be adopted. Major shocks to the international system, however, will drive the United States toward greater use of sanctions against the new nuclear states.

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WHAT courses are open to the United States as nuclear weapons spread? Which strategies will be adopted to try to control this spread? What will be the effect of nuclear proliferation on alliance relationships and on United States policy toward potential adversaries? These questions are not new, for concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations has been strongly evident in America since the end of World War II. While the intensity of this concern has grown appreciably since the Indian explosion of May 1974, over the years it has varied considerably with circumstances and has led to the adoption of markedly different policies.

The acquisition of the bomb by the Soviet Union confirmed the view that Soviet military power posed the greatest threat to America's well-being in the postwar period, validated the policy of containment that had been operational for more than two years, and stimulated an already substantial nuclear weapons program in the United States. Efforts by two of America's traditional allies—Britain and France—to acquire nuclear weapons produced quite different reactions. In the case of Great Britain, American nuclear assistance, which had been provided since the late 1940s and was stepped up with amendments to the McMahon Act in 1954, subsequently included classified information on bomb development and fabrication and a complete nuclear submarine propulsion plant with sufficient enriched uranium to fuel the plant for 10 years. This assistance was crucial to the development of the British nuclear force. By contrast, the United States attempted to persuade the French to forgo the nuclear option, refused to provide assistance to their nuclear weapons program, and later failed to co-opt the French nuclear force into the military framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The spread of nuclear weapons to Asia has only marginally affected American policy toward the nuclear states in the region. China's acquisition of nuclear weapons led the United States to overestimate temporarily the military strength and technological sophistication of the People's Republic, and it was the potential of the Chinese to deliver nuclear warheads at intercontinental ranges that was used as a rationale by the Johnson administration to support the case for the deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system. But, by and large, the American policy toward China that was formulated immediately after Mao's revolutionary victory did not change with the Chinese nuclear detonation in October 1964, and the subsequent opening to China that did come under President Nixon cannot be interpreted as having been strongly influenced by Chinese nuclear capability.

With respect to India, American influence declined precipitously after the United States sided with Pakistan in the 1971 India-Pakistan war. The Indian detonation of a peaceful nuclear explosion left this situation virtually unchanged, although it did prompt Secretary of State Kissinger to make his first official visit to New Delhi in an attempt to improve relations. But the United States has neither achieved this objective nor taken the opposite stance of adopting economic or political sanctions against India, as Canada has done, to punish the Indians for their nuclear transgression.

In sum, there is little consistency in American policy toward those states that have obtained independent nuclear weapons capabilities. Bilateral relations between the United States and the new nuclear state prior to weapons acquisition, which were in turn based upon a complex set of political, economic, military, and historical considerations, have proven to be far more accurate indicators of future trends in U.S. policy than the acquisition by the state of nuclear weapons per se.

Will this pattern continue if a large number of new nuclear states emerge, or will nuclear proliferation on a wide scale so transform the international system as to invalidate any inferences drawn from the past about U.S. policy that are applied to the future? No one knows with certainty. But it seems that as the pressures for and the actuality of nuclear proliferation increase, the United States will be forced to choose among a number of basic options in adapting to a world of nuclear powers.

THE BASIC OPTIONS

One option open to the United States is that of malign neglect. America could permit nuclear proliferation to proceed without attempting to use its considerable political and economic influence to slow the process. It could, to a very great extent, withdraw from the international arena, passively witness the dissolution of its structure of alliances, and remain deliberately aloof from nuclear and non-nuclear conflicts among other nations. It could turn inward, concentrating instead on the maintenance of its massive military arsenal for deterrence purposes while building an elaborate array of air and ballistic-missile defenses to protect itself as well as possible from a nuclear attack on its continental homeland.

There is virtually no prospect of this option being adopted, however. Despite the extraordinarily painful experience in Vietnam, the United States—its government and its people—has remained fundamentally internationalist, though perhaps no longer interventionist, in its approach to world affairs. The sense of the United States as a superpower continues to be the dominant perception, not only of the vast majority of Americans, but of most of the peoples and governments around the globe as well. With this perception of America's status, there is, at least implicitly, a set of concomitant rights and responsibilities which the United States is expected to exercise. As the most powerful military nation of the Western democracies, it is looked upon as the principal counterweight to the expansion of Soviet influence. The strength of the American domestic economy, its extraordinary technological sophistication, and its pervasive international reach necessarily involve the United States in a web of interdependent political and economic relationships with scores of nations whose governments, their rhetoric notwithstanding, seek such relationships. And even states that have often viewed themselves as potential adversaries of the United States—China, some of the socialist states of Eastern Europe, a number of Arab nations—have, in their own national interests, argued against American retrenchment and sought American diplomatic assistance. Consequently, there are no significant voices in the United States or abroad which are likely to persuade America to

adopt the option of malign neglect.

A second option for the United States would be to promote nuclear realignment. This would involve a conscious and overt American effort to scrap its existing security arrangements in favor of creating a ruling elite composed of the nuclear-weapons states. Since it is already the case that every permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is a nuclear "have" nation, there is precedent for such an approach. The aim of this realignment would be to formalize what is an implicit fact in world affairs: nuclear weapons are significant and they automatically elevate the status of those states that possess them. By accentuating the differences between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have nots, a commonality of interests would be fostered among the nuclear nations, thereby reducing the likelihood of interstate conflict among the nuclear powers. Indeed, since its nuclear explosion, India has at times conveyed the impression that it was due certain privileges now that it had entered the nuclear club. By granting such privileges and underscoring the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction, the United States could promote the idea that the nuclear badge had become the lone symbol of the powerful in international politics. Over time this condition could, ironically, impose order on rather than create chaos within the international system.[1]

This option, however, has little to recommend it. As a consequence of the deep political divisions among the nuclear powers, a compact among them would be extremely fragile at best, and they would be almost certainly incapable of adopting a coordinated policy to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, promoting the status of nuclear weapons in this way would surely encourage nuclear proliferation rather than deter it, placing in many hands the ability to initiate nuclear war. The result would be large numbers of vulnerable forces with inadequate command and control systems, subject to seizure by national and subnational groups. Preemptive strikes would be more likely. An increase in regional conflicts initiated by nuclear powers against non-nuclear neighbors could be anticipated. And because the superpower rivalry would not be muted, there would be a substantial probability that in regional conflict situations the Soviet Union and the United States would support opposing parties, thereby running the risk of frequent nuclear confrontations. American security interests would therefore not be at all well served by a realignment of nations that underscored the primacy of nuclear weapons.

A third option is to adopt a policy of confrontation politics. In many ways, this would be the opposite of the second option. Rather than

1. This notion of nuclear realignment providing international stability is a variation of the concept of a unit veto system in which it was hypothesized that the possession of nuclear weapons by all nations would promote a condition in which each state could successfully deter an attack upon its homeland initiated by any other state. See Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 50–2, and his more recent thoughts on the subject, Morton Kaplan, "The Unit Veto System Reconsidered," in Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 49–55.

promoting the elite status of the nuclear states, and thereby encouraging proliferation and instability, the United States, acting either alone or in concert with the Soviet Union, could behave as a nuclear bully, imposing or threatening to impose severe sanctions against any state that either appeared intent on acquiring nuclear weapons or had in fact done so. The range of sanctions could be quite extensive: the severing of diplomatic relations, the cancellation of trade and assistance agreements, the provision of nuclear weapons to the regional rivals of new nuclear states, and "surgical strikes" against the new nuclear facilities and associated delivery vehicles. This option would amount to the overt use of United States political, economic, and military power to prevent near-nuclear states from crossing the nuclear threshold.

The likelihood that this approach will be adopted, except in rare instances, is remote. The will of the Executive branch to utilize confrontation politics and perhaps military force in order to stem nuclear proliferation in regions distant from those areas widely regarded as bearing quite directly on U.S. national security interests (that is, Western Europe, Israel, and Japan) is not very great. The Vietnam experience, applicable or not, would likely be invoked, and the support for such actions in Congress and among the American electorate is unlikely to be forthcoming; opposition and denunciation is the far more probable reaction. Moreover, threats of coercion, if proved not to be credible, would be counterproductive in that they would reveal the weakness of U.S. non-proliferation policy. There is, in addition, the problem of applying the policy in a consistent and even-handed way. Would the United States be willing to implement the same sanctions against both a nuclear Israel that felt threatened with annihilation and a nuclear Iran that had acquired these weapons as part of an overall policy to seek hegemonial control over the Persian Gulf states? Hardly. To determine a set of sanctions that would be appropriate in all cases to the perceived threat while commanding both domestic and international support would be enormously difficult. As a consequence, this option is unlikely to be the principal path taken by the United States to cope with nuclear proliferation.[2]

A fourth option might be termed equality promotion. Many students of the nuclear proliferation problem believe that its underlying cause rests in the fundamental inequality among states—inequality in economic, political, and military terms particularly between the rich states of the north and the poor states of the south. This much-discussed gap between north and south must be narrowed, it is argued, if the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons are to diminish. To tackle the problem from this vantage point would place great demands on the United States. As the world's foremost economic power, the United States

2. This is not to imply that sanctions would have no place in American non-proliferation policy. The ability of the United States to pressure South Korea in 1976 to terminate its contract with France for a chemical reprocessing plant indicates that confrontation politics can be applied and can be successful. This is particularly true in situations in which the United States has substantial economic and military investments that it could credibly threaten to withdraw. But the thrust of the argument is that such situations are not numerous and that, consequently, confrontation politics cannot dominate U.S. policy.

would be called upon to lead the way in redressing the imbalance between north and south. This might mean a return to the massive American foreign aid programs of the 1950s and 1960s, transfers of whole industrial plants, infusion of high-technology products including advanced digital computers, the establishment of management training programs and other educational curricula from preschool through graduate studies—all this to scores of nations in an effort to stimulate economic and social development in much of the Third World.

These efforts would need to be supplemented, in many instances, by military assistance. A large number of nations would seek to obtain modern, sophisticated conventional arms of the quantity and quality that, in recent years, the United States has sold to Iran and Israel, and they would not have the funds to pay for them. At the same time, the United States would have to reduce significantly its nuclear arsenal, either unilaterally or through joint negotiations with the Soviet Union. Reductions in the number of delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads and a substantial slowing of the pace of weapons modernization would all have to be clearly demonstrated before many of the nuclear threshold nations would feel that north-south inequality had been narrowed sufficiently to warrant their forgoing the nuclear option. Failure to take these steps would only confirm the view currently held in many Third-World states that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the only option available to them to equalize the power imbalance between the rich and the poor.

This path, like the others, is unlikely to be taken, and for a number of reasons. Inequality has been an inherent characteristic of both human affairs and international affairs throughout the ages. Except in the rarest of circumstances, the rich have never willingly taken great strides to equalize material imbalances. Rather, the poor have remained poor, or they have grown rich through their own efforts, through good fortune, or because they used force to obtain wealth from the rich. It is extremely unlikely that the rich nations generally or the United States in particular will deviate from this pattern. Moreover, it is not at all clear that, if such inequality gaps were bridged, the effect on nuclear non-proliferation would be favorable. For it is becoming increasingly apparent that the term "north-south conflict" is exceedingly imprecise as an explanation of the forces stimulating nuclear proliferation. The south, in fact, is composed of a highly heterogeneous group of nations that differ markedly in all measures of national wealth. And for most nations of the south, it is a neighboring member of the same region that is its principal rival and its principal threat. Surely Argentina seeks a nuclear capability far more because Brazil may soon acquire nuclear weapons than as a consequence of the fact that Britain and France already have them.

To be sure, the United States can be expected to take a leading role in the years ahead to ameliorate north-south relations and to contribute to some fundamental restructuring of the international economic order. But this will fall far short of achieving a condition of equality among nations. The view is strongly held in U.S. policy-making circles that the incentives for nuclear proliferation rest more

with issues of national prestige and regional conflicts than with matters of economic and military inequality. America is, therefore, not about to embark on an enormously costly program of economic and military assistance nor to initiate substantial unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal that might provide the Soviet Union with political or perhaps even military advantages.

A fifth option that might be termed adaptive continuity is the likely approach that the United States will follow in coping with a world of nuclear powers. This option involves utilizing a mix of strategies tailored to specific aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem and adapting, as most governments do, pragmatically and incrementally to changing circumstances as they unfold.

ADAPTIVE CONTINUITY

As has already become evident in the debates in the United States on nuclear non-proliferation policy since the Indian detonation of 1974, attempts to control the spread of nuclear weapons will move along essentially two lines: political-military strategies and energy-related strategies.[3] These strategies may be summarized as follows.

Political-military strategies

Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT remains the principal international legal instrument for retarding nuclear proliferation. Unless or until its legitimacy collapses in the face of a large number of states violating or withdrawing from it, the United States will do what it can to see that it is retained and that its effectiveness is improved. Indeed, the fact that a number of important states have recently ratified the treaty (notably the Federal Republic of Germany in 1975 and Japan in 1976) testifies to its continued legitimacy within the international community. The treaty will therefore receive overt and high-level support from the United States, which will continue to attempt to induce nonmembers to ratify it.

At this stage the NPT is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for nuclear proliferation to be controlled. It is of great symbolic significance, and its collapse would signal that the effort to control proliferation had failed, thereby further stimulating the nuclear spread. The United States is likely to move in the direction of attempting to create incentives for nonmembers to join the treaty, such as making the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology conditional on the recipient nation being an NPT member and accepting full safeguards as specified in the treaty. It is unlikely, however, that the United States will move so far as to offer amendments to the treaty for fear that the amendment procedures could open the way for some states to withdraw.

Press for Soviet-American strategic arms control. The United States will move ahead in seeking to reach agreements with the Soviet Union in the control of strategic arms, not only because of the utility of the agreements in their own right,

3. The following discussion draws heavily on the author's "Strategies to Slow Nuclear Proliferation: A Propositional Inventory," an unpublished discussion paper prepared for the Aspen Arms Control Workshop on Nuclear Proliferation, 2–6 August 1976, sponsored by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies and the arms control research centers of Harvard, Cornell, and Stanford Universities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

but also because of the linkage made between lack of progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the prospects of nuclear proliferation. Whether this linkage is legitimate or contrived, progress in SALT will positively affect the perceptions of some have nots toward the haves and should influence the domestic debate in threshold countries in favor of restraint. While it is probably correct that nuclear proliferation will be a by-product of regional conflicts, the great power aspirations of some threshold countries, and a number of domestic political considerations that vary from state to state, progress in strategic arms control will at worst have no effect and at best have some positive effect on curbing proliferation.[4]

Adopt pledges of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. There is the prospect, although it is not very great, that the United States will consider some form of pledge concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons. Great caution must be exercised in this area because such pledges could create serious doubt about the credibility of American security guarantees to its allies in Europe and East Asia. It is possible that a non-use pledge could be formulated with the provision that it would not apply to non-nuclear states that assist one or more nuclear weapons states in aggressive actions against other nuclear weapons states or their allies. Indeed, it could be accompanied by explicit assurances to the Federal Republic of Germany and Korea concerning American intentions. If such a pledge proved satisfactory to America's allies and were endorsed by the other nuclear powers as well, it might reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapon use, it would be an indication of the diminishing political utility of nuclear weapons in the foreign policies of the major powers, and it would be significantly reassuring to non-nuclear states.

Adopt a comprehensive test ban treaty. The United States should be expected to pressure the Soviet Union to become party to a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) that would prohibit any further testing of nuclear weapons for any reason whatever, thereby excluding both underground tests and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). A CTBT would have the effect of diminishing the importance of nuclear weapons in world politics, would testify that the nuclear powers are serious in adhering to the provisions of the NPT, and would make it more difficult politically for a near-nuclear state to take the PNE path to an independent nuclear weapons capability. These advantages far outweigh the claims of opponents that a CTBT would slow needed progress in advanced weapons development, reduce the reliability of existing weapons and thereby weaken the credibility of the nuclear deterrent, lower the guard against technological breakthroughs by potential adversaries, be difficult to verify, and accelerate the flow of highly skilled manpower away from weapons research and development work.

As nuclear proliferation continues, it will be increasingly important that a CTBT enter into force but progressively less likely that it will. At present, the position of both

4. A detailed view of the relationship between arms control and nuclear proliferation is presented by Colin Gray elsewhere in this volume.

Soviet and American officials is predicated on an all-or-nothing approach, cognizant that France and China will not sign. As new states enter the nuclear club with weaponry at varying levels of technological development, their proclivity to conduct weapons tests will virtually guarantee that no universal CTBT could be ratified.

Establish nuclear free zones. There remains enormous difficulty in establishing nuclear free zones, as evidenced by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and it is precisely in those areas of the most intense regional conflicts—the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Korea—that the inevitable variations in military potential among the protagonists make the chances for reaching such agreements least likely. Moreover, the nuclear free zone approach will become hopelessly utopian as nuclear weapons spread. The best the United States could hope to do would be to assist where feasible in the settlement of regional disputes among non-nuclear powers, thereby diminishing the need for these states to acquire nuclear weapons.

Maintain and enhance security guarantees. It can be anticipated that the principal stimulants to nuclear proliferation will continue to be threats to the security of non-nuclear states. By maintaining and enhancing security guarantees, the United States could both constrain the options of the non-nuclear states and provide assurances to them that would diminish the incentives for these states to develop independent nuclear weapons capabilities. Whether the United States will be able to establish and preserve new guarantees is difficult to assess. At present, long-standing commitments involving the United States are being increasingly (not decreasingly) questioned, and the prospect of extending these arrangements in a credible fashion to other threshold countries appears to be quite slim. Moreover, in cases where the establishment of security guarantees might be possible, the conditions demanded by the non-nuclear states in terms of economic and military aid may prove to be unacceptable to the United States. Nonetheless, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, the maintenance of security guarantees is a most logical course for the United States to pursue.

Impose sanctions against new nuclear states. Because of the lack of support both at home and abroad for U.S. armed intervention, except where its vital interests are concerned, there is little prospect that the use of military sanctions will be a significant U.S. tool in coping with nuclear proliferation. Political and economic pressures and sweeteners are likely to be applied, however, to persuade non-nuclear allies to remain non-nuclear. Should one or two nations cross the threshold, the United States may well try to deter others by heavily penalizing the new nuclear states. But these penalties will be country-specific, limited in scope and duration, and unlikely to include military instrumentalities.

Other approaches. Two other techniques might be attempted by the United States in future efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. The first concerns the intentional downgrading of the utility of nuclear weapons in American foreign policy, and, hopefully, in world politics generally. This approach has little promise of succeeding, because the status of nu-

clear weapons possession, once gained by a state, is difficult to relinquish.[5] While it may well be the case that more cautious use of language concerning the employment of nuclear weapons would be of some help, the overall impact of the acquisition of nuclear weapons on otherwise weak military states should not be underestimated.

A second technique would be for the United States to provide precision-guided weapons and other sophisticated conventional arms to threshold states in lieu of these states acquiring indigenous nuclear capabilities. Here again, the likelihood of success is low. Conventional weapons, no matter how sophisticated, have neither the deterrent value of nuclear weapons nor their prestige. This tactic could buy time, but in the long run it would not satisfy a state that sought nuclear weapons for either prestige or deterrence purposes.

Energy-related strategies

Establish supplier agreements to regulate the transfer of nuclear technology. Nuclear proliferation can be constrained by minimizing the opportunities for national governments to acquire weapons-grade material. This fact will be as true in a world of many nuclear powers as it is today. The United States, by reaching agreement with the other nuclear supplier nations not to sell or assist in the development of fuel reprocessing plants or uranium enrichment facilities, could impede further nuclear proliferation, no matter what its level, at any point in time. By agreeing to provide and subsidize fuel cycle services at substantial economic advantage to recipient states (compared to those states having their own facilities), the United States could seek to enter into agreements which guarantee the security of supply of energy resources to these recipients. In cases where nuclear facilities are provided, assurances must be obtained that the spent fuel will be returned to the supplier. There are considerable difficulties inherent to this strategy in terms of managing alliance relationships and coping with the instabilities of a nuclear cartel. But the benefits to be derived are worth the effort. This approach should continue to be an effective non-proliferation strategy in the future.

Exercise unilateral restraint in nuclear energy programs. It will remain highly desirable for many years to come that the United States refrain from taking steps with respect to its own nuclear energy programs that would increase the likelihood of the spread of weapons-grade material. Delaying both permission for plutonium recycling and the decision to produce fast-breeder reactors is consistent with this objective. Should the United States move ahead with both these developments, weapons-grade material would spread extremely rapidly and the battle to retard nuclear proliferation would be lost. Those who support plutonium recycling and the production and sale of fast-breeder reactors point to unproven economic arguments to substantiate their case. Unless and until extraordinarily compelling eco-

5. Great Britain may, however, be a counter-example. Should Britain's political and economic decline continue, serious consideration may be given to the relinquishment of the British nuclear force, most probably through a strategy of planned obsolescence. The likelihood of this eventuality is exceedingly low, however.

nomic arguments can be made in support of these programs, there is every reason to delay them.

Establish multinational nuclear facilities. In the years ahead, the United States may well take the lead in establishing multinational nuclear facilities as alternatives to national facilities. These facilities could perform fuel cycle operations from uranium enrichment to waste disposal and could vary in organizational structure from a bilateral supplier-recipient arrangement serving the fuel cycle needs of only one nation to a system of multiple ownership and management serving an entire region. The establishment of such facilities would increase the economic and political costs of acquiring national nuclear facilities and would increase the effectiveness of safeguards against diversion of materials, since each of the participating nations would serve as a monitor against diversion by others. Although multinational facilities run the risk of stimulating reprocessing activities and serving as agents for the transfer of technological know-how, these risks are worth taking. Serious consideration by the United States of converting one or more of its national facilities into a multinational facility is a likely prospect in the years ahead.

Increase financial support to the IAEA. To prevent the diversion or theft of materials from national facilities, the safeguards program of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will undoubtedly require expansion, and increased efforts will need to be made to provide physical protection of these facilities. In effect, such measures can only be achieved with substantial technical and financial assistance from the United States. While care should be taken to ensure that American assistance does not so dominate the agency that it comes to be perceived as a tool of U.S. policy, sufficient aid must be provided to generate an effective IAEA safeguards program. This program is a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition to control nuclear proliferation in the years ahead.

Reduce interest in nuclear energy by adopting alternative energy sources. If the United States were to turn away from nuclear energy, the prospects of nuclear proliferation might well decline. This step would not be an easy one, however. It can be accomplished by imposing a significant energy conservation program and by expending large resources on alternative energy sources—particularly solar energy. On balance, it is likely that the social and economic costs of a major conservation program are simply too high to make it politically feasible in the United States. Moreover, solar energy, if well developed, will probably be economically attractive only on a small scale. It would appear, therefore, that there are, in fact, no alternatives to increased reliance on nuclear energy. Only three events could alter this conclusion: insufficient capital to finance nuclear facilities; a major nuclear accident (resulting from a system failure, not sabotage), creating fear about the reliability of nuclear facilities and turning public opinion away from nuclear energy; or a technological breakthrough that provides a new and inexpensive source of energy.

Each of these political-military and energy-related strategies requires considerable elaboration and

argumentation that cannot be presented in a paper of this length.[6] They have been cited to indicate the range and complexity of the efforts that the United States can be expected to undertake in coping with nuclear proliferation. They vary greatly in difficulty and in level of effort; for example, reaching Soviet-American strategic arms control agreements that would influence some threshold states to remain non-nuclear would clearly be far more difficult than increasing financial support for the IAEA. But a set of parallel approaches is undoubtedly what is called for.

This conclusion reflects the judgment that non-proliferation policies will continue to be implemented in a world of many nuclear powers. In the face of the Nth power acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States will act to prevent the N+1 power from taking the same step.

There is, however, one significant caveat with respect to the option of adaptive continuity, and this concerns the pace of the nuclear spread. The United States has, until now, been able to adjust to nuclear proliferation because its pace has been gradual and the spread has been largely restricted to the major powers who have exercised extreme caution in their handling of the weapons. Should proliferation accelerate, technical deficiencies in the new nuclear forces and the prospect that some national leaders might act irresponsibly will make the world a far more dangerous place and will adversely affect American security interests.[7] A major shock to the system—for example, the sale of a nuclear weapon, the use of a nuclear weapon in anger, or the widespread availability of laser isotope separation technology and expertise permitting off-the-shelf bombs to be acquired by many states within a one-year period—would so suddenly and dramatically alter the nature of international political relationships that it is highly improbable that the United States, under such circumstances, would retain an incremental and cautiously pragmatic approach to the problem.

Should a shock to the system materialize, the United States is likely to move aggressively to halt further nuclear proliferation, using coercive and military measures where necessary. The building of specialized offensive and defensive forces tailored to meet the threat posed by small nuclear-armed states would be encouraged. In some instances, the United States might share its technological expertise with new nuclear states to improve their command, control, and communication systems so as to minimize the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. While a fundamental rethinking of defense policy and alliance relationships might well be stimulated, it is highly probable that sanctions

6. Some of these approaches are addressed elsewhere in this volume. See, particularly, the papers by George Quester, Lewis Dunn, and Michael Brenner. On energy-related strategies, consult *Nuclear Energy and National Security*, A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, September 1976. The case against fuel recycling is best made in Henry S. Rowen and Gregory Jones, *Influencing the Nuclear Technology Choices of Other Countries: The Key Role of Fuel Recycling in the U.S.* (Pan Heuristics, August 1976).

7. Although some Third-World spokesmen claim that this view is racist, the fact is that nations are not equally endowed *with either technologically sophisticated delivery vehicles or political wisdom.*

against new nuclear states would dominate the American reaction.

Whether U.S. security in a world of nuclear powers can be maintained utilizing any of the measures suggested above is an open question. Until the option of adaptive continuity is proven to be ineffective, however, it will constitute the American response.

GLOSSARY

Any specialized area has its jargon, and nuclear proliferation is no exception. This glossary defines those terms most frequently used in the various papers which may be new to readers, including both those which are highly technical (for which, see the papers by Drs. Barnaby and Imai) and those which are more or less commonly emphasized in debates in military policy.

Arms control—any measure limiting or reducing forces, regulating armaments, and/or restricting the deployment of troops or weapons which is intended to induce responsive behavior or which is taken pursuant to an understanding with another state or states.

Arms race—the competitive or cumulative improvement of weapons stocks (qualitatively or quantitatively) or the build-up of armed forces based on the conviction of two or more actors that only by trying to stay ahead in military power can they avoid falling behind.

Atomic bomb—a weapon based on the rapid fissioning of combinations of selected materials, thereby inducing an explosion (along with the emission of radiation).

Breeder reactors—reactors in which the process of fission enhances the concentrations of fissionable materials in the fuel or in a "jacket" covering the reactor, thereby producing more fuel than is used.

Coercion—the attempt to induce a change in behavior through actual punishment, supposedly applicable when compellance fails.

Compellance—the attempt to induce a change in behavior through threatening undesirable consequences in the event of refusal.

Deterrence—the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.

Disarmament—the reduction of a military establishment to some level set by international agreement.

Fissile material (or fissionable material)—isotopes (variants) of certain elements, such as plutonium, thorium, and uranium, which emit neutrons in such large numbers that a sufficient concentration will be self-sustaining, that is, will continue to produce increasing numbers of neutrons until it is damped down, explodes, or the material is exhausted. (See Frank Barnaby, "How States Can Go Nuclear.")

Fusion—a process whereby the atoms of light, non-fissionable elements such as lithium are transformed under pressure, yielding helium and energy in the form of radiation.

General and complete disarmament—the total reduction of an actor's military establishment to the point where no military capability is present.

Going nuclear—the acquisition by an actor of a nuclear capability regardless of size; it may only be the possession and/or explosion of one nuclear bomb.

Horizontal proliferation—the spread of nuclear capabilities across states and/or nongovernmental actors.

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)—an international organization charged, among other things, with monitoring the production and use of special fissionable materials.

Kiloton—one thousand tons (of TNT equivalent).

N + 1st power—that following an Nth power, that is, the next proliferator but one.

Nth powers—a reference to additions to the group of powers possessing nuclear weapons; the next country of a series to acquire nuclear powers.

Non-nuclear (weapons) state—one not possessing nuclear weapons.

Nuclear device—a nuclear explosive which may: (*a*) be intended for nonmilitary uses such as construction, hence peaceful nuclear explosive; (*b*) be too heavy and/or too cumbersome for delivery on military targets and hence useful only for test purposes.

Nuclear free zone—a stretch of territory from which all nuclear weapons are banned.

Nuclear materials—see Fissile materials.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a treaty which, among other things, binds those non-nuclear countries adhering to it to forgo the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons and all signatories to abjure transfering such weapons to a non-nuclear state.

Nuclear option—the ability to go nuclear within a short period of time if one chooses.

Nuclear proliferation—the process by which one actor after another comes into possession of some form of nuclear weaponry, and with it the potential of launching a nuclear attack on other actors.

Nuclear reactor—a mechanism fueled by fissionable materials which give off neutrons, thereby inducing heat. Reactors are of three general types: (1) power reactors, in which the heat generated is transformed into power in the form of electricity; (2) production reactors, which are designed primarily to increase concentration of certain fissionable materials, such as plutonium, Pu-239; (3) research reactors, which are designed primarily to produce isotopes (variants) of some materials and/or to induce radioactivity in others, for applications in genetics, medicine, and so forth.

Nuclear reprocessing—the separation of radioactive waste (spent fuel) from a nuclear-powered plant into its fissile constituent materials. One such material is plutonium, which can then be used in the production of atomic bombs.

Nuclear safeguards—any number of ways to protect nuclear power or production reactors from accidental spillage of nuclear waste, from theft of nuclear materials, or from the diversion of these to unauthorized purposes, such as weapons production.

Nuclear terrorism—terrorism is the systematic use of terror as a means of coercion. Nuclear terrorism involves the use (or threatened use) of nuclear weapons or radioactive materials by an actor, state, or nongovernment.

Nuclear (weapons) state—one possessing nuclear weapons, whether fission, fusion, or both.

Permissive Action Links (PAL)—electronic systems for the control of nuclear warheads whereby these can be armed only if positive action to this end is taken by a duly constituted authority, such as the president of the United States or the supreme allied commander, Europe.

Plutonium recycling—a process whereby plutonium in the spent fuel of reactors is separated from other fissile materials and reused, either as reactor fuel (see Breeder reactors) or for atomic weapons.

Preemptive strike—an attack launched in the expectation that an attack by an adversary is imminent and designed to forstall that attack or to lessen its impact. Usually refers to a strike on an adversary's delivery vehicles, weapons stocks, and other components of nuclear forces.

Radioactive materials—those giving off Beta rays, Gamma rays, or other forms of radiation. Radioactive materials may or may not be fissionable.

SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)—the discussions between the United States and the USSR on the limitation of strategic armaments which have been under way since 1970. So far these have led to: (1) a treaty limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems; (2) an agreement setting ceilings on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for a five-year period; (3) the Vladivostok Accord, setting ceilings (*a*) on all strategic nuclear delivery systems (including heavy bombers) and (*b*) on MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles).

Spent fuel—fuel which has been in use in a reactor for some time and which in consequence has changed composition and diminished in its ability to give off neutrons.

Supplier's Club—a name used in reference to those countries which have the ability to make nuclear reactors and other essential equipment and which have banded together to discuss policies for the sale of nuclear plants to other countries.

Targeting Doctrine—principles governing the selection of targets to be attacked in the event of war, the allocation of weapons to those targets, and the order in which they will be (or can be) attacked.

Vertical proliferation—the development and enlargement of an actor's nuclear capacity in terms of further refinement, accumulation, and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALVIN D. DAVIS. *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914*. Pp. 398. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975. No price.

Idealists look primarily to international law and organization as the means through which the security-power dilemma among nation-states can be resolved. Leaving aside the numerous peace plans and grand designs from Kant to Woodrow Wilson, the world took its first major step in the long history of international organization with the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. No one has chronicled the events leading to and surrounding these conferences with greater historical insight and judgment than Professor Calvin D. Davis. Writing in 1962 of the First Conference, Davis concludes: ". . . The First Hague Peace Conference achieved little in the way of progress for humanity. . . . The conventions and declarations . . . and later agreements based upon those documents were paper achievements—masks concealing failure."

Looking back a decade later in his history of the Second Conference, Professor Davis found his own judgment too harsh, explaining that while the conference had overlooked the prime political problems of the era, it had laid the foundations for new approaches to arms limitation, international arbitration and the laws of warfare, especially the latter. The First Conference founded the Permanent Court of Arbitration with a list of names of arbiters and judges; the Second Conference drew up a convention for a world court failing only to agree on the means of appointing judges, a failure that was resolved when the Permanent Court of International Justice was inaugurated on February 15, 1922. Of four American members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, only one, John Bassett Moore, accepted election by the Council and Assembly of the League, "notwithstanding that he had opposed American entry into the League" (p. 363).

From the outset, it was the forces of international politics and fear of other nations, coupled with the high costs of armaments, that inspired international initiatives however vocal and persistent the peace groups may have been. For example, the decision to call the Conference of 1899 originated within the Russian Finance Ministry as Russia and Austria sought to avoid the strains of matching France and Germany in an artillery buildup. Reactions to this reflected security-power concerns. Lord Salisbury warned that "arms were a serious deterrent to war." The Prince of Wales suspected the Russian ministers of intrigue. Kaiser Wilhelm II

privately warned his foreign minister, Count von Bülow, that there could be a "bit of deviltry" in Russia's move. The French feared dire effects on their military position and the United States telegraphed acceptance but explained that the war with Spain made arms limitations below present levels impractical. Mahan pointed to Russian concern with American power as its motivation and Rudyard Kipling wrote the poem, "The Bear that Walks Like a Man."

Notwithstanding, the First Conference went forward in part because "all questions concerning the political relations of States . . . [were] absolutely excluded." Enthusiasm then and in the Second Conference centered less on armaments than on arbitration and the role of permanent international conferences. Writing of the Second Conference, Professor Davis notes that any student of international affairs "would have quickly decided that the appellation 'Peace Conference' meant little" (p. 137). "Proposals for limiting armaments had failed even before the Second . . . Conference opened" (p. 161). In all the notes and confidential talks in the year preceding the Conference, "none believed that his government threatened his neighbors, yet each feared his country's neighbors" (p. 161). It was this and not novel methods and procedures at the Hague that shaped national policies and brought on World War I. The thousands of documents and millions of words that passed among statesmen were less important than a mutual recognition of the security-power dilemma. Professor Davis dwells on this less than would a political realist but the lesson is clear from the historical account he so faithfully and lucidly provides. His is at least a minor classic.

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EUGENE LINDEN. *The Alms Race: The Impact of American Voluntary Aid Abroad.* Pp. x, 275. New York: Random House, 1976. $10.00.

Linden's title, with its cuteness, is inaccurate: there is no account of a "race"; "voluntary aid" is really just CARE which he notes is largely public (that is, tax-financed) anyway; "abroad" is Lesotho, a most atypical country. The result is a much less general volume than the title suggests, especially with respect to its conclusions.

The conclusions appear in the latter third or so of the book in terms far more general than the bases of analyses should allow: charity has a self-serving role to play in the "consumer" economies; ridding ourselves of guilt through contributions to such agencies as CARE inevitably leads to the breakdown of traditional Third World institutions to the detriment of the recipients. This occurs as the economic "missionaries" seek to prepare traditional institutions for "free enterprise" in much the same way as religious missionaries proselyte. And as for their religious counterparts, enthusiasm in converting varies inversely with the degree of the "faith" of the individual.

This is the principal criticism of the book: the conclusions—valid or no—are essentially independent of the early parts of the work but on which they presumably rely. There is just too much dog here to be set into motion by the little tail.

The history of CARE through various stages—as a means of delivering assistance to specified individuals, as a general relief agency, and finally as a self-appointed development agency—is interesting. And the setting of Lesotho into which Linden takes us is also fascinating. He writes well. But literary skill is no substitute for analytic solidity. He deals mostly with short-term change, and he frequently gives the impression that demonstration of weakness in a particular project is tantamount to proving that the project was counterproductive. Abkhasia is painted in terms of extreme underdevelopment but also producing many who live past 120 years of age, with male potency well into the nineties. Almost any "development" to be offered by the West would damage this entirely enviable situation.

Possibly true, but this says very little to policy for the 90 or more percent of the Third World where life expectancy is far short of that in the "consumer world."

The New Guinea Maring tribe is for Linden a sort of model of the traditional. This tribe practices slash-and-burn. Each decade or so it has an enormous feast by killing off almost its entire swine herd, and then engages in bloody battle decimating the various clans. This behavior limiting animal and human population permits prolonged survival of the Marings in delicate ecological balance. Linden does *not* say that the traditional is better than any other conceivable arrangement, but he implies it is better than any alternative which can be expected from the West's charitable and/or developmental efforts.

This leaves the final problem: What to do? Is there a preferred pattern for charitable/development assistance? Is zero charity really better than a positive amount? Is the guilt *relieved* from giving to CARE really less than the guilt *acquired* (after reading Linden) from giving to it?

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MICHAEL OAKESHOTT. *On Human Conduct*. Pp. viii, 329. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. $18.50.

The first question I ask of any writer "On Human Conduct" is whether a man is responsible for his actions or is a creature of his environment and/or the stars? This author answers,

> Understood in terms of its postulates, 'human conduct' is 'free' (that is, intelligent) agents disclosing and enacting themselves by responding to their understood contingent situations in chosen actions and utterances related to imagined and wished-for satisfactions sought in the responses of other such agents, while subscribing to the conditions and compunctions of a multitude of practices and in particular to those of a language of moral understanding and intercourse. A human relationship is not a 'process' made up of functionally or causally related components; it is an intelligent relationship enjoyed only in virtue of having been learned and understood or misunderstood. . . . *Civitas* is an engagement of human conduct; *cives* are not neurophysiological organisms, genetic characters, psychological egos of components of a 'social process', but 'free' agents whose responses to one another's actions and utterances is one of understanding; and civil association is not organic, evolutionary, teleological, functional, or syndromic relationship but an understood relationship of intelligent agents (p. 112).

The preceding is a summary of his first essay, defining terms and presuppositions of his concept of civil association, the 'state' as *societas* in which *socii* pursue their own interests under accepted conditions, and the state as *universitas*, a partnership which itself becomes a person. His third essay traces tensions of such ideas in the European 'state' or 'nation' of the past five centuries.

In this book the retired Fellow of Cambridge University shares a lifetime of reflection, seeking to "enlighten" rather than to "instruct". His political philosophy draws from many disciplines, for example, history, philosophy, political science, psychology, economics, sociology, jurisprudence, theology and current and classical literature in many languages. Vocabulary and sentence structures give a reading level of perhaps Grade 20, if there is such a Grade! For example,

> . . . Psychology . . . has emerged from the enterprise of theorizing such 'goings-on' as feeling, being interested, perceiving, being disposed, learning, remembering and forgetting, wanting, wishing, willing, believing, playing, acquiring habits, etc., etc., identified, not as states of consciousness or exhibitions of intelligence, but as observable processes; that is, understood in terms of theorems which denote regularities which are not themselves exhibitions of understanding and do not have to be learned in order to be operative . . . they have equipped this science with concepts (often borrowed from other sciences) in terms of which to formulate theorems about the postulates of these processes—faculty, instinct, drive, association, reflex, organic tension, function, valence, canalization, tolerance, conservation, latency, threshold, trace, reinforcement, *prägnaz*, deflection, sublima-

tion, repression, field of perception, configuration, etc., etc. . . (pp. 20–21).

Concern for the future rather than the past is suggested by Footnote 1 on page 313:

It is perhaps worth noting that notions of 'world peace' and 'world government' which in the eighteenth century were explored in terms of civil association have in this century become projects of 'world management' concerned with the distribution of substantive goods. The decisive change took place in the interval between the League of Nations and the United Nations.

What is a 'state', a 'nation'? The modern European state developed from 'feudal' backgrounds, seeking to bring together persons, communities and fragments of communities, strangers to one another, separated in respect of language, moral imagination, customs, aspirations, conditions of living, moved by local affections and animosities, exhibiting the differences of religious belief commonplace in Christendom since the twelfth century. Professor Oakeshott would like to see preserved in the modern state individual freedoms of citizens, seeing them threatened by political promises to give plush benefits if we will just turn over everything to the state. Shall we call it a "social service state', a 'Welfare state', 'social security', 'socialization', 'social ownership', 'nationalization', 'integration', 'cultural engineering', 'communism', 'collectivism', a state understood as a 'public service corporation'?

The teleocratic drift which two world wars imparted to all European governments (combatants and neutrals alike) and the techniques of control and integration devised in these circumstances have been reflected in an ever more confident belief in its appropriateness.

The notion of a state as an all-embracing, compulsory corporate association and of its government as the manager of an enterprise is then to be recognized as one of the most obtrusive of the strands which constitute the texture of modern European political reflection (p. 311).

How can the man limit such remarks to Europe? How different are any of our 'states'?

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ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, ed. *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World.* Pp. v, 231. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. $17.50.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein has edited and written the introductory chapter to a very important volume on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and China toward Third World nations. The book is a significant contribution in two senses: firstly, in that it deals with the highly essential, albeit difficult, concept of influence, and secondly, in that it examines substantively a variety of aspects of Soviet and Chinese policies. Among these aspects are the military assistance programs of the two communist powers, their economic links with developing countries, the diplomatic dimension, and so on.

By concentrating on the notion of influence, Rubinstein and his associates seem to reject the tendency of some political scientists to ignore this concept as too ambiguous and complex. If politics is the science of influence, then influence must be conceptually defined, operationally measured, and empirically assessed. The major contribution of the introductory chapter is in taking the first step toward a better conceptual understanding of influence. Unfortunately, however, Dr. Rubinstein conceives of influence as a product, not as a process—a conception which tends to ignore the dynamics of the phenomenon. The editor errs also by making the methodologically unsound distinction between explanation and prediction. If we can come to understand what causes influence, we can definitely predict it.

The eight substantive chapters deal with Soviet and Chinese influence over particular regions (the Persian Gulf, Black Africa, and Latin America), coun-

tries (India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Cuba), and the Palestinian guerrilla movement. The papers are usually the products of careful research, clear writing, and extensive documentary support (an exception, insofar as documentation is concerned, is Mr. Kerr's analysis of Soviet-Egyptian relations). A major problem with this set of papers, however, is that they are only loosely related to each other and to the theoretical framework set by the editor. Though some contributors occasionally refer to this framework, others write with a minimal awareness of it, and some depart totally from Rubinstein's scheme in order to develop their own conceptualizations. The papers of Maoz and Ginsburgs, for example, are of an a-theoretical nature, while the study of Legvold adopts an independent theoretical outlook. The result is conceptual disintegration, a problem so common to edited volumes.

Nevertheless, this book should wholeheartedly be recommended to those who are interested in the development of a theory of influence in international relations, as well as to those who are interested in Soviet and Chinese relationships with Third World countries.

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WILLIAM SCHNEIDER. *Food, Foreign Policy and Raw Material Cartels*. Pp. vii, 122. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1976. $5.95. Paperbound, $2.95.

The OPEC-induced energy crisis has catapulted economic issues into the main arena of international politics. Combined with the post-Vietnam disenchantment of the U.S. toward the use of military force, oil embargo and other potential raw material cartels, the potential of economic weapons as instruments of foreign policy has received new attention. What William Schneider has done in this brief and readable book is to review the contemporary global economic situation map and postulate the utility of various economic strategies as foreign policy instruments.

Schneider stated his thesis succinctly in his introduction:

> Economic warfare may become the gunboat diplomacy of the backward nations of the world. Arab nations influencing the policies of the United States and its allies in the Middle East crisis are subject to at least some degree of emulation by other states or collection of states in certain circumstances.

In the second chapter, Schneider reviewed U.S. experience with economic warfare. He concluded that we had set too high expectations in both the World War II bombing of German industry and in abortive efforts to slow down Soviet economic-military developments. At the same time Schneider asserted that economic warfare could be a useful adjunct to an integrated foreign policy.

In disarming the possibility of agricultural exports as a component of economic warfare, Schneider contended that "The U.S. lead in agriculture is greater than Arab dominance of the petroleum market." This factor matched with the chronic inadequacies of Soviet agriculture and food deficiencies elsewhere, makes U.S. agricultural products "a very useful element in support of foreign policy."

In addition to oil, however, Schneider next demonstrates that the United States and its industrialized allies in Western Europe and Japan are increasingly dependent upon foreign sources for critical materials.

After examining both sides of the coin, Schneider advocates the creation of a U.S. government grain reserve for both humanitarian and political purposes. He suggests that few raw material cartels (oil aside) appear feasible in the long run.

The availability of a grain reserve, insulated from the U.S. domestic market, would "make possible the exercise of an economic warfare in agricultural products a routine component of U.S.

diplomacy." Even if this weapon might not be used with enthusiasm, "its mere existence could constitute a new force in the arsenal of American diplomacy."

Schneider's exploration of how the United States might take advantage of a major U.S. edge in dealing with the increasingly complex problems facing the United States in many areas of the world merits consideration by U.S. policy makers at the highest level.

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ROBERT WARREN STEVENS. *Vain Hopes, Grim Realities: The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War*. Pp. 229. New York: New Viewpoints, 1976. $5.95. Paperbound.

Citizens, politicians, and scholars do not wish to be reminded of the events and consequences of the Vietnam War, but this study is a classic review of the damage to the American economy in the last decade because of the economic policy decisions by the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The bungling of foreign policy in Vietnam sabotaged the noble experiment of achieving reasonably full employment without inflation and with significant social legislation that occurred from 1961 to 1966 in the brief tenure of the "age of the economist." The deception by LBJ of the escalation of war expenditures in 1965–66 with the economy near capacity without a reduction in private spending terminated the experiment in economic rationalism and generated the shocks to the economy that have yet to be stabilized.

The first part of the book is a brief review of the textbook tools of macroeconomic policy as applied from 1961 to 1966 and the textbook case of how not to use the tools in the past decade. The abuse and doubt of the role of economic policy-making by the public and even economists since 1966 was created because of the lack of information concerning the defense expenditures and the lack of broad public support of the "government's dirty little war." There never was a coordinated policy to finance the war once it escalated beyond that stage and the resulting political and policy debates were distorted by the ideological stances on the war.

The war on poverty was the first domestic casualty of the war. LBJ's attempt to have guns and butter was effectively jettisoned after 1965 due to the lack of political leadership and a lack of funds; however, the attempt to maintain the war on poverty and the political infeasibility of passing a tax increase to fight both wars led to the inflation that still persists. The real gains achieved in the 1960s due to social legislation were exceeded by the increased aspirations which led to disillusionment and defeatism.

The violent distortions in the economy and the destabilizing monetary and fiscal policies utilized because of a lack of a coordinated economic plan to finance the war have led to increased unemployment, inflation, balance of payment disequilibria, and an international financial crisis. A less obvious victim was the attack on the economic education of the polity and politicians. The balanced budget as an end and the return of the "old-time religion" of fiscal conservatism threaten to make economic stabilization policy even more difficult to implement through the political process. The Vietnam War is the classic example of how not to finance a war.

The attempt to save face while disentangling from the war, created additional costs and policy errors by the Nixon administration. The demand-pull inflation engineered by LBJ's deception in 1966 was vigorously attacked by the policies of Nixon in 1969–71 when the cause of inflation had already passed into the cost-push stage; hence, the restrictive policies were not effective and only generated more unemployment. The ideological position of the Republicans to balance the budget and reduce federal spending would have been justified by the economic conditions in

1964–68. The readiness of the Democrats to use fiscal stimulus and incomes policy from 1965–73 would have greatly reduced the economic consequences of the war; ironically the classic blunders of economic policy were due to the process of policymaking and not due to a lack of understanding of economic stabilization.

The quantification of budgetary cost of the war is based on James Clayton's testimony before the Joint Economic Committee and alternative estimates to allocate defense costs added by the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was the second most costly that we have been engaged in and the cost yet to be paid in veteran benefits and interests will be at least double the original outlay of $110 billion. The full costs including future budgetary costs, opportunity cost of conscription, and the indirect cost of recession and inflation due to the war burdens are estimated to be about eight times the budgetary costs. The cost allocations are indeed crude estimates and alternate means of estimation by the defense department are given fair presentation by the author. This social accounting and economic debate may be somewhat confusing to the layman and still repetitious; but the lesson to be learned from this evaluation is vital if we are to avoid such massive errors in the future.

Professor Stevens has provided an interesting, readable account of the economic and political errors that have resulted from the "dirty little war." If the United States is to be involved in future wars or police actions, it can avoid the tremendous costs imposed by not protecting the civilian economy from disruptions due to war financing. The underlying theme of the book is the evils that are generated by policy made from an ideological position and the evils of secrecy in government. The problem of secrecy as practiced by Johnson and Nixon can be used to explain many of the political and economic problems of the past decade. If not, hope for the future will again be dashed by the grim realities of the consequences of war-related effects on the economy.

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TED TAPPER. *Political Education and Stability: Elite Responses to Political Conflict*. Pp. viii, 265. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. $17.95.

Classical political theory assumed that the character of a citizen is a reflection of his regime. How political character is developed and the implications of that development has been a principal theme of the seminal works of political science. In the 1960s political science became almost wholly engrossed with the traditional problem of character development. However, the vocabulary of traditional analysis was changed. Concern for the character of a citizen was replaced by a preoccupation with his 'behavior,' and the processes which determined political behavior were referred to as 'socialization.'

As Tapper explains, "political socialization is both a process through which individuals acquire their political behavior and a framework within which some things are learnt rather than others" (p. 249). His work then is an analysis of these processes and a general survey of the primary socialization literature. Tapper concedes that an "obituary" for this literature might just as easily have been penned; but he takes the position that socialization research can be carried forward if the "crisis in political science" is properly addressed. Tapper's understanding of crisis follows from the central tenet of socialization studies—namely, that the function of political socialization as an input of the political system is to provide stability. If, given the postulation of system theorists that the political system seeks simply to maintain itself, and in light of the many socialization studies which revealed how efficiently the values of the state were imbibed by children, how is it to be explained that these same children

later as graduate students raised havoc at Berkeley? Similarly, if the system was socializing citizens as effectively as the literature seemed to presume, how is it possible to account for the agitation of blacks, women and other dissident groups? Tapper suggests that to answer these questions it is necessary to recognize that while socialization and stability constitute the pre-eminent reality of politics, socialization is not a neatly coordinated and monolithic education for citizenship. Instead, the author states that while socialization may aim for consensus it also provides for role differentiation which may in fact be counter-productive to the requirements of stability. In five well-drawn case studies Tapper explains how socialization processes often work at cross purposes and occasionally produce tension and disharmony in the political system.

What is lacking from this critique of socialization theory is an appreciation of its more profound shortcomings. The greater problem is not that socialization may be dysfunctional and its theory unprepared to explain dissensus. More to the point, socialization theory has not identified the political and has simply failed to explain politics. This in no small way is due to the pronounced ideological biases of such theory made evident by the twin concepts of behavior and stability. But why should it be supposed that stability and behavior or conformism are the essence of politics? Tapper does note in passing criticism which in effect holds that socialization theory is a celebration of the status quo; yet he does not adequately rebut that charge. The author denies, for example, that class provides a useful perspective for understanding conflict, and then proceeds to case studies of conflict (Afro-Americans, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, working-class Tories, women and students), which if anything undercut that denial. The cardinal question however for an objective political science is not how these groups were socialized or whether their socialization in terms of the needed inputs of the system was useful or not. It is better to ask what are the reasons for such political action and whether the current political order ought to be preserved, modified or radically restructured.

In other words, dissensus and revolutionary action do not pose a crisis for political science, but only for theory based on the assumption that politics can and should be controlled. If political science suffers from a crisis, this is only because politics has been confused with public administration. This is not to say that socialization is an uninteresting subject; it is to suggest that the study might be extended, that someone ask how political scientists are socialized or inclined to think or not think about politics. Political theory has always recognized the need for the political education of the citizenry. But classical political theory was also cognizant that the political education of the good citizen did not necessarily make that citizen a good man.

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W. ALLEN WALLIS. *An Overgoverned Society*. Pp. ix, 292. New York: The Free Press, 1976. $10.00.

Not only by the title of this book, but also by the answers given to the questions raised within, this volume cannot be viewed as an objective analysis of American political-economic society. All the answers go against government, mostly in this case the national government. To be sure, it is gaining more operating room, it is breaking down traditional constitutional barriers, it is becoming more and more collectivist. Free enterprise and the market economy are fighting for survival. The author follows Walter Lippman: "the sickness of an overgoverned society." Yet, while there is another side to the coin, in this book you don't get it.

Be that as it may, there is much to be said for this approach. But what can be done? How can this trend be constrained? Who will lead the way back? Professor Wallis picks out the intellec-



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
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tuals, "the academic-journalistic complex." They are the ones, not creators of ideas, nor actually too sharp at analyzing them. Rather they are what Friedrich Hayek calls "intellectual middlemen," following the lead of top scholars and researchers. Over a long period of time, they will spread the good word around—the truth makes free. What the rest of us are going to do until this happens deponent saith not. We are on our own. Pretty thin gruel.

The author shows considerable economy savvy, but not too much on the political ball. Furthermore, the book is a heterogeneous package of essays and speeches, not at all geared for solid reading, not integrated into the conservative philosophy Professor Wallis strives for. He covers all manner of subjects: the draft, the price of steel, Watergate (who doesn't), business and government, unmet social needs, the consumer, the welfare explosion, political entrepreneurship, the power of the people, social security, modern communication, and so on. All very well, much of it is informative and knowledgeable, but without much readability. As a guide for thinking and acting conservatively, it just won't do. It is not a milestone in the battle with the Big State.

Are there enough scholars and researchers out in the open who are bending their talents for the free society, limited government, individualism, private property, the free market, and unfettered enterprise? Professor Wallis names some, and they have eminent qualifications, but they are all too few, and besides they lack charisma. Liberals—not conservatives—are the academic, literary and journalistic majority today.

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AFRICA, ASIA AND EUROPE

MICHAEL AVI-YONAH. *The Jews of Palestine: A Political History from the Bar Kokhba War to the Arab Conquest*. Pp. xviii, 278. New York: Schocken Books, 1976. $16.50.

This work, now happily made available in English, has long (1946) been a standard text for the given period among scholars with access to the Hebrew original (*In the Days of Rome and Byzantium*). The comprehensive analysis by Professor Avi-Yonah of the socio-political forces that shaped this largely neglected period should prove of great value to the larger scholarly community that will now be enabled to examine his tightly reasoned and broadly documented study.

The topics covered in this treatise are self-evidently significant—the disastrous Judean revolts against Rome; subsequent efforts at evolving a compromise modus vivendi between the Jews and Rome; the evolving relationships between Judaism and Christianity; the Church as the spokesman for Rome; the Byzantines and the Jews; the Persian invasion; and finally, the Arab conquest. The author clearly brings to bear a solid background in the elements centrally necessary for a proper understanding of the dynamics of this period—Roman political documents, Jewish traditional texts and the patristic literature of the Church; without any of these, this synthetic history could clearly not have been written.

Avi-Yonah chose his point of departure well—the end of the Bar Kokhba rebellion, and the grave challenges its failure placed before the Palestinian Jewish community. Professor Salo Baron, writing in Volume II of his monumental *Social and Religious History of the Jews*, put it this way:

> When the failure of the Bar Kocheba uprising put a stamp of finality on their loss of national independence and central sanctuary as well as on the total separation of Christianity, the Jews faced one of the greatest crises in their history. Although long accustomed to life in Exile amidst more or less hostile neighbors, they were now confronted with an internal foe who either denied or tried to arrogate to himself all those traditional doctrines which had made Jewish minority existence worth living (p. 170).

This newly militant Christianity, along with its main competitor, the newly

revitalized pluralistic paganism, was to be the major challenge to Jewish loyalty and survival for the next several centuries.

In the course of his presentation, Avi-Yonah focuses appropriate attention on the political conflicts of the 2nd century, the economic upheavals of the 3rd, and the religious persecutions of the 4th century. He properly highlights the distinguished 500 year history of the Patriarchate, and the significant roles played by nationalism on the one hand, and messianism on the other, in maintaining Jewish autonomous aspirations throughout the period.

The work is appropriately subtitled a "political history," clarifying the absence of substantial bodies of available archeological and theological historical material. Similarly, although much documentary use is made of Talmudic texts, the climactic completion and sealing of the Palestinian Talmud is virtually glossed over in silence. These caveats quite aside, the volume is a most welcome addition to the library of materials now available on the history of this sensitive period, and as another major exemplar of the important works of scholarship Professor Avi-Yonah has made available to the English-reading public.

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WALTER BARROWS. *Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and Development in Sierra Leone.* Pp. iii, 265. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. $25.00.

THOMAS S. COX. *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone.* Pp. viii, 271. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $14.00.

With interest in black Africa heightened by current events, the appearance of these two timely studies compels our attention. Although both focus on political development and decay in Sierra Leone, their conclusions contribute to an understanding of third world politics in general.

Walter Barrows, through a study of the role of the paramount chief, offers thought-provoking insights into the viability in the modern political setting of traditional institutions. He rejects the notion of a contradiction between traditional and modern institutions and questions whether the latter inevitably displace the former during political development. Instead, he offers a synthetic model of change. Barrows also questions a static view of pre-colonial society, urging the reader to see the fluidity and motion which existed in the traditional setting. Further, he notes that some aspects of traditional politics, such as the establishment of chiefly ruling families, were actually grafted onto native society by the colonial administration. It would have been interesting had he explored further why some innovations took hold and similar ones failed, as in the case of the Mammy Queens and rotating chiefs.

Barrows' case studies of grassroots politics are most instructive and his references to the activities of the Poro secret societies are particularly fascinating. The overall picture that emerges is one of intra-elite conflict and cleavage sparked by a utilitarian search for self-interest, rather than any sense of identity or ideological purpose.

Thomas S. Cox's study rejects the notion that the military establishment entered into Sierra Leone politics as a modernizing elite impatient with traditional forces and the slow pace of change. Although this motive has impelled other military takeovers elsewhere in the third world, Cox sees the *coups d'état* in Sierra Leone as part of intra-elite cleavages. He supports Barrows' view that the pursuit of individual self-interest and utility is a guiding principle in Sierra Leone politics.

Cox traces the origins of the military establishment, which as an arm of the colonial power, was designed primarily for internal security functions. Since it offered fewer opportunities for advance-

ment and social status than did the civil service, it attracted second-rate candidates. Cox argues that only under the British administration did the army represent state-wide interests rather than private ones. He shows how independence produced a situation where opportunism prevailed and self-serving drives for power and prestige became commonplace. Once primordially inspired cliques emerged, ethnicity and tribal loyalties became a dominant factor in political life and in civil-military relations in Sierra Leone.

In discussing the role of the military throughout the third world, Cox makes some generalizations about Middle Eastern armies which an area specialist might question. For example, is there a "class orientation" of Middle Eastern armies, a pattern of "ideological polarization" and "interclass conflict" of civil-military relations in the area and a "North African tradition" in the armies of Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco (see pp. 2–3, 12, 79–80)? His reference to Israeli assistance in training officers and in developing an intelligence service under the Lansana-Sir Albert Margai faction is disconcerting, particularly if Cox intended to imply Israel's involvement in Sierra Leone's domestic politics. Sir Albert's arrangements with Israel were not unique. In fact, during Sir Milton Margai's tenure, Israel had undertaken assistance projects in Sierra Leone in such non-military and apolitical areas as medicine and construction. Thus a cooperative relationship antedated Sir Albert's assumption of power and, in fact, was already established by 1961, when this reviewer served as Assistant Director of Information in the Israel Foreign Ministry's Department for International Cooperation.

Both the Cox and Barrows books are primarily for the specialist although of the two, Barrows is more readable. His theoretical chapters devoted to model-building are clear and concise. He offers excellent maps, tables and figures. Unfortunately the book is marred by the absence of an index and bibliography and, considering the price, by an inexcusable number of printing errors (for example, pp. 43, 53, 61, 69, 103, 121, 223, 234, 249, 257). Cox's study, on the other hand, reads like a doctoral dissertation, which indeed it was. There is no map, no glossary of terms and none of the useful background information on Sierra Leone which Barrows includes.

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JOHN F. COVERDALE. *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War.* Pp. xxi, 455. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. $18.50.

In its origins, its prosecution, and its consequences, the civil war in Spain was basically a Spanish affair. But contemporaries, confronted with the evidence of foreign assistance to both sides, saw the war as an international conflict, a transcendent struggle between the forces of good and evil, variously defined. This interpretation did little to clarify the role of foreign intervention; on the contrary, the passions aroused by outside aid quickly distorted its extent, influence, and intent. Only in recent years have historians attempted to evaluate objectively the impact of foreign involvement on the outcome of the war. The present volume by Professor Coverdale of Princeton University makes possible a balanced assessment of Italian aid to the Nationalist forces of General Franco and its consequences for both Spain and Italy.

Based primarily on hitherto inaccessible Italian diplomatic sources, this study necessarily focuses on the formulation and implementation of policy in Italy by Mussolini, who made all major decisions with regard to Spain throughout the conflict. Coverdale demonstrates that especially in the opening stages of the war, Mussolini's strategy was more defensive than offensive; ideological and economic imperialism were secondary to the protection of traditional Italian interests in the Mediterranean, potentially en-

dangered by the pro-French policies of the Second Republic. Subsequently, the commitment of 50,000 Italian troops, together with substantial material aid, made prestige an equally important motive for continued Italian intervention.

The author's analysis illuminates the pitfalls of foreign involvement in domestic conflicts. Mussolini's desire for a spectacular Italian victory (especially after the debacle at Guadalajara) and for a rapid conclusion to the war brought his officers into frequent disagreement with General Franco, whose principal concern was the effective occupation of conquered territory. Despite their contribution to the war effort, the Italians were forced to endure their frustration because only Franco seemed to hold out the possibility of ultimate victory. For the same reason, the Italians hesitated to offend Franco by insisting on a Fascist political orientation within the Nationalist zone. The formal similarities between the Nationalist regime and Italian Fascism were not the result of Italian pressure but of Franco's political opportunism.

Coverdale's sources also enable him to provide accurate information on the amount of Italian aid to reach the Nationalists during the war; he concludes that while Italian and German aid was not overwhelmingly superior to that provided the Republicans, it was nevertheless "an essential element in the Nationalist victory." Unfortunately but unavoidably missing from his otherwise comprehensive analysis is an examination of Nationalist policy vis-à-vis its foreign supporters. Until Spanish archives are opened to investigators, this study will stand as the best existing treatment of a highly controversial subject.

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DONALD K. EMMERSON. *Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics*. Pp. 303. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $14.50.

In an effort to determine how various cultural, including religious, differences are reflected in "politically relevant orientations" Emmerson, during 1967–69, interviewed forty members of the then Indonesian political élite, twenty of them higher ranking bureaucrats in the central administration (drawn from a list of 651 senior officials of major government departments), and twenty from the 369 members of the Indonesian parliament. The size of this sample was governed, according to the author, by his consideration that a larger sample might entail the danger of "quick, artificial" interviews that would confirm the researcher's bias rather than reflect the position of the respondents. Three chapters, the heart of the book, deal with the results of Emmerson's interviews, and they are preceded by a brief historical chapter on the evolution of the bureaucracy and representative organs in Indonesia, and by a chapter detailing the life and career of two interview respondents, presumably characteristic of the two categories sampled. A concluding chapter essentially seeks to place the findings in a contemporary setting, and a "Postscript" describes Emmerson's re-interviews in 1974 and 1975 of the two respondents whose backgrounds he had presented earlier.

It is difficult to find anything of significance, either in the author's interview results (is this small a sample really an advantage?), or in his method of presentation. Among the general conclusions, for example, are (1) that cultural minorities are likely to be generally more defensive than "their counterpart majorities" and less inclined to tolerate alternate religious truths, and (2) that secularization, to the extent that it erodes religious or ethnic identity, may reduce "extreme views" and so contribute to a consensus. Neither of these two observations is likely to raise an eyebrow of a student of minority problems or of political modernization. As the majority of respondents were raised in the Dutch colonial period before the Second World War, with its long enduring bureau-

cratic-administrative traditions, it is not surprising to read that (1) the great majority of Emmerson's sample of bureaucrats had fathers who also were civil servants, and had a "colonial nostalgia," while (2), for those without such traditions in their own family lives, that is Emmerson's sample of members of parliament, the fathers were more likely to have had careers in the private sector.

Again, considering Emmerson's bureaucratic sample, in terms of its family background, it was to be expected that the majority in this sample were of Javanese origin. But then, considering the syncretic thoughtworld of the Javanese bureaucracy, pre-war and today, it is hardly remarkable that those in Emmerson's bureaucratic sample had a higher degree of "eclectic religious tolerance" (and, presumably, had "weak" Islamic religious identities) than his group of parliamentarians, some of whom, by virtue of their office, would likely be much more attuned to political parties with a definite religious commitment.

There have been only two general parliamentary elections in Indonesia, in 1955 and 1971, and one wonders about the representativeness of Emmerson's sample of legislators, as interviewed in 1967–69. Indeed, the presumably representative legislator introduced by Emmerson in his second chapter lost his parliamentary seat in the 1971 election; his values and political orientations no doubt remain felt in the Indonesian legislative sphere today, but one can only speculate in what representative degree.

There are other problems with Emmerson's methodological categories. Degrees of intensity in religious commitments are generally hard to establish with precision. For Emmerson, however, a "medium strength Muslim" (as opposed to a "strong" or "weak" Muslim) is one who, though keeping the fast, neither prays "regularly" nor refers "frequently" to his religion, yet is one for whom Islam is "not insignificant" as a "personal referent." What is meant by "regularly," or "frequently," or "not insignificant," or "personal referent," is unfortunately not disclosed. As for a "weakly religious" Muslim, Emmerson defines him as one "whose formal affiliation" only "minimally" affects behavior and "self-image" (of religiosity?)—surely a largely tautological definition. The reader is expected to take all this seriously, however, since Emmerson finds it "noteworthy," for example, that "among bureaucrats more than four-fifths of the weak Muslims had fathers in the public sector, whereas only half of the medium-strength Muslims did."

The book is not entirely without merit. It is good to see Emmerson make the point that the concepts of santri (orthodox Muslim) and abangan (referring to religiously more eclectic persons), concepts rediscovered and greatly overdrawn by some U.S. writers on Indonesia in recent years, may at least in some instances be inherently less antithetical than has been suggested, becoming polarized primarily in a partisan political context. Then, too, for those unfamiliar with the literature on Indonesian political institutional development, the bibliography cited in the notes of the introduction, and in the first chapter, and again at the end of the book, can, despite some selectivity, be quite helpful. On balance, however, the reader should not be misled by the title of this volume. Because of its narrow focus, the dated quality of the samples analyzed, and the questions that must be raised about its methodology, the insights of the book are as little representative of "Indonesia's élite" or of Indonesia's "political culture" as Pluto is representative of our planetary system.

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C. P. FITZGERALD. *Mao Tse-tung and China*. Pp. vi, 166. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1976. $9.50.

This study by a former Professor of Far Eastern history at Australian National University in Canberra is a

eulogy of Mao which preceded his death by some three to four months. It is a brief, popularized version of Mao's life that leaves no doubt that the author considers Mao one of the greatest, if not the greatest, figure in the twentieth century, perhaps in history.

Against a background of contemporary developments, Fitzgerald traces Mao's life from a young scholar through the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the war with Japan and the civil war, to the period of the Cultural Revolution and his conflict with Lin Piao. Unfortunately, the lack of objectivity which characterizes Fitzgerald's book does a disservice to Mao for it makes no differentiation between the earlier and later period of his career and glosses over the complexity of his struggle to gain control of the Chinese Communist Party (the Tsunyi Conference is mentioned only as electing Mao as Chairman), the subtlety of his strategy in dealing with the Japanese and Chiang Kai-skek, and the ebb and flow of his power between the fifties and seventies.

While it is recognized that in such a short study little space can be devoted to the contributions of Mao's colleagues, the result is a one-dimensional product. Fitzgerald also seems loath to admit the depth of the conflicts over policy within China. For example, in the 1958–59 conflict he tends to downgrade the Commune program, the Great Leap Forward, or relations with the Soviet Union as major issues. He prefers to depict the conflict as centering on personalities, on differences between Mao and Liu Shao-chi, on the role of the creative force of mass opinion versus hierarchy and discipline. This latter issue is also used to explain both the Cultural Revolution and the break with Lin Piao. The author suggests that Lin, like Liu, would have imposed a rigid hierarchical structure on China in contrast to Mao's reliance on his revolutionary instinct, disbelief in elite rule and faith in the masses. This oversimplification ignores the fact that the Lin Piao affair was a succession struggle fought over hard policy issues, particularly with regard to economic development and perhaps foreign affairs, and a struggle between Party and Army for control of China's political system. The political role of the military is minimized as is the widespread support that Lin had within the Army. Finally, this affects Fitzgerald's prognosis for the future where he nowhere mentions the key role the military may play in determining the nature of the succession to Mao.

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TOM FORESTER. *The British Labour Party and the Working Class*. Pp. x, 166. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. $11.50.

Since World War I the British Labour Party has been able to provide alternative governments to the Conservative Party. After World War II the Labour Government of Clement Attlee nationalized major industries and greatly extended the social benefits of the welfare state. But in recent years the enthusiasm for socialist reform has abated. This decline has enabled the Marxian Socialists to contend that the Labour Party has lost its radical zeal and is being taken over by the middle classes. Tom Forester is quick to refute these criticisms and to deny that there is a permanent trend downward in the fortunes of the Labour Party. His book demonstrates clear continuities between the Party of today with the Labour Representation Committee of seventy-five years ago when the Labour Party was founded. The author further shows that the Labour Party, although dedicated to the interests of the working class, has never been able to win more than two-thirds of the electoral support of the working classes. He finds that working classes, like other people, cherish a multitude of values, both social and cultural, that divide them from one another and create enmity among neighbors in every community.

In this book the author carefully distinguishes between the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the Con-

stituency Labour Parties (CLPs), and he is concerned primarily with the latter and not the former. The PLP comprises the MPs and the Ministers who form the Government when Labor is in office and the Shadow Government when the Conservatives have a majority. The PLP elects their own Leader who eventually becomes the Prime Minister. The CLPs are the local units of the Labour Party whose primary purpose is to maintain the electoral organization which turns out the vote at elections. The strength of the CLPs depends more on the economic and social conditions of local communities than on the quality of the national leadership. Most histories of the Labour Party have been written without much knowledge of the CLPs, but in recent years scores of studies have been made by social scientists of the Labour Party at the local level. Since this careful research has been embodied in scholarly books and articles not readily available to the general reader, Tom Forester has written his book to survey this literature and to show the relationship between the CLPs and the working class. This excellent introduction to the literature deserves a place on the shelves of all those teaching comparative politics, social stratification, and recent British history.

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ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, HUGH HECLO AND CAROLYN TEICH ADAMS. *Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America*. Pp. 296. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975. $12.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

A growing number of universities in North America have recently been adding courses on comparative public policy. Useful articles have appeared in the journals investigating the content and purpose of a new approach to the traditional concerns of both comparative politics and public policy. The problem of teaching such courses to undergraduates and graduates in a coherent manner has received less attention. With the appearance of this informative and useful volume that problem will be at least temporarily eased. The authors have sought "to enable those interested in public policy and the social sciences to surmount disciplinary and national boundaries" (p. 1). They have generally succeeded in presenting comparative data and alternative explanations for the similarities and differences in the public policy experience of several Western industrial societies. Using the United States as their reference point, the authors have drawn most of their material from Britain, Sweden, and West Germany with briefer references to France, Holland, and Denmark.

In the first of three parts, the study focuses on three areas of social reform: health policy, secondary education, and housing policy. The first of these areas is a popular topic because not only does the United States remain the only advanced industrial society without a comprehensive health policy, but in most other cases the basic principle of universal access to medical treatment has not recently even been an area of real controversy. To be certain, costs and administration have been a challenge in both Sweden, Britain, and other states providing collectively financed health care. In housing policy the problem of coherence between means and ends is more universal. Secondary educational policy finds the United States providing the benchmark with Sweden pursuing similar goals, and West Germany sticking firmly to the traditional early "tracking" of youth into specialized secondary schools. The authors use the widely available quantitative data on number of students (percentage of age groups) attending secondary schools for varying numbers of years. There is, however, little consideration of qualitative differences between secondary education systems or within national systems over time. It is often claimed by opponents of comprehensive secondary schools in West Germany and Great Britain that Amer-

ican and Swedish comprehensive schools have often lowered the quality of education and that American students study longer but do not reach the same average levels of academic achievement as the students in the traditional European tracked secondary schools. Such qualitative questions are, of course, very difficult to address, but they are essential to the systematic comparison of national policies. Recent UNESCO studies of comparative secondary school achievement levels in science and mathematics may provide a clue.

Ensuing chapters consider issues of local-national governmental policy interaction with specific reference to urban, educational, and transportation policies. There is some overlap between the treatment of educational issues here and those already treated in Part I, but the focus is somewhat different. For instructional purposes the treatment of educational governance issues in a separate section probably makes sense. The last section looks at income distribution issues through both maintenance and taxation policies. These questions are the heart of current reappraisal of the welfare state, and the authors manage to present complex material in a form that is readily understandable by non-economists. These chapters are fairly complete, but one could wish that an effort to introduce the concept of "lifetime incomes" had been made. The impact of taxation and transfer payments and social services provided without charge (or at less than cost) to the user can be considerably different over an extended period than in a single year.

A concluding chapter on growth and reform potentials in Europe and America does a good job of tying the case studies together. It also raises several questions about the future of the "welfare state" in the light of current economic, social and political changes in Western industrial societies. Three broad variables are noted as explaining differences in national social policy: structure of the political system, ideologies dominant in national cultures, and social conditions that give priorities to specific programs. Although the authors indicate that the expansion of social policies has nowhere created a social utopia, America lags severely in most programs. The prevalent attitude in the United States that social programs do not work reminds one, in the face of the evidence presented here, of Mark Twain's quip about Christianity.

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CHAE-JIN LEE. *Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era*. Pp. v, 242. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. $12.50.

Based largely on Tokyo and Peking publications, this compact book deals essentially with the manner in which Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and opposition Socialist Party reacted between 1949 and 1972 to the shifting policy of the People's Republic of China. The JSP, which generally supported the policies of the People's Republic, was powerless to influence the LDP, which followed the U.S. policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan and containing mainland China. China's aim was to loosen Japan's ties with the U.S. and Taiwan, prevent Japan from rearming, and normalize Chinese-Japanese relations. Some progress was made by Prime Minister Hatoyama in improving relations between Japan and China, but his successors, Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato, conscious of the U.S. connection and of Japan's large and profitable trade with Taiwan, were repelled by such things as China's Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, abortive military coup in Indonesia, diplomatic strains with certain African countries and Cuba, and self-isolation. Even JSP leaders found that their close identification with China was a serious political liability. Though retreating in 1969 from her past militant and xenophobic foreign policy, China bitterly denounced the Nixon-Sato communique

that year on the reversion of Okinawa as signaling "Okinawanization" of Japan, revival of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and sabotage of Korea's unification. The Soviet Union welcomed Okinawa's reversion as a deterrent to the development of a unilateral strategic force by Japan and to China's regional military temptations. Sudden news of Nixon's visit to China in 1971 produced a profound shock throughout Japan. No less shocking was the UN General Assembly vote to seat the People's Republic of China. China's new spirit of cooperation was attributed to her concern over the Soviet threat. Despite strong resistance from the pro-Taiwan forces in the LDP and top Japanese business circles, Prime Minister Tanaka, responding to Japanese public opinion and softening Chinese demands, established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, laying the foundation for exchanging advanced Japanese technology for Chinese oil and coal. Thus, without weakening her vital security arrangements with the U.S., Japan broadened her participation in the international power game.

The three core chapters of the book are amplified by an introductory chapter and a closing chapter. The appendixes consist of six pertinent papers on the progress of negotiations between Japan and China. Numerous illustrations and tables fortify the author's main points. The index is adequate.

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LINCOLN LI. *The Japanese Army in North China, 1937–1941: Problems of Political and Economic Control*. Pp. 278. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. $27.00.

This book furnishes another chapter in the slowly growing literature on Japanese-occupied Asia. Drawing extensively on Chinese and Japanese sources, particularly material from the archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and records of the North China Army, the author examines the policies by which the Japanese sought to consolidate their control over North China during the period between the renewal of hostilities in 1937 and the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Those familiar with Japanese policies in occupied areas elsewhere in Asia will recognize numerous similarities. There were conflicts not only between civilian and military components of the government, between Tokyo and local commands, but also between military units—for example, between the North China Army and the Kwantung Army, its neighbor to the north. Japanese distrust produced local, collaborationist administrations which were very decentralized, virtually unarmed, and without a significant measure of autonomy. Little attention was paid to education, except of a narrowly technical kind, so that the number of schools and students declined. The goal of economic self-sufficiency tended to discourage any attempt at reforms and, in a food deficit area, intensified friction with the local population. Japanese civilian economic and financial interests, even the Zaibatsu, played a distinctly subordinate role.

How did Japanese policies affect the history of the Chinese Communist Party? At the heart of Japan's problem in North China, Li asserts, was a shortage of manpower which made it impossible for them to control the whole territory and which produced a four-zone arrangement which included neutral as well as Communist-held areas. In the attempt to quell opposition, the Japanese resorted to terrorist measures such as the notorious Three-All policy which intensified Chinese hostility, provoked guerrilla warfare and provided the Communists with the opportunity to assert their leadership. The fact that the Japanese eliminated virtually all non-Communist military units in the region also worked to the advantage of the Communists. In the argument as to whether the basis of the Communist appeal lay in their role as nationalist leaders or as social and economic reformers, Li's position is that both were involved but that, in North China, the

national leadership role did not emerge until after 1941.

Neither the Communists nor the Chinese population are the central actors in this book, however. The focus is on the Japanese, what they did and why. It is from this perspective that the book makes its contribution—an important one—to the study of a significant period in Asian, as well as Japanese, history.

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ALAN P. L. LIU. *Political Culture & Group Conflict in Communist China*. Pp. 205. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1976. $17.95. Paperbound, $5.75.

The temptation to apply analytical political theories to the study of Chinese politics is almost irresistible for political scientists with a behavioral orientation and a special interest in China. Alan P. L. Liu's book *Political Culture & Group Conflict in Communist China* is one of the examples attempting to "link Chinese studies with general social science concepts" (preface). This work examines group conflicts in China during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969. Liu's basic approach is to interpret the Red Guard Movement in a theoretical framework of group conflict. The book is divided into three parts dealing with the conflict process, conflicting groups and, conflict and order. It discusses the various aspects of group conflict during this period, such as political culture, mobilization, violence, the major groups involved, and conflict resolution.

The strength of this book is its comprehensive coverage of the theoretical concepts applicable to the Cultural Revolution. It views the Red Guard Movement with one single analytical focus—group conflict. Many of Liu's interpretations are based on general theories of group conflict and thus have gone beyond the descriptive analysis in historical narratives. Liu has done a thorough and meticulous job in gathering relevant theories.

The difficulty with this book is that in his preoccupation with fitting events in the Cultural Revolution for theoretical explanation, Liu has failed to pay sufficient attention to the larger perspective of the Red Guard Movement in the Chinese political system. The Cultural Revolution is conceived, initiated, promoted, directed and finally suspended by Mao Tse-tung and his close associates. Contrary to Liu's contention that the Cultural Revolution lacks a clear and identifiable goal (p. 174), Mao has definite and officially stated objectives in launching this movement. The Red Guard organization is one of the several instruments used by Mao to achieve his goals. Space does not permit elaboration on this point here. The rivalry among Red Guard groups is largely confined to lower levels. They are not spontaneous pressure groups as those in Western societies. They have never challenged Mao's precepts nor his authority, and they only attack people who are not protected by Mao. Their activities are constrained by the basic policies laid down by the Chairman. The break down of control over the Red Guards in some provinces cannot be construed as the total collapse of Mao's leadership over them. The dissolution of the Shen-wu-lien by the Central Cultural Revolution Group in January 1968 and the final crack down on radical Red Guards by the People's Liberation Army have convincingly demonstrated Mao's control over the course of the Cultural Revolution.

A more serious problem of this book is its extremely limited sources on Red Guards' personal experience which is the basis of most of Liu's theoretical conclusions. For this first hand observation, Liu relies chiefly on the account of two former high school Red Guards, Ken Ling and Dai Hsiao-ai, from Fukien and Kwangtung respectively. One of the frustrations for students of Communist China is the scarcity of reliable data. Fortunately, the study of the Cultural Revolution is a rare exception.

Many original documents and eyewitness reports including interviews with former Red Guards are available in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other countries. Liu does not appear to have consulted many of these sources. The heavy dependence on the experience of two high school students from the two southernmost provinces of China may not reflect the reality of the nationwide situation. Furthermore, the Red Guards are led by college students in Peking, not by high school students in the provinces.

Two minor matters ought to be pointed out also. The book includes too many unnecessary lengthy quotations. In a small book of only 205 pages, these quotations seem to be a waste of valuable space. The name K'ang Sheng, one of the top Chinese leaders who played an important role in the Cultural Revolution, is misspelled as Kang Shen throughout the book.

Liu's book has not shed any new light on our understanding of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, nor has his work added any new information on the subject. But Liu's commendable effort to apply general social science concepts and theories to the analysis of the Cultural Revolution has provided a significant example of the rewards and pitfalls in the theorization of Chinese studies. It is a useful book for students of political science, especially for those who are interested in comparative politics.

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EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER. *Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal.* Pp. xxi, 279. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. $18.75.

While providing a general introduction to government in Senegal from 1957 to 1970, the particular value of this study lies in two areas. One is the exploration of the inner workings of Senegalese politics, which the author likens to a political machine. The other is an attempt to evaluate the ability of the governing elite to create and implement policy that is designed to modernize rural economic structures.

Senegal's political life is historically indebted to the institution of patron-clientage—a system that preceded colonial rule. Today its one-party state is sustained and nourished by an extended series of patron-client networks leading from local to national levels. In return for support, loyalty, or esteem, the leader offers material or status-oriented rewards. Politics is not centered on ideology or symbolic values, but is materially oriented. Jobs, contracts, licenses, loans, scholarships, and the like are the spoils, and the struggle to gain access to positions that control and mete out the rewards is intense.

In Schumacher's view politics of this type hinders administrative efforts to secure compliance with innovative development policies, and allows only for the perpetuation of the status quo. Modernization, too, is undermined by the fact that traditional leaders and structures in rural areas are more effective than representatives of the centralized bureaucracy. (This is a debatable point and I shall return to it.) On the whole this is the rationale the author develops in order to account for the fact that there have been more failures than successes in Senegal's rural development. Official response to failure has been to shape new strategies. Time-tables have been lengthened for attaining goals; individual (rather than ideological) rewards are emphasized; expectations and preferences of international funding agencies are being catered to.

But will this achieve the desired reforms and facilitate development? Schumacher thinks not. Others have suggested that increased development is dependent upon a more efficient and publicly accountable bureaucracy. For them the bureaucracy based on a Western model is appropriate to Africa, and Schumacher is in agreement. In fact he recommends Senegal's bureaucratic establishment be strengthened, although he is quick to warn that

specific research on how to implement this is yet to be done.

In coming to this recommendation the author has relied heavily on previous prescriptions by his peers, whereas his own investigations have suggested alternative lines of action. For example Schumacher finds that traditional institutions, leaders, and values in rural areas are extremely resilient and adaptable. Yet this sector is glossed over as the author—and he is not alone in this regard—searches for ways to strengthen rural productivity.

Perhaps it is here and not at the bureaucratic level that it is appropriate to ask if the Western model of development has obscured a possible source of support. Suggestions that the bureaucracy be reinforced still overlook the practical issue of who is to oversee the implementation of policy, the introduction of innovative elements, and especially the securing of compliance on a day-to-day basis. Civil servants as a rule do not like to live and work in rural communities. Traditional leaders and notables do.

In their recently announced plans to restructure local government, Nigerian administrators indicate they will design units large enough to be development-oriented but flexible enough to utilize traditional authorities as leaders, advisors, and enforcement officials. Thus while development-oriented scholars continue to urge there be stronger bureaucracies, they miss a point that some administrators are themselves beginning to recognize: impersonal dealings with unknown civil servants do not necessarily produce compliance. Local leaders have well-established relationships, influence with their public, and a vested interest in the welfare of their communities. As conduits for development policy they may still offer one of the least tapped resources of the new nations.

Schumacher has not considered this possibility. Any shortcomings in his policy recommendations, however, are more than compensated for in other respects. He has provided an abundance of information on Senegal's bureaucratic and agricultural sectors. Interest in rural development in Africa is gaining momentum and therefore Schumacher's solid contribution comes at an appropriate time.

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RISHIKESH SHAHA. *Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect*. Pp. viii, 208. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. $7.50.

This excellent work constitutes an extremely informative, comprehensive, and up-to-date treatment of the government and politics of Nepal. It presents a balanced and objective analysis as well as a reasoned critical assessment of the Nepali political system. The analysis is complemented by selective and compact historical accounts of the evolution of principal institutions and political circumstances. Mr. Shaha is an experienced participant-observer who judiciously and skillfully combines the perspectives of political theorist, statesman, and social scientist. He is completely familiar with the major events and central figures in Nepali politics, and he brings to this study not only systematic scholarship but exceptional interpretative insight. While he has often been a candid but constructive critic of the current regime, he has played an important role in the government of Nepal and has served as a principal architect of the present constitution as well as ambassador to both the United States and the United Nations.

The book is divided into three parts which deal with political development, the Panchayat system of legislative representation, and international relations. The basic theme is the impact on politics of the tension between the indigenous culture and modernization. Mr. Shaha correctly perceives the paradox involved in a traditional Hindu monarchy embracing an ideology of development when most of the characteristics associated with the various dimensions of development and West-

ernization would tend to undermine the bases of traditional authority. His general recommendation seems to be for Nepal to pursue an active development program which, he believes, can best be facilitated by a relaxation of the tendency toward the centralization of power in the palace, a broadening of representation and the revival of party and opposition politics, and a realization of the more democratic principles of the constitution in order to increase political participation and social mobilization.

Mr. Shaha tends to accept too uncritically the views of American political scientists regarding the character and requirements of development and institution building. He also too easily accepts the Western image of politics as an ideal of democracy and a criterion of political development. Intellectuals in developing countries would do well to pay as much attention to recent critics of pluralism and interest group liberalism as they do to social scientific literature which implicitly equates political development with political culture and institutions. However, the deficiencies of this book are minor, and, after living for a year in Kathmandu, I judge it to be a thorough and lucid account of the politics of this Himalayan kingdom and the best general work on this subject that is available.

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ROBERT L. TIGNOR. *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939.* Pp. 372. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $25.00.

This is a very competent book. From the introductory passages one feared it might be just another diatribe against colonial exploitation, but in fact the author is both well-informed and dispassionately critical.

His examination of the pros and cons of the controversial system of indirect rule as practised in Kenya is excellent. His portrait of John Ainsworth as the type-figure of the administrator whose paternal concern for the welfare of his charges conflicted on occasion with their social and economic interests brings out more clearly than any general commentary could do the virtual impossibility of finding a satisfactory solution for the problems with which he was confronted.

Education and the Christian Missions; dispossession from tribal land; forced recruitment of labour for private as well as public service; alien legal institutions; these problems have arisen time and again all over the world ever since Columbus discovered America.

(Curiously enough, considering their record further south, the Spanish rulers of California seem to have solved them better, or perhaps avoided creating them more successfully, than most.)

They are considered here in great detail in their East African setting. It is ironical how often the most furious resentment was aroused not by punitive action, to which Africans were only too well accustomed, but by well-intentioned reforms. Such was the attempt to compel people to send children to school, and above all the interference with the barbarous but vital custom of female circumcision, which was destined to provide the major incentive to Mau Mau.

It is remarkable how public opinion has changed during the last fifty years. Up till late in the 19th century nobody seriously questioned the principle that a strong nation expanded at the expense of its neighbours. Sometimes the latter were exterminated, as happened in North America and Australia. Sometimes they were absorbed, as happened to the Picts in Scotland. Sometimes they were assimilated, as in the ancient Roman and modern French empires.

A remarkable manifestation of this expansionist ideology was the Anglo-Saxon dream of world domination, a tremendous pioneering force in its day. The half-hearted attempt after the '14–'18 war to create a white dominion in the highlands of Kenya was, apart

from the creation of the state of Israel, which was sui generis, the last example of this attitude, though not, alas, of nationalist aggression.

Not the least important aspect of this book is its discussion of the reasons for the emergence of the Kikuyu as the dominant power in post-colonial Kenya. Like the Ibos in Nigeria, they seem to have a special capacity for adaptation to modern conditions, coupled with a quickness of wit and a general ability which leave their rivals far behind. Knowledgeable persons used to tip the Luo as their most likely rivals.

When you have finished reading this excellent book you may be interested in two others. One is Julian Huxley's *Africa View*, which strongly influenced British colonial policy in this area from 1931. The other is a novel by Nicholas Montserrat, called *The Tribe Which Lost Its Head*.

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LATIN AMERICA

COLIN G. CLARKE. *Kingston, Jamaica: Urban Growth and Social Change, 1692–1962*. Pp. xii, 270. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $25.75.

In this, the first systematic study of a city in the English-speaking Caribbean, Colin G. Clarke (a geographer from the University of Liverpool) is essentially asking: how and why did Kingston develop so badly? This city, with more than 500,000 inhabitants in 1970, or one quarter of Jamaica's population, is of course the storm center of Jamaica's current political/economic/social crisis. Clarke blends geography, history, economics, sociology and demography in his analysis, with prime focus on the post-World War II period, especially the Kingston census returns for 1943 and 1960. His text is richly illustrated with 32 tables, 93 maps, and 32 photographs of the city.

Clarke tells a depressing story of a town that has never begun to fulfill its great practical and aesthetic potential. Kingston has a magnificent natural setting, facing a superb protected harbor, and is built on a spacious rising plain flanked by mountains. It was originally laid out on a generous gridiron plan, echoing William Penn's plan for Philadelphia ten years earlier, but this plan was sabotaged (as in Philadelphia) by the early inhabitants, who wanted to crowd along the harbor front and business center. The merchants who dominated the place in the eighteenth-century heyday of Jamaican sugar production spent little of their wealth on domestic architecture, and—as in all towns in English America—expended almost nothing on public buildings, parks or promenades. As large numbers of free coloureds, ex-slaves and fugitive slaves began to filter into Kingston to escape from labor on the sugar estates, the rich whites withdrew into northern suburbs above the city, where their successors remain today. Clarke shows how the city has always been so rigidly stratified along static geographic/economic/color lines that it is nearly pointless to debate whether race or class is the more important determinant. Up to the 1960s the small white (or European) sector has controlled Kingston. The far more numerous coloured (or Afro-European) sector—joined over time by Jews, Chinese and Syrians—has held low to median jobs and lived in the city center or inner suburbs. The Negroes (or Africans) and East Indians, the largest sector of the population by far, have consistently been relegated to the worst jobs or to permanent unemployment, and have long lived in overcrowded tenements and stockaded squatter camps in West Kingston. Though this city has been a magnet for two hundred years to peasants and plantation laborers, it has always lacked the industrial base for adequate working class employment. As Clarke demonstrates, throughout the colonial period the white island leaders did little or nothing to meet the economic

ıd social problems of the Kingston ɔor. Since World War II the new black ːaders have tried hard to promote in-ustrialization and have instituted sig-ǀficant improvements in education and ı housing for middle income Kingston-ːns, but so many poor and uneducated eople have flooded into the city in ıe last generation that all plans have ıtally failed to meet their needs. Nearly ƆO,000 slum dwellers are now increas-ıgly turning to murder and political iolence as outlets for their frustration.

In assessing an interdisciplinary book ıch as Clarke's, it is easy to think f additional things the author might ave done. Being an historian, I wish e had not relied on thin and anti-uated secondary sources for his treat-ıent of the eighteenth and nineteenth ɘnturies: there is a wealth of un-ĸploited data in the island archives, ıch as the thousands of inventories sting the possessions of colonial King-'onians in the probate records. An rchitectural historian would wish for ıuch fuller treatment of Kingston's ɔnsistently unimpressive experiments ı tropical building. A city planner 'ould like fuller discussion of the ıanging physical layout of the town, r perhaps some comparison with other ˈaribbean towns—for example, Port-of-pain, Trinidad, which despite its rowded natural setting has devoted far ıore open space to parks and prom-nades than Kingston has. A soci-logist could wish that Clarke had upplemented his excellent carto-raphic and tabular analysis of the 1943 nd 1960 censuses with interviews of cross-section of residents from key numeration districts. A political sci-ntist would want the story carried past 962 so as to trace geographic/economic/ ɔlor changes (if any) during the first ecade of independence. But no one uthor can do everything, and Colin ˈlarke should be congratulated for ac-ɔmplishing an innovative, imaginative nd highly interesting analysis of a very nportant Caribbean city.

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SHEPARD FORMAN. *The Brazilian Peasantry*. Pp. viii, 319. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. $13.50.

Shepard Forman is an anthropologist whose professional interest in, and human concern for the Brazilian Peasantry dates to the early 1960s. His latest work on the subject is a clearly-written, well-organized attempt to describe and explain the past and current condition of that important but oppressed segment of Brazilian society. The author approaches his subject in a direct and logical manner, beginning with the historical evolution of the Brazilian Peasantry, proceeding to the economic, social and political dimensions of the agrarian crisis, and concluding with peasant religion and movements of social protest.

The historical section is useful in that it provides evidence that, contrary to what many authorities believe, peasants are, and for centuries have been a very important element in the Brazilian socio-economic system. Slaves, of course, were important during the colonial period and throughout most of the Empire; but, from the earliest times a free peasantry also existed and, indeed, played a crucial role in the economy. The relationship between peasants, patrons, and the land has always been subject to change, but, in the twentieth century, increased emphasis on commercialization has created a situation of severe crisis for the agrarian lower classes.

In describing the peasant's social position, the author sheds further light on a society which others have described as "patrimonial." "Hierarchy," says Forman, "is a fundamental tenet of Brazilian Social life" (p. 75.). Peasants are obliged to seek out "patron-dependancy" relationships in order to survive. The patron is often extremely harsh but the peasant rarely questions his authority since he sees it as basically legitimate. This, in part, explains why organized peasant reform movements are extremely rare in Brazil.

Forman's discussion of the economic

dimension is also quite useful. In it, the author maintains that recent increased emphasis on commercial export agriculture has threatened the peasant in two ways. First, it has increased the value of the land, therefore leading to the displacement of peasants through mechanization. Second, it has changed market relationships shifting the advantage from peasant vendors to middlemen who prefer to buy from large producers. What is more, various panaceas—such as group colonization and the creation of cooperatives—which have been proposed as ways of alleviating the economic insecurity of the peasants, do not seem to work very well when put into practice.

The political picture is no brighter. The peasant has never had much real political power. To this day he remains disenfranchized and unorganized while the agricultural elite—though now somewhat less influential in national politics—continues to dominate the rural scene.

The study concludes with a particularly poignant examination of peasant religion. Though nominally Catholic, Brazilian peasants, according to Forman, are manipulative and this-worldly in their approach to religion. Individuals enter into "contracts" with saints, groups from time to time cast their lot with latter-day Messiahs, all in an attempt to alter a world in which they are otherwise virtually helpless. Religion in this sense, is a pressure valve for peasant discontent.

Forman's study, then, is a welcome contribution to the literature. It is a well-written, well-documented treatment of an important subject. What is more, it provides a number of fresh insights which help the reader to understand and empathize with the plight of this "agglomerate of dispairing people, longing to be saved, still seeking the miracle, and still acquiescing to the will of God" (p. 245).

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PETER D'A. JONES. *Since Columbus: Poverty and Pluralism in the History of the Americas*. Pp. vi, 282. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976. $12.50.

As an ostensible five-century history of some two dozen diverse cultures, this book is an unmitigated failure. There are only about 220 pages of text—260 less those used for maps and photographs. Not all historians, even if using a more suitable size of book, would want to analyze together both of the Americas, for essentially they are profoundly different. In spite of its faults and lacks, the United States has been an economic and social success; and one can therefore draw parallels with less favored countries only by emphasizing its every negative element and passing lightly over every positive one. The distortion is not incidental, in a tendentious detail here or there, but rather pervasive, comprising the framework of the entire content.

The substance of the book consists largely of lists of dates, names, places, more dates. Some of these facts are wrong (for example, Allende was not a lawyer but a physician). Some summarize complex social questions with a truly sophomoric assurance (for example "FDR simply did not spend *enough* on public works and employment"). But most of these details, with no discernible context, are simply meaningless and thus unutterably dull.

Since one of the author's reiterated points is that in most of Latin America the "nation" has been a more or less artificial construct, the organization of the book's material by country is seldom successful. If the "revolution" by which Panama broke away from Colombia is put between quotation marks, should one then discuss the opinions and actions of "Panamanians"? If in Latin America the difference between "liberal" and "conservative" parties is often nominal, should one devote space in a too short book to contests between them?

In fact, then, the dimensions of the principal framework are several highly questionable concepts—"dependency," "neo-colonialism," "plural society," and the like. It is not merely that some o

these reify political biases but, as Jones uses them, they change their meaning with the locale. As developed in Horace Kallen's analysis of the United States, "cultural pluralism" meant that immigrant groups should not be forced to adapt fully to established American norms. Such a policy recommendation differs fundamentally from French Canadians' demands for cultural or even quasipolitical independence, as well as from the economic-cultural-political denigration of Indians in Mexico, Brazil, or Bolivia. To cook up all these in one pot is to prepare a stew that no knowledgeable person will find palatable.

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ALEJANDRO PORTES and JOHN WALTON. *Urban Latin America: The Political Condition from Above and Below*. Pp. 217. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976. $13.95.

In the midst of the publication explosion on urbanization and urban life in Latin America, Portes and Walton have written important interpretive and analytical essays. Using the extant literature, utilizing their own research, and unafraid to be conjectural, they have produced a book that is often exciting.

Other than the joint, brief Introduction and Conclusion, each author is represented by two long essays. In "Elites and the Politics of Urban Development," Walton compares the civic concern of the leaderships in Guadalajara, Monterrey, Cali and Medellín, and proceeds to seek the causes of the very different records. His "Structures of Power in Latin American Cities" is far more ambitious. With evidence from 26 studies (of which four are his own) he explores the validity of seven propositions that have been posited as to "the structural correlates and consequences of the distribution of power." *Inter alia* he finds that in the shift from rule by small, tightly interrelated elites there is neither a displacement of those elites nor a widening of effective political participation to incorporate groups outside the elites. Rather, there are merely new styles of elite domination:

> The emergence of new urban elites based on alliances among the class interests of landowners, industrialists, exporters, development-minded politicians, and foreign investors has at least perpetuated, if not exacerbated, earlier structures of inequality. Nowhere do we encounter evidence of a net gain in the power or privilege of the peasantry and the urban worker (p. 168).

Or, again: he finds no example, in the studies, of "a viable and representative pattern of political pluralism . . . Seldom do middle-class interests constitute an independent source of political power, and there are no cases of regularized lower-class access to policy-making circles (p. 164).

The fundamental sources of elite attitudes and of continued elite domination are succinctly plumbed by Portes. "The Economy and Ecology of Urban Poverty" traces the history of the Iberian cities on the continent; cities that served as loci for conquest and exploitation, for an elitist social order, in which the poor were tolerated while remaining "an object of total unconcern to the official and wealthy city, except perhaps as objects of Catholic charity." And, he argues, this character has survived to the present, absorbing into its value system later immigrants, migrants, and the socially mobile. The spatial shift of the social composition of the cities is delineated: the elite move from the center to the periphery with, often, their own neighborhoods geographically separated from the sprawling shanty towns by the middle and artisan sectors occupying the original core—with, of course, the soaring urban land market manipulated to the benefit of the elite landowners.

Best of all, in this reviewer's opinion, is Portes' "The Politics of Urban Poverty." The urban poor *do* feel frustrations, often severe ones, although there is an absence of "structural blame" for them. The poor *do* participate in collective political action when they believe it to be both necessary and possible in meeting needs: especially housing and landownership. Their political par-

ticipation is rational: "Rational adaptation and instrumental organization to cope with the existing social order have been the trademarks of the politics of urban poverty in Latin America." The particular form of participation, including vote bargaining, petitions and land invasions, depends largely upon the dominant political conditions. And, being aware of political conditions and embroiled in the task of sheer survival, they will not throw their support to revolutionaries until victory is assured or achieved. These findings, and many more, are supported by wideranging evidence and specific case studies. Along the way, Portes also gives what one hopes is final interment to two common myths about the urban poor: that they are locked in a "subculture of poverty," and that they are a seething hotbed of fury and radicalism. Comfortably logical "continuums of political participation" receive justifiably rough handling.

In their Conclusion, the authors note that the explosive urban growth of Latin America (there are about 20,000 urban squatter settlements on the continent) is far from being a sign of progress. On the contrary, it lies at the center of the circle of excessive centralization, inequality, and stagnant agriculture.

A paperback edition would be most welcome.

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FRANK SAFFORD. *The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite*. Pp. xiii, 373. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975. $15.00.

Can the leadership of a developing country foment economic growth by providing technical education and attempting to develop values oriented toward the technical? Very little, if the Colombian experience in the 19th century is to be our guide. Frank Safford argues here that, in Colombia at least, economic growth was itself the prerequisite necessary for the implantation of a technical orientation.

Continuing attempts in the 19th century by part of the upper class in this aristocratic Latin American nation to modify cultural values toward the technical and the practical are described in detail. Early nineteenth century Colombia which had a static agrarian economy and a large proportion of poor and uneducated alongside a tiny wealthy aristocracy who abhorred manual labor, early experimented with manual industrial training. A chapter follows on academic science for the upper classes. Science was not attractive because there were few career possibilities. The careers of upper class youth who were sent abroad for technical and scientific training are explored in a later chapter as are the origins of a Colombian engineering profession. An epilogue treats the twentieth century evolution of technical elites in Colombia.

We believe that Safford's thesis is generally correct for Colombia. His descriptions of the interplay between the various obstructions such as the aristocratic social values and a hierarchical social structure and barriers such as geographic and economic conditions are interesting to the reader who wishes to delve into the details of a case study. There are, however, problem areas in the monograph which detract from its value. Safford's thesis that "the early republican elite sought to direct the upper classes as well as the poor toward technology and economic enterprise" is inadequately documented. Nowhere do we find a discussion of the instruments by which the elite directed the upper class to this end. In fact, the government had neither the authority nor the resources to create incentives to do so. Upper class youth studied abroad with their own families' resources.

A second difficulty relates to the lack of background of the author in engineering. One example is his use of the word "road" instead of "trail." To engineers a road is a finished surface which accommodates wheels. But there were

o roads in Colombia until the twentieth entury. He also fails to perceive that has been geology rather than topogıphy which has posed the major prob-:m in the Colombian Andes in the onstruction of railroads, roads, and ven trails.

The bibliography is extensive, but it ontains some questionable entries (for xample, *Manuela, novela de costumres colombianas* by Diaz which is not eferred to in the text). There are some agging errors in spelling (even of 'olombia, p. 235), some partly transıted phrases (p. 359), and abbreviaons unexplained (p. 332). Many of ıese could have been caught by more areful review. Others of content and ıterpretation could have been corected had the author personally conılted with even several of the many ngineers mentioned in the volume Julio Carrizosa Valenzuela, Vicente 'izano Restrepo, among others highly nowledgeable and respected).

It will be a pity if this monograph not translated into Spanish for, in ur judgement, it would stir much more ıterest and discussion in Colombia than is likely to have among social scintists and engineers in the United tates. The main strength of the study its historical detail and the telling f the story rather than in the validaon of the thesis of development preeding the technical and the practical ince there is no evidence that the ffort in terms of organization and esources was ever very great in 19th entury Colombia.

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UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

LWYN BARR. *Black Texans: A History of Negroes in Texas, 1528–1971*. Negro Heritage Series, No. 12. Pp. xi, 259. Austin, Texas: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1973. $8.50.

Blacks occupy an integral place in Texas history. Alwyn Barr attempts to cover the multiplicity of black Texans' experiences from 1528 to 1971 in a single volume. His primary purpose is to provide general readers with "a summary of available information about Negroes in Texas" (p. viii). Barr also seeks to reinterpret certain aspects of black Texans' history and to provide high school and college instructors with a survey which in part will serve as a corrective for existing textbook treatment of Negroes. Primarily descriptive rather than analytical, his account basically relies upon information contained in secondary sources.

Barr's survey contains no central thesis, other than the general story of the problems, progress, and continued frustrations black Texans have faced at almost every turn. The book begins on an uneven note by attempting to cover from the time the Moorish slave Estevan journeyed with Cabeza de Vaca and his master to Texas shores in 1528 to the close of the Civil War in but two chapters or 38 pages. Coverage of the post-1865 era broadens to include black activities during Reconstruction, the heightening of black pride, and the current status of black families. Barr conveys a sense of the hardships facing black Texans when they sought better education, entry into the professions, and the acquisition of rights guaranteed to all Americans. Echoing the findings of recent historians, Barr notes the growth of segregation prior to the 1890s, the increased importance of black churches and social organizations when Negroes' political and economic positions were circumscribed, and the generally accelerated rate of progress for blacks in the post-1940 era.

Overall, Barr's account reads easily and contains much factual information. The text is free of footnotes, and the bibliographic essay reflects extensive reading in secondary sources, including unpublished dissertations, theses and papers. The book, however, is not without problems. Noticeable gaps and omissions plague Barr's narrative. Given the span attempted and the voids in

existing scholarship, a synthesis like *Black Texans* is bound to slight some topics. Nevertheless, one is surprised to find such scant attention paid to events of the magnitude of the Civil War, World War I, the New Deal, and World War II, in the lives of Texas blacks. Indeed, such treatment will lead many scholars and teachers to question whether a study of this scope should have been attempted in a single, slender volume. Alwyn Barr's *Black Texans* offers general readers a compact survey, but historians and instructors will conclude that the volume attempts more than it can deliver.

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STUART M. BLUMIN. *The Urban Threshold: Growth and Change in a Nineteenth-Century American Community*. Pp. xiv, 298. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. $16.50.

This study of Kingston, New York, between 1820 and 1860, is one of the first books in the growing field of urban history actually to examine the process of urban growth. Most recent works of the so-called "new urban history" have contented themselves with minute dissection of urban social structure. But Blumin is primarily interested in how country towns become transformed into cities and the effect of urbanization on community life. Hence both the choice of town and of time period are significant—Kingston was an old agricultural town which saw its economy and social life transformed in the antebellum period.

Blumin begins with an analysis of Kingston's economy and social structure in 1820, when most residents were farmers and descendants of the Dutch settlers. The paucity of sources for this period makes this the weakest part of the book, but it provides a backdrop for understanding the massive changes of the next forty years. Blumin next analyzes the major forces for change in Kingston: the opening of the canal in 1826, which linked this Hudson River town to eastern Pennsylvania coal fields; and the arrival of European immigrants and native migrants, permanently altering Kingston's social structure. Most of the book analyzes the results of these changes. The physical landscape changed; local political issues took on greater importance, as the town experienced local versions of national conflicts; and the organizational structure of the town became more complex. Using both sophisticated analysis of quantitative sources, along with newspapers and diaries, the author captures the subtle process of change in this town.

Community identification is the central concern underlying this examination of urban development. Blumin questions the common assumption that urbanization in the nineteenth century meant wrenching changes and a breakdown of tightly-knit communities. He argues quite the contrary: that there was very little sense of "community" in the pre-1820 town, whereas the increasingly complex organizational structure which accompanied urbanization intensified residents' awareness of, and attachment to, Kingston as a community. He stresses the ways that the changes brought by urbanization heightened Kingstonians' sense of community. Local political issues did not capture much attention before 1820, but urbanization created local issues of sufficient importance to command the attention and energy of a sizeable proportion of residents. Before 1820, most residents knew everyone else in town, but Blumin finds no evidence that they identified with Kingston as a community per se. The voluntary organizations of the 1850s, however, generated strong loyalties, which Blumin equates with community attachment. Provocative as this argument may be, however, it remains unproven. Despite the scarcity of evidence on pre-1820 Kingston, Blumin dismisses the possibility that Kingstonians may not have written about community awareness because they took it for granted. Their attachment to various organizations in the 1850s might in-

dicate loyalty to specific groups, rather than to the whole community. But reservations about his thesis cannot obscure the high quality of this book. In analyzing the process of urbanization and its consequences for political and social organization, Blumin has helped set the pace for future work in this field.

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RALPH ADAMS BROWN. *The Presidency of John Adams*. American Presidency Series. Pp. x, 248. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1975. $12.00.

Time was when hardly anyone had a kind word for John Adams. In the past three decades, however, scholars have done much to resurrect the image of the New Englander. Ralph Adams Brown's volume probably represents the most laudatory treatment of Adams to date. The author attempts to show that Adams' critics and opponents were incorrect in their assessment and that Adams' administration "was marked by wise and unselfish decisions. . ." (p. ix).

While not presenting much new material, Brown's discussions cover many important aspects of Adams' tenure. Foreign affairs, the focus around which virtually all other issues revolved during the late 1790s, receive the most attention. Adams is pictured as a president contending with a potentially explosive national temper and political opposition within and outside his party as the country moved into an undeclared war with France. The author concurs with Adams' assessment that the achievement of peace with France was the greatest accomplishment of his career.

Few would quarrel with Brown's assessment of the centrality of foreign affairs, but many readers will take issue with the degree to which the author slights other areas. Brown shows, for instance, that Adams preferred peace over his own political advancement, but leaves the reader puzzled over Adams' views on the importance of the election of 1800 or the role of political parties. The organization of the book adds to the imbalance. Only after carrying the diplomatic story down through the fall of 1799 does the author return in any detail to the Alien and Sedition controversy and other earlier, often related domestic developments. The result is a choppy, fragmented story. There also is a problem of perspective. If the study of a public figure is to be effective, it must pay sufficient attention to the context in which the individual operates. Brown's account is only partially successful in this respect. It touches but briefly, for example, on the larger questions involving the United States as an emerging nation or the general factors underlying Adams' defeat for re-election. At times, however, Brown goes to the other extreme. He seldom criticizes Adams, but in the rare departures from this pattern, as in his abbreviated discussion of the Alien and Sedition acts, he spends most of his energies qualifying his criticism. Brown even devotes an entire chapter to defending Adams against charges concerning his possibly inflammatory rhetoric and his absences from the capital. In these and other instances, general readers may well feel buffeted about in a historiographical war neither of their making nor particularly of their concern, and scholars may suspect that the author has set up a straw man; the negative views of Adams which he seeks to counter are chiefly those perpetrated by historians of a much earlier period, not those of modern scholars. Ralph Adams Brown's book contributes to the continuing rejuvenation of John Adams, but it neither matches nor supplants previous studies of America's second president.

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EDWARD M. COOK, JR. *The Fathers of the Towns: Leadership and Community Structure in Eighteenth-Century New England*. Pp. xvii, 265. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. No price.

In this fine scholarly study, Edward Cook has successfully advanced historians' understanding of two very important aspects of colonial life: the nature of political leadership and the differences among towns in New England. Cook focuses on the local officials, describing the process by which they were chosen, their length of tenure, plus the significant role which wealth, family and religious participation played in their obtaining positions of leadership. The discussion on each topic naturally involves description, but the author consistently and skillfully integrates analysis into the text, raising and answering questions both broad and narrow as they arise out of his material. In fact, the book reads somewhat like a continuous, logical stream of thought punctuated by supporting evidence and explanations concerning the author's theoretical underpinnings and methodology—why he chose the variables he did, how he obtained his information, potential biases in his sources, and the like.

Cook's supporting evidence takes the form of laws, individual cases, and statistics. Frankly this book has too much detail and too many dry statistics to be either easy or enjoyable reading for any but the most enthusiastic student of the topic. And the insertion of an endless number of tables into the body of the text is made all the more annoying by the fact that the statistics provided are not always completely adequate. In order to fully answer the type of questions he has posed, the author really needed to go beyond the raw percentages he provides and deal more with the interaction of variables. Cook never really tests the degree to which his key factors of wealth, family and religious participation were dependent on each other. Essentially he treats them as independent and discusses their effects on leadership selection as if these were entirely discreet effects. Such a technique also means that he can't effectively weight them in terms of importance. But he has taken on a broad task here in trying to cover all of New England, and it would have been remarkable indeed if he had succeeded in presenting an analysis which was definitive in all respects.

Actually, the breadth of his study is one of its most valuable aspects, since up to now most of the significant books on New England community life have focused on individual towns, usually Massachusetts towns. Cook bases his generalizations on a much wider sample, including settlements in Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Moreover, he makes a concerted effort to actually categorize the different types of towns in New England, based on the constellation of leadership patterns which emerged in the different communities he studied. He comes up with a five-category breakdown which coincides roughly with the categories growing out of geographers' central place theory. In place of Jackson Turner Main's familiar divisions of frontier areas, subsistence farming areas, commercial farming areas and cities, Cook claims that in New England at least, the significant forms were frontier communities, farming villages, secondary urban centers, major county towns, and cities.

This aspect of his study, pre-figured in his important article on the typology of towns which appeared a few years back, should provide a structure for future studies of individual New England communities—a way of putting them in perspective. Hopefully other historians will fill out and support the picture Cook has drawn in his overview. In the meantime, *The Fathers of the Towns* is valuable reading for anyone interested in leadership patterns or community structure in early America.

LAURA BECKER
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LINO A. GRAGLIA. *Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools*. Pp. 351. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $11.50.

Professor Graglia's book is a penetrating assessment of the role of federal courts in the controversial and volatile area of schools and racial desegregation. Most of the evidence reviewed consists of a detailed analysis of court rulings, and their effects, over the last quarter century that have unearthed legally sanctioned racial discrimination and that have ordered busing in many school districts throughout the United States. The overall verdict of this book is that the federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have done less than a spectacular job, disrupting the political process through actions immune from direct public accountability, distorting and undermining the intents of other, more representative, branches of government, issuing orders barren of clear, logically (and Constitutionally) defensible principles, and creating havoc in the lives of many Americans, black and white, children and parents. In short, as the logo on the book jacket promises, Professor Graglia's work is "a sharply critical view of the court rulings that led to forced busing."

At the core of Professor Graglia's thesis is his interpretation of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court when it first specifically declared legal racial discrimination in public schools unconstitutional (*Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 1954). While expressing misgivings about the need and the desirability of court intervention in this policy arena, Professor Graglia contends that the most defensible principle emanating from the *Brown* case is that racial classification of *any* type in assigning young people to schools is Constitutionally prohibited. Professor Graglia argues that, subsequent to *Brown*, the Supreme Court has drifted from this principle, at times not fully employing it, at other times announcing that this is the rationale guiding court action when in *fact* the court has moved in an opposite direction. In the wake of this vacillation, the courts have ordered desegregation through requiring racial assignments to schools, even if busing were to be needed, and they have distorted legislative actions, especially the words and intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. And for what individual, social, or educational good? As Professor Graglia interprets the evidence, very little benefit has emerged. Indeed the losses in such things as educational achievement, efficiency in the financing of the public school system, defusing antipathy between the races, and instilling public confidence in governmental policy-makers, have far exceeded any gains.

The major strength of this book is the meticulous dissection of court decisions dealing with desegregation issued by judges at *all* levels of the federal judiciary. Sarcasm and outrage aside, Professor Graglia's industrious reconstruction of the court record provides an unusually complete probe into the writings of various members of the court system in their attempts to formulate public policy.

When evaluating the research about the effects of court opinions on human behavior, however, the presentation is less appealing. Here secondary sources provide the reservoir of impact information. Professor Graglia does not question either representativeness or possible spuriousness of these data, for instance. One becomes amused and dismayed in reading that an "independent researcher," assessing the consequences of court ordered busing in Denver, "reported [that] whites . . . will just quietly disappear in two to three years" (pp. 201–202) without any citation for this startling prediction to be found near the quote.

The most disturbing aspect of this book centers upon Professor Graglia's view of the principle that should guide Supreme Court actions in dealing with racial assignment and the public schools. To argue that a completely neutral position in racial classification is the favored rationale forecloses *any* governmental policy formulated to redress, through educational changes, inequities between the races deriving from previous political actions. Constitutional

limitations don't just constrain the Supreme Court. Interpreting equal protection to mean a neutral racial orientation for political policy-makers is a gloomy prospect for those who feel that the existing Constitution provides a means to offset such inequities.

JAMES W. LAMARE
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FRANCIS RUSSELL. *The President Makers*. Pp. 407. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1976. $12.50.

Francis Russell writes well and does a service for those who want a synthesis of the secondary literature of eight 20th Century president-makers—Marcus Alonzo Hanna, Thomas Collier Platt, Theodore Roosevelt, George Harvey, Harry Micajah Daugherty, Louis McHenry Howe, Joseph Patrick Kennedy. There is no use of primary source material which might have taken the author into an exciting world of discovery of new motivations for presidential aspiration and of new hypotheses for presidential nomination and election. While such president-makers as Theodore Roosevelt and Louis Howe have been adequately researched, the others warrant fresh assessments. In his rush to publish—with the use of secondary sources—the author lost an opportunity. At that, he missed some of the valuable secondary sources, that is, Paola Coletta's and Louis W. Koenig's works on William J. Bryan, both of which discussed at some length the attributes of Marcus Hanna, the brilliant organizer of the Republican campaign which defeated the Democrats in 1896. And the author's use of some of the secondary sources is questionable. There is considerable doubt as to whether Claude Fuess wrote the definitive biography of Calvin Coolidge, given the fact that it was "authorized" and that Donald McCoy updated it considerably with his more recent biography, *The Quiet President*.

Aside from the above caveats, reading *The President Makers* is informative and fun—for example: the description of Harrison's last moments with McKinley; Platt hurriedly correcting himself about T.R.'s nomination for the Vice Presidency: "I am glad we had our way—the people, I mean, had their way"; T.R.'s affinity for the huge Taft (even though there is little on T.R.'s actual king-making role); Harvey's loyalty to Wilson until the President left for Versailles (although there is little on why that turned Harvey off); the 1920 Republican Convention where Brandegee quipped: "There ain't any first raters this year . . . Harding is the best of the second-raters"; Coolidge's nearly incredulous nomination for Vice President in 1920; vivid descriptions of Howe's gnome-like role in securing FDR's nomination and election; Joseph Kennedy's reaction of the assassination of his son, the President.

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CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT. *Darwin in America: The Intellectual Response, 1865–1912*. Pp. vii, 228. San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1976. $9.00.

Ms. Cynthia Russett has written an interesting book. A list of her sources, placed at the end of each chapter, evidence the scope and thoroughness of her research. Her style is simple and direct.

Although Charles Darwin was not the first scientist to think of evolution, he, in his *Origin of the Species*, treated the idea extensively. A careful reading of Darwin's book reveals the influence of others, especially Thomas Malthus' *Principle of Population*.

Darwin's theory was never received unanimously by Americans, but it initiated an intellectual revolution. The mental turmoil was expressed most bitterly between the scientists and the theologians. Of all religious groups, Protestants rejected Darwinianism most completely. Chancey Wright, however, found nothing in the theory that was religious at all. In contrast, Charles Peirce grasped the essential features of

evolution—variation and natural selection—but he refused to accept Darwin's theory completely.

Before 1860, the author informs us, the emphasis was on Lockean individualism. Since that time, Americans were required to find a more solid foundation for the state. Industrialism and urbanism influenced our search, but the real problem was the city which drew the masses together, thereby intensifying many problems. Technology, argues the author, created independence but no community.

William Sumner believed that the state should only create favorable conditions for persons to pursue happiness: never create happiness. Lester Ward, however, opposed Sumner's laissez-faire attitude while John Dewey advocated exercising the human intellect to change the world around it.

Many intellectuals, declared Ms. Russett, at first favored Darwinianism with great gusto. By 1900, she contends, Darwin's theory was accepted in American intellectual life as a recapitulation of classical economics. Thorstein Veblen was the first economist to become a true disciple of Darwin. Today, certainly we Americans are far removed from the intellectual struggle over Darwinianism.

GEORGE OSBORN

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P. D. G. THOMAS. *British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American Revolution, 1763–1767*. Pp. vi, 394. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. $25.75.

This is an encyclopedic account of British politics regarding the American colonies from the Treaty of Paris to the enactment of Townshend's taxes. No one familiar with the "Namier school" will be surprised by the general view taken by Professor Thomas, an authority on Parliamentary history in the eighteenth century. Grenville, Townshend and George III are portrayed as responsible statesmen seeking to resolve imperial revenue difficulties while beset by political pressure of all sorts.

On this side of the Atlantic, those men are widely regarded as villains. But Thomas shows convincingly that their beliefs regarding Parliamentary authority over the colonies were not generally different from those held by our heroes Rockingham and Pitt. And in action the former were superior. According to Thomas' well-documented account, Grenville modified certain bills to account for possible or actual colonial objections, and delayed others to allow for colonial consideration. Townshend's well-known effort to enact the American distinction between internal and external taxation was actually supported by those Americans whom he could consult. Pitt, on the other hand, was something of a political opportunist, who once flirted with the idea of dictating all colonial economics, rather than merely trying to raise the badly needed revenue.

Anyone searching information about the day-by-day progress of the debates in Commons and Lords, private conversations among the principals in London, reports by provincial governors, or letters home by colonial agents, need look no further. Professor Thomas has included them all, to a fault. The reader is overwhelmed by dozens of passages about the papers, voting records, and changes of opinions of minor M.P.s like Conway and Dowdeswell, and conversations, letters, and anxieties of unknown businessmen like Trecothick and Whately; and by other passages about wholly irrelevant tidbits of information like what certain Committees of Parliament did on days they were not considering colonial matters, or how much the Rhode Island lieutenant governor sought in compensation for damage done by Stamp Act protestors. While enthusiastically applauding the research that produced such data—and no less the marvelously readable way the hundreds of footnotes are displayed—the reader wonders if the work did not need some significant pruning.

Finally, the book is grossly over-expensive. My guess is that this useful $12–$15 book has been taken right out

of the market by Oxford University Press' price tag.

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BUCHANAN PARKER THOMSON. *Spain: Forgotten Ally of the American Revolution.* Pp. 250. North Quincy, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing Company, 1976. $9.75.

This book was written on the assumption that few Americans except historical specialists know that Spain gave the United States important assistance during the American Revolution. The author's purpose is to recount in a straightforward manner the story of Spain's significant aid.

On the basis of lengthy researches in Spanish and American archives she has woven together a very readable and, sometimes, dramatic account of Spain's aid—at first, surreptitious and, later, open.

The author is at her best in her sprightly treatment of those Spaniards whom she considers heroes—especially Bernardo de Gálvez and Don Diego de Gardoqui. At times the author's enthusiasm carries her away, but it makes for lively reading.

The first third of the book deals with Spanish aid during the period of official Spanish neutrality. The cooperation of France and Spain is discussed briefly and somewhat superficially. The remainder of the work concentrates on Spanish aid after Spain's declaration of war against Great Britain in 1779. It involved loans, supplies and direct naval and military assistance. Gálvez with his appointment as governor of Louisiana in 1777 early comes on center stage where he remains, and deservedly so. The account of his audacious and spectacular campaign resulting in the capture of heavily-fortified Pensacola from the British in May 1781 provides the climax of the book. A brief final section, a distinct anti-climax, attempts to present a reckoning in financial terms of Spain's assistance—a complex and dull subject. This might better have largely been relegated to an appendix with the heroics at Pensacola standing as the dramatic finale.

Overall the book presents much solid information in a pleasing narrative approach. It is nowhere highly analytical nor does it attempt to probe in depth the complex diplomacy of the major powers.

A serious drawback in this work is its deluge of gigantic quotations—in some cases running two to four pages (for example, pp. 65–69). Fewer, shorter quotations and resorting to brief summarization would improve readability. A check of several long quotations, incidentally, revealed some misspelled or omitted words and other transcription problems. The most serious drawback, however, is the lack of an index which sharply reduces its value for quick reference.

While the specialist will discover little that is new in fact or interpretation, the general reader will find this study of rarely-discussed aspects of the American Revolution enlightening and often absorbing.

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University of Connecticut
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SOCIOLOGY

ALFRED W. CROSBY, JR. *Epidemic and Peace, 1918.* Pp. vi, 337. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $17.50.

The influenza pandemic of 1918–1919 killed at least 21 million human beings—twice as many as World War I. But except during its most virulent phase in September–November, 1918, when it sickened and destroyed life so rapidly that in many places neither medical nor mortuary facilities could keep pace with its devastation, the "Spanish" influenza attracted little attention. Even during its worst onslaught, the epidemic was overshadowed by the war and the armistice, and it had not received much attention from historians before the publication of this book. Based upon extensive re-

search in medical and actuarial records, medical journals, periodical literature, and manuscript collections, Alfred W. Crosby, Jr. has reconstructed both the pandemic's attack upon the United States and modern medicine's search for its causes, and he has done so in a lucid and gripping narrative.

Professor Crosby traces the origins of the Spanish influenza to the United States where it began as a normally mild disease in the Spring of 1918. It was carried to Europe by American military personnel and overran much of Eurasia by mid-summer. Then in August, 1918, a much more deadly strain of the disease appeared almost simultaneously in Freetown, Sierra Leone, Brest, France, and Boston, Massachusetts. Striking with astonishing devastation, influenza afflicted between 25 and 40 percent of the American people by June, 1919, and killed some 675,000 Americans. Crosby surveys overall damage, but he concentrates on Philadelphia, San Francisco, troopships, the American Expeditionary Forces in France, American Somoa, and Alaska. Their diverse experiences ranged from a quarantined and disease-free Somoa to fantastic carnage and social paralysis in some native Alaskan settlements.

In 1918–1919 no one knew the cause of influenza, and Crosby makes clear the continuing uncertainty about the origins of the epidemic. Some researchers had suggested that influenza was produced by a filterable agent too small to observe, but a confused, frequently retrograde quest by medical researchers took ten years to establish the existence of viruses and still longer to show that the swine influenza that ravaged the hog population of the Middle West each fall after 1918 was the direct descendant of the Spanish influenza. Crosby points out also that even today's medical science cannot account for the absence in many of the epidemic's human victims of Peiffer's bacillus (which in combination with a virus produces swine influenza in hogs) or explain fully the startlingly heavy incidence of mortality among the Spanish influenza's young adult victims. One puts down this book with a sense of awe at the public apathy that met the pandemic and at the persistent mysteries of the disease's origins, pathology, and disappearance.

There was, in fact, little relation between the epidemic and the peacemaking of 1918–1919, and the book's suggestion of a connection is unfortunate. Crosby's view that the harshness and inequities of the peace settlement owed something to the effects of debilitating illness on the principal negotiators at Paris or on their staffs is simply unconvincing. Yet in spite of a misleading title, this book provides an excellent treatment of a major and neglected event. It serves a useful counterpoint to the concerns and pretensions of political and diplomatic historians, forcing us to recognize that a single, brief epidemic generated more fatalities, more suffering, and more demographic change in the United States than all the wars of the Twentieth Century.

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SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN. *The Best-Laid Schemes: A Tale of Social Research and Bureaucracy.* Pp. 483. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976. $14.95.

The Best-Laid Schemes is the account of the now infamous Department of Defense's (DoD) ever-deepening involvement in the sponsorship and direction of social science research on the causes and mechanisms of revolutionary change, and how insurgency movements could be best combated using social science knowledge. The account is written in the first person by one of those directly involved in the establishment of Pentagon social science research projects into the problem of revolutionary warfare. Those who expect an exposé are cautioned to direct their attention elsewhere, for what *The Best-Laid Schemes* offers is a detailed historical description of the genesis of Project Camelot and similar ventures, and an analysis—and defense—of why DoD became involved in the sponsor-

ship of applied behavioral research on social-political questions.

Deitchman, as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency Programs in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, was directly involved in Project Camelot—an aborted Army sponsored study of the sources of revolutionary movements and how social change could be influenced. Later, as Director of Project Agile—a post-Camelot attempt to continue doing military sponsored social research, but with a low profile—he was in an excellent position to describe the bureaucratic infighting and decision making from the heady days of the early 1960s, through the donnybrook of the ill-named and ill-starred Camelot, up until the Mansfield Amendment of 1969 (Section 203) finally banned the military from carrying out research not specifically related to military functions.

It would be difficult to find a practicing social scientist of note who does not hold a strong professional and moral position regarding DoD research. Thus, as a reviewer, I feel some obligation to state my own position. I consider DoD involvement in socio-political research to have been at best inappropriate, and at worst dangerous. Moreover, as a sociologist I would have to judge that most of the DoD projects were naive regarding both their goals and the state of the art. For example, Project Camelot, the most publicized of the projects, was not only ill conceived, it was also an example of poor research design and inadequate staffing. Researchers working for the Army through the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) at George Washington University of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at American University not only failed to ask the relevant questions, but also consistently overestimated what they could deliver.

Deitchman's own analysis of how and why the programs developed is far more sophisticated. Moreover, the volume is both detailed and well written. Deitchman carefully documents how DoD involvement in social science research grew out of the Kennedy era belief that social science knowledge could and should be applied to national defense problems. Viewed in perspective, the crucial decision was made during the mid-1960s, when segments of the social science community came to define internal war or counterinsurgency as an important problem for research, and accepted the premise that it was "researchable." Once this decision had been made all else followed logically. As put by Dietchman, "But however we might view it now in rueful retrospect over Vietnam, the point at the time was not whether the job *should* be done, or even whether it *could* be done, but rather how to do it better."

Logically, the Department of State should have been the agency most concerned with undertaking research on problems associated with Vietnam and the expanding "war of national liberation," but that agency was, at the time, intellectually and politically stagnant. Most government agencies were more than willing to let the McNamara Department of Defense take the lead. DoD, thus, became involved in sponsoring political studies, since the State Department had largely abdicated its role of providing information, and the military hierarchy recognized that they could not fight "wars of national liberation" in the conventional military manner. The Army, as a consequence, became directly involved in research on counterinsurgency and political instability. The DoD offered social scientists both the pot of gold of research support, plus a sense of mission. The question of whether social scientists could work on contract research, with the explicit goal of developing techniques for avoiding revolutionary change, without compromising their professional ethics and academic freedom was rarely asked until the Camelot debacle.

On the basis of his involvement in government sponsored social research, Deitchman now argues that there should be *less*, not more, governmental sponsorship of research into the workings of society. He suggests that the goals of government bureaucracies are inherently opposed to those of free and

independent scholarly research. Key social issues can be approached with fewer conflicts of interest when done under private sponsorship—the constraints will be smaller, the researcher won't have to face public accountability for projects that the public doesn't approve, and there will be less (though still some) chance of being accused by subjects of being a representative of oppressors. As he concludes, "In the area of learning about societies, their values, and their behavior, I now believe that government can be most effective if it follows, rather than leads."

Although Deitchman is currently with the Institute for Defense Analysis, he has picked up a few of the more obvious Pentagon behavior patterns. One of these is a passion, even in a first person narrative, to avoid using names. In the preface Deitchman states that, "The reader will find that in many cases I have gone to some lengths of circumlocution to avoid naming scientists, civilian or military officials, or even countries, in connection with particular aspects of the events or particular research projects." Why, a decade later, is there a need for such secrecy? Deitchman obviously wants to protect those involved from further vilification, but by going to such lengths to cover up names he leaves the unintended impression that participation was something secretive and covert. Such secrecy makes about as much sense as the CIA's long-standing attempt to pretend that its massive complex across the Potomac from D.C. doesn't exist. During the 1960s it was common knowledge in the social science community who was doing what research for whom. Trying to maintain a cloak of secrecy a decade later merely lends a conspiratorial air to otherwise rather routine knowledge.

A second Pentagon characteristic Dietchman apparently fell prone to during his tours with DoD is Washington parochialism. In spite of his often excellent post-hoc analysis of what went wrong and why, Dietchman candidly admits that he and the others who had been involved in building DoD programs in problems of revolutionary warfare were amazed by the depth of the anti-Defense Department reaction to Project Camelot, and the virulent condemnation of the social scientists involved. While he recognizes that Camelot *per se* was merely the trigger for a bomb that had long been ticking, he still appears rather surprised that the bomb went off when it did. The question is, why were he and others in the DoD bureaucracy surprised? Given the campus ferment at the time, it seems remarkable that upper-level administrators in Washington could be so unaware of the changing mood of the nation. Yet they were. Those, such as this reviewer, who came to the upper reaches of Washington straight from the hinterland during the Vietnam years, were struck by the miasma that engulfed those who should have known better. By limiting himself largely to contact with scientists working for, or sympathetic to, DoD aims and involvement, Dietchman had effectively divorced himself from the changing temper of much of the academic community. Ironically, those attempting to implement programs to study changing attitudes and values in other nations were apparently among those least aware of the massive changes taking place within their own professions and country. To those researching social change, the furor over Camelot should not have come as a surprise, but rather as a foregone conclusion.

Finally, a particularistic nit-pick. The book is typed on an IBM selectric, and not set using standard type. Apparently the goal was to save money, but if that was the case, why not a softcover edition? For $14.95 one should, even in these days of inflation, expect a typeset volume.

The Best-Laid Schemes is must reading for those concerned with the interface between politics, policy and research. It is a thoughtful and intelligent review of a still painful period in the maturation of the American social science community.

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ANTHONY S. HALL. *Point of Entry: A Study of Client Reception in the Social Services.* Pp. 150. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974. No price.

This is a report of a study of the influence of receptionists' attitudes and actions on the likelihood of applicants to a social service agency continuing beyond the point of intake. The study was conducted in four area offices of the public child welfare service of London, England. It grew out of the author's observations while conducting another study in one of the offices. In that study he found that a high proportion of applicants remained with it only a short time, many of them, indeed never coming back after they applied even though they had been accepted. (American studies have similar findings.) This led the author to undertake the present investigation, which centers on factors determining why the receptionists acted as they did.

The present study shows that requirements placed on the receptionists resulted in their becoming more involved with applicants than they were expected to, and that this fact was not known by the administrators of the program. The over-involvement resulted from such rules as that the receptionists should ensure the appropriateness of each applicant's request, that they should fill out a form about the problems and should also assess the urgency of the request. In addition they were often rebuked, gently or not so gently, for intruding on the busy social workers' time by referring inappropriate cases. As a result receptionists sometimes gave applicants their own opinion of what they should do about their problems or selected for referral the applicants they most liked. In general, these unexpected and undesired consequences depended largely on how difficult it was for the receptionists to make contact with the social workers.

The author offers several practical ideas about how to improve this situation. More important, however, he concludes, is the need for "a systematic approach to defining priorities that provides a rational basis for allocation of resources—accepting, rejecting, and closing cases. Without such a system . . . decisions on resource allocation and service provision tend to be made as a result of non-rational factors such as client pressures and chance."

Except for this rather cryptic conclusion, this is an excellent study. Many besides workers in social service agencies will find it interesting and its observations useful. It may even be of benefit to physicians and lawyers in private practice, who have much to lose if possible patients and clients are met by officious receptionists or those who give advice about how to deal with problems.

HELEN L. WITMER

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JACK NELSON. *Captive Voices: The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into High School Journalism.* Pp. xxi, 264. New York: Schocken Books, 1974. $10.95. Paperbound, $1.45.

Constitutional rights are rooted deep in American history but seem strangely threatened by school officials who can, and do, trim the life out of them. Where Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of the press, it appears that common school practices support and justify censorship to maintain social control, the status quo, or the school image.

These findings are reported by Jack Nelson of *The Los Angeles Times* in *Captive Voices*, an inquiry by educators and journalists into First Amendment rights and the function of journalism in high school.

Censorship is a matter of school policy, the report finds, and is directed toward image damaging materials, accepted as a routine part of the school process, is self-imposed, and is a fundamental cause of trivial and uniform high school newspapers.

"The great majority of high school journalism programs did not encourage

free expression, independent inquiry, or investigation of important issues." Most publications are bland and serve as public relations tools for the schools.

Equally discouraging, but perhaps not as surprising, was the finding that members of racial, cultural, and ethnic minorities face subtle but real barriers in gaining access to student publications.

The report recommends that students have ultimate authority for their publications. And the only news that is not fit to print is "material that is legally obscene or libelous or likely to cause immediate and substantial disruption of the school."

A legal guide, suggestions for student publications, and a listing of resources are helpful additions to the report.

Captive Voices is well-intentioned but necessarily restricted in its critical analysis. It criticizes high school publications but many community papers suffer similar faults. Publishers, as well as principals, direct reports in the who-what-where-when-why-how of their stories. In fact, many observers have recognized the similarities between school and small community and a focus on their use of media would offer additional insight for comparative analysis.

This report is admittedly not designated as a scholarly investigation. Some of the many vignettes are superficial substitutes for more basic examinations of cause and consequence. And there is a disconcerting inconsistency in capitalizing, or not capitalizing "Black" and "Chicano."

The report is a needed commentary in support of Constitutional rights, although one might have hoped for a more emotionally convincing case.

As Eugene C. Patterson, editor of the *St. Petersburg Times*, suggests: "Freedom is a difficult art. To teach it, one must practice it." This is obviously true for the school and equally true for the community. One suspects there are unlimited opportunities for improvement.

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HARRY C. PAYNE. *The Philosophes and the People*. Pp. ix, 214. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976. $12.50.

This is an intellectual history of the philosophes' conception, attitude, and policies toward *le peuple*, especially as expressed in their *Encyclopedie* articles of the mid-eighteenth century.

Payne traces the movement in Enlightenment social thoughts from the harsh elitism of a Voltaire to the egalitarian social romanticism of Rousseau. He discusses such other Enlightenment thinkers as Montesquieu, Gibbon, Diderot, Turgot, Condorcet, Helvetius, Holbach and Smith.

It is movement *from* sheer contempt for *le peuple* as educable, moral agents and from naive or ideological insensitivity to their economic plight. The movement is *toward* "a maturing social awareness and growing sensitivity to the people's problems. . . ."

Payne takes particular note of the philosophes' debates about social legislation. It was during these confrontations with actual issues that their elitism was challenged. They generally disagreed about the social utility of religion and legislation regarding it. Regarding universal education, they came to favor at least the development of work related skills. Their economic policies never regarded "*pauvreté*" as eradicable, but concentrated on the alleviation of "misére," chiefly by cultivating charitable responsibility among the rich. Likewise, their occasional reference to civil equality among all persons was nearly always distinguished from political equality.

Payne's concluding chapter traces Rousseau's radically different conclusions from the Enlightenment presuppositions, and their impact on the other philosophes.

What he traces is actually less an historical trend—though there is something of a trend, as in *Encyclopedie* articles in the 1750s and 1760s—and more a fluctuation. For most of the philosophes there seems to be a domi-

nant note of scorn, in sensitivity and separation regarding *le peuple*.

What Payne shows is how this note was tempered from time to time by themes inconsistent with it. The tempering themes he points out are those that resemble the social views of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In Payne's words:

> The philosophes followed an elitist logic of economic and social realism, tempered by their sympathy for the lot of the people. They perceived society as a hierarchy justified not by sacred order but by its inevitability and its potential utility. Within this hierarchy, established by economics and talent, they saw both great possibilities for fairness and ability and great realities of oppression and misery.

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ROBERT F. RUSHMER. *Humanizing Health Care: Alternative Futures for Medicine*. Pp. x, 210. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975. No price.

BUDD N. SHENKIN. *Health Care for Migrant Workers: Policies and Politics*. Pp. v, 270. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975. No price.

These two books are concerned with the organization of medical care. The first was written by the Director of the Center for Bioengineering at the University of Washington; the second was written as the result of Dr. Shenkin's experiences as an administrator of the Migrant Health Program in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Rushmer, after discussing the limited applicability of some of the trends in medical research and the disproportion of health resources that are now devoted to a few "favored" illnesses such as cancer, heart disease, stroke, cystic fibrosis, multiple sclerosis, sickle-cell anemia and some others, argues that different facilities, personnel and organizational arrangements will be needed in the future. On the basis of cost/benefit and value added criteria, he shows the need for a greater amount of ambulatory and home based care with more u of paramedical personnel and a "n version" of the traditional physici He feels that in the future individu must be ever more responsible for th own health, particularly for the illnes which do not require the services physicians per se. We need to be aw of the cost/benefit of many expens parts of our medical system, such as hospitals, and try to find less expens ways of bringing needed medical car those who need it but cannot afford Dr. Rushmer is impressed with Swedish hospital system and belie that the United States could adopt so phases of that system with benefit its medical care delivery system.

The discussion of medical care in Shenkin's book is more restricted, a is concerned with the medical health needs of migrant workers. T analysis presented in this book ser as a basis for Title IV of the Hea Revenue Sharing and Health Servi Act of 1974. Dr. Shenkin advises read of his book to read first the summar at the end of each chapter and ther read the summaries of each sect within the chapters and finally to p ceed to the basic text. This revie followed these instructions, but fou it difficult to get an overall knowle of a chapter from the summaries written even though some of them w several pages in length.

The author first describes the migr workers' characteristics and then problem of their health and medical c which he feels is similar in general to health problems of the rural poor. T second chapter describes the class migrant health program which Shen claims is extremely weak. Next he cusses proposed alternatives to classical program. In the discussion administrative considerations of Migrant Program the author points two distinct phases: "The phase of novation and the phase of support management." Both these phases necessary and in his estimation, e phase requires different personnel organizational forms. Advisory gro made up of migrants and representati

of migrants with a significant degree of autonomy would also be required for each phase. The migrants have had too little input vis-à-vis the migrant health program in the past and there is great need for such input both in the planning and innovative phase and in the organizational phase. In conclusion, the author argues for some strong political input including pressure from the United Farm Workers. There is an Epilogue which describes in considerable detail the development and passage of Title IV.

Both of these books attempt to show how health could be improved by changing the medical care delivery system so that many now not getting medical care would have easier access to it. Better education and personal knowledge of health needs are recommended. Although those who can afford it can get excellent medical care in the United States, there is a great necessity to make it easier for rural residents, migrants and the poor to get such care. These two books advocate some changes in the medical care delivery system which their authors believe would work toward this end.

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JOYCE STEPHENS. *Loners, Losers, and Lovers: Elderly Tenants in a Slum Hotel.* Pp. ix, 118. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976. $8.95.

Imagine, if you can, a short book on the elderly which is simultaneously theoretically sound, revealing in its description, and both critical and humanistic in its approach. Fortunately, imagination is not necessary; Stephens has produced just such a book with *Loners, Losers, and Lovers.* Moreover, this monograph presents evidence and arguments which contradict certain widely held stereotypes of the elderly as necessarily passive, defeated, dependent and incompetent.

Employing the method of participant observation and the theoretical guidelines of the symbolic interactionist perspective of sociology, Stephens investigated the everyday lives and social milieu of elderly residents of a "SRO" (single-room occupancy) slum hotel. The usual criticisms of participant observation and case study methods are less valid in this instance due to the truly extraordinarily effective use of synthesizing concepts and generalizations. As an examplar of how sociological theory and language can be used to illuminate and explain, rather than obfuscate, social life, *Loners, Losers, and Lovers* is nothing less than superb. Particularly effective are the ways in which the contradictory demands of sufficient descriptive detail and integrative and generalizing commentary are balanced.

The text is organized as the reality was experienced by Stephens: a general description of the SRO hotel, then a view of the management and other "outsiders," and then a presentation of the behaviors and interpretations of the elderly residents. The contrast is vivid between the objective social situation in which these people live, in which money is always scarce, physical danger is prevalent, medical problems are calamitous, and effective public social agency support is nearly non-existent; and their personal interpretations and responses to these conditions, which reveal strength, courage, tenacity, and autonomy. After reading how these presumably incompetent people survive in what is unquestionably a very difficult and harsh environment, it is hard to maintain a conception of elderly persons as unable to care for themselves, or to manage their own lives. While they do not "win," they are in no sense of the word defeated.

The implications of this study are many and varied. Perhaps foremost among the questions raised is how the social conditions of the elderly who wish to remain autonomous can be made more humane and less punishing without necessarily infringing or limiting their right to self-determination. There are also obvious implications for changes in public assistance programs for the elderly, and for more general shifts in the political and social assumptions and beliefs upon which such

programs are based. In addition, theories of aging and of social deviance must respond to the evidence presented in Stephens' study.

For all of the above reasons, and for others too specific and detailed to mention, *Loners, Losers, and Lovers* is recommended without qualification or hesitation to anyone interested in social gerontology, urban life, social deviance, or social theory; in sum, to anyone interested in gaining greater understanding of and insight into social life, and how social situations and social interaction can combine to produce a unique outcome: meaningful human encounters.

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ANSELM L. STRAUSS. *Images of the American City*. Pp. 306. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. $12.95.

This book can be reviewed in three different ways, each one appropriate. Therefore, to REVIEW #1:

Anselm Strauss has contributed a useful addition to the literature on American cities and what their images mean to their residents and interpreters. His work identifies major methods by which cities are symbolized, and how these configurations take form in mid-century America. His is an important contribution to urban studies, and no planner or urban sociologist should be without his volume for reference and historical reminder on the varying meanings of "city".

Strauss' book is flawed by the failure to cite recent literature on his subject, particularly the seminal work of Lynch and Clay. Indeed, this reviewer was not able to find references beyond 1960 in the volume.

Or, one might cast REVIEW #2:

Transaction Press has done the urbanist the favor of re-issuing Anselm Strauss' classic *Images of the City* some fifteen years after its original publication by the Free Press of Glencoe. Strauss' work is still useful as a reference, although it has been importantly updated in the interval by the contribution of Kevin Lynch, in particular. Strauss, though he focuses heavily on Chicago in the volume, and stints the West, did present a discussion no student of the growth of cities can afford to overlook in his comparative study of the growth of urban symbolism.

And, finally, REVIEW #3.

What is one to say about a publisher with the effrontery to reissue an important historical study in a field without acknowledging the original date of issue and source of publication? Indeed, Transaction Press presents Anselm Strauss' *Images of the City* in a format exactly that of an original issue, replete with a preface thanking Howard S. Becker and Blanche Geer of Community Studies, Incorporated, of Kansas City, Kai Erikson of the University of Pittsburgh, and Nathan Glazer of Bennington College. Issue in its present format is confusing to students, destructive of traditions of scholarly citation and accuracy, insulting to the author, and ignorant of basic principles of honesty and scholarship. The publisher should assume its moral obligation to rectify its egregious error by enclosing an errata page in all copies giving proper attribution to the work it has chosen to re-issue.

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DUANE F. STROMAN. *The Medical Establishment and Social Responsibility*. Pp. x, 193. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1976. $12.95.

Duane Stroman, Associate Professor of Sociology at Juniata College in Huntington, Pennsylvania, presents a well-documented critique of the health care system in the United States, focusing on the medical profession as the main cause of the "illness of our current health care system." Stroman outlined the signs of that illness as the extensive unmet medical need in the country, the uneven quality of American medicine, unnecessary medical services and the high costs of medical care.

The author accomplishes his purpose,

"to understand the complexity of our health care system and the forces for change within it," and the abundance of statistical detail and fact is somewhat overwhelming in sections of the book. However, the timeliness of the subject and the cogency of the author's arguments are well worth the effort.

The thrust of the critique of the health care system comes in chapters 5 and 6; there Stroman openly challenges the monopoly exerted by the medical establishment on health care. The author maintains that while the medical establishment sustains free enterprise medicine, it does so at the expense of the public. Instead of improving medical care for the majority, the medical professionals have worked to maintain their own closed system of providing services through the fee-for-service practice.

The author concludes his analysis with a "patient's bill of rights" and calls for a national health care system "to match the needs of our complex society."

Duane Stroman must be given credit for presenting an immense amount of information on such a problematic subject in a coherent perspective, and also for offering a necessary and convincing critique of the medical establishment in this country.

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ECONOMICS

RUSTOW A. DANKWART and JOHN F. MUGNO. *OPEC: Success and Prospects*. Pp. ix, 179. New York: New York University Press, 1976. $12.50.

This short and eminently well written book should be read by every public and private official dealing with energy problems in general, and OPEC matters in particular.

This reviewer has seldom seen a multidisciplinary work that did not do grave injustice to one or all of the separate disciplines analyzing the subject matter. This is not the case with the work of Dankwart and Mugno on OPEC. Although the points of economic theory used in the analyses are not explained, the conclusions resulting from the theory are presented so the non-economist reader can perceive their significance as they relate to what OPEC is trying to accomplish. With the exception of several key tables, the empirical evidence used in support of the authors' arguments are neatly placed in an appendix, to be carefully scrutinized or ignored as the reader wishes. Similarly, the reader is not distracted by minute descriptions of the dozens of meetings, agreements, and government policy actions that made OPEC an international force. These descriptions also appear in neat chronological order in an appendix.

The book consists of three chapters and a short conclusion. Chapter one, of course, describes the creation and rise to power of OPEC. In 31 pages, the authors concisely and clearly discuss the roles played by the Persian Gulf Countries, Venezuela, the third world countries, the governments of industrialized countries, and the major oil companies in diplomatic and economic (price and tax) policies through the 1973–1974 petroleum crisis.

Although chapter 2 examines the way in which industrialized and third world countries view their positions vis-à-vis OPEC, and how OPEC funds are being recycled, the most interesting part of the chapter relates to the spending and investing objectives of OPEC. In that analysis Dankwart and Mugno look at such diverse objectives as: (1) the economic development of OPEC members, (2) the military security of some members, (3) direct investment in the private enterprises of industrialized countries, and (4) economic aid to third world countries. The chapter also examines how OPEC differs from other (potential) raw material cartels.

The main thrust of the third chapter and the conclusion is that OPEC stands strong in the immediate future because of (1) the futile nature of economic, military, and political retaliatory ac-

tions against OPEC; (2) the unlikelihood that OPEC members would gain much by price cuts, and (3) that economically viable alternative fuels are a long term solution.

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ORVILLE F. GRIMES, JR. *Housing for Low-Income Urban Families: Economics and Policy in the Developing World.* Pp. xiv, 176. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. $11.00. Paperbound, $3.65.

This World Bank Research Publication is a short but richly documented account of the urban housing problem in developing nations. It is descriptive—almost anecdotal—though the statistical appendix suggests that much empirical and some econometric effort underlies the terse text. An impressive Select Bibliography and consistently fine footnote source references enhance the credibility of author Grimes as commentator on this complex and surprisingly sensitive subject. The understated message of the book is that policy-makers in many developing nations are doing much less than they could to improve urban living conditions, mainly because they fail to appreciate the special kind of economics that is relevant.

Orville Grimes is billed on the jacket as an economist on the Development Policy Staff of the World Bank, a specialist on urban land and housing problems. The Preface seems to make it clear that the book was written for the Bank, representing collaboration by a number of Bank staff, and that abundant statistical material was developed through the Bank. The copyright page, however, has a disclaimer by the Bank for views and interpretations contained in the book. For those who may never have chanced upon the strange diplomacy of international assistance agencies, this apparent inconsistency means that the World Bank wants to avoid telling client governments how to conduct their internal affairs but at the same time hopes that a certain amount of enlightenment will make future financial discussions with those governments easier and more amicable. In short, it is reasonable to take this book as a primer on World Bank expectations with respect to urban housing efforts; client governments will be well advised to absorb its message.

The book is significantly more optimistic than Charles Abrams' elegant, explicit treatment of the same subject in *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (MIT Press, 1964). Much of Abrams' book was a graphic description of the urban housing problem in numerous developing nations. Grimes' book is addressed primarily to people who already know what the problems are but fail to perceive how these problems can be solved. So it is a discussion of policy options and economic facts of life, documented as often as necessary with success stories such as Singapore and Hong Kong.

The physical problem is that a large fraction of these urban populations have grossly inadequate housing, in terms of space, sanitation, comfort and security. Incomes are low, but a large share of those who are underhoused could afford the economic cost of minimum standard housing if it were produced; the need for subsidy or income transfer is relatively minor in most places. The market economy does not supply housing because suitable financial institutions do not exist and because suitable land is not provided with utilities or transportation. Governmental housing agencies tend to produce the wrong kind of housing in the wrong places, at extravagant cost and frequently in token quantity. The real problem, as Grimes sees it, is public policy, because ". . . in most countries improvement in policy can contribute substantially to better housing without a major commitment of additional resources" (p. 91).

Specifically, there seems to be little need for loans or grants from international agencies: "In many developing countries poor people pay rents that yield returns on capital of from 30 to 100 percent a year" (p. 88, citing an AID publication). Housing can be financed

internally if the nation will but "improve the workings of financial markets" (p. 58). Among the improvements suggested are removal of interest rate restrictions, encouragement for local building societies, diversion of social security funds to urban housing, and avoidance of rent control.

The other major policy option which Grimes supports is the "sites and services" approach. This often-repeated phrase refers to public provision of transportation and basic utilities to suitable, mostly peripheral, land. Houses themselves can best be built by private means, without government intervention or subsidy. For lack of such serviced land urban squatters in many metropolitan centers crowd illegally upon central sites better used for expanding businesses or not used at all. Getting government out of the business of building houses directly for the poor means that families get as much housing as they can afford and no more. In most cases this would be reasonably good, as long as cheap, serviced land is available. For the very poor there is often opportunity for "cross-subsidy"; if some of the resettled families pay a bit more for land, interest and the housing itself than those things actually cost the resulting surplus can be used to lower the rents of the poor—a kind of progressive rent scheme. The main thing is to discourage public agencies from putting scarce public resources into just a few projects which are developed at unrealistically high standards.

There are precedents and models for all the policy improvements which Grimes suggests, and he cites them. Brief as it is, this book ought to go far in persuading governments in developing nations that they could solve their urban housing problems if they really wanted to; they don't need help from the World Bank. This is the kind of frustrating advice often associated with bankers, a valid argument but somehow irrelevant. The book is a bit disingenuous in not anticipating how third world governments might respond to the lessons.

The large irrelevancies are two. First, there are few among the developing countries which actually have control over their internal financial system so that private capital for housing can be mobilized, and few also sufficiently benevolent to care. Showcase developments, externally financed and occupied mainly by favored officials can be photographed and displayed through a controlled press as proof that General X or Chairman Z has "solved" the nation's housing problem.

Second, the "sites and services" approach assumes a capacity for fiscal and development planning which scarcely exists in the most developed of nations, as well as a capital fund. Putting water, electricity and sewerage in a peripheral tract of land and extending good public transportation to that site requires public investment which may not be recouped through the existing fiscal system—that is, through user charges. Making that investment in advance of settlement is a gamble. How does one know that suitable development will occur? Information about the nature and extent of effective demand for housing and about real supplies of housing credit is just not available. Indeed, feasibility studies and infrastructure risk capital are just what developing nations most reasonably expect from agencies such as the World Bank. Grimes' book does not imply that such is forthcoming.

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STEPHEN HERBERT HYMER. *The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investments*. Pp. xxii, 253. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976. $12.50.

Back in 1960, the late Stephen Hymer completed a Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Economics at MIT. It was probably the most read, unpublished dissertation in history. Everyone who was seriously interested in multinational corporations borrowed it. Hymer insisted foreign direct and portfolio investments were very different. He considered the theory of interna-

tional capital movements applicable to portfolio investments. This theory argued that investors moved funds to get the best interest rates. He showed how it did not explain most foreign direct investments. He stressed control as crucial to foreign direct investment. "Cross-investments," direct foreign investments of U.S. companies abroad and foreign companies in the United States in the same industries, could not be accounted for by looking at interest rates. Economists, Hymer suggested, should not be using the theory of international capital movements but rather a theory of industrial or firm (enterprise) relationships in studying international operations of national firms. Considerations of oligopoly were more meaningful than those of interest rates.

The dissertation came as a breath of fresh air. It took observed phenomena and thoughtfully viewed the theoretical implications. It compared national and international operations of firms. I often wondered why Hymer never published the thesis. Charles Kindleberger in a sensitive introduction explains that the thesis was rejected for publication. What Hymer published later seemed to me less interesting and less original. As he grew older, he became interested in radical economics. Then in 1974, at age 39, he died in an automobile accident.

Now, MIT Press is publishing the thesis. As I reread it after more than a decade, I am struck by (1) the lucidity of the argument in the early chapters (Kindleberger tells us that one reader for MIT Press in 1960 found it too "simple and straightforward"); (2) how many of Hymer's ideas are now well accepted (I had forgotten that Hymer had stressed the necessity of a firm engaged in international business having advantage of some kind); (3) how Hymer neglected the vast antitrust literature on international business that was available in 1960 and would have helped him in his analysis; and (4) how much more sophisticated the literature on multinational corporations has become in the last sixteen years.

I welcome MIT Press's decision to publish this thesis. I wanted it for n library.

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JOHN W. MELLOR. *The New Economi of Growth: A Strategy for India ar the Developing World.* Pp. ix, 33 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Pres 1976. $11.50.

While conventional theories of ec nomic development have consistent neglected the role of agriculture as tl leading sector, proper credit should to a remarkable group of agricultui economists who have heroically resist the received wisdom. Now that tim technology and unconcealable ma poverty have reduced the appeal of co vention in development studies, tl recent works urging a revision of tl established strategies of developme should get a more patient recepti than could be expected before. F tunately, within about a year, two maj works elaborating rural-oriented stra gies of development have emerged. O is authored by Bruce Johnston and Pet Kilby, and the other by John Mellor the subject of the present review.

Mellor's book presents a sustain critique of what he calls capital-inte sive strategies of economic growth wi a detailed analysis of the theory a practice of its Indian variant and at tl same time offers a rural-led strategy its alternative. Though the empiri materials are primarily derived from tl recent economic experience of Ind these are set in a comparative context relevant Asian experience. The ca study itself makes the book well woi reading but the comparative sensitivi and the new approach considerat increase its value for a wider circle readership, including scholars a policy personnel.

Those who have followed the in vidual and the collaborative works Mellor published earlier, will rec nize that many of the ideas contain

in his statement of the rural-led strategy are not unfamiliar. What is new, however, is the bold integration and elaboration of these ideas in the form of a consistent strategy explicitly designed to confront the issues of growth, employment and welfare together. The components of this strategy are deceptively simple. The new strategy will involve giving priority to increasing agricultural production through investment in new technology, reducing capital intensity in the industrial sector, simultaneously increasing exports and imports, and emphasizing the use of planning for productive inducement rather than unproductive regulation.

This strategy calls for a substantial shift from the established practice in India and some other countries which concentrated most of their attention on capital formation in the industrial sector. The basic emphasis in Mellor's strategy is on increased production of wage goods, particularly food, which if sustained by agro-technical innovation, is likely to generate cumulative production, employment, and welfare gains. That is why the first priority is accorded to agriculture where ensuring proper supply of inputs, adequate infra-structural provisions and assistance to small farmers can make a big difference. In short, a dynamic agricultural sector will imply not merely joining rural growth with economic participation but in addition, will ensure the needed intersectoral flow between agriculture, industry and trade without the cumbrous bureaucratic regulations that normally mark centralized planning.

Mellor is aware of the hard fact that it is not easy to switch strategic emphasis from industry to agriculture and from capital goods to wage goods. Not even the arguments of employment and welfare needs of the poorer masses are likely to shake the conventional ground very much since the established approach delivers a patronage effect that is congruent with the interests of the ruling coalition of social and political forces. His perceptive discussion of the internal and external political factors which can make a difference in the choice of a growth strategy is uncharacteristic of growth literature. While one may wish that he could elaborate this part further, he at least should be given due credit for recognizing the crucial political factors that are conventionally dismissed because of their untidy nature.

Whether one shares Mellor's high hopes regarding the promise of agrotechnical innovations or his critique of conventional developmental planning and the value of the new strategy, he will have to recognize this book as a challenging contribution to the literature on economic growth and development. Reliance on technology, market mechanism, inducive planning and foreign compassion are, of course, unlikely to excite many scholars and politicians for a variety of reasons. No matter what these reasons are, they too will find the empirical part of this work highly rewarding. Those who would read this book for a novel approach to poverty-focused, rural-oriented development may question the author's austere detachment from the problems of the rural asset and authority structures. This neglect may be due to his interest in devising a strategy which may be feasible under the conditions of the existing regime. However, given the author's deep concern for the levels of living of the rural poor, it is not readily apparent to what extent a policy of switching investment unaccompanied by structural transformation in rural society will be able to accomplish substantial changes in the life situation of the poor such that they may have access to a life consistent with human dignity.

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LEO PANITCH. *Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy: The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy, 1945–1974.* Pp. x, 318. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $22.50.

The writer of this study of the role of the British trade union, as the direct object of the incomes policy, and ultimately the means of administering the policy to the rank and file, stresses the new social contact between the British Labour Government and unions. Assistant Professor Panitch of Carleton University, Canada, in his volume stresses the necessity of stabilizing the economy and restraining industrial militancy. His well-documented and indexed book formed a Ph.D. dissertation at the London School of Economics.

Professor Panitch reveals the trends of this development in the incomes policies of successive post-war governments, especially in the 1964–70 Labour Government. He also traces the way in which wage restraint was obtained from the unions, or imposed upon them, in the context of the attempted integration of the unions within the existing political and economic order.

The author emphasizes the role of the Labour Party in incomes policies generally—a stand which has emerged less from an interest in socialist economic planning than from the Party's integration ideology, particularly its rejection of the concept of class struggle in favour of affecting a compromise between the different classes in British society. Wage restraint, in the absence of effective price and profit controls, has given rise to repeated conflicts within the Labour Movement.

As Professor Panitch stresses, the basic aim of the 1964 Labour Government's incomes policy was to infuse the working people with national considerations at the level at which economic class considerations had persisted more stubbornly, namely, at the level of trade union wage bargaining. However, as the Labour Party extended its national integrative posture to attempt to employ trade unions as agencies of social control in restraining industrial conflict, the main political and class divisions in British society increasingly moved inside the Labour Movement itself. In a decade, the political and industrial issues became one, and the contradiction raised by an industrially militant working class affiliated with an ideologically integrative political party assumed new significance.

The volume follows an historical record of incomes policy, beginning with the 1945 Labour Government's attitude toward this policy and proceeding into the late 1960s—a complex period in which dividing lines did not fall into neat compartments. The author has provided an excellent description of the sharp divisions of left and right Ministers and backbenchers, Conference and Parliamentary Labour Party members, and within the union movement, between radical and moderate union leaders, militant shop stewards, the TUC and individual unions.

The conflict has not ended. However, the author concludes that *In Place of Strife* (issued in 1969) was a major step in integrating certain factions in the Labour Movement. His volume provides a general analysis of social democracy as it is defined in modern British society.

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INGO WALTER. *International Economics of Pollution*. Pp. 208. New York: Halsted Press, 1976. $17.50.

Starting with the premise that environmental management places a 'shock' or pressure on the international economic system, Walter examines the impact of environmental quality standards on international trade, comparative advantage, multinational corporate operations, transfrontier pollution and economic development amongst other topics. The essential argument is that "international variations in collectively determined environmental priorities, systems of public administration and environmental assimilative capacity can be expected to produce significant differences in the economic impact of environmental management on national economies and, in turn, on economic relations between nations" (p. 33).

In order to assess the impact of environmental controls, Walter assumes

the polluter pays principle. With this assumption the author concludes that, in the short term, enforcement of environmental controls, will not be critical to the balance of payments question. He notes, however, that the impact at the industry and firm level may be considerable. By implication the effect on particular regions in any one country, or on countries with a non-diversified economic base, may be significant. In the long term, the author argues that pollution control will have a relative impact on prices. The keys to both long and short term adjustments are the policies adopted by governments to control environmental pollution. Policies that deviate from a polluter pays principle tend to influence the competitiveness of firms primarily in the intermediate and long term periods. Subsidies to industry on the other hand tend to defeat the polluter pays principle in all time periods.

The focus of the book is on economic analysis, but there is a clear recognition of the political dimension, especially in the last four chapters. In these chapters Walter explores the impact of multinational corporations on economic interchange and particularly on the key role such organizations play in the transfer of environmental technology. He notes that developing countries in particular may very well benefit from the importation of technology for pollution control since this could lead to more sustained and orderly growth. These last four chapters lack the precise and vigorous argument apparent in the early chapters. This, in many respects can be attributed to the nature of the topics which are analyzed, but it could be disconcerting for an economist interested in a vigorous economic analysis of transfrontier pollution, multinational corporations and trade, environment and economic development. The book goes beyond the international economics of pollution implied in the title. The strongest point about the book is the theoretical discussion of the economic impact of pollution control and the recognition of a broad range of factors which are critical to sound environmental policy. The book would have been considerably enhanced had the author devoted more attention to specific cases and examples to illustrate his conclusions.

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OTHER BOOKS

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
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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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PREFACE

In the United States, the concept of industrial democracy is largely associated with the institution of collective bargaining. Industrial democracy is regarded as achieved whenever strong and independent unions gain the right to share effectively with management in making the basic substantive and procedural rules that determine the employment relationship. Participation occurs not only through the negotiations leading to the conclusion of a collective agreement but also through the continuing role of the union in administering the agreement during its lifetime. Until recently this interpretation was also current in Great Britain, and it would be fair to say that even now both the American and the British systems of industrial relations, with their emphasis on adversary collective bargaining, are close reflections of this view of industrial democracy.

In most of Western Europe, however, and in a number of other countries industrial democracy and its companion terms, such as worker participation in management, have acquired quite different meanings. Industrial democracy there refers often, though not always, to various schemes designed to associate employees or institutions representative of employee interests more closely with the internal decision-making process in the units constituting the private or public sectors of the economy. Without abandoning collective bargaining or even demoting it to a subordinate position, industrial democracy in these countries is conceived of as a means of direct employee access to the policy-making and operating levels of individual enterprises, especially the larger ones. The aim is to transform, or to reform, long established patterns of authority and power in industry by granting to employees a degree of influence over all vital affairs of the enterprise which more nearly approximates that of employers, shareholders, and their representatives in management. It is revealing of this meaning that in France the term in current usage is not industrial democracy but "the reform of the enterprise," while in Germany a principal component of industrial democracy is known as codetermination (Mitbestimmung), that is, employee codetermination in the management of the enterprise.

The prevailing meaning of industrial democracy, however, is by no means exhaustive of the conceptual and terminological varieties. In an increasing number of countries, the emphasis on employee participation in decision making is being extended by schemes intended to achieve employee participation in the ownership of industrial capital. As in the case of shared decision making, there are substantial differences between the several plans to achieve employee participation in ownership, with some plans envisaging a far-reaching redistribution of wealth and, thus, also of power. It is entirely conceivable that the long-term consequences of capital-sharing plans, or at least of the more sweeping ones, will be even greater in terms of ultimate employee and union control over economic policy making than the introduction of new forms of shared decision making in industry.

Still another meaning of industrial democracy refers to rather widespread efforts to restructure the organization of work so as to enhance its attractiveness or quality. The link between industrial democracy and what is sometimes referred to as the humanization of the work environment consists of attempts to confer on the individual worker, or a particular work

group, more power over the performance of required tasks in the production process than has been customary. Changes of this kind are usually expected not merely to lead to improvements in morale and output but also to alter in some fashion the hierarchical relationships characteristic of the organization of work in almost all industrial societies.

Industrial democracy cannot be regarded in isolation from ideological and political motivations and objectives. Its leading supporters in most countries—aside from intellectuals of various viewpoints—have been trade unions and allied political parties. Conversely, its leading opponents have been employers and their associations, as well as political parties associated with their views. At least to some degree, both the proponents and the opponents of industrial democracy in one or more of its variants regard it—with satisfaction or apprehension—as a means of changing the existing distribution of power not only in industry but eventually also in society at large. Others hope or fear, as the case may be, that it will in the end lead to a complete transformation of the social order toward some form of participatory collectivism.

To be sure, not all trade unions support industrial democracy, nor do all employers adamantly oppose it. Some unions reject it as an undesirable diversion from their central bargaining tasks, while others regard it as a potential dilution of their commitment to establish a socialist society. On the other hand, there are employers who regard certain forms of industrial democracy as a necessary device for "derevolutionizing" the labor movement, while others welcome its promise of significant improvements in job satisfaction and productivity.

The existence of a politico-ideological dimension to industrial democracy emerges clearly from the case of Yugoslavia, which has proclaimed self-management as the basis of society itself, including of course the industrial segment. Moreover, Yugoslavia has become to some extent a model for certain less developed countries (such as Peru, India, Algeria) that are attracted by the vision of a socialist society but repelled by the reality of its implementation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Whatever may be the motivations or the ultimate goals, there is no doubt that the widespread preoccupation with industrial democracy, at least among many industrially advanced countries, requires close attention. It seems inevitable that current trends will bring about, indeed in several instances have already brought about, significant changes in various national systems of industrial relations. The essays in this volume attempt to indicate, with special reference to labor-management relations, what has already occurred in a representative selection of countries and where they seem to be headed.

A note of caution is appropriate. Discussions of a trend extending across a broad range of countries may easily create an impression of a universal and inexorable force at work. That would be misleading here. In spring 1976, for example, the Swiss electorate rejected by wide margins two referendum proposals favoring worker participation in management. Likewise there are no significant indications of interest in industrial democracy schemes among American unions and employers, except perhaps for scattered efforts to improve the quality of work. Among less developed countries, too, there are few indications of sustained interest, and insofar as experience may serve

as a reasonable guide to action, the failures of Peru and India presented in this volume hold out scant promise of success elsewhere. As to the Soviet Union and most other Eastern European countries, there is little prospect of early change in the direction of more industrial democracy.

One is thus left with the distinct impression that, at least for the time being, most innovations associated with the term industrial democracy will be confined to the countries of Western Europe, including Great Britain. That is where the impetus now is and where further reinforcement can be expected from current efforts to build some form of institutionalized industrial democracy into the supranational body of rules for European corporations that is gradually emerging from the European Community. Hence, this volume of essays on industrial democracy has allocated more space to Western Europe than to other parts of the world.

JOHN P. WINDMULLER

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Toward the Participatory Enterprise: A European Trend

By KENNETH F. WALKER

ABSTRACT: Workers' participation in management has been extending in various forms in Europe during the third quarter of the twentieth century, and in the last quarter the business enterprise in Europe will evolve into a pattern of organization that may best be designated "the participatory enterprise." This evolution will involve changes in conceptual models of the enterprise and continued effort to resolve certain practical problems that appear to be inherent in participation. Unlike classical models of organization, the participatory enterprise is a coalition of conflicting and cooperative interests. Further progress is required in clarifying the causal relations involved in participation, which the small research effort to date reveals to be more complex than is often assumed. Experience shows that participation does not remove problems of human interaction and relations, but changes their character. It is time to abandon global thinking about participation and move to a more discriminating approach which does not seek final solutions but recognizes that participation is a living, evolving process, the outcome of which cannot be predicted in detail.

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WORKERS' participation in management, in one form or another, is now widely practiced in the industrial world, and its extension is continuously debated. Although the problem of in what ways, and to what extent, workers should and can take part in managerial functions has been on the agenda of various social reformers since the nineteenth century, it was only in the third quarter of the twentieth century that large-scale attempts were made to put the idea into practice. While the various forms of workers' participation in management have fallen short of the hopes of their advocates, and various practical problems have been encountered, the trend toward increasing participation is unmistakable.

During the final quarter of the twentieth century, it may be expected that the business enterprise in Europe will evolve into a pattern of organization that may best be designated "the participatory enterprise." This evolution will involve developments at the conceptual level and also at the practical level.

At the conceptual level, changing models of the enterprise are opening the way to a more fruitful formulation of the participation problem in organization theory. Further conceptual progress is being made in clarifying various propositions (usually implicit in the controversial debates over participation and industrial democracy) concerning the cause-and-effect relationships involved and in stating them in testable form.

At the practical level, experience of the last 25 years indicates that certain problems may be inherent to workers' participation in management. Recognition of such problems, and of the limitations which they impose, can open the way to formulation of realistic goals for the operation of the various forms of participation in management.

After a brief review of the trend toward the extension of workers' participation in management, this paper will address the problems of conceptual clarification and summarize the practical problems that have been found in the way of the practice of workers' participation in management.

THE TREND TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT

It is convenient to distinguish three principal forms of participation in management. The first may be called representative integrative participation. It consists of a modification of the formal structure of the enterprise to provide for workers, through their elected representatives, an opportunity to participate in the administration and government of the enterprise in varying degree. Shop floor participation involves a variety of different forms, all of which have the common feature of building into the worker's job elements of planning and supervision which would otherwise be performed by supervisors. Collective bargaining involves participation by workers through representatives who are part of the formal structure, not of the enterprise but of another organization (the union), by means of which workers participate in management from outside the enterprise, as it were.

While collective bargaining is not universally regarded as a form of workers' participation in management, it cannot be denied that in the absence of collective bargaining management would make decisions

unilaterally. Each widening of the range of issues subject to collective bargaining has been contested by management as an invasion of managerial functions, and the historical trend has clearly been toward greater and greater penetration of areas of decision which would otherwise be taken unilaterally by management.

Representative integrative participation now exists in quite a few European countries, both through elected works councils and through representation on the governing board of the enterprise. One notable exception, Great Britain, is now considering legislation for representation of workers on the board and Ireland may also do so.

The trend is definitely toward extension of this form of participation, as some recent examples will show. The number of workers' representatives on the board is being increased (as in the Federal Republic of Germany). Board room participation initially introduced on a trial basis is confirmed permanently (as in Scandinavia). The rights of works councils to information are being extended (as in Belgium and the Netherlands), and the councils' consultative and decision-making roles are reinforced (as in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy). In no country has this trend been reversed.

Shop floor participation in its various forms is not yet a major feature of the industrial landscape, but it, too, appears to be spreading in most European countries, despite many setbacks and false starts.

Collective bargaining continues to spread to categories of employees not previously covered, particularly among white-collar workers, technical and professional staffs, and the middle levels of management. More important for our purpose is its continuing penetration into areas of decision making traditionally regarded as the preserve of management, such as investment plans, major changes in scale of production, technological procedures, and methods of work organization. The 1974 legislation in Sweden may be regarded as the culmination of this trend, reversing, as it does, the traditional dominance of management over such decisions and proceeding on the basis that all managerial decisions are in principle negotiable. Without changes in the law, the de facto situation in Great Britain and Italy is similar, and the trend in other countries is in the same direction. (For example, some years ago the German metalworkers' union began to include limitations on the length of the work cycle in its collective agreements.)

In addition to the clear historical trend of each form of participation to extend, a tendency is observable for further forms of participation to be added in order to complement existing ones. Thus countries like Britain and Ireland, which have previously relied on participation through collective bargaining alone, are considering adding representative participation. The Federal Republic of Germany, after 25 years' reliance on collective bargaining and representative participation, is now starting to develop shop floor participation. Norway, after a period of concentration on shop floor participation, a few years ago returned to developing representative participation. Both the Biedenkopf Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany and a European Economic Community (EEC) commission have stressed the need for a

comprehensive structure of participation at all levels of the corporate organization.[1]

THE PARTICIPATORY ENTERPRISE AS A MODEL OF ORGANIZATION

The concept of the participatory enterprise contrasts sharply with the concepts of classical organization theory and with traditional managerial practice. Both classical theory and traditional practice take a "top-down" view of the enterprise, regarding the problem of organization as essentially that of establishing a technological or administrative system which determines the tasks to be performed by the subordinates in the enterprise and the conditions under which they are to be performed.

When the enterprise is seen as a technical system, designed according to engineering criteria, the human beings in subordinate positions are seen as necessary only to the extent that they are required to fill the gaps between machines to perform the necessary tasks. This line of thought leads logically to the creation of automated factories.

When the enterprise is seen as an administrative system, the subordinates are thought of as a kind of human extension of the managers, carrying out the tasks which the managers would perform if they were omniscient and omnipotent. In this view the machines are regarded as extensions of the human beings, helping them to carry out tasks which they could not do at all otherwise, or which would be more arduous or more time-consuming without the machines.

For both these classical concepts of the enterprise the personnel functions of management are regarded as existing essentially to ensure that the subordinates in the enterprise play their appropriate part in the operation of the system, while workers' responsibilities are restricted to the diligent performance of their allocated task.[2] This view can only conceive of workers' participation in management as a cooperative process.

The top-down view of the enterprise characteristic of classical organization theory is paralleled by traditional managerial approaches which also see the enterprise as essentially unitary, an organization in which all parties cooperate, sinking their individual and sectional interests in a consensus and collaboration. The existence and significance of conflicts of interest among the members of the enterprise are ignored by this approach.[3]

In fact, conflict is built into the nature of enterprise organization.[4]

1. See *Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen: Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission* (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz, January 1970); and Commission of the European Communities: "Employee Participation and Company Structure," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 8/75 (1975).

2. This basic tenet of the classical view lingers on in some attempts to formulate a participative conception of management. See, for example, P. Hill, *Towards a New Philosophy of Management* (London: Gower Press, 1971), which speaks of the manager guiding employees "to commit themselves and their energies wholeheartedly to the objectives of the company and to the tasks they undertake" (p. 44). The possibility that workers might have objectives of their own is ignored.

3. See Allen Fox, *Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Research Papers No. 3.

4. As Simmel noted: "a certain amount of discord, inner divergence and outer controversy is organically tied up with the very elements that hold the group together," in

Subordinates have a certain "zone of indifference"[5] within which they are prepared to comply with the commands of their superiors. The width of this zone is determined by exchanges between superior and subordinate, resulting in what has been called an effort-bargain[6] or inducement-contribution balance.[7] At each moment of his working life, each member of a work organization contributes a certain proportion of his total energies and abilities to the organization and withholds a certain proportion. The balance between contribution and withholding is struck in the interaction between superior and subordinate in what is in effect, if not in appearance, a continuous process of bargaining.[8] Each time a supervisor gets a little more work out of the worker in return for the same pay, a new effort-bargain has been struck and the true price of labor has fallen. Each time the worker succeeds (through restrictive practices or other means) in putting in a little less effort, the effort-bargain has altered and the true price of labor has risen.

Thus, an enterprise is not a unitary but a pluralist system, "containing many related but separate interests and objectives which must be maintained in some kind of equilibrium."[9]

Enterprises viewed as pluralist systems contain people who not only have abilities to perform the tasks demanded by the functions of the enterprise but also possess personalities and economic and political interests as workers and citizens. In varying degree, they have needs to structure their own work situations and to control their own lives, at work as well as off work. In this perspective, the question is not whether workers shall participate in management, but rather how and to what extent.[10]

An important feature of the concept of the participatory enterprise is that it accommodates the possibility of conflictual, as well as cooperative, participation. Furthermore, participation in management can only be democratic in the context of the participatory enterprise; a unitary view of the enterprise is not consistent with industrial democracy, since it denies the existence of workers' independent interests.

Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 17–18. Gross stated that: "One of the major advances of modern administrative thought has been an ever-widening recognition that conflict and co-operation are inextricably inter-twined in the life of any organization." Bertram M. Gross, *The Managing of Organizations* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), vol. 1, p. 265.

5. Chester I. Barnard, *Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).

6. Hilde Behrend, "The Effort Bargain," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1957), pp. 503–15.

7. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), ch. 4.

8. This point was made well before the writings of the organization theorists referred to in the last two notes by John R. Commons, *Industrial Goodwill* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1919).

9. N. S. Ross, in *Human Relations and Modern Management*, ed. E. M. Hugh-Jones (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1958), p. 121. A similar view is taken by E. Pusic (see I.I.L.S., "Workers' Participation in Management in Yugoslavia," *I.I.L.S. Bulletin*, no. 9 (1971), pp. 129–72). Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), adopts an essentially similar approach.

10. This was the conclusion of a colloquium held in May 1976 to discuss the implications of the EEC's "Green Paper" on "Employee Participation and Company Structure." See European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD), *The Reform of the Enterprise* (Fontainebleau, 1976).

CLARIFICATION OF CAUSAL RELATIONS

In controversy, workers' participation in management is approached from various perspectives, each of which carries with it expected (hoped for or feared) results. These perspectives and their corresponding expectations I have described in more detail elsewhere.[11]

The link between each perspective and the corresponding expected effect is, in each case, one or more assumptions about the operation of workers' participation in management practice. Thus, for example, those who view workers' participation in management from the perspective of democracy assume that in its practical operation workers will be able to exert real influence on managerial decisions. Those who see workers' participation in management from the perspective of reducing alienation assume that the form of participation they have in mind will, in practice, produce greater worker satisfaction and fulfillment.

Compared with the amount of ideological debate, the amount of research on workers' participation in management is pitifully small. It has, however, not been altogether negligible, particularly in certain countries,[12] and there are certainly sufficient well-established data to demonstrate that many of the assumptions made about the cause-and-effect relationships involved in participation are not necessarily correct, at least not in all circumstances.

It is clear from German research, for example, that representative integrative participation through works councils and workers' representatives on company boards has had practically no effect on the daily life of the worker on the job.[13] Thus, this type of participation does not serve the purpose of increasing workers' personal fulfillment in their daily work situations.

Research also shows that personal participation in a representative participatory body may contribute to or detract from fulfillment according to how well the participative body functions. For example, a Polish worker is reported as saying: "The self-management conference enables one to know the life of the undertaking better . . . a man considers himself as a worker of greater value."[14] Both Yugoslav and French research report frustration of members of participatory bodies which they considered not to be working satisfactorily.[15] Personal participation in decisions concerning the immediate work situation may not be related to satisfaction with the job, according to British research,

11. Kenneth F. Walker, "Workers' Participation in Management: Problems, Practice and Prospect," *I.I.L.S. Bulletin*, no. 12 (1974), pp. 3–35.

12. The conclusion of Clark and Heller that there is practically no field research on the subject seems to ignore the substantial body of research in the Federal Republic of Germany. See A. Clark and F. Heller, "Personnel and Human Resources Development," *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. 27 (1976), pp. 4–9.

13. See Friedrich Fürstenberg, "Workers' Participation in Management in the Federal Republic of Germany," *I.I.L.S. Bulletin*, no. 6 (June 1969), pp. 94–148.

14. International Institute for Labor Studies, *Further Data on the Operation of Workers' Participation in Management in Poland* (Geneva, 1971).

15. See J. Obradovic, "Participation and Work Attitudes in Yugoslavia," *Industrial Relations*, vol. 9, no. 2 (February 1970), pp. 161–69, and M. Légendre, *Quelques Aspects des Relations Professionnelles* (Paris: Service d'Etudes pour le Développement et l'Animation, 1969).

although it may be related to labor turnover.[16]

Another widely held assumption in the controversies over participation is that representative participation increases workers' power over decisions, although certain union federations (notably the Confédération Générale du Travail in France) hold the opposite view of such participation under capitalism. Mulder's research[17] suggests that participation may reduce the power of workers, while that of Tannenbaum[18] shows the possibility that both management and workers may gain in power.

One of the most common expectations is that participation will increase cooperation and promote industrial peace; this goal may even be written into the legislation or collective agreements establishing the participative structure.

Experience indicates that whether, and how much, participation contributes to cooperation and industrial peace varies according to the total situation. Participative structures intended to promote cooperation may merely provide another area of conflict.[19] Descending participation in the form of work groups tends by its nature to be cooperative in character and effects, but conflict may arise between such groups,[20] and changes in work organization may raise issues that can provoke industrial conflict.[21] Collective bargaining, although based on an adversary principle, varies widely in the extent to which it is conflictual; in addition to the fact that in many cases negotiations proceed peacefully and in a constructive atmosphere, the trend toward continuous bargaining and the establishment of joint committees for the study of problems of mutual interest shows that many collective bargaining relationships have important cooperative dimensions.[22]

The expectation that participation will raise or lower efficiency is particularly difficult to test, mainly because of the problem of separating the effects of participation from those of other factors. Research so far suggests that participation is unlikely to have major effects, either positive or negative. In general, the hopes of advocates and the fears of opponents of participation appear to have been exaggerated.[23]

These examples suffice to show the need to test the veracity of assumptions as to causal relation-

16. J. A. Lischeron and D. Wall, "Employee Participation: An Experimental Field Study," *Human Relations*, vol. 28, no. 9 (1975), pp. 863–84, and N. Nicholson, T. Wall, and J. Lischeron, "The Predictability of Absence and Propensity to Leave from Employees' Satisfaction and Attitudes toward Influence in Decision-making," unpublished manuscript.

17. M. Mulder, "Power Equalisation through Participation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 16 (1971), pp. 31–8.

18. Arnold S. Tannenbaum et al, *Hierarchy in Organizations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974).

19. As reported by Légendre, *Quelques Aspects des Relations Professionnelles*.

20. As reported in D. Gorupic and I. Paj, "Workers Participation in Management in Yugoslavia."

21. See, for example, J. Douard and J. D. Reynaud, "Union-Management Conflicts over Quality of Working Life Issues," ch. 26 in L. E. Davis and A. B. Cherns, eds., *The Quality of Working Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 393–404.

22. See, for example, A. Shirom, *Industrial Co-operation and Technological Change: A Study of Joint Management-Union Committees in American Industry*, paper submitted to International Industrial Relations Association, Second World Congress, Geneva, 1970.

23. This was the conclusion of the Biedenkopf Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany.

ships implicitly made in most ideological debate. The same needs to be said of the statements of some social scientists who continue to list psychological job requirements which are, by implication, attributed to all workers despite evidence that workers vary in their aspirations and in the criteria by which they judge their jobs.[24]

The task of the next 25 years will be to build on the research to date, which has shown the fallacies of dogmatism, either by practitioners or social scientists, to explicate the causal relations involved in the participative process.

PERENNIAL PROBLEMS IN THE OPERATION OF WORKERS' PARTICIPATION

Parallel to the conceptual clarification that has been emerging, actual experience in a variety of countries, both Communist and non-Communist, has revealed a remarkably similar set of problems in practice. This suggests that these problems are inherent to representative integrative participation and may be expected to recur, no matter what its form or in what economic, social, and legal context it may be set. In the evolution toward the participatory enterprise in the next 25 years, therefore, these problems may be expected to arise and to set limits to the realization of the concept of participation.

So far as representative integrative participation is concerned, it is clear that the placing in position of a structure intended to provide for workers' participation in management does not guarantee that such participation will be fully effective. Institutional arrangements for workers' participation in management may become either a living reality or a mere "petrifaction of a participation philosophy."[25] Legal prescriptions for participation may be observed in varying degree, and even when the law is observed, what happens in practice varies considerably from enterprise to enterprise.[26] The problems encountered include:

1. role-conflict of workers' representatives;
2. maintenance of effective links between workers' representatives and their constituents;
3. effective communication to the workforce about the operation of the participative institutions;
4. achieving living participation within participative structures.

In addition to these problems encountered in the operation of representative integrative participation, all forms of workers' participation in management appear to experience difficulty in extending participation throughout the work force generally. Experience in all countries, Communist and non-Communist alike, has revealed considerable difficulty in getting all workers to participate, no matter what the structures and the process of participation available to them.[27]

24. An example is F. E. Emery and M. Emery, "Guts and Guidelines for Raising the Quality of Working Life" in Doran Gunzburg, *Bringing Work to Life* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975).

25. A. B. Cherns, "Conditions for an Effective Management Philosophy of Participation," in C. P. Thakur and K. L. Sethi, eds., *Industrial Democracy: Some Issues and Experiences* (New Delhi: Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, 1973), p. 95.

26. This occurs even in Communist countries. See, for example, I.I.L.S., *Further Data on the Operation of Workers' Participation in Management in Poland.*

27. Research in Communist countries shows that workers with greater education,

There are many reasons why it is difficult to obtain the participation of all types of worker, most of which have been documented by research. There is, first, the general tendency in human affairs for the majority to remain relatively apathetic while the active minority participates. Many workers may be more concerned with their lives outside of work. Workers at low levels in the hierarchy may take a cynical view of the possibility of influencing their immediate work situation through representative participative bodies, a view which may well be realistic since such participation may have relatively little impact on the factory floor. Workers also vary in personality traits, some being more amenable to authoritarian styles of management than to participation. Some types of worker are apathetic toward shop floor participation, resisting attempts to give them more interesting work and added responsibility or to make them participate in groups. The tendency of representative participation and, perhaps, trade union structures to become bureaucratic may also discourage workers from active participation.

Parallel to the problem of involving all workers in participation is the difficulty, experienced in Communist countries and in trade union enterprises as well as in market economies, of gaining wholehearted cooperation by all managers in the operation of participative bodies. Many managers who claim to practice participatory approaches do not believe that their subordinates possess the abilities necessary to take part in managerial functions.[28] Variations in managerial attitudes have been found to have much effect upon the operation of participative bodies.[29]

A further practical problem experienced quite generally in the operation of participation is that workers (and their representatives) may lack the knowledge necessary to take part in managerial functions, or at least in certain functions. This problem points to the need for adequate training.

Once more, there is a parallel on the managerial side, where technical knowledge may be adequate, but deficiencies may exist in competence to operate effectively in a participative structure, on account of attitudes (as noted above) or habituation to more authoritarian approaches. Training is evidently required here, too.

The role of the time factor must also be taken into account in the operation of workers' participation in management. Neither workers nor managers may be able to adapt at once to a participative mode of working in the early stages—time may be needed to learn to participate.[30] Time may also work in the opposite direction—enthusiasm for participation may wane. (For example, improvements in absenteeism following the introduction of

technical expertise, and skill are overrepresented in the participative bodies while unskilled manual workers, younger workers, and shorter service workers are underrepresented. See ibid., and I.I.L.S., "Workers' Participation in Management in Yugoslavia."

28. See A. W. Clark and J. Wotherspoon, "Managers, Conflict: Democratic Management versus Distrust of People's Capacity," *Psychological Reports*, vol. 32 (1973), pp. 815–19.

29. See M. Montuclard, *La Dynamique des Comités d'Entreprise* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1963).

30. The evolution of attitudes and practices through time are well documented by Montuclard, ibid., and by S. K. Chakraborty, "Joint Consultation in the National Coal Board (U.K.)," *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1971).

hop floor participation have freuently worn off with the passage f time.)

Experience has also shown that he practical operation of any paricular form of participation is much ffected by the existence and funcioning of other forms of participaion. The growth of informal shop loor bargaining in Great Britain, for xample, clearly contributed to the lecline in joint consultation machinery. Participation through works ouncils and representation on company boards of directors would work quite differently in the Federal Republic of Germany were it not for he active support of the unions.[31]

Finally, account must be taken of he general economic, social, and political climate, from which various pressures arise, some favorable to participation and others unfavorable.[32]

FROM GLOBAL VISION TO SOBER REALITY

Research and experience to date both show clearly that participation has no magic but is, rather, an alternative form of enterprise organization which has its own problems of human interaction and relationships, as well as of operating efficiency. Participation does not remove problems—it changes their character.

It is also evident from research and experience that it is time to give up thinking of participation globally and move to a much more discriminating approach, distinguishing various forms, aims, operating problems, and effects of participation. It is necessary, too, to recognize that what happens in each case will vary according to differences in the human and situational factors and their interplay.[33] Further research and experience will illuminate the ways these factors operate and enable global visions of participation (favorable or unfavorable) to be replaced by increasingly precise operational models.

It must be recognized, however, that the nature of the participation process renders it logically impossible to specify the shape and character of the participatory enterprise in detail in advance. Participation is a living process, and if its outcomes could all be foreseen in detail it would not be truly free participation. Thus, there can be no final solutions in participation, only learning, development, and choice among a number of alternatives.

The emergence of the participatory enterprise will be conditioned by three needs which will have to be met in such a form of enterprise organization. Sufficient autonomy will have to be provided for managers in order to induce capable people to undertake this essential task. First, a role for enterprising leadership (of a non-authoritarian character) will have to be provided. Second, unions will have to be given a meaningful role; there is no longterm future for forms of participation which ignore or seek to counter union activities and responsibilities. Third, participation must provide workers with practical gains—it must make a significant difference to their work lives, or they will be apathetic toward it.

31. See I. L. Roberts, "The Works Constitution Acts and Industrial Relations in West Germany: Implications for the United Kingdom," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, vol. 11, no. 3 (November 1973), p. 350.

32. See Walker, "Workers' Participation in Management: Problems, Practice and Prospect," pp. 19–20.

33. Ibid., pp. 12–18.

The participatory enterprise will, however, not function solely in the interests of its members (including the shareholders), but it will be required to meet community standards of social responsibility. This may involve means for the representation of the interests of various groups of stakeholders in the success of the enterprise. In this sense, the evolution of the participatory enterprise is an aspect of the wider issue of the reform of the enterprise, another theme that will increasingly engage our attention during the final quarter of the twentieth century.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 431, May 1977

Unions and Industrial Democracy

By ADOLF F. STURMTHAL

ABSTRACT: This article concentrates on the role of unions in a system of industrial democracy, which is interpreted as labor participation in managerial decision making. The Western industrial world is confronted with two conceptions of the role of unions in the plant: one, characteristic of the great majority of U.S. unions and a substantial part of organized British labor, sees unions as countervailing power to management; the other, predominant on the European continent, wants labor to take its place in management and to participate in both the privileges and the responsibilities of decision making. This analysis is based on a comparison of the institutional arrangements of West Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden. In each of these countries, unions have a different role in industrial democracy. At one extreme unions operate at top managerial levels; at the other they function largely at the workshop level. These differences are further complicated by the danger of a cleavage between collective agreements concluded for an entire industry or other comprehensive unit and the reality that exists in the plant, a distinction to which the British Donovan Commission drew public attention. Moreover, efforts to combat wage-push inflation tend to concentrate union power at the top, while industrial democracy is more vital the closer to the plant level it operates.

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BY FAR the most attractive attribute of the term industrial democracy is the infinite variety of meanings that can be read into it. The range is indeed bewildering. It reaches from workers' self-management via consultation and codetermination to collective bargaining, and in passing picks up such diverse notions as job enrichment and autonomous work groups.[1] It goes back in history to such utopian ideas as eternal social harmony, passes through various forms of industrial engineering designed to make workers accept the social status quo, and reaches to new devices for managing the inevitable conflicts that arise in the context of industrial relations.

"Basically," says the article on democracy in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, "industrial democracy is democracy within industrial plants. . . . In its ultimate form, industrial democracy calls for self-government by the workers in a plant. . . ." Although the author of the article fails to do so, he could have quoted a series of opponents of Karl Marx, such as Proudhon, Kropotkin, and other anarchists, or even the early Bolsheviks as adherents of this interpretation. The roots of industrial democracy in French syndicalism and British guild socialism are well known.[2] Alas, we have become less optimistic than these earlier theoreticians about the outcome of experiments of this kind, just at a time when the rising educational levels of large parts of the labor force in the industrially advanced countries bring closer the day when at least some forms of greater self-determination at the work place seem feasible, are often asked for, and frequently realized. Perhaps Harold Wilson, the accomplished politician, was sensing the trend of the times when saying: "The pressure for a greater degree of workers' democracy in whatever form—joint consultation, participation, works councils, and so on—is only in its infancy. There is little doubt that we are at the beginning of a social revolution in this sphere."[3]

Under the circumstances, any meaningful discussion will have to start with a process of elimination—excluding topics not to be discussed—and a process of concentration—that is, a list of questions to be explored and the context of the particular industrial relations systems in which they are to be studied. I shall disregard problems of job enrichment and autonomous work groups, on one hand, and all schemes of consultation, on the other hand,[4] and concentrate on an examination of the role of unions in industrial democracy. The examples on which I intend to draw are taken from Great Britain, Sweden, and West Germany, with one or two brief references to the United States and other countries.

1. Johannes Schregle, "Workers' Participation in Decisions within Undertakings," *International Labour Review*, vol. 113, no. 1 (January–February 1976), pp. 8–15.

2. See Adolf F. Sturmthal, "Industrial Democracy in the Affluent Society," *Proceedings* of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1964, pp. 270–79.

3. Quoted in John Horner, *Studies in Industrial Democracy* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1974), p. 11.

4. Many experiments in industrial democracy are undertaken in order to stimulate higher productivity. While such changes may be a by-product of the institutional arrangements which we are considering, we are dealing here with those which aim at changes in the power structure of the enterprise concerned.

THE ROLE OF UNIONS

Perhaps the most fundamental problem of industrial democracy is to fit the union into the system. The British long ago coined the slogan "You cannot sit on both sides of the bargaining table," meaning that the union cannot at the same time represent the workers in a given plant and be part of the management. Attempts to do so, nevertheless, were—partly inadvertently—made in France during the first rush of nationalization measures after World War II and led to some of the most confusing results in the industrial relations systems of the enterprises concerned. One solution, which indicates how desperate the confusion was, consisted of the enactment of a law prohibiting representatives of interest groups in managerial functions to consider any other interest except the one they were supposed to defend.[5]

The basic difficulty arises from two circumstances. First, the union exists to defend its members' interests in conflict situations. Second, while industrial democracy appears to demand that power be moved as close as possible to the shop floor, other concerns, primarily the need to check wage-push inflation, require that power be shifted to the upper ranks of the union hierarchy. In either respect, it is the role of the union in a system of industrial democracy which presents one of the central problems that reformers have to tackle.

Whoever refers to unions in relation to industrial democracy speaks in the first place of methods of managing industrial conflict. All talk about collaboration and common objectives notwithstanding, industrial relations consist of a mixture of conflict and cooperation. It is not simply a conflict over the distribution of revenue, but also the inevitable clash between those who have authority and those they have authority over. It is true, of course, that workers are interested in the well-being of the industry and the enterprise in which they are employed; but no public relations slight of hand can make us forget the tension between those who manage and those whom they manage. Any attempt at using devices labeled "industrial democracy" to make us overlook this element of conflict is—consciously or unconsciously—an act of deception.

Collective bargaining enters the area of industrial democracy in two ways. It can be an instrument through which the institutions of industrial democracy are established. In isolation, this is a rare case, if it exists at all. Usually, it is legislation which paves the way for the new institutions to come into being. In another role, collective bargaining, extended in scope, is itself the process by which participative management is implemented. Needless to say, in the latter situation the system of bargaining, indeed of industrial relations as a whole, is radically changed if the union participates effectively in decisions which traditionally have

5. Even though the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management is altogether different from any of the examples used in this paper, this experience shows some of the problems here discussed with—perhaps excessive—clarity. Thus, *Yugoslav Trade Unions*, no. 78 (September–October 1972), reports that an enterprise, ironically called "Tito's Mines," with about 11,000 workers, in drawing up a new statute "did not mention them [the Trade Union Confederation, the League of Communists, and the Youth Union] at all. . . . Simply, for one reason or another, certain organs seemed to 'forget' that they existed." This error was duly corrected when the "socio-political organizations" themselves protested.

been regarded as management prerogatives.

Basically, collective bargaining is one of many ways of managing conflict. Although it does not always succeed in avoiding some forms of conflict settlement which are painful for society at large, it does succeed in the large majority of cases. Participation in managerial decision making represents another method of settling conflicts. A fairly new attempt consists of combining both methods. Examples for each of these three methods of managing industrial conflict can be found in the three countries which we shall examine.

THE BRITISH APPROACH

The purest form of collective bargaining cannot be found any more in the United Kingdom. Even though it is the homeland of this form of conflict management, the U.K. has departed from it and is probably going to deviate from it even more. The issue of whether the union should limit itself to the role of bargaining partner or seek some form of participation in management had long been hotly disputed in the British labor movement. Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison were, at one time, the leading spokesmen of the two sides in the discussion. Bevin was the advocate of union participation in the management of nationalized enterprises. Morrison defended the view that only experts—including those with industrial relations experience, such as former union officials—should be appointed managers. Morrison's views triumphed and continued to prevail for almost four decades. It was only when the steel industry was nationalized at the end of the 1960s that employee directors at area group level were appointed from among unionists in the industry. These were part-time appointments, and on assuming their positions the employee directors had to resign their union functions, though not their main jobs in the industry or their union membership. The 16 employee directors represented a new departure in another sense, too. Unlike former unionists who had been appointed to the boards of other nationalized industries, they came from the same industry they were to supervise and help manage.

The more recent attempts of the Labour party and the leadership of the Trades Union Congress to introduce a German type of co-determination in Great Britain run counter to a long tradition. It is, thus, not surprising that they have met with sharp resistance from some of the most powerful British unions that wish to retain their full independence from management and to continue to act as bargaining partners rather than as co-administrators.

Underlying these striking divergences of views of the role of labor unions in the enterprise are different conceptions of their task in society at large. Many, though not all, British (and American) unions see themselves as countervailing powers whose main or even almost exclusive assignment is to bargain with management. They refuse to accept any share of responsibility for the administration of the enterprise and expect that the bargaining process will establish a fair balance between their demands on behalf of the interests of their members and those of the owners of the enterprise. In this process, the interest of society at large—if there exists such a clearly definable interest—will also be preserved: in extreme cases by the intervention of the government, but in most cases by the simple fact that

no single bargain is of sufficient gravity to have a substantial impact on the well-being of society. Industrial democracy, in this view, is limited in scope to bargainable issues. Since, however, almost any problem confronting the enterprise can, under certain circumstances, affect the interests of the union or of its members, no issue can definitely and persuasively be designated as not bargainable except where some issues are explicitly insulated from union influence (as was the case for a long time in Sweden). While acknowledging the right of management to manage, the unions reserve for themselves, in fact, the right to bargain on any managerial prerogatives if circumstances appear to require such procedures.

The locus of industrial democracy in this interpretation is to be as close as possible to the work place, where the impact of the union is most clearly felt by the rank and file. This is the approach of U.S. unions and of many British unions, even though the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) now seems to lean toward the high-level interpretation of industrial democracy. The picture in the U.K. is further confused by the substantial degree of independence from union control which shop stewards in many industries enjoy.[6]

CODETERMINATION: THE GERMAN ROAD

German unions conceive their area of work to be within the management of the enterprise. They are, thus, at the opposite end of the spectrum from American and a substantial number of British unions. Instead of being a countervailing power to management they want to be a part of it. Their two main arguments in favor of union representation on the governing boards of industrial enterprises are: first—regardless of what unions do or say—they will be held responsible by public opinion for whatever ills befall the enterprise; and, second, they can discharge their responsibility only if they are fully informed about the problems, activities, and technical and economic conditions of the enterprise. Such information, the unions claim, can only be obtained by labor representation on the boards that decide enterprise policies.[7]

It is important to remember that the German codetermination concept was deeply influenced by the tragic end of the Weimar Republic and the horrors of the Nazi era. Two notable historical considerations played a particular role: one was the financial support that some elements of big business gave to Hitler, the other was the division in the German trade union movement under the Weimar Republic which weakened its power of resistance to the rising tide of Nazism.

To meet the first consideration, codetermination on a so-called parity scale was introduced in the iron, steel, and coal industries during the postwar occupation, with the approval of the then-existing British Labour government to monitor the political activities of German heavy industry. The second consideration

6. For instance: "Few unions trouble to prescribe for the processes that include election of stewards and convening of shop meetings." John Hughes, "Trade Union Structure and Government," *Research Papers*, no. 5, part 2 (Donovan Commission Research Documents), p. 59. See, also, W. E. J. McCarthy, "The Role of Shop Stewards in British Industrial Relations," *Research Papers*, no. 1 of the Donovan Commission, especially pp. 50 ff. and pp. 72 ff.

7. A good presentation of these arguments can be found in Ludwig Rosenberg, "Codetermination, Socialism, and Education," *Free Labour World*, no. 314 (July/August 1976), pp. 313–14.

was resolved by the merger between the formerly separate Socialist and Christian unions; but this required a program acceptable to both, and codetermination appeared to fill the bill. In their postwar role as guardians of political democracy, the unions assumed managerial functions, and even though the original consideration has long lost its importance, the concept of union participation in management has remained. Yet it creates about as many problems as it appears to solve.

The advantage, from the point of view of the union, is that the system permits it to settle labor-management conflicts often long before they reach the bargaining table or even become publicly known. Codetermination, as noted earlier, is an additional method of managing the inevitable conflicts between labor and management. Thus, one aspect of codetermination is that it provides a supplementary means—additional to collective bargaining—of settling disputes. Whether the low incidence of strikes in West Germany can be explained this way is doubtful, since the low levels also apply to industries in which only a modicum of codetermination exists. Some observers, including Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, have reasoned this way.[8]

Codetermination, however, is supposed to mean much more than an additional way of managing conflict. It is to be workers' participation in management in general. And this is the area in which it presents its most difficult problems. Elsewhere I have referred to unions who seek this kind of participation with the concomitant assumption of responsibility for the welfare of the enterprise as administrative unions.[9] The main issue in this respect does not really relate to the role of the labor members of the supervisory boards who, on the whole, create few problems. Rather, the really serious problem stems from the ambiguous position of the so-called labor director, a member of top management who is a guardian of the interests of the enterprise and at the same time a union man owing his well-paid position in almost every case to the union. To a considerably lesser degree, the same problem of divided loyalty arises for the members of the works council, who are in most cases union members of fairly long standing and owe their office to election by all employees regardless of union membership. It is reasonable to expect that the labor director will solve his dual loyalty problem in most cases by behaving as a member of the management team, and the empirical evidence available on this point appears to confirm this assumption. After all, it is not too difficult to identify the long-term interests of the enterprise with those of its employees.

However, for employees it is frequently their short-term interest that matters and if, apart from the crisis of 1969–1970, there has been no major manifestation of dissatisfaction with the existing institutions of industrial relations in West Germany, at least some part of the credit should go to the fortunate economic developments in the country. Still, "when people are questioned on the degree of personal satisfaction and asked, 'How well are you personally satisfied with co-

8. See Heinz Hartmann, "Codetermination Today and Tomorrow," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, vol. 13, no. 1 (March 1974), p. 55. The excellent performance of the German economy may have played a more important role in maintaining industrial peace.

9. Sturmthal, "Industrial Democracy in the Affluent Society," p. 9.

determination? Did you get out of codetermination what you wanted personally?' there is a noticeable lack of enthusiasm."[10] Moreover, public opinion polls, even those taken in behalf of the trade unions recently, indicate almost invariably that an extension of codetermination does not rank at the top of the list of demands of individual union members.

On the negative side of codetermination, one must add that it operates at the top level of the company. And since until quite recently the German unions only rarely attempted to operate at the workshop level, leaving this area to the works council, the union is often said to be in danger of "operating in a void."[11] Even if this is an exaggeration, it contains more than a germ of truth. "Codetermination has long been a high-level affair."[12] The worker himself quite often does not even know the names of his representatives on the supervisory board. Nor have the unions made any sustained effort to achieve worker participation on the floor.

There are powerful reasons in an age of predominantly high employment levels and inflationary tendencies to justify a concentration of union influence at the top. They have mainly to do with anti-cost-push efforts, such as the German "concerted action" which has been remarkably successful. But there is no point in denying that high-level forms of industrial democracy do little to bring about genuine workers' participation and may, in fact, widen the gap between the worker and his union.

THE SWEDISH SOLUTION

It is this issue which the Swedish labor organizations have squarely faced in their attempt to introduce workers' participation. They have combined collective bargaining and industrial democracy at the plant level in a particular fashion designed to strengthen union influence both in the workshop and in national policy matters. Legislation in 1976 has paved the way for different forms and degrees of workers' participation to be made the subject of collective bargaining. In the first place, unions may delegate two members to the board of larger companies, those with more than 100 employees. So far, this has meant fairly little in practice and, in fact, has been used by unions in only about two-thirds of the applicable cases.

The main emphases of the Swedish unions have been on the extension of the scope of collective bargaining and shifting its focus to the plant. Practically every important management decision is henceforth to be open to bargaining, and the bargaining process is to involve the union in the plant. In effect, this practice will shift industrial democracy to the place where it is most meaningful for the worker, that is, the work place, and will avoid putting labor representatives in a schizoid position. At the same time, by transferring unsolved local disputes to negotiations at the national level, the system maintains the ultimate authority of the national union. Sweden thus seems to have devised a solution for what in other countries has appeared to be an insoluble problem—how to combine industrial democracy at the work place

10. Erich Potthoff, Otto Blume, and Helmut Duvernell, *Zwischenbilanz der Mitbestimmung* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1962), p. 321.

11. Hartmann, "Codetermination Today and Tomorrow," p. 58.

12. Ibid., p. 62.

with collective bargaining and to give the union a status in the plant without compromising union independence. This is, at least at first sight, a very different formula from the division between unions and works councils in West Germany and unions and shop stewards in Britain.

To maintain separate organizations for bargaining and organizing work at the shop floor level and for the same or similar tasks at national or regional levels is likely to produce suspicion or at least tension between the two parts. Even if all members of the works council have a union affiliation, their dual loyalty must expose them to severe strains from time to time.[13] If it does not, then another danger appears: that of workers creating their own independent and informal organizations to which, at least for a period, their primary loyalty belongs. This seems to have happened during the great strike wave in Western Europe in the late 1960s and in the Italian rebellion against the *Commissione Interne* created after World War II.[14] To cite the fact that the great majority of works council members belong to unions does not suffice as an answer. Indeed, it merely tends to focus our attention more clearly upon the danger of dual loyalty. In the Swedish case this issue was accentuated, in spite of the tremendous authority of the union leadership, by the ill-famed Article 32—originally Article 23 of the Basic Agreement of 1906 between the federations of employers and trade unions, which gave management full authority at the work place. One of the main reforms in the direction of industrial democracy was the nullification of Article 32 by the Swedish legislation of 1976, which now enables the union to negotiate on any issue of importance in plant operations and on individual workers' tasks and working conditions.

SOME GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

This means, of course, a radical change in the structure of unions and in the collective bargaining system. The great battle for union representation in the plant has to be won on two fronts: against union tradition and probably also against workers' refusal to pay higher union dues, since new union agencies will have to be created.[15] The second front is that of the employers who wish to keep union representatives out of the plants.

Collective bargaining will have to be changed to end the dual system of national and plant level bargaining, of which the Donovan Commission in Britain spoke in its 1968 Report. Enterprise or even plant agreements will have to become the rule rather

13. For example, in the Netherlands the simultaneous presence of works councils and shop stewards has at times led to strained relations between them, since their competencies overlap. See J. T. M. Andriessen, "Developments in the Dutch Industrial Relations System," *Industrial Relations Journal*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1976), p. 52.

14. ". . . what was new about the winter 1969/70 strike wave was not the resort to unofficial, and illegal, action but the strike's size and duration, and a much higher level of wildcat strikes thereafter than before. The Swedish unions' hold on their members' loyalty was evidently eroding, as elsewhere in Europe." Andrew Martin, "From Joint Consultation to Joint Decision-Making: The Redistribution of Workplace Power in Sweden," *Current Sweden* (June 1976), p. 6. This refers to events preceding the recent reforms.

15. Even if unions succeed in shifting their financial burden to the enterprise, the result for the individual worker is the same as if he had to pay higher union dues. Wages are reduced either way, since labor costs increase.

than the exception. Some movement in this direction is already under way in a number of countries. This, too, of course, adds to the costs of unionism.

More important than the relatively minor financial issue is a basic problem which this extension of union activity into the plant is likely to create. Where industrial unionism prevails as in Germany, problems of which union is to represent the workers in a given enterprise are relatively easily solved. The issue, then, is merely whether the all-embracing union confederation, as the agency of all organized workers, will also have some voice in any participation scheme. But where the structure is more fragmented, the difficulties will be correspondingly greater. Even in Germany, the existence of a separate and fairly small white-collar trade union occasionally presents problems. However, these become tremendously magnified when, as in Britain, a large number of unions can claim to be spokesmen for different groups of workers in the same plant. Even greater difficulties arise in countries in which two, three, or still more unions of differing ideological attachment and confederal affiliation dispute each other's right to represent the same group of workers.

However, while admittedly complicated and painful, these situations need not be regarded as insuperable hurdles. They have been handled, with tolerable degrees of success, in the elections of comités d'entreprise in France and in the corresponding institutions in Italy, Belgium, and elsewhere. If these have not always produced the desired results, it is partly because one ought not to expect eternal harmony between capital and labor and, in a more immediate sense, because until quite recently, these bodies were mainly consultative bodies only. Consequently, the workers attached only little, if any, significance to them. Organized labor can hardly be expected to accept responsibility for decisions which it cannot effectively influence.

Beyond these—admittedly serious—organizational and financial issues there remains a basic ideological one which no public relations campaign can cover up. The more the union becomes involved in management participation, the more serious the danger of syndicalism is likely to be. I am using this term in a special sense: a coalition of management and union directed against the consumer. Management accepts, to a large extent, union demands, with the more or less clear understanding that the two will cooperate in transferring cost increases—usually with an adequate increment for profit—to the consumer of the goods or services involved.[16]

Yet, as we have seen, separating the employees' organs of industrial democracy from the union is likely to lead to an alienation between the union and its rank and file. Indeed, it may create the kind of situation which the Donovan Commission in Britain so tellingly described—the coexistence of two industrial relations systems, one legal but fictional, the other real but often outside the control of the unions. What matters, therefore, is to avoid creating new institutions that are competitive with those of collective bargaining, but at the same time prevent management and union

16. A searching, but greatly exaggerated and one-sided version of this theme appeared as early as 1944 in Henry C. Simons, "Some Reflections on Syndicalism," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 52, no. 1 (March 1944), especially p. 23.

from exploiting the powerful position which such exclusivity gives them.

It is obviously dangerous for a society to have management and unions engaged in almost continuous warfare which powerfully contributes to the disintegration of society. It is almost equally harmful, in the light of a wider interpretation of social concerns, to permit excessively close collaboration between the two. A respectful distance, permitting both conflict and cooperation, seems to be best. This is partly a matter of attitudes about which outsiders may have little or no control; it is also a question of institutional arrangements. It is at this point that society, and perhaps also the social scientist, may have some influence. Neither the dream of eternal class warfare nor that of perpetual harmony is attractive when closely examined. Fortunately, they are both utopian.

Industrial Democracy and Industrial Relations

By JOHN P. WINDMULLER

ABSTRACT: Some of the changes which are transforming Western European industrial relations systems under the banner of industrial democracy are in reality serving to expand the scope of collective bargaining and to extend it structurally downward to include the level of the individual enterprise. Through employee representation on corporate boards of directors and enlarged rights of works councils, many issues formerly the exclusive prerogative of the employer are becoming subject to joint decision making. As a general rule, the new rights are being obtained almost entirely through legislation rather than collective agreements. They include, among others, a right to information about vital affairs of the enterprise which management is obliged to provide to employee representatives. Since the scope of collective bargaining in the United States has always been wider than in Western Europe and the individual enterprise is central to the North American bargaining structure, it is not readily apparent how worker participation in management would contribute to improved labor-management relations in the United States.

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IN APRIL 1976 the Volkswagen Company of West Germany decided to invest about a quarter billion dollars in setting up an automobile assembly plant in the United States.[1] The decision expressed a determined effort to preserve the company's North American market in the face of rising production costs at home and a declining competitive position overseas. The step also ended a long period of bargaining inside the company over the employment impact of setting up an American manufacturing operation. Labor won a guarantee that no jobs would be lost and that VW employment levels in West Germany would be maintained over the next 10 years.

What was remarkable about these negotiations was neither the issue nor the outcome—job security has always been a primary union goal, especially in Western Europe. Rather, it was the fact that the bargaining occurred inside the company's supervisory board, approximately equivalent to an American board of directors, on which labor at that time held one-third of the seats outright. Other persons sympathetic to labor's interests occupied several additional seats. (The ratio of outright labor-controlled seats has since been increased by new legislation.) Thus, labor used its legally mandated positions on the company's highest policy-making body to extract concessions that management might well have rejected or even refused to discuss as bargainable items if the union had demanded them in regular collective bargaining negotiations. By taking full advantage of its insider position, labor demonstrated that control of a bloc of employee representatives on the board could be converted into a de facto extension of the structure and subject matter of collective bargaining.[2] And in a wider sense, the outcome demonstrated once again that arrangements providing for worker participation in management are capable of exerting important effects on industrial relations.

A caveat to begin with: the industrial relations effects of participation will vary considerably from country to country. After all, even if every country were to adopt precisely the same kind of worker participation scheme—which is not very likely—it would impinge on very differently constructed industrial relations systems and perforce lead to different results. The fact is, of course, that each country is evolving a distinctive form of worker participation, distinctive in major components as well as nuances. The overall effect, therefore, may well be to increase—or at the very least to maintain—the already considerable differences among industrial relations systems rather than bring them closer together.

Nevertheless, the differentiation does not preclude certain common consequences. As a general proposition, worker participation in the several variants currently emerging in Western Europe is tending to bring about a closer integration of

1. *New York Times*, 24 April 1976. For the background of this decision and for an incisive discussion of the operation of codetermination inside the VW board of directors, see the excellent article by Alfred L. Timm, "Decision Making at Volkswagen 1972–1975," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1976), pp. 94–103.

2. See Johannes Schregle, "Worker Participation in Decisions within Undertakings," *International Labour Review*, vol. 113, no. 1 (January–February 1976), pp. 6–7.

certain components of national industrial relations systems. For example, the predominant practice of sectoral or industry-wide bargaining between national unions and employers associations is being increasingly articulated with negotiations at enterprise and plant levels. This is particularly the case in countries where the two usually separate organs of employee representation—trade unions and works councils—are moving closer together.

Some interesting changes in traditional roles and attitudes are part of this process. In most countries the law still imposes on works councils an obligation to cultivate a harmonious and collaborative relationship with the employer "for the good and welfare of the entire enterprise." For example, the West German works council law, as amended in 1972, provides that "the employer and the works council shall work together in a spirit of mutual trust, having regard to the applicable collective agreements and in co-operation with the trade unions and employers' associations represented in the establishment, for the best interests of the employees and the establishment."[3]

Yet by gradually becoming involved in plant level collective bargaining, many works councils are turning into more militant organs of employee interest representation. In some situations, this trend has even reached a point where occasionally a works council will nowadays assume a leading role in an industrial dispute, once almost unheard of. Unions, on the other hand, although expected to be more aggressive than works councils, are no longer quite so free to push the cause of their followers when union officials spend part of their time attending to the responsibilities of membership on corporate boards of directors. In fact, it is more than likely that this awkward duality of tasks will require unions to accept some sacrifice in militancy and perhaps even to soften their social criticism. The class struggle does not fit readily into the board room.

Although participation schemes can assume a variety of institutional forms, most of them can be subsumed under one of five categories: (1) the inclusion of employee representatives on corporate policy-making boards; (2) the integration of works councils or similar bodies into the managerial decision-making procedure at plant and shop floor levels; (3) the introduction of changes at the work place designed to improve the quality of working life; (4) the establishment of employee stock ownership plans or other forms of participation in enterprise capital or profits; and (5) the appointment of workforce-oriented managers to handle labor relations.[4] All five are potentially of considerable significance for industrial relations, but the discussion here will emphasize

3. International Labor Organization, *Legislative Series*, Federal Republic of Germany 1 (March–April 1972), p. 2.

4. Under legislation which at one time applied to only one sector of German industry but is now being extended with some modification to the others, a designated member of top management is to be responsible expressly for employee relations. In the coal and steel industries, where he is known as the labor director, his appointment and in due time the renewal of his contract require the approval of the employee members of the board. Contrary to expectations, this peculiar form of participation does seem to be practicable, but at least for the time being it has remained confined to West Germany.

the first two because they are currently most widely applied.[5]

THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Industry-wide bargaining between employers associations and national unions—whether for an entire country or only for a particular region—has been the prevailing practice in most Western European countries for a long time. In some countries, such as Sweden, Norway, and Holland, economy-wide negotiations between central federations of employers associations and trade unions have sometimes been superimposed on industry or sectoral bargaining, and when that happened the resulting agreement has become the framework establishing the limits for further bargaining at industry level. But whether fully or only partly centralized, the bargaining process has rarely moved in the opposite direction, that is, to the individual firm or plant, although here and there a few large enterprises (VW in Germany and Renault in France) have constituted an exception.

The reasons for the neglect of the individual enterprise, a neglect which is so markedly in contrast with the enterprise-centered bargaining structure in North America and Japan, have been explored at length elsewhere.[6] On the union side, one must consider a combination of ideological preferences and organizational weakness. The priority that European labor movements accorded to class-oriented industrial unionism, with its accent on worker solidarity and on mass organization, usually left a vacuum at shop and enterprise levels. On the continent, it was filled by independent, statutorily created works councils and in Britain by shop stewards with uncertain and undefined ties to the union. Where unions forsook the individual enterprise for larger aims, employers were at least equally keen to limit bargaining relationships to an entire branch of industry or some other multiple of firms, for in this way they were best able to protect specific managerial and entrepreneurial prerogatives against union encroachments. Whenever challenged on this point—which was not too often—employers offered tenacious and, on the whole, successful resistance to union efforts to penetrate the enterprise and dealt instead with works councils or shop stewards.

It is conceivable, of course, that the macro-oriented European bargaining structure might at some indefinite point in the future have become more decentralized even without any explicit stimulus. In fact, in some countries a trend toward decentralized bargaining did get underway in the 1950s and 1960s. A notable example is Great Britain, where postwar full employment greatly strengthened the bargaining position of shop stewards vis-à-vis plant management. Yet, whatever

5. On the whole, empirical data about participation are still scarce. Only the West German experience with codetermination is of sufficiently long standing to represent an important body of experience. But even in that country, the amount of published empirical research constitutes just a minute portion of the enormous literature on codetermination. See Bernhard Wilpert, "Research on Industrial Democracy: The German Case," *Industrial Relations Journal*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1975), pp. 53–64.

6. See, for example, *Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies* (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1974), pp. 93–5.

organic developments along such lines might eventually have occurred, the recent development of formal schemes of industrial democracy, including worker participation in management, has enormously quickened the extension of the bargaining structure to the level of the enterprise.

The required presence of employee representatives on company boards constitutes an important expression of bargaining decentralization, especially when employee directors are sufficiently numerous to form a bloc of their own. Of course, not all issues coming before company boards for decision will henceforth be resolved through bargaining between employee and shareholder blocs, nor should one assume that unit voting will determine all policy choices. The lines of division will not always run automatically between shareholder representatives (or management) and employee representatives. Nevertheless, there is no question that bargaining will become a common form of resolving differences between blocs on many issues, including those that are of most immediate concern to employees and that are likely to impinge in some way on present or future terms of employment. Among them will be such items as plant location, the opening or closing down of entire operations, securing of investments, introduction of labor-saving equipment, employee and executive compensation policies, and other fundamental matters requiring top-level decisions. The submission of such items to a bargaining or quasi-bargaining process between more or less homogeneous blocs represents, in effect, a penetration of the collective bargaining process into the individual firm.

Another current development tending to alter the bargaining structure is the result of a changing orientation of works councils and similar bodies of employee representation. Regardless of the origins or the traditional functions of works councils, which do differ considerably from country to country, formal schemes of worker participation generally tend to promote the integration of works councils into the bargaining structure. They do so most frequently by allocating to the works councils explicit bargaining rights in certain subject areas or by entrusting them with responsibility for supervising the implementation at plant level of macro-type collective agreements concluded between unions and employers associations. They may, of course, do both. The eventual result of these developments could well be an "articulated" bargaining structure in which enterprise agreements concluded between plant managements and works councils become an integral element in a chain of coordinated bargains that extends from the individual plant at the base to the national economy at the top.

Several current developments are gradually leading in that direction. In some of the new legislation or drafts of legislation, works councils not only have gained recognition as bodies suitable for representing the interests of employees in the individual enterprise—a recognition which in most countries they have long enjoyed—but also are being granted a status equivalent to that of a U.S.-style bargaining agent. In effect, works councils are beginning to acquire a kind of legal authority to engage in adversary collective bargaining at the level of the individual enterprise.

This development constitutes a

sharp departure from traditional conceptions of the proper role of works councils. In the Netherlands, for example, which is, in this regard, representative of many other countries, the principal task of works councils since their establishment by law in 1950 has been the cultivation of a harmonious partnership between employer and workforce to promote their mutual interest in the prosperity of the enterprise. To underline that this was to be a cooperative rather than a conflictual relationship, the employer or his designated representative has by law sat as the chairman of the council, and that arrangement is by no means unique to the Netherlands. According to newly proposed amendments, however, the works council is to become first and foremost an instrument for the vigilant protection of employee interests per se, a watchdog over management, and an agency for plant-level bargaining over issues supplemental to the industry-wide agreement. In short, it is to resemble a union and may adopt an adversary posture vis-à-vis the employer. In this new conception of the role of the works council, there may still be a bit of room for formal cooperation between management and workforce, but that is to be subsidiary to the works council's primary tasks of closely monitoring management decisions and watchfully protecting employee interests. Of course, the employer will not only have to give up his role as chairman, but disappear from the council entirely.

CREATING NEW RIGHTS

Worker participation in management frequently establishes new power relations in the enterprise by conferring on employees, more particularly on their representatives, certain rights designed to enable them to share in areas of corporate decision making that previously were under the exclusive control of the employer or his representatives.

The specific character of the new bargaining rights is, of course, bound to vary. Some examples of the potential range will be given below. What most of them have in common is their statutory origin. The new rights at enterprise level are being obtained, or have already been achieved, almost entirely through legislation rather than collective agreements between unions and employers associations at national or industry levels. To be sure, that is in part the result of a general preference for national standardization, a preference which is much stronger in Europe than in North America. But it must also be recognized that in most European countries (Britain being an important exception) organized labor's efforts to expand the range of issues subject to joint determination—what is often termed the scope of bargaining—have been far more successful when labor has relied on its political strength than on its ability to extract concessions from employers in collective bargaining.

Even in Sweden, where labor's bargaining power at national level relative to the bargaining power of employers is greater than in most other countries, the recent statutory expansion of union bargaining rights at enterprise level—and the corresponding contraction of long established management rights—came about only when a labor-oriented government passed the necessary legislation. The alternative would have been a collectively negotiated basic agree-

ment similar in form to other basic agreements that have led to important innovations in Swedish labor-management relations. That route, however, was effectively blocked by determined employer resistance. And so, after discovering that its bargaining strength was insufficient to achieve a significant degree of worker participation in operating management, Swedish labor exerted its considerable political leverage to secure by law a fundamental shift in the balance of bargaining power at the level of the individual enterprise.

Sweden's decision exemplifies developments elsewhere.[7] The new bargaining rights at enterprise level, as specified in legislation, are too detailed and comprehensive to be reviewed here except for a few major items. First, they include procedural rights, such as required meetings between works councils (or their counterparts) and management, the type and scope of information to be supplied by management, internal procedures for settling disagreements, and provisions for the use of outside agencies in resolving certain kinds of disputes. Second, they cover explicitly the substantive issues which have become mandatory subjects for bargaining at plant level, including working hours, vacation schedules, pension plan regulations, and health and safety provisions. There can be little doubt that these new items, which have become bargainable subjects, coincide very closely with the detailed substantive and procedural terms of collective agreements that are customarily concluded between local unions and plant managements in North America.

7. See "Swedish Codetermination at Work Act," *European Industrial Relations*, no. 31 (July 1976), pp. 19–24.

The parallel underlines a vital aspect of European worker participation schemes. Not only do they constitute a legislative-political redress of the balance of bargaining power in the enterprise, but they also seek to remedy the past organizational failures and neglects of unions at local and plant levels.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION: THE DISCLOSURE RULES

In most industrial relations systems based on collective bargaining, controversies are bound to arise from time to time over the obligation of employers or employers associations to provide the employee side with information relevant to the bargaining process. Nowadays it is not so much the principle of sharing information that is an issue, for that has been pretty well settled, but rather the nature, detail, and disposition of the information to be furnished. As a general rule, disputes over information sharing have been most acute in systems based on single-firm bargaining, not only because enterprise and plant-level agreements are almost by definition tailor-made to fit the circumstances of the individual enterprise, but also because in such systems a union's bargaining effectiveness depends to some extent on the specificity of the information at its disposal. In industry-wide bargaining, however, the outcome is likely to be a set of minimum standards rather than genuinely effective terms, and therefore the union's need to have detailed information about the economic and financial circumstances of each enterprise is considerably less acute. This important distinction helps to explain the construction in North America of a body of detailed ad-

ministrative regulations specifying the employer's obligation to furnish bargaining-related data to the union and the absence of comparable rules in the bargaining systems of Western Europe.

More recently, however, institutionalized worker participation, with its emphasis on changing the balance of decision making in the individual firm, has been compelling Western European countries to become much more explicit and regulatory about this kind of information sharing. This again underscores the theme of this essay that participation in essential aspects, is an extension of collective bargaining to the individual enterprise.

Generally speaking, employee members who serve on corporate boards are entitled to receive the same information, in kind and volume, that is supplied to all other board members. This is the case even when some of the board members on the employee side are actually full-time union officials who directly or indirectly represent their organizations in negotiations with the same companies on whose boards they are serving or who at the very least will eventually negotiate agreements with employers associations to which these companies belong.

At the works council level, the legal requirements on information sharing are more often than not enumerated in considerable detail in the relevant legislation. Not only do the laws require the employer to report periodically to the works council or one of its committees on corporate financial policy, profits and losses, the state of the order books, production planning, and other vital data, but he must also supply detailed information on all items that have been designated as subject to joint employer-employee determination. Thus, in the Netherlands draft legislation now being considered specifies pension plans, profit sharing, employee savings plans, working hours, vacation schedules, compensation plans, job evaluation, health and safety rules, contemplated acquisitions of other firms, spin-offs of subsidiaries, plant closings, mergers, production cutbacks or expansion, plant relocation, organizational changes, and related matters. Comparable statutes in other countries are nearly as detailed.

Wherever legislation on worker participation makes the execution of management initiatives contingent on the consent of the works council or at least on prior consultation with it, the employer must supply information sufficient to enable the works council to make an informed judgment. There is very little difference in principle between this rule and the detailed administrative prescriptions of the National Labor Relations Board in the United States defining the employer's obligation to bargain in good faith.

A difference does exist, however, in the subsequent treatment of such information. Whereas in the United States there has been relatively little concern about the problem of protecting the confidentiality of bargaining-related information supplied by an employer to a union, in European systems the employee members of corporate boards and the members of the works council are legally required to safeguard privileged information made available to them. Indeed, some laws provide for stiff penalties where a breach of confidence can be proven. Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to expect such a rule to be effectively enforced, particularly in

cases where employees are represented on corporate boards by union officials who in another context represent the bargaining interests of their members. In practice it is to be expected, therefore, that in most instances detailed information about the affairs of an individual enterprise will become available to the research departments of the unions in due course. That is not necessarily a deplorable consequence, considering that other outsiders such as banks have long had access to supposedly confidential corporate information by virtue of their widespread representation on boards of directors.

It is still an open question, however, what use unions will make of the information acquired through worker participation. West German experience indicates that the unions have so far made no effort to use the multiple board memberships of their officials as a means for establishing a central depository of information through which to oversee a particular industry, not to mention the economy as a whole. Nor does information sharing seem to have made them noticeably more aggressive in their bargaining. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that possession of detailed information on the economic status and prospects of individual enterprises will moderate instead of sharpen a union's bargaining expectations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The spread of information about current developments in industrial democracy in Western Europe is bound to raise the question of whether the United States, too, will move in a similar direction. The foregoing analysis suggests that some of the main purposes of worker participation in management have already been achieved in the United States through an enterprise-centered system of collective bargaining. Part of what is being sought in Western Europe under the banner of industrial democracy—that is, joint decision making on issues of vital importance to employees, information sharing, adequate procedures for disputes settlement in the enterprise, and related goals—has long been an integral part of the American industrial relations system. In a thoughtful review of American labor's position, Thomas Donohue of the AFL-CIO explained at a conference on industrial relations in May 1976 that "because American unions have won equality at the bargaining table, [they] have not sought it in corporate board rooms."[8] Perhaps, then, the question one should really ask is whether the European model of worker participation in management is not, in substance, a reasonable facsimile of the American pattern of decentralized collective bargaining, as adapted to the historically different circumstances of the Western European countries. It would appear so.

In any event, it is quite certain that Donohue's rather negative appraisal of participation ("it offers little to American unions in the performance of their job unionism role") and his rationale for that appraisal ("We do not want to blur in any way the distinctions between the respective roles of management and labor in the plant") are shared by an overwhelming portion of American unions. And yet, there is

8. *John Herling's Labor Letter*, 7 August 1976, p. 1.

a point to be made on the other side of his argument which leads straight back to the case of the Volkswagen Company mentioned at the start of these observations. If labor's spokesmen in the United States are justified in their complaints that American workers have suffered a serious loss of jobs and income through the capital and technology exports of U.S.-based multinational firms, and if neither labor's application of considerable political pressure to change the permissive terms of present legislation nor the practice of adversary collective bargaining is capable of securing adequate relief, control of a bloc of seats in corporate board rooms might be an alternative worth considering.

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New Focus on Industrial Democracy in Britain

By ANDREW W. J. THOMSON

ABSTRACT: Industrial democracy in Britain has traditionally operated through the process of collective bargaining, but since 1973 the Trades Union Congress has pursued the objective of giving workers' representatives parity on company boards of directors with shareholders' representatives. This approach was adopted in the Labour party's election manifesto for the current Parliament, but the government, somewhat uncertain as to how to implement this objective, has appointed the Bullock Committee to investigate the issue. The committee's report is expected to be broadly favorable to the TUC viewpoint, but most employers and some unions want a more flexible approach to worker participation. Any government legislation in the near future is likely to be threatened by time constraints and a declining majority in Parliament, but there is general agreement in all the political parties about the need for some further development in participation, even if not about the precise form that it should take.

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THE ISSUE of industrial democracy is in a state of flux in Britain at the present time, and a watershed in its development appears imminent. Industrial democracy is, of course, a term which covers a variety of different concepts, but for reasons of space this paper will concentrate mainly on the issue of most immediate relevance, namely worker representation on the board of directors.

BACKGROUND UP TO THE 1970s

The major industrial relations legacy from the nineteenth century to the twentieth was a solid commitment to trade unionism and collective bargaining as the primary focus of worker self-expression, although the nineteenth century had seen a number of socialist and anarchist theories and experiments, including self-governing cooperatives and Owenite communities, none of which flourished except the retail cooperative movement. The first quarter of the present century saw the growth of a much more explicit political orientation through the emergence of the Labour party and also a sudden mushrooming of more radical ideas based on syndicalism and guild socialism, with nationalization becoming the practical focus of aspirations toward industrial democracy. In the discussions of the time, nationalization was often taken to involve some form of workers control, but over the next 20 years opinion within the Labour party moved in favor of the public corporation, in which there would be a conventional management structure but with some interest group representation on the board, as the primary vehicle for implementing nationalization. This approach was duly incorporated in the post-World War II nationalization legislation without much opposition; a sprinkling of unionists were put on the industries' boards of directors, but not in any dual capacity which might compromise their responsibility to one side or the other. Little thought was given to the private sector.

Parallel with these developments was the consolidation of the role of the trade union as the primary representative of the workers. With the exception of the short-lived World War I period, there was no plant-based challenge to the status of the national union and the industry-wide collective agreement, and its eventual emergence in the late 1950s in the form of informal bargaining by shop stewards and stewards' committees merely served to underline the formal status of the union even if the reality was that unions frequently lost control of plant level activity. By the 1960s, it could be said that unions had already achieved effective participation through the limitation of management discretion in most large and medium-sized companies in Britain.

This essentially pragmatic position was perhaps best rationalized by Hugh Clegg.[1] His approach was to take an analogy from the democratic political pluralism of government and opposition and argue that industrial democracy is best obtained by having two opposed sides, management and unions. He advocated three basic principles whereby this concept of industrial democracy might be perceived: "The first is that trade unions must be independent both of the state and of management. The second is that

1. Hugh Clegg, *A New Approach to Industrial Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960).

only the unions can represent the industrial interests of workers. The third is that the ownership of industry is irrelevant to good industrial relations."[2] Such a situation is, of course, perfectly compatible with capitalism; indeed, it conveniently justified the status quo and the predominance of collective bargaining and as such reflected a majority view at the time within the Labour movement. Even at the present it remains an important strand of thinking.

In the middle 1960s, however, a new dissatisfaction with the state of industrial democracy arose. Best represented on the left by the Institute for Workers Control,[3] it drew on the growing power of shop stewards within industry and within the union movement while also reacting against the bureaucratic structure of the nationalized industries, which it perceived as state capitalism. The swing of the unions to the left as the state attempted to exert controls on collective bargaining through law and incomes policies was a further factor in arousing interest in new forms of industrial democracy. Within the Labour party itself, a working party on industrial democracy was set up in 1967,[4] but in spite of endorsing the general principle, it was unable to recommend a blueprint for participation which covered the various situations and issues in different sectors of the economy.

However, the most influential voice of the 1960s came from the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (the Donovan Commission),[5] which carried out a thorough review of the British system of industrial relations in its report in 1968. The commission thought that its proposals for the reform of collective bargaining would adequately cover developments at plant level and intermediate level, and a majority felt unable to recommend the appointment of workers' directors to the boards of companies, although a group of three thought that experiments should be facilitated, and two others (not union representatives, incidentally) wanted mandatory arrangements. In its White Paper *In Place of Strife*,[6] which resulted from the Commission's Report, the Labour government merely noted that it favored experiments with worker directors and intended consultations as to how this might best be achieved. It also, like the Donovan Commission, took the view that collective bargaining "represents the best method so far devised of advancing industrial democracy."

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1970S

The issue, however, remained a topical one, and indeed spread well beyond the Labour movement to other political parties and bodies. A particular impetus was given by Britain's entry into the European Common Market in 1973. The Liberal party produced proposals similar to the German framework, and the Conservative government promised, although it did not actually produce, a discussion paper on the subject. The key occurrence, how-

2. Ibid., p. 21.

3. See Ken Coates and Tony Topham, *The New Unionism: The Case for Workers' Control* (London: Peter Owen, 1972).

4. The Labour party, *Industrial Democracy* (London, 1967).

5. *Report of Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office Cmnd 3623, 1968).

6. *In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office Cmnd 3888, 1969).

ever, was a paper produced initially by the research staff of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1973 which broke sharply with the rather xenophobic tradition of the unions by proposing what was, in considerable part, the European framework of industrial democracy. This paper made a major issue of board level representation, although it reaffirmed the primary significance of collective bargaining.[7] Not only was the paper accepted by the unions at the 1973 Congress, albeit without great enthusiasm or even discussion of its implications, but more importantly the subject became one of the focal points of discussion between the TUC and the Labour party in the development of a Social Contract.[8] The Social Contract was a wide-ranging set of promises by the Labour party in exchange for voluntary wage controls by the unions, and when the party took office in March 1974, it became the centerpiece of economic and political policy. After the passage of the first two of the three promised pieces of industrial relations legislation, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 and the Employment Protection Act of 1975, industrial democracy came to the forefront of attention. However, the government, although largely committed to the TUC scheme, was uncertain about how to implement it, and therefore announced a committee of inquiry in August 1975.[9]

7. Trades Union Congress, *Industrial Democracy* (London, 1973). The document was reissued in a slightly amended form in 1974.

8. The Labour party itself produced a document which made proposals similar to that of the TUC. (*The Community and the Company*, London, 1974).

9. The setting up of the committee was hastened by the introduction of a private member's bill on board representation in the House of Commons, sponsored by Giles Radice, M.P.

The terms of reference of the committee were extremely narrow, leaving little room for any fundamental appraisal of the underlying issues:

> Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial democracy in the control of companies by means of representation on the board of directors, and accepting the essential role of trade union organisations in this process, to consider how such an extension can bes be achieved, taking into account ii particular the proposals of the Trade Union Congress report on industria democracy as well as experience ii Britain, the EEC and other countries Having regard to the interests of th national economy, employees, investor and consumers, to analyse the implica tions of such representation for th efficient management of companies an for company law.

The restrictive terms of referenc created difficulty in finding an ade quate chairman and membershij but a team of suitable weight wa duly assembled under Lord Bullocl the Oxford historian. The Bulloc Committee was also restricted t the private sector, and a separat working party was set up under Ala Lord of the Treasury to investigat similar issues in the public secto We will first look at the privat sector.

THE POSITION OF THE TUC

As expressed in the TUC's majo policy document of July 1973:

> The traditional British trade unio attitude to schemes for "participation in management of private industry h been one of opposition. It has bee considered that the basic conflict interest between the workers and th owners of capital and their agent prevents any meaningful participation i management decisions. The reasonin behind this opposition has varied fro the claim that the trade unions' job

simply and solely to negotiate terms and conditions, and not to usurp the function of management, to the proposition that trade unions should not be collaborationists in a system of industrial power and private wealth of which they disapprove.[10]

However, although the TUC made a number of recommendations about the scope for improving industrial democracy based on the strengthening of union organization and the widening of the scope of collective bargaining, it now saw the need for something more:

. . . it is clear that this leaves a wide range of fundamental managerial decisions affecting workpeople that are beyond the control—and very largely beyond the influence—of workpeople and their trade unions. Major decisions on investment, location, closures, takeovers and mergers, and product specialisation of the organisation are generally taken at levels where collective bargaining does not take place, and indeed are subject matter not readily covered by collective bargaining. New forms of control are needed.[11]

The TUC's basic proposal to achieve this objective in the private sector was that there should be a new Companies Act, to be introduced in stages, initially applying to the 600–700 enterprises employing more than 2,000 workers. In the companies covered, there would be a two-tier board structure with supervisory boards that would be responsible for determining company objectives and for appointing the management boards. One half of the supervisory boards should be elected through trade union machinery, but the new provisions would only become operative in unionized firms. Representation of workers on boards could only be through bona fide unions choosing to exercise this right. Finally, the change in structure should be reflected by a statutory obligation of companies to have regard for the interests of working people as well as shareholders.

This pattern was in keeping with, and was undoubtedly influenced by, other European developments. But another element of European practice, the works council, was emphatically rejected by the TUC which argued:

An attempt to introduce a general system of works councils in British industry would lead to one of two things. Either they would duplicate existing structures at plant levels, in which case Works Councils would clearly be superfluous; or they would displace and supersede existing trade union arrangement; this latter approach would be even more unacceptable to the trade union movement.[12]

In its evidence to the Bullock Committee, the TUC based its major submission on the document already discussed, but added a supplementary memorandum to expand on certain issues. The only point of change was that as a second best to giving union members half the seats on supervisory boards, the TUC might accept equal voting rights with other directors on unitary or single-tier boards. This alternative envisaged that union directors might be outnumbered by shareholders' representatives and executive managers, but the TUC was prepared to accept it, provided the managers had no vote. On other issues the TUC argued that: the legislation should not specify how elections of union representatives should be conducted, for this should be decided by the union organization,

10. Trades Union Congress, *Industrial Democracy*, p. 14.
11. Ibid., p. 34.
12. Ibid., p. 38.

typically a shop stewards body; nonunionists should be excluded from participation because, in the large companies with which the TUC proposals were concerned, the majority of employees are union members; parity of representation would not necessarily lead to deadlock because neither side need vote as a block, or the chairmanship (with casting vote) could rotate or an independent chairman could be appointed; there should be no consumer representation, since there would be no definable constituency to which representatives would be accountable; where unions decided not to participate in the new system, the structure should operate but the workers seats would remain unfilled; the reason for the claim to 50 percent of the seats was that only in this way could union representatives be expected to feel any sense of collective responsibility for board decisions; and finally, equal responsibility would not mean identical responsibility, since the primary responsibility of union members would be to their constituents, and they would thus be workers' representatives on the board rather than worker directors.

OTHER UNION VIEWS

Although the TUC has carried its viewpoint at its own congresses, there is far from unanimous acceptance of its proposals within the union movement. For example, the Engineering Workers Union has argued that supervisory boards could act in opposition to the development of collective bargaining; such boards, like works councils, would duplicate or supersede the growth of collective bargaining at company level, and they could well degenerate into the rubber stamps of management boards, creating the illusion of power without the reality. For this union, the desirable alternative is the unlimited extension of collective bargaining into areas such as pricing, investment, location, forward planning, sales, and profitability. The Electricians Union, from a much more right-wing political stance than the engineers, has argued along similar lines: the essential need is for unions to maintain their independence; there is a danger that management could coopt the union, which might lead to an alternative representation at the place of work; it is not the responsibility of working people to manage the enterprise, nor can union directors accept responsibility for managerial decisions and still represent workers who feel they must oppose them. The General and Municipal Workers Union has indicated that a general mandatory obligation should be placed on managements to negotiate with unions on a number of issues, including those which might be decided at board level, such as forward decisions on investment, reorganizations, mergers, and changes in product lines. While parity of union representation on supervisory boards might be one way of achieving such joint control, the union has commented that TUC policy did not provide for equivalent compulsion on negotiations where the unions concerned did not opt for this type of board.

THE EMPLOYER POSITION

Employer submissions to Bullock were almost universally critical of the TUC proposals. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) pronounced itself in favor of participation, but argued that there was no suitable standard system: larger

ɪmpanies with over 2,000 emoyees should be required by law reach participation agreements ithin four years, failing which ere would be an arbitrated soluon; medium-sized companies ight be brought within the law on ırticipation agreements later, and the meantime should be enɪuraged to extend participation ɪluntarily; small companies with ıder 500 employees should be ıcouraged to set up company counls. Employee representation at ɔard level would not generally be ıitable; where they were favored ıey should be solidly based on :her arrangements below board ·vel; and any suggestion that nployee participation necessarily ıvolves employee delegates on the ɔard was seen as irrelevant and nacceptable. In addition, the CBI :jected the TUC principle of singleıannel representation which ex.uded nonunion employees, esecially among manual workers, and 'so the proposal that there should e participation only when this was esired by trade unions. The particiation agreements, which were the eystone of the CBI approach, were › come within certain guidelines, ıcluding ratification by all emloyees in a secret ballot, joint rrangements where more than one .nion was participating, no con.ict with collective bargaining or ecognition arrangements, and, perıaps most important, no interference rith the executive function of mangement or its legal responsibility ɔr discharging its third-party obligaions. The actual participation in lecision making would thus be ·xtremely limited. Company counils for smaller companies (which vere generally ignored by the ınions) would consist entirely of employee representatives with the chief executive as chairman.

Most employer and independent evidence similarly stressed the need for flexibility, although in doing so it was bound to fall short of the TUC claim for parity on the board. Another theme running through the employer evidence was the need to build up participation from the bottom rather than impose it from the top if commitment from employees was to be achieved. There were many other criticisms of the TUC's proposals on grounds of democracy and accountability, but perhaps most of all there was criticism of the impact on efficiency of the TUC proposals, which had suggested that board representation would decrease workers' resistance to change and thus increase overall efficiency. Rather, the feeling was that there would be delays in reaching decisions, not infrequently deadlock, and that a great deal of extra time would be consumed; boards would become an arena for political maneuver and conflict rather than a forum for making realistic decisions. Finally, apart from anything else, there would be great difficulty in obtaining suitable people.

POLITICAL AND OTHER PERSPECTIVES

The Conservative party has said little of substance about methods of representation. A recent party pamphlet merely noted:

> The appointment of worker-directors is not the first or the most obvious way of achieving real participation involving the whole of the labour force. A Conservative government will encourage the implementation of schemes which fully involve all employees in the operation of their companies. Schemes

for financial participation will also be encouraged.[13]

The Liberal party also rejected key parts of the TUC proposal, in particular the emphasis on union domination. They accept two-tier boards, but want directors elected by shareholders and employees who would have equal voting rights. The party also wants workplace councils which would have to approve certain decisions jointly with management.

The government has naturally been reserving its position while the Bullock Committee has been sitting, but a speech in May 1976 by the responsible minister, Edmund Dell, the secretary for trade, suggested that, except for the fundamental principle that some form of employee representation on the boards of companies should be introduced, all options were open. But he also stressed that any government initiatives would have to be "compatible with improved industrial relations, the efficient management of companies, and an increasing level of investment of risk capital."[14] Britain, he added, "could not afford the luxury of radical change if the result is not to be greater efficiency."

There is no space to do justice to the large number of other views, but one which must be mentioned is the National Consumer Council (NCC). Their main point was quite different from those mentioned so far, but very clear:

. . . such a carve-up between labour and capital in a modern version of the corporate state could not be in the interests of consumers . . . we cannot but fear that, if labour and capital were locked together in one organizational combine, the push for security would become strongly underpinned and the tendency to monopolistic limitation to new entrants to a trade enhanced.[15]

The NCC therefore has suggested, although with little hope of success, that there should be consumer directors.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

So far we have dealt with the private sector of industry, but the issue of industrial democracy also applies to the public sector in which there are two main types of situation. The nationalized industries are reasonably similar in their structure to private sector companies, and there the TUC proposed similar arrangements, that is, a two-tier board with a 50 percent trade union representation on the first-tier board. But it also wanted direct involvement on managerial boards at lower levels. There have already been some developments in this sector: the British Steel Corporation, for example, has had worker-directors on divisional boards since the late 1960s, but this experiment has not generally been regarded as a success in spite of some restructuring of the scheme in 1972;[16] the Post Office has also already agreed that there will be union representation on its board, possibly in a two-tier structure which would be echoed at regional and lower levels. As in the private sector, however, views are far from uniform. A report on the structure of the electricity industry unequivocally rejected equality of numbers on the board. It argued that such a board could not have a common purpose, and the unions in the industry strongly supported this

13. Quoted in *The Times*, 5 July 1976.

14. Quoted in *The Financial Times*, 19 May 1976.

15. Quoted in *The Times*, 25 March 1976.

16. See Peter Brannen et al., *The Worker Directors: A Sociology of Participation* (London: Hutchinson, 1975).

position. At the other end of the spectrum, the National Union of Mineworkers has put forward proposals that each colliery should be directed by a team of 12 persons elected by the employees for a three-year period. The team would appoint the professional managers.

The public services, primarily central and local government, present much more difficult problems because of the role of Parliament and the local authorities as representatives of the electorate. However, without being explicit, and accepting that the machinery might need to be different, the TUC has argued that "in principle the case for giving public services trade unions due and timely opportunities to contribute the views of their constituents is as valid as the case for a greater measure of industrial democracy for the rest of the working community."[17] By this, the TUC means "a satisfactory degree of representation on the main decision-making operational bodies." But which bodies and what kind of representation are difficult issues, which, like all the issues in the public sector, have not been adequately ventilated in public. The Lord Committee has operated in private, there has been no provision for outside views to be heard, and there is unlikely to be any published report.

THE PROBLEMS FOR POLICY

The foregoing views and issues present both philosophical and technical problems for policy determination. Most of them can only be listed rather than discussed. But one key issue deserving at least a brief discussion is how far unions can or must accept responsibility for the decisions taken at board level. In its 1973 document, the TUC tried to detach the sharing of power from the sharing of responsibility, and even though the TUC General Secretary Len Murray accepted the need to share responsibility at the 1976 congress, it is precisely for this reason that many unions have preferred to pursue other ways of exercising power. As already noted, unions in Britain generally can already exercise power through participation in the process of management via collective bargaining, and there is considerable fear not only that collective bargaining will be diluted, but also new challenges from below will appear to conflict with the formal union organization. It seems likely, indeed, that any emerging possibilities of board level representation will not be taken up in a number of companies where unions wish to preserve their independence. For employers, the problem is the obverse: will the changes merely take bargaining into the boardroom without achieving the objective of cooperation in implementing company policy? Beyond this central issue, a list of some of the more significant problems which Bullock and the government will have to face up to is as follows:

—Should there be a two-tier structure of boards of directors, and if so how should powers be divided between the two?

—Should worker directors be solely the representatives of trade unions or should they also cover nonunionists? Can worker representation be equated with trade union representation? What about representation of managers, few of whom are unionized in the private sector? What about nonunionized companies?

17. Trades Union Congress, *Industrial Democracy* (1974 version), p. 43.

—What proportion of worker-directors should there be?
—What arrangements should be made in regard to decisions below board level?
—Should worker directors be elected directly or indirectly, or appointed?
—Should there be powers of recall of worker-directors in certain circumstances?
—What should be done with multi-plant company structures, multinationals, and holding companies?
—What should be the responsibilities of worker-directors?
—How should the workers themselves be involved, given obvious dangers of remoteness from their representatives?
—How should the system of collective bargaining operate if the board has overall responsibility for industrial relations policies?
—How will enough suitable worker-directors be discovered, trained, and serviced by their unions?
—How can difficulties associated with secrecy and confidentiality of company information be overcome?
—What should be the authority of the shareholders' meeting?
—Should there be differences between the public and private sectors?
—Should there be differences in sizes of companies?
—Should the system be mandatory or voluntary?
—How quickly should any new scheme be introduced?
—What should be done to reconcile disagreements in setting it up, including differences among unions in a system of multiple union representation?

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

While the central focus of attention to new systems of representation in decision making is on the Bullock and Lord Committees, there have been other developments of significance in recent years. Those in the nationalized industries have already been mentioned. British Leyland, recently brought under state control through the National Enterprise Board, has introduced an elaborate three-tier participation structure after a good deal of advance preparation. The base of the structure consists of more than 30 plant-level joint management-union committees. From these, the stewards elect representatives to divisional middle-level joint committees, and in turn these bodies send 15 stewards to the car council chaired by the chief executive. However, it is fundamental to the scheme that management retains the ultimate right to make all decisions. The structure is designed to allow the workforce to contribute to problem solving and the formation of future plans, but it precludes negotiations and codetermination. Somewhat similar schemes have been introduced in other large companies such as Chrysler and Ferranti; it is noteworthy that these, like Leyland, are companies which have recently received large public subsidies.

A very different dimension of industrial democracy has been the experience with various forms of cooperatives. There has been a long history of producer cooperatives, most of them members of the industrial Common Ownership Movement, but unlike their retail counterparts, they have been small in scale and significance. There have also been copartnerships, such as the John Lewis Partnership, but again, they have been very much the exception.

The early 1970s saw a considerable number of factory occupations,

mainly in protest against closures, and some of these led to work-ins and cooperative ventures.[18] The work-in at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was the best known, but there were several other smaller ones. However, the major institutional developments came with the new Labour government of 1974 which inherited a number of closure problems. Wedgwood Benn, secretary of state for industry, after considerable arguments within the government, offered public aid to finance worker cooperatives in the N.V.T. motorcycle factory at Meriden, the Fisher-Bendix plant at Kirkby, and the *Scottish Daily News*. Another separate aspect of industrial democracy is experimentation with various forms of job enrichment or improvements in the quality of working life,[19] but while such experiments do exist, it is probably fair to say that in this respect Britain lags behind other countries.

Finally, there have also been, or are pending, other governmental measures which can be said to contribute to industrial democracy;[20] indeed elements of significance for industrial democracy are scattered through various pieces of legislation. The Employment Protection Act of 1975 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 were both major pieces of legislation extending individual and union rights; perhaps the most significant provision was the right to disclosure of information given to unions in the Employment Protection Act. Beyond these, the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 provided for unions to request and participate in safety committees and to have safety representatives with designated powers. The Industry Act of 1975 created the possibility of voluntary planning agreements in which unions would be expected to be consulted and also created rights of information disclosure going beyond those contained in the Employment Protection Act. Also within the Industry Act, the National Enterprise Board (and its sister bodies the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies set up under separate legislation) was given the task of promoting industrial democracy in undertakings which it controls. The government is also planning to bring in legislation to give unions 50 percent representation on pension scheme management bodies.

THE NEXT STAGE

The publication of the Bullock Report is expected in mid-January 1977, but there has already been a good deal of informed speculation about its contents. It seems likely that the whole committee will accept the principle of worker-directors, including the employer representatives, which may create difficulties for the CBI in its present opposition to this principle. There is likely to be a recommendation for a single- rather than a two-tier board (on this issue the TUC and the CBI have changed sides), which would be divided into three parts. Shareholder and union representatives would comprise the largest (and equal) groups which would then together nominate the smaller third group. Worker-directors would be

18. See Ken Coates, ed., *The New Worker Cooperatives* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1976).

19. See Department of Employment Manpower Papers No. 7, *On the Quality of Working Life* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973).

20. For a review of this legislation, see A.W.J. Thomson and P.B. Beaumont, "The British Labor Government's Industrial Relations Program," *Cornell International Law Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 1976), pp. 159–90.

elected through the union machinery, and only company employees would be eligible; an external union official could, however, come in as part of the third group. The machinery would be brought into operation by a ballot of the whole workforce, with the employer having no say in the decision. The employer representatives on the Bullock Committee are, however, expected to dissent on two points: they would prefer a two-tier board, and they do not want so many places to be given to the workers. The report as a whole will, nevertheless, generally endorse the TUC position.

However, this will be far from the end of the story. Although the government is largely committed to the TUC viewpoint and has included industrial democracy in its legislative program for 1976–77, it may well find it necessary to interpose another stage of discussion, such as a Green or White Paper. In any case it will have difficulties in pushing through early legislation on industrial democracy because the coming parliamentary session is likely to be dominated by the issue of devolution to Scotland and Wales, and time considerations may prevent its passage. There is also likely to be a major battle in Parliament, since employers and the Conservative and Liberal parties are unlikely to accept the government proposals. Moreover, the government is likely to lose some of its parliamentary support through defeats at by-elections, and already at the time of writing its majority is a precarious one. A general election is indeed a distinct possibility well before the government's full period expires. Therefore, legislation in the form the TUC and the Labour party would like is by no means assured. However, the general principle looks certain to advance in one form or another. All the political parties are committed to some conception of industrial democracy, and there will also be some pressures arising from Common Market obligations.

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West German Experience with Industrial Democracy

By FRIEDRICH FÜRSTENBERG

ABSTRACT: The prevailing forms of industrial democracy in West Germany and the proposals for its further development cannot be encompassed in a single integrated system. There are few basic issues of industrial democracy which do not contain a complex interlocking of regulative norms, contractual relationships, and cooperative activities. A genuine German development is codetermination or Mitbestimmung. In order to evaluate its proper significance it is necessary to differentiate between shop floor and board levels, between the institutions of works councils, labor directors on management boards, and worker representatives on supervisory boards. The greatest achievement in industrial relations, largely due to the works councils, is perhaps the establishment of a reasonably well functioning grievance and negotiation machinery within the individual plant and the larger corporation. Codetermination in supervisory boards has not undermined profit orientation as a criterion of performance, but employee representatives have been able to obtain proper consideration of the social aspects of work. There are limits in a system based mainly on statutory measures. More personal involvement and more self-government at workplace level might be on the agenda for the near future.

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THOUGH there is much agreement about the need for more democratic participation within the world of work, opinions differ widely as far as content and scope of industrial democracy are concerned. This also applies to the case of West Germany where the prevailing forms of industrial democracy and the proposals for its further development cannot be encompassed in a single integrated system. They reflect, rather, a pluralism of possible interpretations of basic concepts and, within these limits, of historically established areas of consensus in terms of working solutions.

Public attention usually focuses on codetermination, especially at supervisory board level. But one must realize the complex meaning even of this key concept and its interrelation with other practices of industrial democracy in contemporary West Germany. In order to get as clear a picture as possible of the present situation and of the forces working to maintain or change it, the basic approaches to problems of industrial democracy in West Germany must be briefly analyzed.

BASIC APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

In a society based on democratic principles, the structure and operation of enterprises require legitimization by consent. In order to serve this purpose three models are used in West Germany.

First, industrial democracy can be fostered by state regulations which offer a framework for the articulation and consideration of various interests. Such legal provisions are fundamental prerequisites for the form and content of industrial relations.

Second, the contractual model offers the parties concerned an opportunity to settle their problems in free negotiations leading to agreed compromises that are limited both in time and scope. Industrial relations at sectoral and regional levels of industry usually follow this pattern.

Finally, we also encounter the application of a cooperation model which is characterized by joint participation in problem-solving processes and which offers to the representatives of employees varying degrees of information, consultation, and codetermination. It is this model especially which has strongly influenced industrial relations within the West German enterprise.

There are few basic issues of industrial democracy in West Germany which do not contain a complex interlocking of regulative norms, contractual relationships, and direct cooperative activities. But in specific situations the different models are unevenly applied and promoted by the various interest groups. This becomes quite clear when one considers the main viewpoints that usually emerge in any major discussion of issues in industrial democracy. There are always groups aiming to enlarge the basic rights of the workforce in order to improve the quality of working life. However, there is often a clear distinction between those advocating the improvement of basic individual rights and those aiming at greater collective rights. In practice, individual rights usually focus on the conduct of individual contracts of employment and problems of the individual career as well as on issues of social and employment security. Collective rights are the basis for most activities within the area of

codetermination and will be discussed in more detail later on.

The contractual element, of course, prevails in collective bargaining, though it is also based on relevant legislation (that is, the law on collective agreements). But contractual elements can also be found in codetermination activities. For example, negotiations between works councils and management often result in individual plant-level agreements.

More participation in order to foster industrial democracy is usually claimed by the unions within their concept of codetermination, covering the whole area of industrial relations from workplace levels to issues of the economy in general. Arguments in this direction usually focus on representative participation. Arguments for direct participation by individuals and work groups are usually brought up either by syndicalist groups within the trade union movements or, from a quite different viewpoint, by advocates of industrial partnership models. Some employer groups aiming at social reform are strongly recommending a type of industrial democracy based on both participative management and employee stock ownership plans.

Before turning to a discussion of the different attitudes and the underlying interests which shape the dynamics of industrial democracy, we shall analyze the framework for the type of industrial democracy which is a genuine German development: codetermination (or Mitbestimmung).

THE FRAMEWORK FOR CODETERMINATION

Codetermination in West Germany is based on worker or employee representation. In varying degrees, it extends to both shop floor and board levels as far as private industry is concerned. Three fundamental laws determine its functioning: the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of 1972, which covers all enterprises with at least five employees; the Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of 1951, as amended in 1955, which covers only the coal and steel industries; and the new Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of 1976, which covers corporations with more than 2,000 employees. In the public sector, the Personnel Representation Act of 1974 provides codetermination rights similar to those granted by the Works Constitution Act.

In order to evaluate the proper meaning of codetermination, it is necessary to differentiate between shop floor and board levels,[1] between the institutions of works councils, labor directors on management boards, and worker representatives on supervisory boards.

WORKS COUNCILS AT SHOP FLOOR LEVELS

1. Works councils are elected by all employees of the enterprise, but separately for blue-collar and white-collar workers. They are formally independent of the unions.

2. Works councils cannot call a strike, but they have the right to sue management for alleged breach of contractual or legal rights. In

1. West German companies are governed by two strictly separate boards: the Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat), usually convening once quarterly to decide general matters of company policy, and the Management Board (Vorstand), whose full-time members are appointed by the Supervisory Board and who actually run the business.

such cases, which are rare, remedial action has to be sought in the specialized labor courts. More usually, failure of management and works council to agree leads to referral of the issue to an arbitration tribunal.

3. The law grants works councils a broad range of rights to information, consultation, and codetermination. For example, the Works Constitution Act of 1972 grants codetermination rights to works councils in respect to the shop rules, the regulation of daily working hours and rest periods, temporary short-time or overtime work, the time and location for wage payments, the preparation of the vacation schedule, the installation of devices for controlling employee performance, safety regulations, the administration of welfare services in an individual plant, the assignment of company housing, the determination of job and piece rates, the formulation of wage determination systems, the introduction of new methods of remuneration, and the determination of principles for the operation of suggestion schemes. Codetermination rights are also granted to cover the introduction of any technological changes affecting the work place, work flow, or work environment. In such cases the works council may demand appropriate measures to take into account considerations based on ergonomics. There is also an important right to codetermine in the issuance of guidelines for personnel selection and in the administration of vocational training. In the event of major operational changes within the enterprise, management and works councils are mandated by law to conclude an agreement which pays due regard to the balance of interests involved; and in case economic disadvantages result for employees, they are to introduce adequate measures of social planning.

Thus, the legal rights of works council members in West Germany by far surpass the rights of equivalent bodies in other countries. Nevertheless, the system of works councils creates certain problem areas which limit the effectiveness of participation. Each works council operates within a social tension field comprising its employee constituency, management, and the union. The relations between the works council and its constituency are largely shaped by the problem of proper representation. Employees in modern plants are divided into numerous formal and informal groups, each having its own goals. It is difficult to reflect the complexity of this structure in the composition of the works council. Usually some groups are underrepresented, for example female employees,[2] shift workers, or foreign workers. The evidence also shows that among blue-collar workers those in the higher skill grades have a better chance than others to elect their candidates.

As a rule, a newly elected works council has to contend with a certain amount of employee antagonism toward, and lack of interest in, its work. In larger plants, the unavoidable bureaucratization of works council activities intensifies the existing alienation. The appointment of union stewards for each workshop and office often helps to facilitate two-way communication between works council members and their constituents. Research has shown that the chairman of

2. In West Germany 15 percent of works council members were female in 1975.

the works council tends to be assured of regular reelection, thus making this office a quasi-professional function.[3] Likewise, the diversified activities of the works council require increasing specialization on the part of its members in order to negotiate effectively with management experts. As a result, a wide range of special committees has come into existence, the most common ones being committees for problems of wage rate setting, accident prevention, white-collar employees, female workers, young workers and apprentices, social welfare, and physically handicapped workers. Thus, a properly functioning works council usually has quite a complex structure. The better equipped it is to match management's qualifications in negotiations, the more its members are professionalized, thereby creating a social distance between themselves and the average employee.

The practice of holding plant assemblies during working hours has not proved sufficient to neutralize oligarchic tendencies within the works council. Most employees are not interested in detailed reports on works council activities. Though by law such assemblies must be held four times a year, empirical research in the West German electrotechnical industry has shown that actually they take place quite irregularly. In a group of 104 plants, they were held only once in 19 plants, twice in 33 plants, three times in 35 plants, 4 times in 15 plants, and not at all in 2 plants. There was also a noticeable trend toward a steady decrease of employee participation in the assemblies.[4]

The relations between works councils and management are decisively influenced by the problem of integration. At least once every four weeks, council and management representatives are required by law to meet in joint conferences. These are often organized by the personnel manager. Of course, management usually attempts to utilize the works council's functions for its own purposes and to integrate them into the existing social system of the factory. This is usually done by inviting the works council members to assume functions and to organize activities holding out the prospect of some tangible advantage for employees. The administration of company-financed social institutions, the control of working conditions according to the provisions of law, and especially the selection of workers for layoffs in periods of work scarcity are examples of works council activities supporting the personnel department.

Besides areas in which a works council can be used, in effect, as an executive organ of management policy, there are also conflict areas. The greater the difficulty of agreement between management and works council, the more the negotiations become formalized. In cases where they are conducted in a formal and legalistic manner, management is aided by its own legal department, while the works council largely depends on experts provided by the union. Though there are some cases where works councils still identify themselves wholeheartedly with management's policy, there are other cases where the works councils show a high degree of militancy

3. See Friedrich Fürstenberg, *Die Anwendung des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes im Hause Siemens* (Munich: Siemens AG, 1970), p. 11.

4. Ibid., p. 10.

toward management. In the long run, the works council can operate successfully only when it is not closely identified with either management or the union.

The relationship between works council and union poses the problem of solidarity. In spite of the legally autonomous status of the works council, works council members are usually union members and often hold positions as union officers. To be a member of a works council can be an important step in a career that may ultimately lead to full-time office in a union or even to political office. There are strong informal organizational ties between the works council and the union. Newly elected works council members are trained in union-sponsored courses, and the union also provides them with specialized information and advice necessary for their work. In dispute situations, the unions are the only organizations which can back up the works councils in their dealings with management. On the other hand, works councils must also be able to act successfully within the enterprise by taking into consideration worker interests as well as management objectives. Therefore, issues may well arise where a certain company-mindedness by the works council comes into conflict with union policies aimed at achieving uniform terms of employment for an entire industrial sector. Although the unions hold a key position in elections to works council membership through their ability to enter slates of nominees, they do not completely control the composition of the works council. For example, in the 1968 elections in the Siemens Company, 41 percent of the newly elected works council members were not organized. However, shortly after the election most of them became union members.

Generally speaking, harmonious relations between employer associations and unions and the maintenance of full employment tend to facilitate the effective functioning of works councils. By the same token, conflict in society at large or in a particular industrial sector will adversely affect the works council by creating instability. Perhaps the greatest achievement in industrial relations attributable to the works councils is the establishment of a reasonably well functioning grievance and negotiation machinery within the individual plant and the larger corporation. Open conflicts, such as strikes, only rarely involve the works councils.

PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT BOARDS

At the level of management boards, so-called labor directors were introduced in the West German mining and iron and steel producing industries by the Codetermination Act of 1951. They are appointed in the same way as other members of the management board, but they cannot be appointed against the wishes of the employee representatives in the supervisory board who usually initiate the appointment. As a rule, the labor directors have the confidence of the unions. While it is their special responsibility to administer the personnel and labor relations policies of the company, they also participate fully in the decision making on company policies in general, for these must be made jointly by the members of the management board acting as a group. Under these circumstances, a basic dual loyalty is inevitable:

the labor director is responsible both for effective management performance in general and for effective representation of the employees' point of view. In 1960 about two-thirds of all labor directors were in charge of the entire personnel administration apparatus of their firms, but only between one-third and one-half of them played an actual part in the firing and dismissal of staff members not covered by collective agreements.[5] This group usually consists of the higher level employees and of academically trained employees in the enterprise.

Experience has shown that the labor director can handle his difficult marginal situation only by attempting to become fully integrated in the management structure and socially accepted by his colleagues on the board. This is, of course, a matter of both competence and tact. Usually, labor directors are not recruited from the ranks of works council members or union officials. They tend to be persons of high technical or intellectual qualifications, experts in their field of competence rather than skillful politicians. From the employees' and the unions' point of view, their main function is the development of personnel and social or labor policy within the enterprise in a way that reconciles the company's economic and social requirements. In practice, this task amounts to introducing modern methods of personnel management. Thus, the labor director's role has generally been one of counterbalancing the points of view of the technical and financial experts on the management board.

5. See E. Potthoff, O. Blume, and H. Duvernell, *Zwischenbilanz der Mitbestimmung* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1962), p. 102.

The recently introduced general codetermination law in West Germany departs from the long-established rules for the coal, iron, and steel industries by specifying only that a labor director shall be appointed in firms with 2,000 or more employees—in other words, by omitting the additional requirement that the labor director's appointment have the endorsement of the employee members of the board. In consequence, there will be no direct representation of employee (and union) interests on the management boards outside the mining, iron, and steel producing industries.

WORKER REPRESENTATION ON SUPERVISORY BOARDS

Regarding worker participation on the supervisory boards of German firms, two types of legal provisions must be distinguished: minority representation and parity (or equal) representation. Minority representation applies to firms subject to the Works Constitution Act. It provides that in joint stock and limited liability companies having more than 500 employees, one-third of the members of the supervisory board shall be employee representatives nominated by the works council but elected by the employees. Obviously in such situations the employee members cannot, as a rule, prevail against the will of the shareholder representatives on the board.

Full parity representation has so far been achieved only in the mining and steel industries. There the Codetermination Act of 1951 prescribes parity of capital and labor representatives, the former being designated by the shareholders' meeting and the latter by the works councils and unions. Both parties select by cooptation one neutral

person. The recent Codetermination Act of 1976 has now extended this system to all companies with more than 2,000 employees, but with two restrictive provisions: (1) at least one employee representative must be designated by the group of so-called Leitende Angestellte (employees exercising managerial functions); and (2) in impasse situations, the chairman, who is always designated by the shareholders, casts the deciding vote.

In order to evaluate the functioning of worker representation in supervisory boards, one has to take into account the proper meaning of these institutions in West Germany. The legal function of supervisory boards is mainly the appointment and control of the management board. In practice, especially during periods of flourishing business operations, the actual activities of supervisory boards do not amount to much more than policy coordination and advice and formal ratification of decisions already made by the managing board. Supervisory boards usually convene not more than once every three months. Thus, their activities are rather remote from day-to-day management operations.

In terms of actual power relationships, minority representation of employees in supervisory boards ought to be seen as a means of improving internal consultation and the flow of information. Interestingly enough, works council members who simultaneously sit on supervisory boards have an advantage over their counterparts in plant management, who often get their information secondhand and rather late at that. Though employee representatives on the board have no decisive veto rights, their consent is usually considered useful by shareholder representatives. That usefulness at times enables them to obtain some concessions for the workforce. A typical case occurred when the supervisory board of a large German automobile manufacturing firm decided to raise the dividend. The employee representatives objected to this decision until a large bonus payment for all employees of the firm was approved at the same time.

The interests of employee representatives focus, of course, particularly on measures which are likely to affect employment conditions, such as changes in products and production. Timely information on plans in these areas may help the works councils to take appropriate measures.

The functioning of parity codetermination in the coal mining and steel producing industries has been the subject of several empirical studies, the most recent one being the so-called *Biedenkopf Report* of 1970.[6] The report, widely considered to be authoritative, found that parity on supervisory boards had not led to revolutionary changes in company policy. Moreover, the boards functioned smoothly, and unanimity in decision making was the rule.[7] The favorable result has been fostered by the already mentioned fact that decisions in the supervisory boards very often amount to no more than an endorsement of plans already discussed in detail at management board levels. Therefore, decisions by actual voting are less important than informal consultations beforehand. Such consultations usually take place between the works council members and union officials represented on the

6. *Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen* (Bundestags-Drucksache VI/334).

7. Ibid., p. 36.

supervisory boards, on the one hand, and shareholder representatives and members of the management board, on the other hand. The neutral member on the supervisory board usually does not cast the deciding vote. Instead, his role is that of a mediator.[8]

The decisive problem for supervisory boards is setting long-term goals for company policy. Under West German codetermination, profit orientation as a guide to policy has not really been questioned. No major projects planned by management have been prevented by employee representatives, as shown by analyses of corporate merger proposals and the controversial issue of pit closings in coal mining. However, employee representatives have often been able to obtain proper consideration of the social and labor aspects of such situations. Thus, supervisory boards have become more involved not only in the technical and financial but also in the social planning of company operations. This holds especially true for the social effects of investment and organizational restructuring. The Biedenkopf Commission did not find any evidence that there had ever been a severe breach of confidence or a deliberate act directed against the well-being of the enterprise by employee representatives.[9] On the contrary, the rather difficult restructuring of the West German coal mining industry proceeded without any major strikes, due largely to worker participation in all major decisions.

We would summarize by noting that the present provisions for employee representation on supervisory boards do not amount to real codetermination in all managerial affairs. Rather, the very structure of supervisory boards and the legal framework within which they operate offer indirect but very real opportunities for influencing the decisions in the management board. And it is this board which decisively shapes the technical, economic, and social reality of the enterprise. The authority of management decisions has not been questioned by this system of representation, but the basis for its legitimacy has changed.

CURRENT ISSUES OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

Industrial democracy is less a state, characterized by legal and contractual provision, than a constant process that changes its focus according to differential participation and goal setting. This observation applies also to the case of West Germany. Public opinion, parliamentary debates, and discussions among both union members and managers clearly show that the current framework has many built-in tensions.

The new Codetermination Act of 1976 embodies many features of a fragile compromise. For instance, the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) does not regard the law as an adequate expression of parity codetermination because, in case of a tie vote, the chairman of the board (who is elected by the shareholder representatives) has the deciding vote. For its part, the Confederation of German Employers Associations fears that the new law might shift the balance of economic power decisively in favor of the unions.

The present and foreseeable practice of codetermination places de-

8. Ibid., p. 40.
9. Ibid., p. 54.

cisive power in the hands of representative oligarchies. Empirical research shows, however, that the rank and file of employees often have quite different notions of codetermination, their focus being on direct action at shop floor level.[10] Similarly, the still existing legal obligation of works council members to cooperate with management in mutual confidence and to avoid open conflict sometimes causes unrest on the shop floor, as articulated by unofficial work group spokesmen. Some left-wing unionists, therefore, are demanding new forms of interest articulation—for example, by strengthening the role of the union stewards (following the model of shop stewards in Britain and the United States). Such development would obviously run counter to the dual structure of industrial relations in West Germany under which unions are excluded from plant-level negotiations. Nevertheless, more direct participation in codetermination by the workers at shop floor level is still an unsettled problem.

Generally, the unions have had to face some opposition from certain members who object to the growing importance of cooperative forms of industrial democracy. These groups would prefer to return to labor relations patterns requiring less union involvement in managerial affairs.[11] The quest for a more militant union movement is often advocated also on the grounds that otherwise the membership might fade away or that the emancipation of workers is being sacrificed for greater privatization of affluent employees.

By contrast, there are many ongoing activities aiming at the introduction of participative management, possibly combined with profit sharing and property formation by employees. Such models often appeal to more highly skilled employees. The fact that the number of production workers is gradually declining and the number of white-collar workers is rising certainly will have an impact on future strategies for more industrial democracy and on relevant ideological justifications.

We may conclude this survey by noting that the present West German system of industrial democracy, based as it is mainly on legally secured codetermination, has some specific limits. More personal involvement and more self-government at work-place level might be on the agenda for the near future. At the same time, unions are mustering all their political strength to achieve a social partnership in public affairs designed to improve the quality of life of the working population. Industrial democracy in West Germany is still an issue with a considerable dynamic of its own.

10. See, for example, Friedrich Fürstenberg, *Die Soziallage der Chemiearbeiter* (Neuwied-Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand, 1969).

11. See, for example, F. Deppe, ed., *Kritik der Mitbestimmung* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969); also J. Bergmann and W. Müller-Jantsch, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Cooperative Unionism and Dual Bargaining System Challenged," in *Worker Militancy and Its Consequences, 1965–75*, ed., Solomon Barkin (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 235–76.

The "Reform of the Enterprise" in France

By YVES DELAMOTTE

ABSTRACT: In France, the "reform of the enterprise," a more common term than "industrial democracy," became an acute question in 1974–1975 with encouragement from President Giscard d'Estaing. He appointed a commission chaired by Pierre Sudreau to investigate the matter and make appropriate recommendations. The commission's report was published early in 1975. This essay is divided into four sections. First, it provides a brief outline of the most relevant institutions in the labor field to set the framework for examining the problem of the reform of the enterprise. The second section outlines germane developments prior to the appointment of the Sudreau Commission and notes that, before 1974, reform of the enterprise consisted mainly of a steady enlargement of the functions of plant committees (comités d'entreprise). The third section summarizes the chief proposals of the Sudreau Report. The final section reviews the still very modest follow-up to the report.

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IN FRANCE the term "reform of the enterprise" is in much more common use than the expression "industrial democracy." Generally it refers to initiatives by government rather than spontaneous developments or understandings reached jointly by the parties in industry. Historically, reforms in France have been expected to come through new laws and through state sponsorship of new institutions, for it is generally assumed that only in this way can their general implementation be ensured. That explains why the president of the republic, Giscard d'Estaing, took the initiative in 1974 to put the reform of the enterprise on the national agenda. Before examining the issue more closely, we must first indicate the basic institutional and political context in which the problem has been posed. We shall do so by outlining first the organizations of unions and then the system of employee representation at the plant level.

THE BACKGROUND

The General Confederation of Labor (CGT) is the oldest and most influential labor federation. The bulk of its membership are manual workers. Some of its leaders are members of the Communist party, and for the CGT the exploitation of the working class will cease only with the advent of collective control of the means of production. For the CGT, long-term objectives do not necessarily exclude specific short-term demands, particularly for higher wages and improved job security, but the prospect of reform of the enterprise within capitalist society is considered an illusion.

The French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), which holds second place in terms of membership, does not accept capitalist society either. It differs from the CGT, however, in its profound distrust of collective and bureaucratic models based on authority from the top down. The principle of industrial self-management which the CFDT espouses expresses its intent to preserve for workers a certain freedom and spontaneity against the encroaching pressures of institutions and political parties.

Three additional confederations are more reformist in orientation: the so-called Workers' Force (FO), with members mainly in the civil service; the very small Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC); and the larger but occupationally limited General Confederation of Supervisors and Technicians (CGC).

Employees are free to join the union of their choice or not to join. The choice depends mainly on personal beliefs. The overall rate of unionization is low compared with most other industrialized countries.

Local unions with a sufficient number of members are entitled to recognition as representatives of employees in an enterprise. They may play an active role when a dispute occurs, but unlike American unions they very seldom negotiate collective agreements at the individual enterprise level because the customary unit for collective bargaining is an industrial sector or branch at national or regional level.

The system of employee representation in the enterprise is based mainly on institutions which are legally distinct from the unions. Shop stewards (délégués du personnel) are elected annually by all employees. Their task is to take up grievances with management. The plant committee (comité d'entre-

prise) consists of the employer and representatives elected biennially by all employees. It has essentially an advisory role. The employer is required by law to provide the committee with certain information, such as balance sheets and profit and loss statements and projected innovations or reorganizations, and to entertain the committee's advice. When plant committees were established by law in 1945, the main objective was to encourage cooperation within the enterprise and to develop a form of participation in management. We shall note below to what extent this aim has been met.

The existing plant-level institutions do not depend on the presence of unions. However, where unions do function in an enterprise, they are each entitled to put up lists of candidates in elections for shop steward positions and plant committee membership. The seats are then allocated among candidates of the different unions in proportion to the votes cast for each list.

Following the events of May 1968, the unions gained the establishment by law of a new plant-level institution, namely union stewards. These union stewards, which are not to be confused with the much older institution of shop stewards, are directly designated by the several unions represented in the enterprise rather than being elected by all employees. Their task is essentially to ensure a union presence in the enterprise, to collect union dues, distribute union literature, arrange for union meetings, and similar union-centered activities.

Seen as a whole, the system of plant-level representation is varied and complex; it is the result of a juxtaposition of institutions created by successive laws rather than the outcome of a global and coherent conception. The question is, of course, frequently posed whether it should not be simplified, but that would be a difficult undertaking.

REFORM IDEAS PRIOR TO 1975

Between 1945 and 1974, the idea of reforming the enterprise inspired occasional management initiatives and, of course, occupied the thoughts of various individuals and organized groups. It even stimulated some government activities. Two phases may be distinguished. The first scattered efforts in the years immediately following liberation from German occupation tended to turn on the association of capital and labor. This association, however, usually did not go beyond employee profit-sharing plans. The plans actually implemented lost their originality with the passage of legislation on profit sharing in 1959 and in 1967, especially the latter which instituted compulsory profit-sharing plans, as mentioned below.

The second phase, which started in 1972–1973, resulted from the realization of certain employers that there was a certain urgency attached to making improvements in the quality of working life of their employees. In reaction against the former application of the ideas of scientific management, they began experimenting with new forms of work organization which sought to enrich rather than to simplify individual tasks or which made possible the establishment of work groups able to organize their work themselves and to negotiate production standards with management. The experiments showed that the reform of the enterprise did not necessarily have to be achieved solely from the top down but could

also come from the base by giving workers more autonomy, more responsibility, and more influence over their environment.

Of all the writings on reform during these years before 1975, we mention here only the one which examined the issues most profoundly, *Pour une réforme de l'entreprise*, published in 1965 by François Bloch-Lainé, a high civil servant known for his ability and imagination.[1] He proposed, among other ideas, a new type of employee representation, the creation of a genuine grievance procedure (joint examination of grievances and possible recourse to arbitration), and minority participation of employee representatives in a supervisory board to which management would have to submit periodic reports. In its own time, Bloch-Lainé's work unfortunately did not lead to any immediate results, but in 1975 the Sudreau Report incorporated the last of these ideas.

During the pre-1975 period, the government took the initiative in two fields: in the name of participation it instituted profit sharing and it also enlarged the functions of plant committees.

Regarding profit sharing, a first decree in 1959 created an optional system which was seldom used. A second decree in 1967 established a compulsory system which is still in force and affects all enterprises with more than 100 employees. Profit sharing as a form of participation was largely the idea of General de Gaulle. After the events of 1968, he began to emphasize the need for forms of participation that had to go beyond profit sharing, but he left the presidency in 1969 without explicitly elaborating his ideas.

The second line of government action was pursued more consequentially. Between 1966 and 1973, various laws defined and increased the functions of plant committees in areas of job security, industrial safety, working conditions, vocational training, and related matters. Regarding job security, to mention only one example, the kind of information now required from an employer who plans to effect a major retrenchment in his workforce is extremely detailed, and the period of required advance notice has been made very specific.

It is rather remarkable that the legal extension of the functions of the plant committee was in practice achieved by prior agreement between employers and unions. The explanation is that management now considers it necessary to provide employees with accurate information about a variety of problems. Also, since the introduction of union stewards in 1968, employers have acquired a more favorable opinion of the plant committees, for they are institutions based on plant-wide elections among all employees and thus less susceptible to external influences than the union stewards.

For the unions, the plant committees are a most important source of information. For instance, when a mass layoff is envisaged, the period between the first receipt of the information and the effective date can be used to make counterproposals, to appeal for help to government agencies, and to mobilize public opinion. This enables the unions to pressure management into reversing its plan, and at the same time helps them to avoid the appearance of involvement in a

1. François Bloch-Lainé, *Pour une réforme de l'entreprise* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965).

decision which they don't want to seem to have approved. Thus, management and unions both recognize the value of plant committees but for quite different reasons. The consensus remains somewhat ambiguous, and one author has referred to the kind of participation generated in the plant committees as adversary participation.

The period 1945 to 1974 may be summed up as follows:

1. The two major unions (CGT and CFDT) opposed direct involvement of employee representatives in management responsibilities.

2. In an adversary context, the most natural way of participation was one that developed within the plant committee and that allowed employee representatives to exercise some measure of control over certain decisions of management.

3. The main changes took the form of a continuing extension of the functions of the plant committees. Proposals for radically restructuring or simplifying the complex system of representation met with no success.

4. Toward the end of the period, it had become ever more clear that reform of the enterprise had to be sought not only in institutional terms, but also at the level of the workers themselves so as to improve working conditions and increase employee influence over the work environment.

THE SUDREAU REPORT

A few months after his election to the presidency of the republic in May 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who throughout his campaign had emphasized the need to renew French society, asked the government headed by Jacques Chirac to draft a number of reform proposals, including a reform of the enterprise. Since it was not self-evident what reform measures would be acceptable both to employers and unions and since it seemed that a preliminary investigation might help to answer that question, the president established a "Commission for the Study of the Reform of the Enterprise" in July 1974 consisting of 11 persons under the chairmanship of a former cabinet minister, Pierre Sudreau. The CGT and CFDT, which in the elections had opposed the candidacy of Giscard d'Estaing, refused to join the commission.[2] However, a former head of the CFDT did become a member in his private capacity.

The Sudreau Committee sat from September 1974 to January 1975. It heard evidence from the National Council of French Employers (CNPF), the five main labor federations (CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CGC), and individual experts. It set up 12 working groups, each one in charge of a specific aspect of potential reform. The report was presented to the president of the republic on February 7, 1975, and was distributed a few days later.[3]

2. According to the CGT and the CFDT, a genuine reform of the enterprise can only take place if there is a change in the economic and social system. These two confederations are demanding a considerable enlargement of the prerogatives of the plant committees and of union representatives, even to the extent of giving them power to stop work on machinery considered dangerous. The Sudreau Report did not go that far.

3. *Rapport du Comité d'Étude pour la Réforme de l'Entreprise*, chaired by Pierre Sudreau (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1975). (An English translation of the report has been published under the title *The Reform of the Enterprise in France* by the University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Industrial Research Unit, Philadelphia, 1975).

The report is divided into two sections. The first one is entitled "The Background." It contains a statement on the general philosophy which underlies the specific proposals in the second section, and it makes clear that the objective of the report is not to propose a single reform of the enterprise but rather a variety of reforms which take into account the diversity of corporate structures. The authors chose deliberately not to emphasize labor-management relations in the enterprise, nor the role or power of the unions and employees, but rather to deal with these questions in conjunction with others of generally greater interest to employers and shareholders than to employees.

This choice is made particularly clear in the second section which contains the specific proposals. They are divided into 10 chapters: (1) transforming day-to-day activities in the enterprise; (2) redefining the position of employees; (3) adjusting certain provisions of corporation law to the contemporary situation; (4) strengthening the rights of shareholders; (5) improving the operation of employee profit-sharing plans; (6) enacting new legislation on business; (7) encouraging the creation of new types of enterprises; (8) preventing problems in industry and helping firms to face up to them; (9) updating current procedures to settle labor disputes; (10) integrating the objectives of the enterprise with those of society.

It is not possible even to summarize here all the proposals. We shall only mention those which particularly affect the position of employees and their representatives in the enterprise. These can be grouped into three main categories: (1) the employees, (2) representative institutions, (3) company law.

The improvement of working conditions is given a position of top priority. Such improvements are not to be limited merely to the prevention of accidents or to purely physical facilities. They must also aim to give workers more varied and challenging tasks as well as increased responsibility.

The report suggests that each employee should have the opportunity to express himself on the content and the conditions of his job. This proposal is based on the positive results of experiments undertaken in enterprises where workers in the same department met regularly with their foremen to discuss improvements in work organization and setting. Underlying these suggestions is the idea of upgrading manual work, an idea derived from the fact that in France the position of manual workers is materially and socially still inferior to that of manual workers in other industrialized countries. The upgrading is to occur both in the enterprise and in society.

Some proposals aim at achieving a more representative and differentiated composition of plant committees. It is also proposed that multinational corporations designate a representative to make annual reports on overall corporate strategy to the plant committees of their French affiliates. Other proposals are designed to furnish employee representatives serving on plant committees with more precise and concrete information so as to enrich the social dialogue. The suggestion is also made that economic subcommittees with 5 to 12 members be created in enterprises employing more than 1,000 persons. These subcommittees would be attached to the plant committees. Their task would be to scrutinize thoroughly the economic information which

management is legally required to provide to the plant committees. The Sudreau Report also recommends that each enterprise prepare certain social indicators (on the wage structure in the enterprise, weekly working hours, absenteeism and turnover, industrial accidents, vocational training and advanced training, and so forth). These data, constituting a kind of social balance sheet or social audit, would be given each year to the plant committee. The purpose would be to provide a statistical base for dialogue between management and employee representatives, to emphasize areas in which further action is necessary, and to assess the effect of measures already taken.

The report further proposes that company law should be amended to allow experimentation with new corporate arrangements, such as firms administered by a system of participative management under which employees would own stock entitling them to a share in profits and to representation in management. However, the most innovative proposal aims to set aside one-third of the seats on corporate boards for representatives of the employees.[4] The idea is not to institute co-management but rather a form of joint supervision. Employee representatives would still be in a minority on the boards. In any case, French boards of directors do not usually intervene actively in operating management. Various formulas have been proposed to pick the employee representatives; for example, election by the plant committee or by the employer or appointment by the unions.

4. Most French corporations have a supervisory board or board of directors. Its chairman is also, as a rule, the chief executive officer.

Joint supervision would allow employee representatives to be informed about decisions without necessarily being involved in making them. Furthermore, as the Sudreau Report puts it, "the representatives of the employees could exercise their right to abstain when the decision at issue would seem to them to pertain to the field of management and not to [policy] supervision."

IMAGINATION AND REALISM

Although it was denounced by the CGT as a political maneuver, the Sudreau Report was quickly recognized to have two major qualities: imagination and realism. Its imagination manifests itself in the multiplicity of the proposals, of which we have examined only a few. Its realism is inherent to the substance of the proposals and the suggestions for their implementation.

By and large, the proposals are designed to cause the least possible resistance from management and unions. Extending the prerogatives of the plant committees responds to frequent union demands, as does the suggestion to employers to accept the trade unions as genuine partners. No effort has been made to simplify or clarify the very complex system of representation within the enterprise, for the unions are strongly attached to the multiplicity of institutions and to their acquired positions. There is even less intention to circumscribe the right of the unions to propose candidates for election to the various bodies of representation in the enterprise.

The expansion of the prerogatives of the plant committee affects an essentially advisory institution, and the report underlines the necessity

for continued strong leadership and authority in the enterprise. As compared with co-management, joint supervision through employee membership on corporate boards is likely to appear to employers as more tolerable. It also respects the desire of French unions not to assume management responsibilities; these are to remain in the hands of a top manager or a management group. If the supervisory board were compelled to make a decision impinging directly on management, the employee representatives could always abstain.

Considering that France is a country where the viewpoints of the employer side and the major unions are very far apart, the authors of this report have framed their proposals so that they should be acceptable to both parties. The realism of the report also shows through in the measures envisaged for the implementation of the recommendations. The report suggests that, to begin with, joint supervision should only be instituted where employees and shareholders agree. The proposal for a social audit presupposes a period of experimentation in order to determine the social indicators that would be appropriate. Each enterprise is to decide for itself how to implement the rights of employees to express their views.

Recognizing the wide diversity of individual enterprises, the authors of the report suggest that many of their innovations should first be tested and that the parties themselves ought to determine how the experiments are to be conducted. This pragmatic approach, which might also have the secondary effect of promoting more collective bargaining in the enterprise, is most remarkable since in France the main tendency in labor relations has always been to have recourse to legislation.

IMPLEMENTATION

At the time of writing (October 1976), more than 18 months have passed since the publication of the Sudreau Report, and some progress has been made in implementing its proposals. A Fund for the Improvement of Working Conditions was created in July 1976. This fund, with a budget for 1976 of 24 million francs, will provide financial assistance to those enterprises that submit model programs for the improvement of working conditions. Parliament now has before it a bill on industrial safety which represents a significant advance over previous legislation in that field. The upgrading of manual work, the need for which was underlined in the report, has become one of the main concerns of social policy. A high level government post to deal with working conditions of manual workers was created in January 1976. A new law passed in December 1975 allows manual workers who have held certain kinds of strenuous jobs for five years (continuous production flows, assembly line, foundries, construction) to retire on full pension at age 60 instead of 65. Another act of July 1976 provides that workers who have done considerable overtime work are entitled, in addition to premium pay, to compensatory time off with remuneration.

Among measures still in the planning stage is a bill to amend the company laws to authorize supervisory boards of enterprises with more than 2,000 employees to coopt employee representatives into membership. An awkward legal obstacle could thus be avoided, and the

boards would still be free to use the option or not. Another bill in preparation deals with the social audit. It will specify the data which employers are to submit annually to the plant committees.

The government expects that economic subcommittees envisaged in the report will be established in enterprises with more than 2,000 employees. Employers and unions are to determine jointly the organization and functioning of this new body. In large corporations with several subsidiaries, the creation of corporate-wide employee representation committees will be encouraged. These group committees will include representatives of the several plant committees from the subsidiaries and will be entitled to scrutinize the consolidated financial statement of the corporation.

In considering all these issues and recommendations, the government has adopted the pragmatism of the Sudreau Report. Instead of immediately preparing new laws, it is encouraging industry to experiment. Once the results are in, laws might then be prepared. This flexible and rather loose concept of reform has enabled the government to bring under the umbrella of reform a considerable number of measures that have already been taken to improve working conditions.

However, if one were to insist on a more restrictive and more rigid concept of reform, that is if one were to define it in terms of industrial democracy, the measures taken up to now would seem meager indeed in comparison with the many recommendations of the Sudreau Report. As yet, the government is obviously determined not to impose by law such ideas as establishing economic subcommittees or forming consolidated plant committees for large corporations. A bill to modify the company law to enable corporations to coopt employee representatives for membership on the boards of directors has been announced, but no specific date for enactment has so far been mentioned.

This go-slow policy is probably due, at least in part, to recent economic and political changes. Opposition to the reformist ideas of President Giscard d'Estaing has been openly expressed in some major political parties. Besides, the current priority objectives of government are reducing unemployment and controlling the rate of inflation. The situation is thus quite different from what it was in February 1975 when the Sudreau Report appeared.

National elections are due to be held in March 1978. In the meantime the present government will certainly continue to push for improvements in working conditions and will seek to upgrade manual work, but it is difficult to foresee what the government will do for the reform of the enterprise in the narrower sense. No doubt political considerations will strongly influence the pace of developments.

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Industrial Democracy in Scandinavia

By Bernt Schiller

ABSTRACT: In the 1930s industrial relations in the Scandinavian countries changed from conflict to cooperation. This change laid the basis for the negotiated establishment after World War II of consultative plant committees. The limitations inherent to the operation of such committees led, in the 1960s, to demands for more sweeping changes in industrial decision making, including demands for employee codetermination. All three Scandinavian countries have granted to their employees legal representation on company boards, but the unions have stressed that such representation will have only limited value if it is not simultaneously accompanied by the introduction of democracy on the shop floor. To that end experiments with semi-autonomous work groups have been carried out in Norway. In Sweden a law on codetermination in 1976 has made decision making at all company levels subject to collective bargaining. Moreover, in Denmark and Sweden labor has demanded a share in future corporate capital growth through employee stock ownership, and bills designed to achieve this objective have been drafted but not yet enacted in Denmark and Sweden. In general, these developments point to an increasing integration of trade union leaders in management functions and more government intervention in economic policy and labor relations.

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THE study of industrial democracy is an integral part of the study of relations between capital and labor and the role of the state in that relationship. Here the term industrial democracy will be used to mean both worker participation in decision making (sometimes referred to as work-place democracy) and sharing in the company's capital or profit or both (sometimes referred to as economic democracy). The two aspects are related to each other, particularly in Scandinavia.

The trade union struggle to democratize the work place has historically been directed toward restricting the employer's prerogatives to hire and fire and to direct the work process. Its aim has been to increase employment security and to obtain influence on management. Influence could mean the right to be consulted or to take part in decisions. Whatever the degree of influence, it might be applied at different levels in the company: on the shop floor, at the top management level, in the company's board.

In this discussion, four questions will be asked:

1. What aspect of industrial democracy has been emphasized in Scandinavia?
2. What is the degree of influence on decision making?
3. What levels in the company are involved?
4. What is the structure of profit or capital sharing?

These questions will be set in the context of the development of relations between capital and labor in order to determine to what extent different components of industrial democracy are emphasized under certain conditions. Three phases of development may be distinguished. We shall call them conflict, cooperation, and integration. We shall test in particular the propositions which hold that over time the interest in work-place democracy has shifted from employment security to influence on management, from consultation to codetermination, and from the shop floor to executive board levels, while the approach to economic democracy is said to have shifted from an individualistic to a collectivistic one.

THE CONFLICT PHASE: FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO THE 1930s

In Scandinavia the existence of an unusually large rural middle class made a fairly smooth transformation from agrarian to industrialized societies possible. The trade unions were soon accepted by employers, and collective bargaining early became widespread. Collective agreements were local (only later industry-wide) and the trade unions were correspondingly decentralized. By prevailing standards the unions were well organized, but compared to the present period the membership ratio was low. The social democratic parties embarked early on the path to reformism, but they had no real access to power before the end of World War I. Employers' prerogatives were well protected, and the only concessions were some inadequate safeguards against dismissals of shop stewards.[1]

1. For a general background in English of labor relations in Scandinavia, see Walter Galenson, *The Danish System of Labor Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952); by the same author, *Labor in Norway* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949); *Labour Relations in Norway* (Oslo: Norwegian ILO Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Af-

The question of industrial democracy was first brought up for public discussion immediately after World War I in the revolutionary tide of that period. Workers councils were to be given a role in the socialization of the means of production demanded by the revolutionary wing of the labor movement. The proposals set forth by government committees in the Scandinavian countries were influenced by British guild socialism, but they were mainly intended to ward off genuinely revolutionary aims. The revolutionary situation passed quickly, however, and had disappeared already by 1920.

A trait common to all the proposals laid before the several parliaments was that the competence of the proposed workers councils was to be strictly advisory. Even this went too far for the employers but, of course, not far enough for large sections of the labor movement. The problem for the future was set more precisely by the question posed during the first half of the 1920s: could real influence be assigned to the trade unions while preserving their traditional role in a capitalist society? Some employers during this time became interested in raising productivity through different schemes of voluntary profit-sharing plans, so as to link the economic motivation of workers to the interests of the company. Such schemes, however, were without lasting importance.

fairs, 1975); T. L. Johnson, *Collective Bargaining in Sweden* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962). A more recent survey also covering the subject of this article is given by Walter Galenson, *Current Problems of Scandinavian Trade Unionism*, Conference Paper, American Enterprise Institute, February 1975.

THE COOPERATION PHASE: 1930s TO 1960s

From the Great Depression on, the labor movement increasingly turned to cooperation with the employers. The militants on both sides were suppressed, organizational structures were accommodated to centralized bargaining, and an ideology based on cooperation and the welfare state was developed. Social democratic parties, sometimes in coalition with liberal or farmer parties, soon became the largest parties and the ones most frequently in government. Social democratic dominance became most pronounced in Sweden, next in Norway, and least in Denmark.

Another world war was to occur before the time was ripe to carry out the moderate proposals of the 1920s. In the meantime, the strength of the labor movement increased further, and the new spirit of cooperation with the employers was symbolized by the conclusion of basic agreements in Norway and Sweden in 1935 and 1938, respectively.

After World War II, radical visions of socialism, as after World War I, had to be reconciled with employers' interest in stimulating productivity to promote the task of reconstruction. Agreements establishing plant committees with equal representation for management and employees (white-collar workers were also now included) were negotiated in 1945, 1946, and 1947 in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, respectively. The committees, however, soon aroused dissatisfaction for being weak and having only an advisory function. Even the information flow to employees, which was intended to be the major vehicle

for workers' motivation and participation, seemed irregular and insufficient.

At the end of the 1960s, new collective agreements in the three Scandinavian countries gave employees the right to exert an influence, sometimes equaling that of management, on safety rules, plant welfare arrangements, and long-term personnel policies. Equal importance was also attached to improved protection against arbitrary dismissals and a stronger position for shop stewards. These concessions were obtained gradually and were not tied to any unusual peaks of interest in industrial democracy as such. It should be noted also that the achievements up to this point generally came through negotiations between labor and employer organizations, not through legislation, even though the threat of legislation was invoked on occasion.

THE INTEGRATION PHASE: THE 1970s

In the mid-1960s, the rights of private ownership and labor's traditional fear of becoming hostage to a shareholders' majority on company boards still seemed to block any decisive trade union advancement into the sphere of management. But then the tide changed under the impact of two major developments.

First, the historical record shows that industrial democracy has had a particularly strong appeal in times of deep-going changes in social values, as for example after the two world wars. At the end of the 1960s, another wave of unrest and revolutionary change in both West and East brought with it an upheaval in prevailing value systems. The structural changes in industry which had taken place during the thrust of expansion in the late 1950s and early 1960s now began to produce a host of side effects. Dislocation of industries, regional unemployment, and a deterioration of the industrial milieu in Scandinavia as elsewhere in Western Europe led to radical claims for control of working conditions by the employees themselves.

Second, while the Scandinavian countries remained capitalist in economic structure, they developed large public sectors and increasing degrees of economic intervention by the state. Limited labor resources and the continued need to compete on the world market forced private industry to finance economic growth through huge capital investments. On one side, this led to large concentrations of capital in private hands, and, on the other, the difficulty of raising funds in the necessary amounts made industry increasingly dependent on public funds. At the same time, industry came to rely on government-supported incomes policies to keep consumption in check. This proved difficult even when social democratic governments were in power and used their influence inside the trade unions to enlist support for incomes policies. The problem was aggravated by the recession of the early 1970s, especially in Denmark. Inflation and taxes ate up wage increases, and the high rate of wage increases became itself one of the sources of inflation. The labor movement thus found itself frustrated in its traditional wage policy and looked to a new policy of industrial democracy for compensation.

LEGAL SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION

An early illustration of the spirit of integration between capital and

labor is the Norwegian joint research project (Cooperation Project) set up in 1962. Significantly, personal remembrances of wartime cooperation between industrialists and labor leaders are said to have facilitated the undertaking which the state later was asked to finance. The employers were interested in increased productivity to prepare industry for eventual entry into the Common Market. An important motive for the Trade Union Confederation (LO) was pressure from the Left. The Socialist People's party, which had split from the Social Democratic party, had successfully made industrial democracy part of its platform in the 1961 elections. The bourgeois parties also showed a positive interest in workers participation, and thus the LO had to come up with direct proposals of its own. That occurred in 1963 and 1965 through the Aspengren Committee. This committee proposed that the development toward industrial democracy should follow three lines: (1) expanded consultation among employers, shop stewards, and plant committees; (2) education of workers to prepare them for participation; (3) and changes in company organization in order to enable workers to take part in decision making.[2]

These three principles were all realized during the following decade. The first one was included in the revised Basic Agreement of 1966, which also contained provisions for a Council on Cooperation. An agreement in 1970 between the LO and the national employers federation further widened the scope of education and research by establishing an Education and Development Fund which also took over the funding of the Council on Cooperation. The state was brought into the agreement as the collector of funds through the National Insurance Institution. For 1973 the total contribution of the private sector amounted to 25 million Norwegian crowns (U.S. $4.5 million at 1975 exchange rates). The LO that year financed 9,000 one-week courses for shop stewards.[3] The most interesting portions of the educational apparatus have been the experiments carried out by the Cooperation Project. Their findings imply that management should relinquish its decision-making power to semi-autonomous work groups in the company. The experiments have spread throughout Norwegian industry and have also influenced Swedish developments.

However, the proposal to change the internal company structure so as to give employees legal representation in decision making met fierce resistance from the employers. The sociologists Fred. E. Emery and Einar Thorsrud, who conducted the Cooperation Project, noted in their initial report in 1964 that worker representatives on company boards would be caught in the dilemma of dual loyalty. Such representation would have only limited value if democracy were not increased at the same time on the shop floor. The LO accepted this idea of making legal representation conditional on other measures to increase democracy. The idea of establishing a corporate assembly, proposed by the Aspengren Committee, left the question of board representation to the decision of the employees in the enterprise.

The necessary provisions of the

2. E. Thorsrud and Fred E. Emery, *Mot en ny bedriftsorganisasjon* (Oslo: Tanum, 1970), pp. 9–12.

3. *Industrial Democracy* (Oslo: NFTU/LO, 1975).

Company Act were not passed by Parliament until 1972. They came into force in mining and manufacturing in 1974 and in construction, transportation, and the service sectors in 1975. Any company with more than 200 employees was to have a corporate assembly of at least 12 members, two-thirds being elected by the shareholders and one-third by the employees. The corporate assembly may make recommendations to the company board on any matter. Employees are entitled to not less than two members on the boards of companies as long as there are more than 50 employees. A board on industrial democracy, with representatives from the central organizations of industry and labor and the state, supervises the law and may grant exceptions to its provisions.[4]

About the same time, that is in 1973–74, the trade unions in Sweden and Denmark also obtained through legislation the right for employees to appoint two members to company boards. In Sweden the legislation was intended to be provisional. In Denmark the use of employee representation was left to an employee vote. The figures show that in about 70 percent of the companies the employees have used their rights, and only in a few cases has there been an outright rejection of board representation.

The cautious attitude of the trade unions in all three countries is reflected in the nonmandatory character of the legislation. It is left to trade unions to invoke implementation of the legislation. Also, the unions have stressed the importance of pushing for industrial democracy simultaneously at different levels in the company.

THE ATTACK ON THE SWEDISH EMPLOYERS' PREROGATIVES

In searching for an approach to industrial democracy that was congruent with traditional trade union policy, the Swedish trade union federation (LO) has dramatically increased the scope of collective bargaining. Growing discontent during the latter half of the 1960s focused on the well-known and long-standing Article 32 in the statutes of the Swedish Employers Confederation. The article laid down the employer's exclusive right "to direct and distribute the work," and was literally sacred to the confederation. Ever since the confederation had begun to engage in collective bargaining, Article 32 had been written into most agreements. But if it were to be removed, what should replace it? To fend off radical claims temporarily, the LO appointed a committee, in 1969, which after much deliberation presented a new scheme elaborated by an expert in labor law, Sten Edlund. Its report on industrial democracy, which was adopted by the 1971 LO congress, made the new scheme the core of a package that also included improvements in employment security and provided for employee representation on company boards.[5]

4. For detailed accounts of the experiments in Scandinavia, see Gerhard Bihl, *Von der Mitbestimmung zur Selbstbestimmung. Das Skandinavische Modell der selbststeuernden Gruppen* (Munich: Goldman, 1973). On the corporate assembly in Norway, see Åke Anker-Ording, "Industrielle Demokratie in Norwegen," *Industrielle Demokratie, Menschenwürde im Betrieb 2*, ed. Fritz Vilmars (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975), pp. 116–27.

5. *Industrial Democracy. Program Adopted by the 1971 Congress of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation* (Stockholm: LO, 1972), and Bernt Schiller, *LO, paragraf 32 och företagsdemokratin* (Stockholm: Prisma, 1974), pp. 84–105.

The last and most important part of the new scheme, a law on codetermination, was passed in 1976. Decision making on all company levels was made subject to collective bargaining, and employees acquired the right to strike over codetermination questions even after an agreement on wages had been concluded. The employer was required to negotiate before making decisions on important matters, such as reorganizations, expansions, or shutdowns. In case of disagreement, the trade unions were accorded the right to impose their own interpretation concerning employee obligations to work and the meaning of the provisions of agreements on codetermination, and that interpretation was to be binding until the labor court makes a decision.

PROFIT SHARING AND INVESTMENT FUNDS

The schemes of work-place democracy outlined above for giving employees an increased role in decision making at different levels of the company have all been enacted by law or have emerged from collective bargaining. The profit sharing proposals we shall consider next are currently in abeyance, and their adoption depends on the prospects for political change. Thus, the Danish proposal for profit sharing was set forth by the trade union congress of 1971 and by the Social Democratic government in 1973, but the 1973 election produced an overwhelmingly bourgeois majority which is not likely to enact the scheme. The proposal has three aims: (1) to give employees a stake in future capital growth and investments in industry; (2) to increase employee influence over company policies through stock ownership; and (3) to increase the rate of capital formation.

An "Employee Investment and Dividend Fund" is to be set up, financed from a payroll tax which is paid by employers only and which is to rise stepwise until it reaches 5 percent of total payroll. Every full-time employee, regardless of age and wage, will have the same share in the fund. The individually owned shares are not to be negotiable for seven years. Two-thirds of the contributions from the larger enterprises (more than 50 employees) are to remain in the enterprise as employee-owned shares, while one-third will become risk capital of the fund which can be invested in other companies. The steady growth of the employees' shares remaining in the company will give the wage earners an ever greater vote in general meetings of the shareholders. Had the proposal been enacted in 1974, the fund would have accumulated by the 1980s between one-tenth and one-third of all Danish share capital.[6] The fund is to be governed by a board which, according to the latest (December 1975) Social Democratic and trade union proposal, is to have 120 members, of which 40 will represent the trade unions, 40 will come from other employee organizations, and 40 are to be appointed by the state.

The scheme is characteristic of the views of Danish Social Democrats about the relations between capital and the state. It assumes that under welfare state conditions the private sector is no longer capable of generating a rate of savings necessary to maintain full employment. Yet the continued existence of

6. *Co-ownership, Co-determination: The Danish Government Bills on Economic and Industrial Democracy* (Copenhagen: LO, 1973).

capitalism itself is not to be challenged. Employee shares are not permitted to exceed 50 percent of total shares issued. The individual employee will become a small shareholder in the fund, not in his particular company, and the rights of disposal of the shares will be circumscribed. Investments are to be encouraged in a way which favors larger enterprises.

The Danish proposal has met criticism from the left which has described economic democracy as a kind of first aid for crisis-ridden monopoly capitalism. On the other hand, the idea of establishing a fund and the composition of the board to oversee the fund have been criticized by employers and by the bourgeois parties as a form of socialization of the economy and an expression of the excessive pretensions of trade union power.

THE SWEDISH EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT FUNDS

In Sweden a draft proposal for employee investment funds was adopted by the 1976 LO congress. It was drafted by a committee chaired by the trade union economist Rudolf Meidner. A government commission to prepare the necessary legislation was appointed by the Social Democratic government before it lost the 1976 elections after having been in power for over 40 years, but the prospects for action on the commission's work are, at least for the duration of the present Parliament, rather bleak.

Under the proposed system, 20 percent of the profits of all privately owned larger companies would each year be converted to employee shares which will remain in the company. The dividends paid on the shares will go into a Central Clearing Fund to be collectively owned and managed by the trade unions. Its revenues are to be spent to promote trade union activities. The basic aims of the LO proposal are said to be three: (1) to support the long-standing solidaristic or egalitarian wage policy; (2) to countervail the concentration of private capital; and (3) to reinforce work-place democracy.

Regarding the first point, the solidaristic wage policy, under which the differentials between high and low wage groups are to be narrowed, has required restraints to be imposed on workers in profitable industries and has had no mechanism for preventing the so-called unutilized scope for wage increases from increasing the returns to the owners in the more profitable industries. The fund is supposed to provide the solution for this problem.

The continuing demand for huge investments and the high degree of self-financing has led to a concentration of large amounts of capital. To transfer part of the profits to funds controlled by the trade unions would counteract private capital concentration and force the present owners to share economic growth with their employees. This is now the dominant motive, according to Meidner. Through the conversion of profits into employee shares, the majority of a company's shares and the right to vote them would in the long run be transferred to funds controlled by wage earners' organizations.[7]

Unlike the Danish proposal, there would be no withdrawal of capital from the company, for this would only lead to higher consumption and reduce employee power in the company. Consequently, there is no

7. "Employee Investment Funds" (mimeographed summary, LO, 1976).

place in the Swedish system for individual share certificates. Employee ownership would be collective. No limits are set on the growth of employee-owned stock. In these respects, the Swedish proposal is definitely more far reaching than the Danish one and reflects differences in the structure and power positions of the two labor movements.

The employer organizations have drafted a counterproposal to channel 1 percent of yearly wages into decentralized funds. The income would be invested in industry, but after 5 to 10 years employees would have the right to cash in their shares. The voting rights of the employee shares are to be restricted. The proposal in some respects resembles an employers' version of the Danish economic democracy proposal. It differs from that of the Swedish LO in its emphasis on individual instead of collective ownership; and, in advocating decentralized funds instead of collective ownership, it differs from the proposals of both the Swedish and the Danish trade unions. Their preference for centralization, according to the two trade union centers, is motivated by solidarity with workers in less profitable industries, but to an even larger extent it is regarded as a necessary means of achieving employee power over industry and society.

The Meidner report goes so far as to state that the remnants of class society will be eliminated only when the wage earners become the owners of large parts of Swedish industry, but the sponsors of the "Employee Investment Funds" are not very interested in labeling the coming social order either a mixed economy, socialism, or corporatism. They are pragmatic but also aware of the changing role of the trade union movement. Gunnar Nilsson, president of the Swedish LO, pointed out to the 1976 LO congress that in a modern society the trade unions cannot be limited only to the conventional type of representation of their members' interest. He said: "With or without Employee Investment Funds, an inexorable change is taking place in the part to be played by trade unions."[8]

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

At the outset, we suggested that the content of worker participation and the structure of profit sharing could be expected to change in certain directions as relations between capital and labor go through successive phases of development. To what extent have these expectations been confirmed?

There has been no clear shift in emphasis from employment security to influence on management as anticipated. It is true that employee efforts to exert influence on management were minimal before the end of World War II and hardly aroused profound interest in the 1950s and 1960s. Since only the most recent demands for worker participation have emphasized influence on management, it can be said that the shift has taken place. On the other hand, the far-reaching Swedish legislation of 1973 and amendments of the Danish and Norwegian basic collective agreements to strengthen employee protection against layoffs indicate that the trade union movement has not lost interest in job security.

One can be more certain about the second proposition. The expectation that labor would escalate its

8. "News from the 1976 LO Congress" (mimeographed, LO, 1976), pp. 16–17.

demands for influence from consultation to codetermination as capital-labor relations move from the cooperation to the integration phases has been substantially confirmed. Increased competition for export markets and a long period of labor shortages strengthened labor's position. It therefore became possible for labor to press for a much stronger role than the consultative status granted to the plant committees. The plant committees reflected older forms of production and power relations between capital and labor. New models, capable of assuring participation at all levels of a company's hierarchy, had to be constructed.

These very developments show that demands for codetermination have not shifted from shop floor to executive board levels, as our third proposition suggested they might. On the contrary, the demands have been applied to all levels in the company simultaneously. If anything, the greatest emphasis has been on the shop floor level, as in the Swedish law on codetermination and in the Norwegian experiments with semi-autonomous groups. In contrast, labor has been quite hesitant in entering the board room in all these countries. Thus, a gradualistic approach in which industrial democracy is built up from below has been preferred, with great emphasis placed on the need for education to back up this development.

While the demand for influence at all levels of the corporate hierarchy is the most important characteristic of the Scandinavian drive for industrial democracy, it also accelerates the process of integration. Labor's representatives will meet with those of capital in job design on the shop floor, in the formation of policy in personnel administration and in overall enterprise decisions in the company assemblies or board rooms. Considerably more negotiation will go on everywhere in the company, with the radical expansion of the scope of collective bargaining in Sweden leading the way.[9] In all these respects, labor representatives will become more fully integrated into management functions. This creates the possibility that trade union leaders might become absorbed as new elements in corporate leadership. Employees in general may benefit from such a development, but there is also a risk that they could be left to the mercy of an all-powerful coalition of management and trade union leaders.

Finally, the anticipated shift from individualistic to collectivistic forms of profit sharing has taken place, on the whole, as suggested in our fourth proposition. To be sure, the Danish proposal, unlike the Swedish one, retains individual shares in a restricted form. However, the discretion and influence which the ordinary stockholder derives from his ownership will, in several respects, not be available to the employee owner, for under the Danish plan the funds are to be administered collectively by a combination of trade union and state appointed representatives, and under the Swedish plan they are to be completely controlled by the trade unions.

All the new arrangements here discussed have been introduced through legislation or are awaiting legislation. This is in marked con-

9. In some respects, counterparts are to be found in British and Italian industries. See "Employee Participation and Company Structure," *Bulletin of the European Commission*, Supplement 8/75.

trast to previous periods when issues of industrial democracy were settled through negotiations and collective agreements. The reason for the change may well indicate that stronger efforts were necessary to override employer opposition to admittedly more radical goals. The use of legislation to break the resistance of the employers does not necessarily imply that a new period of conflict will now prevail, but there is no question that legislation has noticeably increased the bargaining strength of labor in the triangular relationship between labor, capital, and the state.

The new role of the state in legislating on relations between employers and employees is a result of the fact that the state itself has undergone a fundamental change through the sharp expansion of the public sector and increasing intervention in the structure of industry, regional policy, and national economic planning. At the same time, the state as the largest employer has itself become subject to reform and regulation. In the future, this development may increasingly open up the possibility for employee organizations to claim that decisions made by the state bureaucracy should be subject to codetermination just like decisions in private enterprise. This prospect creates entirely new problems of balancing the public interest against the interests and rights of public employees, problems which are not present in the private sector. Codetermination and trade union representation at all levels of public enterprises and administrative agencies not only blur the line between employees and employer but also between organizations and the state, and they do so in a way which justifies raising the question of whether we are moving toward a corporate state. It is partly in this context that the development of industrial democracy in Scandinavia must be assessed.

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Between Harmony and Conflict: Industrial Democracy in the Netherlands

By WIL ALBEDA

ABSTRACT: Important changes are taking place in the industrial relations system of the Netherlands, and it is not clear yet whether the long established pattern of stable and peaceful relations can be preserved. The Catholic and socialist labor federations have merged into a single organization whose left wing is rethinking the issue of industrial democracy. The relatively new legislation of the early 1970s, which enlarged the rights of works councils and opened corporate board membership to representatives of employee interests, was still based on ideas generated in the 1960s. But the new structures which resulted from this legislation are already considered insufficient by some sections of the trade unions, although they command the support of the separate Protestant labor federation and of the expanding unions of white-collar employees. The two principal viewpoints are based on different models or concepts of industrial relations, with the older one relying on an essentially cooperative relationship while the new groups tend to think in terms of permanent conflict or adversary relations. Historically, the Netherlands has had an integrative industrial relations system. It remains to be seen how strong this tradition remains.

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MODERN industry was a latecomer in the Netherlands. For a long period, Holland was a country thriving on intensive agriculture and the commerce and traffic that was the result of the geography and the colonial history of the country. Before the Second World War, industry was small scale and family owned, though with some notable exceptions (Unilever, Philips, Royal Shell, partly the fruits of the colonial empire). As in some other Western European countries, the trade union movement was from the beginning split between a social democratic federation (Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen—NVV), a Catholic federation (Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond—NKV), and a Protestant federation (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond—CNV). Whereas the NVV based its activities on the ultimate goal of socialism and a moderate class-conflict ideology, the two "confessional" trade unions propagated cooperation between the different groups in society, hoping for a more organic organization of society through workers' participation in decision making, especially on issues of importance to the national economy as a whole or to an entire industry.

In the first half of the century, the three tendencies in the trade union movement found it difficult to cooperate. As a consequence, the movement was weak and divided. The style of management was paternalistic, and as in most continental European countries, labor relations did not include a trade union presence within the enterprise. In time, an interventionist government helped employers and trade unions to develop modern industrial relations. It is important to consider this background when discussing worker participation in the Netherlands. In more than one sense, this country represents a special case.

Not surprisingly, the pre-1945 discussions about granting workers some form of codetermination (medezeggenschap) focused more on proposals to create bipartite or tripartite bodies to govern each industry than on changes in the structure of the individual company. It is a symptom of the rapid modernization process that the country has undergone since 1945 that, by contrast, the discussions after 1950 began to focus on the internal organization of the company.

In the years after the second World War the preexisting trend toward strong centralization in Dutch labor relations was carried to its logical conclusion in the domain of national wage policy, carried out by the government in cooperation with the central organizations of employers and trade unions. The national wage policy was remarkably successful until the development of the Common Market, the pressure of inflation, and the completion of post-war reconstruction led to its disintegration. Centralization, however, has remained an important element in the Dutch industrial relations system. In order to create a forum for dialogue among government, employers, and trade unions, the legislature established a Social-Economic Council. This official advisory body consists of 45 members, 15 appointed by the employers' federations, 15 by the trade unions, and 15 independent members appointed by the government on the assumption that they will represent the general interest. The Social-Economic Council must be consulted on all important legislative

bills in its area of jurisdiction. As a consequence, both trade unions and employers organizations have acquired an important say in matters of national policy. It should also be noted that the position of the trade unions in this consultative process has been strengthened as a result of a considerable softening of their historic differences. The NVV has kept its social-democratic outlook but abandoned the class-struggle ideology and the belief in the necessity of extensive nationalization. For their part, the Christian unions have shed their traditional fear of government interference in the private sector.

The first postwar measure to deal with industrial democracy was a law on works councils (1950) that sought only to develop a form of consultation and information sharing within the enterprise. The "independent position of the employer" was to remain unimpaired, and only in the so-called social field (which in the Netherlands includes personnel policies and company benefit programs) was a modest form of actual participation in the decision-making process introduced. The trade unions' role within the works council was to be very limited. They had preferential rights to submit lists of candidates for election as works council members, but unorganized lists were also acceptable. As a consequence, and especially where a large percentage of the workforce was white collar, many works councils included among their members a large minority and sometimes even a majority of unorganized employees.

In 1966 the Dutch Productivity Council, a subcommittee of the tripartite Social-Economic Council, published the results of an inquiry into the attitudes and opinions of employers and workers with regard to the functioning of works councils.[1] It is interesting to note that on general issues both sides seemed to express rather positive judgments. For example, there seemed to be a consensus on the usefulness of the works council. At the same time, however, the inquiry revealed a rather critical attitude toward the actual functioning of works councils. The more important findings may be summarized in these terms:

1. Both employers and works council members thought that the qualifications of works council members and the amount of information given to them were inadequate.
2. Communications between employees and the works council seemed to be weak. Through lack of interest and understanding, many employers had no clear idea of the tasks and functions of the works council.
3. Employee representatives felt that the powers of the works councils were too restricted, an opinion that was not shared by the employers.
4. Blue-collar workers in particular expressed the wish that the works councils should more clearly and more directly represent employee interests.

In the course of the 1950s and 1960s, two new trends became visible. First, the trade unions realized increasingly how weak their position inside the enterprise had remained. In a modern industrialized country, they simply could not afford to accept their traditional exclusion from the shop floor. Consequently, they developed a strategy for the penetration of the enterprise (bedrijvenwerk).

1. P. I. D. Drenth and J. C. van der Pijl. *De Ondernemingsraad in Nederland* (The Hague: C.O.P., September 1966).

Second, within the universities and the trade unions, a wide-ranging discussion got underway with regard to the process of decision making in the company, which led the government to appoint a commission to investigate the structure of the enterprise. The commission's report (1965) proposed minority representation of workers on corporate boards of directors and enlarged rights for works councils. Near the end of the 1960s, these recommendations resulted in specific proposals for new legislation concerning both works councils and boards of directors.

The preparation of the legislation concerning the composition of boards of directors affords particularly useful insights into the workings of the Dutch industrial relations system and the legislative process. The debate was rather confused. Three elements played a role:

1. The Protestant Federation of Trade Unions (CNV) and some important groups within the socialist trade unions (NVV) wanted to establish a system of worker representation on the board not very different from that of West Germany's.
2. The employers rejected the idea of worker representation on the board, but agreed that within the board expert knowledge of social affairs should be more adequately represented in the future.
3. Left-wing groups within the NVV and NKV (the Catholic Trade Union Federation) were afraid that direct representation of workers on corporate boards would enmesh the trade unions too strongly in the capitalist enterprise.

When the government asked the Social-Economic Council to draft a proposal for legislation, the above three viewpoints were, of course, brought forward. J. W. de Pous, the chairman of the council, then proposed an ingenious compromise: the board of directors would appoint its own new members through cooptation, but both the shareholders and the works council were to have the right to submit and veto new nominations. This compromise was taken over by the government in its own bill and made applicable to all companies with a workforce of more than 100 and a capitalization of more than 10 million guilders. An exception was, however, made for international companies, that is, those having more than 50 percent of their employees serving abroad.

The new law came into force on July 1, 1973. It allowed companies three years to adapt their by-laws. One of the early problems encountered by works councils was the lack of availability of qualified candidates for board membership. As one newspaper put it, the long practice of close contacts between works councils and managements had limited the number of potentially acceptable directors, that is, of persons not so far to the right politically as to be unacceptable to the workers and not so far to the left as to be unacceptable to the employers. The point has also been made that as a consequence of manipulative techniques works councils tend to accept nominees proposed by management and generally leave the initiative to the employer. Finally, the trade unions in general have not been successful in instructing their members on works councils to act more independently.

With regard to the revision of the separate legislation on works councils, a similar procedure was followed. The government asked the Social-Economic Council for advice, an imperfect compromise was

reached, and on the basis of this advice a bill was introduced and enacted into law by Parliament. The main elements in the new legislation, passed in 1971, are the following:

1. It affords the elected members of the works council (meaning everybody except the chairman, who by law must be the employer or his representative) more possibilities to function independently. Elected members now have the right to hold preparatory meetings, or caucuses, before they meet with the chairman. In this way, they have more opportunity to reach agreement among themselves without excessive pressure from the employer. Further, they now have the right to obtain assistance from experts outside the enterprise.

2. The emphasis in the new law on greater independence for the elected members is reflected in a redefinition of their role as representatives of the explicit interests of employees in the enterprise. In the original law, the role of works councils had still been defined in terms of furthering the interest and well-being of the enterprise.

3. The new law also accorded several important new rights to the works council. First, it now is entitled to be informed in advance of important company decisions, for example the appointment of a new member of top management, and major economic and financial developments. Second, the works council now has the right to be heard before a decision is made on important matters. This means, for instance, that the board of directors cannot make a final decision on the annual report, including the distribution of dividends to shareholders, before the works council has had an opportunity to examine and discuss the underlying documents. Decisions vitally important to the enterprise, such as mass layoffs, shutdown of the firm or of an important part of the firm, takeovers or amalgamations, require prior discussion with the works council. Moreover, in the so-called social field certain important decisions now require the consent of the works council, among them regulations concerning holidays, shiftwork, overtime, and profit-sharing.

Although the laws of 1971 and 1973 were based on a consensus of the social partners, new proposals were soon brought forward for additional changes. The background of the new proposals is to be sought in the still evolving development of trade union views on industrial democracy. Two elements in particular have played an important role in shaping the new attitudes. During the 1960s the trade unions experienced more and more strongly the disadvantages of the Dutch industrial relations system, which traditionally has had no place for trade union activities on the shop floor. In a country where the terms of the collective agreement are applicable to nonmembers as well as members of unions, this state of affairs could easily endanger the existence of the trade unions or at least seriously weaken their effectiveness. The danger was that a well-developed structure of relationships between trade unions and employers at the level of each industry, and between these two entities and the state at the level of the nation as a whole, would eventually collapse because it had been erected on the feeble basis of nonexistent or at best irregular and intermittent relations

at the grassroots level. This anomaly could lead, and in fact did lead, to the loss of trade union membership and wildcat strikes, for example in 1969 and 1970.

On the basis of these considerations, the trade unions developed new strategies for trade union activities on the shop floor (the so-called bedrijvenwerk). Elements in this strategy were the organization of trade union structures within the firm, the explicit distinction between workers' interests and the interests of the firm, and an increased emphasis on the content and conditions of the individual job. From time to time the new trade union presence came into conflict with works council members who tended to continue working on the assumption of a genuine convergence of the interests of workers and the firm rather than on the assumption of an inevitable conflict. In addition, the trade unions reacted to the loss of membership (or at least to a rate of membership growth that lagged behind the development of the labor force) by taking an ideologically more radical and organizationally more militant attitude. The new attitude was reinforced by the penetration of neo-Marxist and new left ideas into segments of both the socialist trade unions (NVV) and the Catholic trade unions (NKV). These two trade union centers recently decided to form a new superfederation (FNV, Federation of Trade Unions in the Netherlands), in which the two constituent bodies will retain, for the time being, a certain measure of their own identity. The new superfederation came into existence in January 1976.

Whereas the Protestant trade unions (CNV) have retained their traditional reformist and integrative attitudes, the FNV tends to be more aggressive, and some of its affiliated unions even espouse a rather polarizing position. If carried to its logical conclusion, a polarizing attitude would, of course, lead to a rejection of the more integrative elements of industrial democracy, including the existing works councils and the presence of employee representatives on company boards of directors. Some radicals, though only a small minority, have even proposed replacing the works council entirely by a trade union presence within the firm.

THE NEW LEGISLATION

In an effort to cope with the serious economic difficulties that arose in the early 1970s, the government and the trade unions concluded a package deal at the end of 1974 in which the trade unions accepted a form of wage controls and the government promised to introduce further revisions in the legislation on works councils and a new law on capital gains sharing (the so-called Vermogensaanwasdeling). In promising new legislation, the government coalition of two socialist and two Christian-Democratic parties put itself into a very difficult position, for the socialists in the government tended to support the more radical position of the FNV while the Christian-Democratic coalition parties were at least in part closer to the views of the more moderate CNV.

The FNV proposal envisaged a works council consisting only of elected members, that is, without the presence of the employer as chairman. As already noted, the FNV is apprehensive that the presence of a management representative may

lead to the manipulation of works council members who in general have less education and invariably less information than management. In the view of the FNV, the works council should be guided exclusively by considerations of employee interests and not allow these to be diluted by the broader interests of the enterprise as a whole. Therefore, works council rights should include the right to monitor management decisions, including the exercise of a veto power, rather than the right to participate in the decision-making process. On the other hand the Protestant unions, whose view is shared by many white-collar unions, the new third force in the Dutch trade union movement, want to maintain the existing orientation and organization of the works council.

The current Minister of Social Affairs Jaap Boersma, a former research director of the Protestant trade union federation, made a heroic attempt to combine the two positions in a bill that at this writing has not yet been passed by Parliament. The main elements of the bill provide, first, that the works council shall consist only of elected members and that the chairman may be chosen by the works council itself rather than being imposed on it by law. To this extent, the proposal follows the FNV position. Next, the bill proposes that a new institution be introduced, a consultative plant assembly, or joint meeting, where management can exchange views with the works council. Joint meetings are to take place at least six times a year under the chairmanship of the employer. In addition, the works council may demand at any time a joint meeting, and management must accept the demand within two weeks. Such a meeting is to be chaired by the chairman of the works council, an elected member.

The rights of the works council are to be extended in the following respects:

1. The works council is to be consulted before the appointment of a member of top management. In practice this will mean, of course, that it will be extremely difficult to appoint a manager who is not acceptable to the works council.
2. Important decisions that in the future cannot be taken without prior consultation with the works council shall include decisions on new investments.
3. All decisions in the area of social affairs are to be considered as subjects on which management has to get the prior approval of the works council.

It should be noted that the rights of the works council may be further extended by collective agreement, or by management alone if the works council approves. In case of disagreement over important decisions, the works council has the right to appeal to the courts.

Taking into account the fact that the existing works council already has, and in practice uses, the right to meet independently, that is, without the chairman, the changes proposed in the membership, chairmanship, and procedure of meetings are not particularly impressive. Certain other rights of the works council are to be extended, but the right to joint decision making is limited to social affairs. The new right of judicial appeal in case of important decisions might in practice turn out to be quite a nuisance if an employer is confronted with a difficult works council.

The question has been raised, not

only by employers but also by advocates of industrial democracy,[2] of whether the draft bill, based upon a too obvious compromise, really means progress. The new works council has more independence from management in the sense that its views and decisions may be prepared without a management presence. However, the law stipulates that the final decision of the works council should be taken only after "management has been heard."

An interesting confirmation of the doubts that have been expressed about the bill occurred when a number of works councils, among them some from large firms like AKZO and Unilever, proposed that the works councils of Dutch enterprises should come together to form a national body for the purpose of expressing the joint views of all works councils on the proposed new law in Parliament. The idea drew the disapproval of the trade union federations who claimed that it had been inspired by members of separatist white-collar unions.

DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SHOP FLOOR LEVEL

At the shop floor level, two recent developments must be stressed. One, already mentioned earlier, is the introduction of the new trade union strategy of establishing a presence on the shop floor. The other concerns experiments in shop floor democracy. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the new trade union activities' inside undertakings in detail.

In principle, the trade unions—or at least several of them—are setting up their own plant-based structures within the firm. The in-plant trade union organization is expected to become both a base for plant-oriented action, such as channeling employee grievances to the unions or to the works councils or preparing a strike, and a part of the external organizational structure of the trade unions. Members of the various executive bodies of the unions are increasingly being elected with the participation of the plant union organizations and the older, geographically based local and regional bodies.

Insofar as the union's in-plant organization is willing to cooperate with the existing decision-making structures within the firm, especially the works council, it can serve as a "constituency for the works council" and thereby strengthen its own ties with employees. In some cases, however, the in-plant organizations are more and more becoming a form of permanent opposition to management. In consequence, conflicts between unions and works councils may well develop where the latter choose to follow their own approach.

In the case of Hoogovens, the large steel-producing company, the in-plant organization of the union has adopted the practice of committing those of its members who serve on the works council to abide by the decisions of the in-plant section of the union. This decision, of course, makes the smooth functioning of the works council more difficult, for no decision can now be made without the consent of the in-plant section of the union. Considering the well-known apathy of the majority of union members, an internal union can easily fall under the domination of militant activists, including some on the left who look upon every form of cooperation with the em-

2. As, for instance, Prof. H. J. van Zuthem, "Herziening van de Ondernemingsraad," *Economisch-Statistische Berichten*, 18 August 1976, p. 778.

ployer as a form of class betrayal. As a result, the works council at Hoogovens is sometimes split between the moderate members of the Protestant blue-collar union and the several white-collar unions, which tend to be supported by the unorganized members of the works council, and the radical members of the socialist union, supported half-heartedly by their partners in the Catholic organization.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY BETWEEN HARMONY AND CONFLICT

Dutch industrial relations have always been characterized by a low level of labor unrest. Since the war, strikes have become even more infrequent than before. However, between 1969 and 1974 there was a sudden upswing of industrial conflict. In 1969 and 1970 wildcat strikes involved workers in several industries. In 1971, 1972, and 1973 the trade unions successfully took the initiative in several major conflicts to show their members that they had not grown as soft as their left-wing opponents suggested. Yet the new labor unrest took a rather heavy toll. Trade union strike funds were severely depleted, especially by strikes involving demands for greater narrowing of wage differentials. Consequently, in 1974 and 1975 labor unrest sank to the lowest levels ever reached, although a kind of verbal unrest developed in several firms, centering on the ambivalent attitude of works councils which were being pulled in different directions by conflicting viewpoints.

One might thus conclude that since open conflict was too expensive for the trade unions (and for the national economy as well), the trade unions transferred their aggressiveness to matters internal to the enterprise. The effects of this change include more emphasis than heretofore on issues that divide employees and employers. However, the national debate over the proper course to be followed is still continuing. The basic question remains whether a form of codetermination should be developed that would involve workers and their representatives in some formal way in the decision-making process or the trade unions should resist such integration until the country has adopted a form of genuine workers' control.

The debate places employers in an uneasy dilemma, for neither solution seems very attractive to them. The government, too, is not in an easy position. Should it accept the views of the Protestant unions, knowing that the new structures will in many cases not be able to function because of trade union resistance? Or should it rather accept the conclusions, and thus the consequences, of the left wing in the superfederation, FNV, which could frustrate the operation of the economic system as a result of ever greater polarization? The first view represents the official position of the Protestant unions and of many individuals and even some unions in the socialist-Catholic superfederation. The second reflects the views of the more powerful unions in the superfederation. A wise government would perhaps wait till the trade unions can reach a consensus. However, the promises inherent in the package deal of 1974 make procrastination an awkward policy for the government to adopt.

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Collective Bargaining: The American Approach to Industrial Democracy

By MILTON DERBER

ABSTRACT: Collective bargaining is the American route to industrial democracy. Some unionists and others, however, have advocated a widening and deepening of the participative role of workers and unions in managerial decision making. Examples of union-management cooperation outside of the conventional collective bargaining boundaries can be found as far back as the 1920s. But only a small number of cases have survived to the present day. Since 1970 the federal government has encouraged joint union-management committees and autonomous work group experiments to improve productivity and the quality of working life. A National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life has been established by Congress. A number of companies have, independently or in cooperation with unions, introduced job enrichment programs, flexible work schedules, and semi-autonomous work groups. Many companies have taken advantage of tax law benefits to adopt profit-sharing and employee stock ownership plans. Union leaders have generally been suspicious of such management schemes as well as productivity plans unless safeguards are provided for worker job security and employment conditions. They have rejected the German codetermination system of worker-directors. There appears to be little prospect of dramatic change during the foreseeable future although collective bargaining may gradually extend worker participation in managerial decision making.

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IN CONTRAST to European developments, the theme of industrial democracy has evoked relatively little discussion in the United States in recent decades. This condition is not attributable to a lack of interest on the part of unionists or weakness in the labor movement. It is due, rather, to the predominant view that industrial democracy in the United States has been widely achieved through the system of collective bargaining. Imperfections and limitations of collective bargaining are recognized, but only a small minority of labor activists call for new routes to industrial democracy, such as German codetermination, Yugoslav workers councils, or Scandinavian autonomous work groups.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE AMERICAN ROUTE

The American idea of collective bargaining as industrial democracy is the product of more than a century's experience. Since I have treated this evolution in a book-length analysis,[1] I shall not attempt even a short sketch here. It is important to note only that the collective bargaining system emerged out of fierce competition with numerous alternatives: individualism; socialism; profit-sharing, stock-ownership, co-partnership; company employee representation plans; syndicalism; producers cooperation; scientific management; and others.

The essence of collective bargaining as industrial democracy is as follows: (1) employees have the right to form, belong to, and govern labor organizations of their own choice without employer interference; (2) employers and their managerial staffs have the right to form their own representative organizations and to manage the operations of their enterprise; (3) wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are codetermined through the process of collective bargaining, and the agreement is reduced to writing in a signed and legally enforceable contract; (4) employee grievances and complaints over the implementation of the contract and claims to fair treatment are subject to due process through a formal grievance procedure specified in the contract; (5) neither the managers nor the union officers may discriminate against an employee (or potential employee) because of race, sex, age, national origin, or religion; (6) the strike or lockout is a legitimate tool in the determination of the contractual rules governing the relationship, although the parties may voluntarily abstain from or relinquish its use; (7) in the resolution of grievances the strike is generally replaced by binding arbitration; (8) the personal dignity of all employees, whether part of a minority or majority group, is respected, their freedom of speech is protected, and they are treated as equal citizens with equal opportunities at the work place and in their union.

This model of industrial democracy, like the counterpart model of political democracy, is rarely achieved in its entirety and is often seriously abused. The federal and some state governments have sought through legislation, administration, and adjudication to safeguard and promote its principles.

BEYOND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Since the 1930s, most trade unionists and their leaders, as well as

1. Milton Derber, *The American Idea of Industrial Democracy* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).

most large employers, have been content to work and live under the collective bargaining system. Some, however, have desired to extend the scope of union-management interaction beyond its conventional boundaries. In particular, they have advocated a widening and deepening of the participative role of workers and the union in managerial decision making. This approach was epitomized several decades ago by a work entitled *Organized Labor and Production: Next Steps in Industrial Democracy*,[2] jointly authored by Philip Murray, then head of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee and vice-president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Morris L. Cooke, a well-known consulting engineer and advocate of scientific management. The imaginative work envisaged a comprehensive integration of unionism and scientific management in the enterprise and the industry, the full sharing of business and industrial information, and even the seating of one or more union officials on company boards of directors. At the national level, unions, management, and government would cooperate in close harmony to achieve a stable and growing full-employment economy based on collective bargaining, civil rights for employees, and scientific control of industrial relations.

Although the Murray-Cooke dream of industrial democracy was largely ignored, a small minority of unionists and managers did develop schemes of union-management cooperation outside the normal collective bargaining boundaries. Examples[3] can be found as far back as the 1920s in the railroad and garment industries, but the best-known programs developed just before and after World War II are the Tennessee Valley Authority joint cooperative committees to eliminate waste, increase efficiency, stimulate training, safeguard health, and generally improve employee morale, and the Scanlon Plan, a system of joint worker-supervisor suggestion committees combined with a cost-saving plant-wide bonus. In both cases, the cooperative arrangements were carefully kept separate from the collective bargaining process.

During World War II, some 5,000 joint management-labor production committees were set up under government sponsorship to help increase productivity and to boost morale, but only a few hundred were estimated to have made any significant contributions to productivity and virtually all of them disappeared after the war.[4] In the late 1950s and early 1960s, several major union-management agreements revived interest in developing new collective bargaining institutions for the furtherance of productivity, the protection of employee job rights, and the enhancement of cooperative relations. Among these were the Armour Automation Plan (1959) in which Armour and Company and the then two major meat packing unions attempted to ease the displacement effects of a major company reorganization involving the shutdown of about a dozen obsolete plants and the opening of several new plants in

2. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1940).

3. See Harry M. Douty, *Labor-Management Productivity Committees in American Industry* (Washington, D.C.: The National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality, May 1975).

4. Dorothea de Schweinitz, *Labor and Management in a Common Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949).

different geographical locations; the Mechanization and Modernization Agreement of the West Coast Longshore Industry (1960), in which the Pacific Maritime Association bought out a complex of restrictive work rules with work and income guarantees; and the Basic Steel Human Relations Committee (1959), which was an outgrowth of the 116-day steel strike and which established joint union-management subcommittees to study problems and potential conflict issues during the period between contract negotiations. All three of these programs and most of the others like them had a limited life but made important contributions during their existence.[5]

THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE

A new stage in the evolution of methods to extend union-management relations beyond traditional collective bargaining limits was presaged by the establishment of the National Commission on Productivity by President Richard M. Nixon in July 1970.[6] As its name indicates, the original purpose of the commission was to revitalize a slackening productivity and to "achieve a balance between costs and productivity that will lead to more stable prices."[7] In December 1971, an amendment to the Economic Stabilization Act (Public Law 92-210) gave the commission statutory recognition and enlarged the scope of its functions and responsibilities, including encouragement and assistance in the establishment of "labor-management-public committees." In 1973, when the Stabilization Act expired, the Senate passed a bill that would have expanded the commission's objectives to include "to help improve the morale and quality of work for the American worker." It was also proposed to change the name of the agency to the National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality. This bill was disapproved in the House, objections being voiced to its $5 million cost, and only by executive order was the curtailed commission able to survive as the Office of Productivity under the Cost of Living Council.

In the spring of 1974, however, the House reversed its earlier vote and a new law was enacted and signed on June 8, 1974, establishing the National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality under the chairmanship of Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller with a one-year appropriation of $2.5 million. In November 1975, still another law was passed (Public Law 94-136) which repealed its predecessors and transferred the staff and functions of the commission to a new National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life. The center was to be governed by a board of directors composed of 27 members, appointed by the president, from labor, business, the general public, state

5. See James J. Healy, ed., *Creative Collective Bargaining: Meeting Today's Challenges to Labor-Management Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

6. This commission offers a striking contrast to the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, established by Congress and appointed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. The latter was based on the assumption of an accelerating automation which, many feared, would displace workers and create extensive social and personal dislocations and hardships. See Report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, *Technology and the American Economy*, vol. 1 (February 1966).

7. First Annual Report of the National Commission on Productivity, appendix A, (March 1972), p. 21.

and local government, and the federal government. In addition to its prior functions of fostering productivity and work quality, it was directed to work closely with federal departments and agencies to help improve their productivity. It was given an appropriation of $6.25 million for the period to September 30, 1976, and $5 million for each of fiscal 1977 and 1978, thus assuring a continuity of nearly three additional years. The word "center" instead of "commission" was apparently intended to emphasize the agency's continuing role.

This brief, rather erratic experience was reflective of two incongruent forces. On the one hand, there was a widespread feeling in many influential circles (the media, academe, and segments of industry and government) that American workers were becoming increasingly discontented with work and work relations and that the productivity of American producers was falling behind that of their competitors in Europe and Japan. This sentiment, whether wholly accurate or not, was fostered by the widely publicized strike of General Motors workers at the company's new and highly automated assembly plant at Lordstown, Ohio, in early 1972; by the report of a Task Force of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare published in December 1972 under the title, *Work in America*; and by a spate of American and European publications and conferences on worker alienation, the "new working class," job enrichment and enlargement, and humanization/democratization of the work place.

As a brake on the over-zealous proposals of some proponents of a new industrial order, spokesmen for organized labor expressed reservations and conditions. In cases such as Lordstown, they noted that the factors involved were no different from those in disputes of prior years over the speedup and other unsatisfactory working practices. On the productivity front, they reaffirmed a long-held position that productivity gains must not be made at the expense of worker employment, pay levels, or conditions of work. At the same time, they made it clear that if steps were to be taken to spur worker productivity and to humanize the work place, they wanted to be consulted.

The intended consequences of these dual forces were, as noted above, a continued and ultimately successful pressure for the establishment of a permanent center and a readjustment of the objectives and structure of the center (1) to balance employer interests in greater efficiency and competitiveness with labor interests in improved working conditions and (2) to assure that programs stimulated or assisted by the center would be based on union-management agreement and, where feasible, joint committees. In the course of these developments, the boundaries of the system of industrial democracy, based on collective bargaining principles and procedures, were enlarged.

It is too early to try to evaluate the contributions of the center and its predecessors since 1970 to American industrial democracy. Moreover, both before and since 1970, some of the more progressive corporations, occasionally in cooperation with unions, have conducted autonomous experiments and developed innovative programs without the commission's or center's involvement. Some illustrations from both categories may illuminate the paths for possible future development.

COMMISSION/CENTER HIGHLIGHTS[8]

The principal contribution of the commission was to encourage and support joint committee programs through publicity in the media, the issuance and distribution of popularly-written reports and pamphlets, and union-management conferences. Supplementing these efforts on a very limited scale, the commission helped to initiate and sometimes to finance joint committee systems as well as some experiments in autonomous work groups.

Among the plans which the commission widely publicized were the Employment Security and Productivity Committees established in the basic steel industry as a result of the collective bargaining agreement of 1971; the relatively long-established Scanlon Plans and the joint cooperative committees in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA); the Jamestown, New York, community program begun in 1971; several labor-management cooperation arrangements developed through the initiative of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and utilizing its Relations by Objectives (RBO) technique;[9] the national joint labor-management committees in the retail food and interstate trucking industries fostered by the Cost of Living Council and the FMCS; the quality of work demonstration project at the Cleveland plant of the Eaton Corporation; and the autonomous work group experiment at the Rushtown Coal Mine of Philipsburg, Pennsylvania. In addition to these largely private sector plans, the commission/center has focused attention on the use of joint committees in the federal and local governments.[10] The origins, objectives, and procedures of these plans varied significantly. A brief description of three of them may indicate the range of thinking and practice.

In the steel industry, for example, the 10 major corporations and the United Steelworkers of America agreed in 1971 that in order to improve the international competitive position of American steel and thereby to protect jobs and profits, joint labor-management employment security and productivity committees would be set up at the plant level. The committees were to be composed, for the union, of the local union president, the chairman and secretary of the grievance committee, and the grievance committeemen most concerned with the agenda problems to be discussed, and for management, of the plant manager, the superintendent of industrial relations, the plant industrial engineer, and the area superintendent. Although final decisions on operations changes were left to management, the latter often adopted union ideas. When they did not, they discussed with the unionists the reason for not acting.

8. See National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, *Recent Initiatives in Labor-Management Cooperation*, February 1976, 62 pp. and appendices.

9. RBO is a technique devised by the FMCS to resolve deeply imbedded union-management conflicts that have reached crisis proportions for the parties. It involves separate and joint sessions in which union and management officials are led to define what the other party should do to improve relations, what each party should do itself, what "action steps" should be followed to achieve each of a mutually accepted list of objectives, and a timetable for implementation.

10. Only limited information is available on these governmental committees. See, for example, James E. Martin, "Union-Management Committees in the Federal Sector," *Monthly Labor Review*, vol. 99, no. 10 (October 1976), pp. 30–2.

According to the National Center report, some 250 plant committees had been established by 1975 with widely varying results. Workers in some plants continued to be suspicious that productivity gains would be at the expense of speedup and job loss. On the other hand, examples of successful committees were cited to illustrate that by reducing costs and improving quality, job security was enhanced and worker morale was strengthened. Union President I. W. Abel credited the committees with contributing to more mature collective bargaining relationships throughout the industry. There were dissenters in the union, however, who thought the workers' interests had been sacrificed.

The Jamestown, New York, program illustrates a community-wide effort to restore economic health to a depressed and conflictful industrial city through union-management cooperation. The initiative came from the mayor with the assistance of a representative of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. About two years after the Jamestown Area Labor-Management Committee had been established and had demonstrated notable progress in increasing productivity and reducing strife in its 36 member enterprises, it received financial assistance from the National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality and the Economic Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce to intensify its program at the plant level. A full-time professional coordinator was appointed to get plant union-management committees started or restarted, to help implement skill development training of workers and managers, and to extend committee activities to work redesign, communication, grievance handling, and safety. No attempt was made to standardize in-plant committees. The parties in each plant determined their own structure, procedures, and problem priorities. In some plants, the committees almost failed because of insufficient or ineffective communication with rank and file workers. But overall, the leaders of the program felt that substantial progress had been made.

Perhaps the most far-reaching experiment sponsored by the National Commission was the autonomous work group program in the Rushton Coal Mine, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, modeled after European examples, with the agreement of the United Mine Workers of America. The experiment took the form of an action-research project initiated by the private National Quality of Work Center, with the research team drawn from the University of Pennsylvania and Penn State University. A local union-management committee, known as the Steering Committee, collaborated with the research team in designing, developing, and implementing the project. Initially a 27-member work group, consisting of volunteer miners, was trained to perform a variety of jobs in a section; pay and classification differences were eliminated: and the three crew foremen were limited to planning and safety functions. The work group was given full responsibility in mining the coal. Collaboration replaced competition among the workers, interest in the work and worker satisfaction grew measurably, accidents declined, and productivity jumped. The experiment encountered many difficulties, but these were gradually overcome and the experiment was extended to the entire mine, after the plan

was modified to take into account some worker objections and ideas.[11]

As noted above, the Rushton experiment was initiated by a unit originally known as the Quality of Work Program. This unit originated in the Federal Price Commission in 1972, was transferred the following year to the National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality, and in April 1974 was transformed into the private, nonprofit Washington-based National Quality of Work Center in close association with the University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research. The center's goals are to develop and seek funding for demonstration projects, such as Rushton, in order to improve productivity, the quality of working life, and labor-management relations.[12]

INDEPENDENT COMPANY EXPERIMENTS[13]

In the decade or so prior to the establishment of the first commission, a number of leading companies had introduced, more or less independently, a variety of schemes designed to improve employee morale and boost productivity. Some of these schemes involved simply the redesign (enlargement, enrichment, rotation) of jobs and work practices; a few were more far-reaching, emphasizing greater participation of workers in management decision making and alteration of supervisory structures and styles. Virtually all were initiated by management, often as a result of some academician's or consultant's theories or suggestions. Most, but not all, were conducted in non-union plants or among non-union groups of employees.

Among the participative programs that received particular attention was one established in 1971 at a new Pet Food plant (General Foods Corporation) in Topeka, Kansas. All 70 of the employees were organized into relatively autonomous work groups (from 8 to 12 members) responsible for a production process. Group members were trained to perform all requisite tasks. Supervisors were replaced by team leaders, who were ultimately expected to be unnecessary. Parking lot, cafeteria, locker rooms, and other facilities were available to all on an equal basis. It was estimated that the 70 produced as much as a conventional plant of 110. But the Pet Food approach has not been widely imitated, and the General Foods Company has been cautious in extending ideas gained from this experiment to its other plants.[14]

A number of other major companies have developed self-management work groups or redesigned jobs to make them less boring, including AT&T, Polaroid, Texas Instruments, Monsanto Chemical, and Kaiser Aluminum, but these have mostly been confined to small sections or groups. No large-scale changes in company practice have

11. An enlightening account of the Rushton experiment is provided by Ted Mills, "Altering the Social Structure in Coal Mining: A Case Study," *Monthly Labor Review*, vol. 99, no. 10 (October 1976), pp. 3–10.

12. National Quality of Work Center, *The Quality of Work Program: The First Eighteen Months*, April 1974-October 1975.

13. See, in particular, Special Task Force to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, *Work in America* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, n.d.) ch. 4 and appendix.

14. In the case of a group program at another of its plants, the company has been charged with committing a violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act by allegedly dominating a labor organization. The case had not been decided by the National Labor Relations Board at this writing.

been reported. For the most part, it may be suggested, these job enrichment and worker participation schemes are a late twentieth-century revision of Taylorism, a new model of scientific management based on recent psychological theories about job satisfaction and communications instead of engineering concepts. Like the earlier scientific management models, they have rarely been adopted in a total system but rather have been applied in selected parts.

OTHER APPROACHES

Contemporary with the foregoing programs were scattered company experiments with other ideas about the humanization of work, the improvement of worker morale, and increases in productivity, efficiency, and profitability. One set of ideas focused on work schedules, another on financial incentives.

Experiments with unconventional work schedules reflected the belief that workers would be happier and more productive (these qualities are not necessarily correlated in practice) if they had more flexibility in coming to or leaving work or if they had a prolonged weekend.[15] The former typically provided a band of starting and finishing hours between, say, 7 and 9 A.M. and 3 and 5 P.M., maintaining the same number of hours in a work day or work week while allowing employees to avoid rush-hour traffic, carry out domestic and personal errands, or get children off to school. The latter lengthened the work day from eight to ten hours while reducing the work week from five to four days, thereby giving employees a longer weekend and cutting down on travel time. Both schemes appeared to achieve their aims to the mutual satisfaction of some employers and employees.

In other enterprises, however, the experiments were unsuccessful either because of the nature of production or, in the extended work-day case, because of opposition to a lengthening of the historic eight-hour day. Unions, in particular, objected to the latter scheme. Instead, they proposed a shortening of the work week to 36 or 35 hours and the elimination or reduction of overtime. In 1973 one of the major issues in the lengthy Chrysler strike was compulsory overtime, and the compromise settlement provided that production employees may not be required to work more than nine hours a day, six days a week, or two consecutive Saturdays except during the annual model changeover period and at key parts plants. In 1976 a central issue of the Ford strike was an increase in the number of paid days off, and the three-year settlement provided for 13 additional paid nonwork days (over the three years, not per year) beyond the existing paid vacations and holidays. But this step toward reduced work time was designed to spread work and increase job opportunities rather than to make the work situation more palatable to employees.

Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, one of the paths to democratization of industry as well as to higher productivity advocated by some reformers was to give employees either a share in current profits or in stock ownership. In either event, it was felt that the tie of employees to the enterprise

15. See, for example, Riva Poor, ed., *4 Days, 40 Hours* (Cambridge, Mass.: Bursk and Poor, 1970); Douglas L. Fleuter, *The Workweek Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975).

would be strengthened and their productive effort would be enhanced. Neither profit sharing nor stock ownership made a great deal of headway, however, until after World War II. Changes in the tax law gave profit sharing a tremendous impetus with the result that between 1947 and 1965 the number of plans approved by the Internal Revenue Service rose from under 2,000 to nearly 43,000. Parallel tax law changes in 1974 and 1975 promised to have a comparable effect on stock ownership. A particular beneficiary was a plan developed and long advocated by lawyer Louis O. Kelso under the label ESOP (employee stock ownership plan). ESOPs have been used to enable companies to make capital investments at reduced interest and tax rates. In some cases, they have led to employee ownership of financially distressed companies. Although most of the ESOP users are comparatively small, an increasing number of major firms are exploring the feasibility and desirability of its adoption.

Whether profit sharing or stock ownership increases employee loyalty or productivity remains a debatable question.[16] There is very little hard evidence thus far that employee participation in decision making has advanced. For the most part, unions have been suspicious and antagonistic, fearing that successful schemes will weaken employee attachment to their union and unsuccessful ones will bring criticism on cooperating union leaders. Others are critical on the grounds that whatever financial benefit accrues to companies and employees will be at the expense of taxpayers and the U.S. Treasury.

16. See, for example, Bertram L. Metzger, *Profit Sharing in Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Profit Sharing Foundation, 1966) and Work in America Institute, Inc., *World of Work Report*, vol. 1, no. 7 (September 1976), pp. 4–5, for a discussion of ESOP.

UNION ATTITUDES

Throughout the swirl of discussion and experimentation during the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and Europe, the leaders of the American labor movement have maintained a firm ideological attachment to collective bargaining as the main route to industrial democracy.

This view was clearly and succinctly expressed by Thomas R. Donahue, executive assistant to the president of the AFL-CIO, in a speech delivered at an international conference in Montreal on May 26, 1976.

> We do not seek to be a partner in management—to be, most likely, the junior partner in success and the senior partner in failure.
>
> We do not want to blur in any way the distinctions between the respective roles of management and labor in the plant.
>
> We guard our independence fiercely—independent of government, independent of any political party and independent of management.
>
> . . . We've watched co-determination and its offshoot experiments with interest, and will continue to do so, but it is our judgment that it offers little to American unions in the performance of their job unionism role (given our exclusive representative status and our wide-open conflict bargaining) and it could only hurt U.S. unions as they pursue their social unionism functions —seeking through legislation, political action, community involvement and a host of other approaches, to improve our members' lot by improving society generally.[17]

17. International Conference on Trends in Industrial Relations, "Remarks" (mimeographed), p. 5.

William W. Winpisinger, general vice-president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, put labor's position about job enrichment more bluntly.

I can think of no better way to sum up my opinion of job enrichment than to say that it's nothing more than good old "job evaluation" and "time and motion study" in sheep's clothing. Any time industrial engineers and management get together, the workers end up getting it in the neck.[18]

A somewhat more sanguine view has been expressed by Irving Bluestone, a top official of the United Automobile Workers Union.

. . . American unions move to meet practical problems with practical solutions. It is highly improbable that they will approach the problem of worker participation in decision making via fierce ideological struggle founded in socioeconomic theory. . . . When workers feel victimized, they combine their forces to correct the situation, case by case, problem by problem. Gradual persistent change, not revolutionary upheaval, has marked the progress of the American worker.[19]

Bluestone went on to note that decisions regarding purchasing, advertising, selling, and financing, or the selection of a board chairman, are far more remote from the immediate problems facing the worker than are job-related decisions. He foresaw, as areas of possible confrontation between union and management, decisions about plant shutdowns and relocations, subcontracting of work or shuffling of work among facilities in a multiplant corporation, production scheduling and standards, technological innovation, and calls for excessive overtime. Beyond the immediate job level, however, he envisaged controversy about the double standard for managers and workers with regard to hourly and salaried pay and the use of time clocks, "paneled dining rooms" versus "spartan cafeterias," privileged parking facilities, and organizing the work schedule to enable the worker to manage his personal family and home chores. Responding, in effect, to the Lordstown publicity, he stated that one of the essential tasks of the union movement is to "humanize the work place." But he also warned that humanizing the work place "must not become simply another gimmick designed essentially to 'fool' the worker by having as its primary goal or hidden agenda an increase in worker productivity."[20]

As to the sentiments of the mass of union members on the subject of industrial democracy, John Carmichael, executive secretary of the Newspaper Guild of Minneapolis and St. Paul, suggests:

. . . many trade union leaders in this country have underestimated the interests of their members in this kind of development [that is, worker participation in the decisions of the work place].

18. "The Job Satisfaction Debate—What's Relevant to Labor," remarks at Center for Labor Research and Education, Palo Alto, California, 28 September 1974 (mimeographed), p. 13.

19. "Worker Participation in Decision Making," in Roy P. Fairfield, ed., *Humanizing the Workplace* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1974), p. 57.

20. Correspondence with the Research Department of the UAW in November 1976 revealed that following the 1973 GM agreement, 14 local participative programs had been developed within the corporation, 10 involving the UAW. Because of a commitment not to publicize the programs prematurely, the informant was not able to provide details, but he reported that in some cases discipline problems had disappeared, absenteeism had dropped dramatically, the quality of the product as well as efficiency had improved, and respect for both company and union had increased.

It may not have surfaced yet in a volatile way, but I am convinced the interest is there. You don't have to be an alienated, dissatisfied worker to be interested in worker participation. Some of the most productive, responsible workers . . . are interested in workplace decision-making and will participate.[21]

Carmichael's view is given some reinforcement by a report issued by a group of some 50 California trade unionists, members of a wide variety of unions, attending a university conference on "The Changing World of Work." The report starts out with the assertion: "This first Western Assembly of Workers calls for a major extension of democratic principles in the workplace. While our individual needs vary widely, we have the strong conviction that we as workers generally have too long been ignored in making critical decisions affecting our work life."[22] The report continues, however, with an expression of strong support for the collective bargaining system, and the belief that it is compatible with a broader worker participation role. It calls, in particular, for experiments with worker-elected supervisors, without disciplinary powers, whose primary function would be coordination.

PROSPECTS

Predicting the future course of social change is a dubious project. The history of American industrial democracy, however, suggests little prospect of dramatic change in the work place during the foreseeable period ahead. Partly out of concern with domestic problems including high turnover and absenteeism, ineffective discipline, and slackening productivity growth, and partly in response to publicity about recent European industrial relations developments, American managers and unionists have displayed increasing sensitivity to methods of extending worker participation in decision making, making the work place more satisfying, and reducing job boredom. But the approaches that have been adopted in most quarters have reflected the traditional pragmatic, nonideological spirit, and collective bargaining, despite its recognized limitations and imperfections, seems certain to retain its dominant role.

Indeed, the strength of collective bargaining has been its pragmatic quality in response to changing conditions and needs. It has never been constant or static, as even a superficial review of bargaining structure and scope, contract administration, and dispute settlement procedures demonstrates. Most of the recent innovations in job redesign, employee-supervisor relations, flexible work schedules, and incentive pay schemes are compatible with collective bargaining. Joint union-management productivity and work quality committees have many forebears. Neither profit sharing nor stock ownership is novel, and recent versions, largely stimulated by tax law benefits, do not appear to promise a fundamental change in the management of most enterprises. Finally, there is little current evidence that American workers or unions desire to assume managerial responsibilities apart from the codetermination of job-related terms and conditions.

21. "Worker Participation in the U.S.: Seeds of a Quiet Revolution," paper prepared for Harvard Trade Union Program, fall 1974, p. 42.

22. "The Changing World of Work," Report of the Western Assembly of Workers, 27–29 September 1974, Palo Alto, California, sponsored by the Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley, and The American Assembly, Columbia University.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 431, May 1977

Participative Management in India: Utopia or Snare?

By SUBBIAH KANNAPPAN AND V. N. KRISHNAN

ABSTRACT: In India, the appeal of worker participation has derived from the utopian premises of the Indian development model with its promise of rational planning and democratic processes. The former strengthened the directive role of the government while the latter served as the medium of interest-group mobilization and mediation. Whatever positive role one may attribute to these, in the absence of other structural changes they had, at best, negligible or uncertain consequences in terms of favoring worker participation in management. One reason for this is that the cultural and economic distances between management and labor were great, with little to take the place of weakened traditional authority structures. The government scheme for worker participation, although beset by weaknesses, failed largely because the external environment was inhospitable, and one may expect this to continue into the foreseeable future. The Indian Emergency of 1975 signaled a dramatic change, with a more explicitly top-directed scheme. If made permanent, this would move Indian practice closer to that of the Communist countries, with an integrated structure of economic and industrial authority and provision for modest but subordinate labor inputs in the decision-making process.

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INDIA was at the center of the development stage and the scene of much talk about democratic development and industrial democracy when, in 1956, an official tripartite committee reported favorably on the prospects for participative management.[1] Influential Indian opinion saw in worker participation an embryonic basis for broader efforts to integrate interest groups at the national level. Its appeal was no less important for those with a narrower focus, such as trade union leaders—and difficult to disregard in this discussion—for the government exercised broad and detailed regulatory power over the economy and industrial relations at national, industrial, and plant levels.

THE INDIAN ENVIRONMENT

Organized labor in India was participating in decision making in three important ways:

1. It was represented in the government's tripartite Indian Labor Conference and associated tripartite bodies at regional, industrial, and other more narrowly defined levels.
2. It was engaged in collective bargaining and related procedures and such institutions as grievance handling, complaint and suggestion systems, and works councils (which were statutorily required in registered factories over a certain size), and less explicitly in the governmental conciliation and arbitration process.
3. It was participating in joint management councils, joint consultative boards (in some of the larger public sector undertakings), union representation on boards of directors, workers' cooperatives, and employee profit-sharing plans, all of which sought to enhance the worker's status and possibly also his stake in the system of industrial authority.

The industrial relations framework mainly affected wage-earning labor in the urban and modern sector of the economy: the factories, railways, posts and telegraphs, mines, plantations, large commercial establishments, ports and docks. Although this sector was and still is strategically well placed and total employment is substantial, it covers not more than 3 to 4 percent of the labor force.

The ingredients for successful and constructive labor-management relations generally did not exist. Except in rare instances, employers did not recognize unions. Union leaders were poorly versed in the arts of collective negotiations and more prone to resort to mass action to influence public policies.

Even when employers were legally required to recognize unions and attempts were made to structure industrial relations, as in the well-known Maharashtra (formerly Bombay state) procedures, there was no concomitant obligation for the employer to bargain in good faith. Further, in the giant textile industry—the main focus of this legislation—negotiations at the peak level in an industry characterized by many units could not readily go beyond such generalizable issues as wages and service conditions. There were also continuing disputes concerning the representative nature of the recognized union. The legal requirement was 15 percent of industrial employment, and there were no pro-

1. India: Ministry of Labor and Employment, *Report of the Study Group on Worker Participation in Management* (New Delhi: Manager of Publication, 1957).

cedures for a secret ballot to handle challenges. Even under favorable circumstances, it would have been difficult for workers to participate in decisions at such an aggregate level. Employer involvement, too, was limited to the level of the employers' associations, embracing diverse units with considerable variations in the economic and production conditions of member firms.

More generally, government action in industrial relations was aimed at the industry level, whether nationally, in major regions, or in metropolitan areas. In the public sector, decision making was centralized at the national level—for example, through the Railway Board which functioned as employer of over a million workers, or through the employing ministries, such as the one for steel which incorporated large modern plants. To be sure, there were some elements of participation and democracy in these relationships as unions had freedom to organize and employers, public or private, could challenge or otherwise seek to influence prevailing approaches by their side. Observers have also noted the growing professionalism of Indian management and, to a lesser extent, Indian unions. Nevertheless, to the extent that there was a clearly discernible national pattern, what stood out was the interplay among well-organized interest groups rather than the ingredients of effective employee participation in the managerial process. The involvement of interest groups at peak levels was at best only an exercise of shared management, with the government as the dominant figure. While the industrial and economic system led to centralized authority, the emerging political system mobilized the challenges to the system, and the pattern of accommodation which emerged was an important lubricant.[2]

The recommendations of the 1956 tripartite committee, which ushered in an era of experimentation with joint management councils, are best seen as an effort to improve the top-heavy structure of confrontation and reconciliation. The effort was, however, a very limited and conservative one. It involved no substantive change of economic or productive relations even in the developed sectors of economic activity to which it was applied. There were no organizational changes involving union or industrial authority, or changes in the patterns of decision making. The framework of industrial relations remained unchanged. Since a good deal of the literature in and about India on this subject pertains to this particular experiment, we will briefly discuss its lessons.[3]

2. R. D. Agarwal, *Dynamics of Labour Relations in India, a Book of Readings* (Bombay: Tata-McGraw Hill Co., Ltd., 1972).

3. Important references include the following: K. C. Alexander, *Participative Management—The Indian Experience* (New Delhi: Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, 1972); Subbiah Kannappan, "Worker Participation in Management: A Review of Indian Experience," *International Institute of Labour Studies*, Bulletin 5 (November 1968); D. P. Pandit, *Worker Participation in Management: Myth and Reality* (New Delhi: N.V. Publications, 1975); K. C. Sethi, "Worker Participation in Management," *Eastern Economist*, vol. 55 (31 July 1970), pp. 181–87; N. R. Sheth, *The Joint Management Council, Problems and Prospects* (New Delhi: Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, 1972); Zivan Tanić, *Workers' Participation in Management: Ideal and Reality in India* (New Delhi: Shri Ram Center, 1969); C. P. Thakur and K. L. Sethi, eds., *Industrial Democracy: Some Issues and Experiences* (New Delhi: Shri Ram Centre, 1973).

THE 1956 EXPERIMENT IN WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT

The 1956 recommendations drew some inspiration from the utopian aspects of practices abroad, particularly the Yugoslav experiment in self-management. Other stimuli included American attempts to identify the causes of industrial peace with a view to diffusing their influence more generally. Nevertheless, Indian conditions were regarded as so different as to warrant initially only an experimental and limited venture.

The scheme which was eventually applied envisaged the constitution of joint management councils that would: (1) be assured access to certain information about the economic and employment conditions of the firm and industry; (2) be consulted on certain issues like wages and employment conditions; and (3) be given shared authority in the administration of plant welfare and safety facilities. Overall, the executive authority of management was preserved, while the representational role and status of workers' representatives were to be enhanced.

From the very beginning, the intent was to proceed cautiously. The role of workers' representatives was to evolve in proportion to the development of their skill and training for participation. The development of appropriate attitudes was stressed, and the government was to assist the process by providing an advisory personnel management service as in the United Kingdom. The scheme was also, initially at any rate, to be introduced only in some 50 enterprises employing at least 500 persons each. All these cautions and qualifications did not, however, obscure the more ambitious thrust, despite doubts concerning the underlying commitment. The idea was planted that workers would obtain increasing opportunities for influencing major decisions affecting the enterprise. The areas of influence would go beyond wages and bonuses and would include, at least potentially, such items as production, marketing strategies, capital expansion, technical change, and finances.

However, the Indian environment presented some features that were to frustrate these expectations. In the absence of a mandatory and well-defined procedure for collective bargaining, there was the clear possibility that the joint management councils would become bargaining rather than participative forums, although the participative scheme envisaged a clear separation of the two. Second, there were long-standing and unresolved conflicts between rival organizations over rights of representation. These conflicts extended both to the unit of representation and to the proper procedures to settle the conflicting claims. Also, the cultural and ideological climate of suspicion and distance between organized labor and management made it difficult to separate the quest for participation from potentially even more disruptive issues involving the legitimacy of (private) management and employer attitudes rooted in the traditions of authority.[4]

The scheme hoped to bypass all these problems by being both voluntary and selective. The latter criterion emphasized the need to

4. Jai B. P. Sinha, "A Case of Reversal in Participative Management," *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations* (October 1974), pp. 179–87.

choose units which had a superior record in constructive labor relations. However, the pressure for demonstrated successes led to a watering down of the selectivity criterion. Although the emphasis was on the demonstration effect of successful experiments, conflicting expectations clouded this prospect. The units which did exceptionally well by Indian standards, such as the Indian Aluminum Works at Belur, were untypical in the Indian context: they were usually capital-intensive, had a skilled labor force, and were part of the large-scale corporate structure being developed under India's import-substitution policies. The successful cases were few, and the emphasis on joint management was often counter-productive even when there was enthusiasm for consultation.[5]

There is really little to be added to the Indian literature on participative management which emphasizes the divergence between expectations and actual performance and voices the skepticism derived from contrasting official claims with observed progress. However, the experience does offer lessons of more general value, for it testifies to the enduring and intractable aspects of the Indian industrial relations scene. A brief representative sample of difficulties associated with the 1956 experiment will illustrate the point.

The record of meetings of joint councils was poor. Of 99 councils at the end of 1965, 29 had never met during the year, 25 less than once in a quarter, and of the 34 public sector units, 9 had never met.

The record of information sharing was poor, and managements, which provided the joint council chairmen, were reluctant even to supply an agenda in advance.

Joint administration of welfare measures was not observed, and there was not even an identifiable budget as a basis for shared responsibility.

Paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes were noted in managerial approaches, and in one case even the mere courtesy of providing tea or adequate seating facilities was not extended.

Worker and management representatives had conflicting emphases, the former stressing material changes and benefits, while the latter, limited in authority, were content to observe the status quo.

There was only limited consultation and follow-through, even when decisions were taken unanimously in the joint councils.

It should be emphasized, first, that the participating firms were not the "backward" segments of Indian industry but rather the modern units and, second, that they had volunteered to experiment with joint councils. The difficulties in the way of developing shared responsibility were not unique to this particular experiment and will survive well into the future. However, the scheme was not officially terminated, but allowed to fade away, a high-ranking official explaining that the former step required too much conscious purpose. Only with the declaration of an emergency in 1975 did the government announce a drastically altered course.

THE INDIAN EMERGENCY OF 1975 AND AFTER

The changes introduced in 1975 extend, of course, beyond partici-

5. N. R. Sheth, ibid., pp. 134–35.

pative management, and this fact should be noted. The dominant emphasis is on raising the level of industrial discipline and reducing work stoppages and other disruptions of work. The national tripartite machinery, including the well-known Indian Labor Conference, has been dismantled. In its place, bipartite bodies have been established at national industrial levels excluding, however, the public sector. For purposes of national consultation, the government has expressed its intention of not dealing with any labor organizations other than the three major national federations, the Indian National Trades Union Congress (INTUC), All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), and Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS). Apparently this arrangement will exclude other trade unions and groups in the country, but the scope of the exclusion is not clear as yet. Despite the revival of a plan for worker participation, there is some indication that the trade union leadership has become restive, since independent action by trade unions is now greatly restricted.[6]

On October 30, 1975, the Indian government announced a new set of guidelines for worker participation in mining and manufacturing in units employing 500 or more workers.[7] Two levels of joint councils were envisaged: a shop council at the department or shop floor level and an enterprise council. Their primary functions are to improve productivity, discipline, absenteeism, and similar shortcomings. Enterprise councils were endowed with some appellate authority. As before, representation on the councils was equally divided between workers and managerial representatives, with one of the latter serving as chairman. Representational procedures were to be flexibly determined by individual councils.

Apart from the emphasis on productivity and discipline, it is worth noting that the new scheme was entirely government-initiated without the preliminary extensive process of tripartite consultation and consensus-building which had characterized earlier initiatives. Although the concept of worker participation and shared responsibility occupies a prominent place in the 20-point program, it would be naive to assume that the impediments noted in earlier periods will readily disappear. It is also germane to point to the increased authority of management in the new order. Issues which earlier were subject to bargaining, such as wages, bonus payments, and fringe benefits, are now to come under a centrally administered wage restraint and freeze policy. Whether the framework which will eventually emerge is, as in China and other countries, a mechanism for mass mobilization and involvement rather than participation depends on how the political system itself will evolve and what balance will ultimately be struck in the distribution of power among different groups in society, including organized labor.

LESSONS OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Indian experience has been the conservative nature of the experiment. Despite lofty goals, there was hardly any change in the

6. B. M., "New Framework for Industrial Relations," *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 10, no. 47 (22 November 1975), p. 1789.

7. India: Ministry of Labor, *Scheme for Workers' Participation in Industry at Shop-Floor and Plant Level*, Resolution No. 561001 (4)/75-DK, I(B), 30 (October 1975).

economic and political structure, nor even in the approaches of the parties immediately affected. While some may see in this just another manifestation of a supposedly ubiquitous vacillation and softness in the Indian national character, it may really be an expression of the power structure and its disinterest in change.[8] Patterns of concentration of authority were actually reinforced by the economic policies pursued at the same time as populist pressures were encouraged in the nascent democracy. More often than not this encouraged conflict rather than cooperation. The latter remained a pious hope, while the former mushroomed into massive confrontations emphasizing the role of government as policeman rather than as reformer. While some conflicts, such as the central government employees' strike of 1960 and the railwaymen's strike of 1973, were national in scope, there were other tensions elsewhere in rural and district organization indicating similar problems with participatory expectations.

Despite the emphasis by observers on the professionalization of Indian top management and the improved caliber of trade union leadership in the more established industrial centers, one cannot be sanguine about the scope for decentralization in decision making. In spite of nearly 20 years' experience and exhortations, the situation which exists in a leading nationalized industry (that is, steel) cannot even assure managerial authority, let alone workers' participation. A respected observer and manager, with a union background, observed in 1976:

> . . . collective bargaining on really important issues remains somewhat unreal in public enterprises. Even the managers of these enterprises find it quite difficult to change the existing rules, procedures and systems. . . . Once, when I declared a very small token reward to a section of employees . . . for a particularly admirable piece of work . . . and although such reward was both well within my prescribed powers to give and in conformity with past practice, I received a pointed query from New Delhi about it. Similarly, when the revision of the national wages agreement with the union for the steel industry was being negotiated in the latter part of 1974 and the first half of 1975, neither the bargaining strategy nor the specific offers were decided in consultation with the plant managements or even the chairman or board of Hindustan Steel. . . .
>
> In such a situation, negotiating with their own management is a frustrating and somewhat fruitless exercise for the employees and their unions. . . . The only way they feel they can fight this feeling of powerlessness and alienation is by displaying negative attitudes, indifference in work and postures of defiance. . . .

He acknowledges that there are also instances of gross indiscipline and deliberately low output, but adds revealingly that these are, by contrast, a more straightforward management task: when a problem arises, it "is often the result of management not standing—or not being allowed to stand—firm."[9] While the private sector may be free from some of these troubles, it still remains true that many items in labor-management relations are nationally

8. Van D. Kennedy, "India: Tender-mindedness vs. Tough Problems," *Industrial Relations* (October 1965), pp. 1–22. Kennedy stressed the need for toughness of mind in tackling tough problems. He felt that the national leadership has not used its powers to the fullest.

9. Bagaram Tulpule, "Management and Workers in Public Sector," *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 11, no. 22 (29 May 1976), pp. M-49–M-58.

controlled. The emergency appears to have strengthened this framework.

It may be relevant at this stage to ask what are the sources of the pressure for participation. The 1956 experiment was introduced from above, although there was an accompanying chorus of demands from national trade union federations. The revived interest in worker participation in 1975, in the context of the Indian emergency, is an innovation directed from the top which has dispensed with the formality of prior consultations with affected groups. What is not clear is the extent to which Indian workers, even before the emergency, were interested in the promise of participatory management and in expanding the scope of their interests to cover issues other than wages, bonuses, and job security. A top-directed scheme, without a corresponding worker demand or enthusiasm for participation is likely to remain a pious hope.[10] Alternatively, it might develop into an instrument of national mobilization but hardly of participation. Under optimistic assumptions, one could envisage the new system as being more efficient and equitable in solving problems of production and work-place relations. A more realistic possibility, however, is that it will minimize the divergent pulls inherent to the earlier system of industrial and economic authority and patterns of political mobilization and articulation.

Whether workers accept or reject the new order will depend fundamentally on their anticipations. Lest one forget, when in 1968 Charles de Gaulle spoke of the need for participation, the radical students of Nanterre chanted:

Je participe
Tu participes
Il participe
Nous participons
Vous participez
Ils exploitent

This reaction is potentially applicable to India, China, or any other country where participation is seen as a panacea. A similar inclination toward unrealistic expectations was noted by the senior author in Sri Lanka in 1971 in the context of a national emergency. Both national and visiting experts seemed ready to latch on to the promise of worker participation as a vehicle for developing a national purpose.

This brings us to another aspect of the Indian experience. A great deal of effort has been devoted to separating conflict issues, such as bonus and wages, from participatory issues such as production, discipline, and other day-to-day concerns. The effort is well intentioned and, within certain limits, sound. At the same time, it is clear that these issues are interdependent, and it would be futile to keep them artificially separate in the face of festering discontent, no matter how skillful the procedural compartments. More generally, this point also applies to the scope of worker participation as a contribution to the national purpose. Both conflict and cooperation are part of the participatory processes, and the utility of participation depends on how well it can handle both. Attempts to separate them, except as a device for orderly progress in both respects, or attempts to smother one while encouraging the other are likely to fail or at best to yield illusory progress which convinces no one but the faithful.

10. A post-emergency observation by a distinguished Indian economist is pertinent: "There has been much talk of workers' participation in industrial management. But it provides, at best, some window-dressing." V. M. Dandekar, *Illustrated Weekly of India*, 17–23 October 1976, p. 11.

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The Industrial Community in Peru

By WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE AND GIORGIO ALBERTI

ABSTRACT: The Industrial Community is a government-imposed reform program for private industry in Peru. Created in 1970, the Industrial Community was designed to improve relations between labor and management, to increase productivity, to redistribute income and enhance social justice, and to accelerate economic progress. The record shows that the Industrial Community has fallen far short of the expectations of government leaders on all of these points. Reasons for the generally negative outcomes are examined.

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In 1976 Whyte and Alberti published Power, Politics and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru, *the major report in English of this Cornell-IEP program.*

THE Peruvian Industrial Community (IC) was brought into existence by government decree through the General Industrial Law of July 1970. The terms and conditions were specified in more detail in the Industrial Community Law announced in September of that year.[1]

The IC was envisaged as an important part of a broad program of the revolutionary military government, designed to restructure all of Peruvian society. According to government spokesmen, this reform of private industry had the following objectives:

1. to improve relations between labor and management;
2. to increase productivity;
3. to redistribute income and enhance social justice;
4. to accelerate economic progress.

There may have been one further objective, which, though never expressed by government spokesmen, was often reported by those who claimed to be close to the government: the IC in the long run would give workers sufficient power and economic stake in their firms to eliminate the necessity of unions. After coming to power in October 1968, government leaders had repeatedly argued that the existing political parties had served the interests of party leaders at the expense of the population. Unions, being closely linked with political parties, were similarly distrusted by the new leaders of Peru.

1. The present report is part of a larger study being published in book form in Peru. We base our conclusions on close examination of 44 firms and extensive documentary records and interviews with management, union, and IC leaders by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The application of the law on the Industrial Community was initially limited to private manufacturing industry, but in succeeding months the government decreed similar legislation to cover mining, energy, and fishing. The original law decreed the establishment of an Industrial Community in every manufacturing firm with six or more employees or with a volume of sales amounting to more than 1 million soles per year (about $24,000). With the exception of individuals holding stock in the firm, the IC was all-inclusive in its membership, making no distinction between blue- and white-collar workers or between workers and members of management. The law required each firm to turn over annually to the Industrial Community 15 percent of profits before taxes in the form of stock. If the firm reinvested enough profits to make up this 15 percent, the payment could be made in newly issued stock. Otherwise, management was required to turn over the required percentage by drawing on the holdings of the existing private stockholders. The distribution process was to go on until the IC had accumulated 50 percent of stock ownership. From that point on, the 15 percent payments would be made in cash.

The General Industrial Law also required each company to make an annual cash distribution of 10 percent of its profits before taxes to all employees. While this clause was not an integral part of the section establishing the Industrial Community, there was nevertheless a general tendency among workers to credit their gain to the IC since it came into being at the same time.

In each firm, a so-called general

assembly of all members of the IC elected a council of five to nine members, depending on the size of the firm. The council elected a chairman and also a representative to the board of directors of the company. While the IC was entitled to have a representative on the board even before it had come into possession of any stock, the law also provided that in the future IC representation on the board of directors would increase proportionately with the stockholdings of the community.

The law imposed an important shift in power relations between management and the workers. The government decreed that IC representatives on the board of directors should have the same rights as representatives of the private stockholders. Implementing regulations issued several months after the passage of the law decreed that IC representatives on the board were to have access to the company's books and also had the right to hire outside accountants, lawyers, or other specialists to help them interpret these documents. Furthermore, to prevent management from retaining control through a divide-and-conquer strategy as the IC holdings approached 50 percent, the law specified that the IC representatives on the board must vote in a bloc. Finally, so as to separate the IC from unions—and perhaps also to weaken the unions—the law provided that individuals holding union office could not be elected to the IC council.

THE CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

The ability of the government to impose such drastic changes upon private industry can only be understood in terms of the weakness of the private manufacturing sector in Peru. Peru's industrialization came late and progressed slowly. The census of 1940 found only 17.2 percent of the economically active population employed in manufacturing and construction. Particularly during and following World War II, manufacturing appeared to be expanding rapidly, and yet the 1961 census counted only 16.8 percent of the economically active population employed in manufacturing and construction.[2] The expansion of jobs in this sector had not even kept pace with the expansion of the economically active population.

Most of the important firms in manufacturing, mining, and banking were foreign owned. Furthermore, Peruvian-owned manufacturing enterprises had been founded mostly by immigrants or sons of immigrants whose foreign origins retarded their movement into positions of economic and political power. Members of the economic and social elite were divided by rivalries between those whose primary interests were in agriculture and mining and those devoted to manufacturing. There was also a small but vigorous group of manufacturers who were seeking government support for their growing exports.

Organized labor was weak and divided. The labor federation CTP (*Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos*) had been founded by members of the APRA party (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) of Haya de la Torre, and APRA had had a long history of conflict with the military and particularly with previous military

2. Magali Sarfatti Larson and Arlene Eisen Bergman, *Social Stratification in Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1969), pp. 319–20.

governments. The present military government granted official recognition to a rival organization, the Communist-led CGTP (*Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos*). The move was regarded by some of the government's critics as evidence that the military leaders were Communist sympathizers, but the decision can be more plausibly explained in terms of a divide-and-conquer strategy.

While Peru previously had many military governments, the junta that came to power in 1968 was the first one committed to a program of restructuring society. This new direction can be accounted for by changes which had taken place in the structure and education within the military establishment. In the 1950s, Peru established for the first time a joint chiefs of staff organization which set the stage for what are now called institutional coups. Instead of some individual strongman seizing power, the joint chiefs simply make a collective decision to move from the barracks into the presidential palace, with the head of the joint chiefs becoming president. Such a collective move is more likely to be based on prior discussion of program and policy than in the case of an individual leader who seizes power on the basis of his popularity and personal influence within the officer corps.

The 1950s in Peru were also marked by the establishment of CAEM, the Center for Higher Military Studies, which developed a 10-month educational program for senior officers in the army, air force, and navy. The CAEM program gave relatively little attention to strictly military matters and concentrated on the social, economic, and political problems of Peru, reflecting the philosophy of its founder that "to have a strong national defense, the first requirement is to have a country that is worth defending."[3]

The CAEM program was the capstone of an ambitious military educational system. Luigi Einaudi[4] has pointed out that promotions in the Peruvian military establishment have long been based primarily upon educational achievements.

The CAEM program developed along ideological lines congruent with the changes taking place in Peruvian intellectual circles, that is, basically from laissez-faire economics to the structural emphasis of dependency theorists.[5] The program focused upon Peru's needs for structural change, for gaining control over its own vital resources, and for controlling its destiny through economic planning.

While the intellectual roots of the IC have not been fully documented, the basic conception seems to derive from three sources: the social doctrine of the Catholic church, an examination of certain European experiences, and the urge of government leaders to create an original Peruvian model. The church supplied a vision of society in which class conflict would give way to a harmonious order with greater social justice for working people. Peruvians had been greatly attracted to self-management, but they recognized that the system in Yugoslavia had arisen out of a set of wartime and postwar develop-

3. Personal conversation with General José del Carmen Marín, founder of CAEM.

4. Luigi Einaudi, *The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis* (Los Angeles: The Rand Corporation, 1969).

5. Joseph A. Kahl, *Modernization, Exploitation and Dependency in Latin America: Germani, Gonzalez Casanova and Cardoso* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, Inc., 1976).

ments which had largely eliminated private ownership of industrial plants so the way was cleared for the government to establish a new set of relations between workers and management. Peruvians were also interested in West German codetermination but did not think it went far enough in changing relations between workers and management. Finally, government spokesmen repeatedly proclaimed that their regime was "neither capitalist nor communist" but was building a distinctively Peruvian model of society. They took pride in the fact that nothing like the Industrial Community had ever existed anywhere before.

THE IMPACT OF THE IC

The announcement of the IC was greeted with shocked surprise by leaders of private industry. While they objected to the double-barreled 15 percent and 10 percent distributions of profits to the IC and employees, their main concern was the threat to the control of their companies. Their anxieties were increased by government measures affecting other parts of the economy. The government had expropriated the International Petroleum Company in the first days of the regime and had followed up with expropriations of some foreign-owned banks and mining companies. A drastic agrarian reform program was decreed in 1969. Furthermore, within a few months after the decree establishing the IC, public discussion turned to the creation of an even more "advanced" form of industrial organization: social property, a worker-managed set of enterprises to be financed largely by government. Government spokesmen repeatedly proclaimed that social property was destined to become the predominant form of industrial enterprise in Peru. Since such a development could not be achieved with the limited resources the government had to invest in social property, private industry leaders naturally feared that the government would respond to worker and union pressures to accelerate the structural changes by transforming the industrial community into fully worker-managed enterprises.

As soon as the Industrial Community Law was decreed, private industry leaders began to study it in hopes of finding ways by which they could retain control of their companies. If they did not reinvest profits and had to provide the 15 percent stock distribution annually from holdings of existing shareholders, clearly they would accelerate the loss of control. If, on the other hand, they did follow a policy of reinvesting each year at least 15 percent they found that, as the law was being interpreted, such a policy would only postpone for a few years the eventual acquisition of 50 percent by the IC. While management critics of the law at first concentrated their fire on the impracticality of having a 50-50 division of power between the IC and private shareholders, they gradually came to realize that the "tipping point" at which control could shift to the employees might come well before the 50 percent level had been reached. As the IC approached a 50 percent holding, many private stockholders would anticipate that, on gaining control of the company, the IC would raise wages to take 100 percent of potential profits for employees instead of dividing the returns equally. Such an expectation could lead to panic selling on the part of individual shareholders, thus al-

lowing the IC to gain an absolute majority through purchases of stocks thrown on the market.

There seemed to be only three ways by which managers representing the private shareholders could retain control:

1. ensure such poor economic performance that there would be few or no profits to share with the IC;
2. raise executive salaries at the expense of profits in those cases where members of management held large blocks of stock;
3. expand the capital base of the company through reinvesting more than the 15 percent slice taken by the IC and bringing in additional capital.

None of these options offered a satisfactory solution to private management. The first course would have meant retaining control of a firm constantly on the edge of bankruptcy. The second course, while apparently followed in some firms, naturally provoked conflict with the industrial community which now had full access to the company's books and could challenge exorbitant executive salary raises in the press and before the Ministry of Industry and Tourism responsible for administering the law. A substantial increase in the capital base was simply not practical in a climate characterized by lack of investor confidence.

Union leaders in the CTP were as surprised as management by the creation of the Industrial Community, but their reactions were quite different. While some of them expressed concern that the IC might weaken unions, they welcomed both profit sharing and participation in managerial decision making. At the same time, they tended to regard the IC as a hybrid that could not be expected to have a long life. Therefore, when the discussion on social property began, radical union leaders and a number of intellectual leftists argued that the IC should only be a transitional form, eventually giving way to social property.

Marxists were divided in their stance toward the IC. Some viewed it as a dangerous move toward class conciliation, while others argued that the IC deserved support because it gave more power to the unions and the working class.

CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

As a measure to promote industrial peace, the IC has been a disappointment to its sponsors. In the five years preceding its establishment, the official statistics record 1,889 strikes. In the five years following the IC creation, there were 2,993 strikes, an increase of almost 60 percent. There were 372 strikes in 1969, the last year before the IC. The 1975 total was 794, second only to the peak year of 1973 when 824 strikes were registered.[6] In the early months of 1976, as industrial conflict mounted, the government found it necessary to outlaw strikes. While it would be an oversimplification to blame all of the increase on the IC, clearly the record lends no support to the government's predictions that the new institution would create harmony between workers and managers.

An examination of specific cases shows that the IC's impact has varied according to the characteristics of the parties. In general, the larger the firm, the greater the rise in levels of conflict. Firms located in the political and economic center of the country, the Lima metropolitan area,

6. *Industria Peruna* (January 1976).

where about 70 percent of manufacturing is concentrated, have been more involved in conflicts than firms in the provinces. In firms where union leaders had ties to a leftist political party, there tended to be more conflicts with the IC than in firms where union leaders were not so heavily politicized. Of course, these variables often go together, since most of the large firms are in the Lima metropolitan area and the political commitments of union leaders in the capital are likely to be stronger than in the provinces.

The relationship between conflict and profits was rather complicated. High conflict situations existed among both highly profitable and highly unprofitable firms, but all of the firms where the IC and management and union leaders considered relations to be harmonious had above average profits.

Although some well-known cases of union-management cooperation in the United States have arisen during economic crises where the firm was facing bankruptcy, there do not seem to be any counterparts in Peru. The failure of the parties to close ranks and seek cooperation when the firm is facing bankruptcy is probably due to the quite different social, political, and economic setting. IC leaders seemed less inclined to cooperate with management and instead preferred to give an additional push toward the precipice in the hopes that the government would step in following bankruptcy and reorganize the firm on a social property basis.

We were unable to find a single case where the creation of the Industrial Community had changed a conflict situation to one of labor-management cooperation. On the contrary, we were impressed by the continuities in labor relations before and after the establishment of the new institution. Where union and management had a history of conflict and mistrust, the IC became, as several executives called it, "just a second front in the war." Where relations between union and management had previously been reasonably harmonious, the introduction of the IC was accomplished without any serious disturbances, but there was no evidence that the IC itself had improved the already existing good relations.

Instead of fading away with the development of the IC, at least at the local level, as the government had anticipated, the unions appeared to be gaining strength. In fact, in some cases formation of the IC actually precipitated the organization of unions where none existed before.

Whereas government spokesmen envisioned the IC as strictly separate from the union, the record shows that these expectations have been illusory. Since all union members also belong to the IC of their firm, the aim to keep the two organizations separate has turned out to be clearly unrealistic. In general, where the union has been well organized and strong, its leaders have controlled the nomination and election of IC council members. Close relations between the two organizations can be an important aid to militant union leaders, especially since the IC enables union leaders to obtain information from the company's books on financial and other previously confidential matters.

A general atmosphere of conflict does not necessarily preclude instances of cooperation. Occasionally, when bargaining between

union and management has broken down, IC leaders have assumed a mediating role. There are also cases where the IC and management have worked together to protect mutual interests. For example, they may jointly urge government to grant a price increase for their product, to make available the foreign exchange necessary to import raw materials needed by the firm, or to block the establishment of a competing firm in the same industry.

Initially, government leaders did not plan to have a national organization of industrial communities, but as IC leaders from various firms went through common orientation and training programs, their association naturally suggested the desirability of a national organization. When the government finally permitted a national meeting of Industrial Communities, it quickly got out of control. While government leaders emphasized the distinction between the ICs and unions and denied that the ICs were simply a way-station to social property, the delegates overwhelmingly passed a set of militant resolutions, urging the government to push the IC toward social property and defining the IC as primarily an instrument to strengthen unions so as to advance the interests of the working class.

Being unable first to prevent and then to control the national organization CONACI (*Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Industriales*), government officials sought to divide it by sponsoring and financing a dissident group representing the smaller firms with less highly politicized IC members. While this schism persisted for several months, the two groups eventually proceeded to negotiate their differences and form a more or less unified national organization.

PRODUCTIVITY

Management often acknowledges that the IC has stimulated technological change, at least in profitable firms. While private investors have been reluctant to put up new capital, there has been a general tendency of firms to reinvest 15 percent of their profits, not only to improve output but also to save private investors from having to transfer some of their shares to the Industrial Community. The IC also has apparently lowered worker and union resistance to the introduction of new machinery. This is not to say that unions have ceased resistance to layoffs due to technological change, but they have put less pressure on management to replace workers who quit or retire. Management is thus able to reduce the workforce through attrition.

Since the IC is made up of blue-collar and white-collar workers, as well as accountants, supervisors, and engineers, there is at least a theoretical possibility that the IC might develop into an internal consulting organization capable of suggesting improvements in efficiency. We found no case where this possibility had even been attempted. Management has been highly sensitive to even the appearance of infringements on managerial prerogatives. IC criticisms and suggestions regarding managerial efficiency have not resulted from systematic study but have been couched in the form of attacks on management extravagance. For example, IC council leaders tend to question executive salaries and bonuses, consultation fees, expense accounts, the private use of com-

pany cars, and similar vulnerable areas.

In the early months following enactment of the IC law, some management and IC leaders commented on improvements in worker motivation. However, as time went on such comments became less frequent. There is reason to believe that the dramatic announcement of the Industrial Community generated expectations of a new era in labor relations. As the old frictions and conflicts broke out again, attitudes on both sides seemed to revert to the old pattern. However, there may have been one lasting change: a greatly increased worker interest in training programs both for job skills and for an understanding of management.

Utilization of the knowledge and ideas of rank and file workers depends upon a structural innovation that Peruvian management has been most reluctant to carry out. The law requires worker participation only at the top level, in the board of directors. Except in a very small firm, this is a most inappropriate place for serious discussions of productivity because the management representatives are far removed from the shop situation and the worker representatives can know intimately only small parts of the total operation. If workers are to contribute valuable productivity information and ideas, they must be involved in the decision-making process at the level of the shop or section where they work. While there have been occasional statements from government officials to the effect that it would be a good idea to extend worker participation in decision making down to the shop level, leading spokesmen of private industry have vigorously rejected such suggestions as involving further encroachment on the prerogatives of management.

DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Government rhetoric has emphasized the redistribution of income for the benefit of low income groups. In these terms, the IC can hardly be considered successful. The incomes of Peruvian blue-collar workers in the more modern sectors of industry put them within the top 25 percent of the population. Thus, the distribution of profits from private industry through the IC amounts to taking money from the top 1 percent and distributing it within the top quartile of the income-earning population. And since the better paid workers are generally employed in the more profitable firms, profit sharing tends to benefit workers who already hold a favored position.

As we saw above, the IC has stimulated reinvestment of profits, but this policy is less likely to create jobs than to substitute capital for labor—in a country of growing urban unemployment.

Since the creation of the IC there has been a sharp reduction in new capital investment in Peruvian manufacturing enterprises. Executives in foreign controlled firms have been told by their home offices that they may reinvest local profits but they cannot expect to import capital, no matter what the potential demand for their product. Peruvian investors have also been reluctant to risk their money on a new enterprise in which they may eventually lose control to the Industrial Community. It is not only the existence of the IC that puts a damper on

investment, but also the opening up of other investment opportunities that promise greater returns with less risk. For example, investors in high tax brackets can escape taxation entirely on money invested in enterprises designed to stimulate tourism. They can also invest in tax-free government securities with a guaranteed return of 10–12 percent, without any risks except those affecting the economy as a whole.

THE FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY

As Peru was sinking into a severe economic crisis, with an increasing rate of inflation and enormous foreign debt, many government officials became convinced that the IC must be drastically modified in order to stimulate foreign and domestic investment. But abandonment of the IC would be regarded by militant critics on the left as capitulation to the imperialists and the local capitalists.

After many months of debate within government, President Francisco Morales Bermudez finally announced a decision which, in effect, ended the threat of worker control. Shares held collectively by the Industrial Community will be distributed to individual workers, who from now on will receive dividends as well as retaining their 10 percent individual profit sharing.

In its early years, the revolutionary military government of Peru attracted favorable attention around the world as a new type of military government: an authoritarian regime which nevertheless ruled in a relatively non-repressive manner and which showed an extraordinary commitment to structural reform designed to improve the position of the working class. As economic and political difficulties have pushed the regime toward increasing reliance on physical force, this goal is fading, so that it is now unlikely that outsiders will look to Peru as a new model for restructuring society. On the other hand, the disappointing results in Peru must be examined partly in terms of Peruvian culture, the evolution of industrial relations, the social structure, and the distribution of power that prevailed in society in the past. Another country where social class lines are not drawn as sharply, where organized labor has been more fully involved in cooperative projects, might be able to avoid the negative results of the Peruvian model by applying it in some modified form. Nevertheless the record of the IC certainly lends no support to those who would wish to apply the same general development strategy elsewhere.

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Worker Participation in Israel: Experience and Lessons

By ELIEZER ROSENSTEIN

ABSTRACT: This article examines the record of experience with a succession of worker participation programs in Israel over the past 50 years. Collective bargaining has been the universal form of industrial democracy, but it has been accompanied and supplemented at various times by joint productivity councils, plant councils, and joint management boards. The latter have been limited so far to enterprises owned by the General Federation of Labor in Israel, the Histadrut. Profit sharing as a form of participation is presently in the process of being instituted in that sector of the economy known as the Labor Economy. Self-management and self-government have always constituted the basic principles of Kibbutz and Moshav movements as well as the cooperative enterprises. However, the introduction of industrial enterprises into the once purely agricultural Kibbutz settlements has brought with it a substantial amount of hired labor, and consequently the integration of hired labor into the self-management structure has raised substantial difficulties. Evaluation of Israeli experience must pay special attention to the problems of integrating representative participation with direct shop-floor participation.

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THE idea that workers should participate in managerial decision making has deep roots in the social ethos of the large labor sector of Israeli society. Several innovative social institutions have emerged from that sector. Best known are probably the Kibbutz and the Moshav which developed in agriculture and are based on communal principles. Less well known abroad are the consumer and producer cooperative enterprises of the labor movement in the so-called Labor Economy. All these economic activities are an integral part of the Labor Federation of Israel—the Histadrut—which was founded in 1920. It is a unique organization in its combination of purposes and its structure and functions.[1]

The Histadrut has always been guided by four interrelated aims: a nation-building program of pioneering and development; the formation and development of a laboring class; the creation of a just society; and the development of a high standard of living. Unique to Histadrut is the co-existence of a powerful and virtually all-embracing trade union wing and an extensive set of economic activities, organized in the Hevrat Ovdim (community of workers).[2] These two principal units are combined with a broad network of cultural and educational activities, extensive welfare services, and consumers' and producers' cooperatives.

Membership in Histadrut is direct. Upon joining, the member is entitled to all the services, including trade union protection and social welfare. He also becomes a member of Hevrat Ovdim and automatically a co-owner of its properties. Over the years, the Histadrut has grown into a mass organization.[3] Its economic sector now accounts for about 23 percent of national employment, 19 percent of the net national product, and 19 percent of total exports.

We shall examine, first, the most universal aspect of workers participation in Israel, namely collective bargaining. We shall then examine the participatory mechanisms in Histadrut enterprises and also in the self-managed economy, that is, the cooperatives, the Moshavim, and the Kibbutzim.

PARTICIPATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Labor relations in Israel are based on a system of collective agreements

1. In spite of its unique characteristics, relatively little has been published about the Histadrut in foreign languages. The most comprehensive bibliography is Mordechai Mironi and John J. Flager, *The Histadrut* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, Industrial Relations Center, 1975). See, also, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Labor Law and Practice in Israel*, BLS Report No. 315 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office); Nadav Halevi, "The Israeli Labor Movement," THE ANNALS, vol. 310 (March 1957), pp. 172–82; Yehuda Slutzki, "The Histadrut—Its History, Structure and Principles," in *Labor and Society in Israel*, ed., Isiah Avrech and Dan Giladi (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Department of Labor Studies, 1973), pp. 6–23. For a most interesting historical-sociological examination of the Histadrut in its early stage (1920–1948), see Israel Kolat, "The Concept of the Histadrut," in *Labor and Society in Israel*, pp. 204–27.

2. Hevrat Ovdim is presently made up of five components. In descending scale of their contributions to the net product of the economy, they are: (1) cooperative settlements—Kibbutzim and Moshavim; (2) wholly and partially owned enterprises; (3) manufacturing, transportation, and service cooperatives; (4) marketing and consumer associations; (5) Histadrut nonprofit organizations.

3. Presently, 75 percent of Israel's labor force holds direct membership in the Histadrut. The members now total 1,100,000, or approximately 60 percent of Israeli citizens above the age of 18.

concluded between an employer or employers' association and the trade union side of Histadrut.[4] Usually the top-level organizations conclude "skeleton" agreements which are then adapted to conditions in each industry by means of subsidiary agreements negotiated between an individual trade union or a local labor council and the corresponding section of the employers' organization. In general, the skeleton agreements are renegotiated every two years by the Histadrut in its capacity as a trade union organization and the Israeli Manufacturers' Association. They lay down conditions of work, including wages, social benefits, working hours, shift work, rules of conduct and discipline, hiring, employment termination, negotiating procedures, settlement of disputes, and the rights and obligations of the parties.

At national level, the Trade Union Department of the Histadrut speaks for more than 80 percent of wage and salary earners in the country. Its policies are heavily influenced by the country's economic problems and tend to reflect a compromise between worker expectations and national economic interests.

At local level, the labor councils represent Histadrut in most of its multifarious activities, including its trade union activities. Together with plant level bodies—the workers' committees—the labor councils represent the workers vis-à-vis plant management.

As a rule, plant-level labor relations are the joint responsibility of local management (plant manager and personnel director) and the workers' committee. The labor council intervenes only in the event of a dispute when no agreement is reached between the two sides.[5] A workers' committee, consisting usually of three to seven persons, represents the workforce in all matters related to the collective agreement. It negotiates supplemental agreements and takes up with management any question concerning working conditions or discipline that may arise from the administration of the agreement. Members of the workers' committees are elected by the workforce at least every two years. In view of their broad frame of reference and the direct election of their members, they have accumulated great power and influence in the labor relations system.[6]

To the extent that a strong union side in collective bargaining represents a form of worker participation in management, Israel may serve as a model. Through their

4. These agreements may be special, applying to a particular enterprise or employer, or general, applying to the whole or part of the country or to a specific type of work. The system of collective agreements is recognized in the Collective Agreements Law (1957).

5. For analyses of plant labor relations in English, see Milton Derber, "Plant Labor Relations in Israel," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 17, no. 1 (October 1963), pp. 39–59; Eliezer Rosenstein, "Histadrut's Search for a Participation Program," *Industrial Relations*, vol. 9, no. 2 (February 1970), pp. 170–86; Arie Shirom, "Workers' Committees in the Israeli Labor Relations System: An Appraisal," *Industrial Relations Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1971), pp. 66–74.

6. Accumulation of power in the hands of shop stewards is not unique to Israel, although the extent to which workers' committees have ignored or objected to Histadrut policies has grown considerably in Israel in recent years. One suggested explanation for the contradictory approaches of the trade unions (national or local) and the plant level workers' committees in Israel is that the first behave as political organizations whereas the second act as economic ones. See A. Friedman, "Workers' Committee and Trade Union—Partners in Rivalries," in *Structural Changes in Labor Unions*, ed., A. Friedman (Tel-Aviv: Industrial Relations Research Association of Israel, 1972), pp. 22–40.

representatives, employees at all levels have a strong voice in the determination of their terms of employment, and Milton Derber recently characterized union participation in setting wages, hours, and working conditions as substantial. However, at least in the private sector, participation is still extremely limited or nonexistent in such important areas as product choice, production and engineering methods, plant location, selection of managerial personnel, marketing, and accounting. On the other hand, workers' committees often have considerable influence in the personnel management area, including individual upgrading and wage increases, fringe benefits, redundancy, transfer, discipline, and sometimes even selection of first-line supervisors.

REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOR ECONOMY

During the last 30 years or so, several attempts have been made to introduce in Israeli organizations participatory schemes beyond collective bargaining. These schemes were usually initiated by the leadership of the Histadrut and introduced in enterprises which belong to the Labor Economy. One of these—the Joint Productivity Council—was adopted by the private and state sectors and now constitutes an integral part of the Israeli system of industrial management. Since all new experiments started in the Labor Economy, we shall begin there.

The participation programs to be examined were originally designed mainly for Histadrut industrial enterprises known as the administrative or institutional plants. The terms refer to the industrial enterprises which are directly owned by Hevrat Ovdim and its holding companies. The biggest holding company is Koor, which is the industrial arm of Hevrat Ovdim and Israel's largest industrial complex. It comprises more than 60 major plants in almost every industry and 30 commercial companies.[7]

The background for the introduction of the participative experimentation in Histadrut-owned enterprises is the nature of the labor-management relationship which has developed in them. Histadrut-owned industrial plants have grown substantially in number, size, and employment since the early 1940s, and gradually the pioneering and intensely idealistic workforce of the early days has been replaced by newcomers for whom a Histadrut-owned plant has been just another work place. At the same time, the growing complexity of the production process compelled abandonment of the idea that professional management could be dispensed with. The introduction of technical experts, bureaucratic procedures, and related processes produced a growing similarity between the Histadrut-owned enterprises and the private enterprises, at least in terms of worker perception. To counteract these trends, the top

7. Koor was launched in 1944 as a subdivision of Solel Boneh (another holding company of the Histadrut), became independent in 1958, and today operates some of the largest manufacturing facilities in the Middle East. Of its 90 major plants and companies, 40 are wholly owned by Hevrat Ovdim through Koor, while Koor maintains a 50 percent interest or more in the others. Private business firms from Israel and abroad, including major international corporations, are associated with Koor in many jointly owned companies. Koor's impact on the national economy is reflected in the fact that the concern produces 9.3 percent of the total output of Israeli industry and accounts for 10 percent of its industrial exports.

Histadrut leadership introduced participation programs, the aim being to reconcile the exigencies of production with the original ideology of the Labor Economy. In other words, economic development was to remain a key component of nation building, and strong cooperative and harmonious relationships were to prevail between managers and managed.

THE JOINT PRODUCTIVITY COUNCILS

Joint productivity councils (JPC) were first developed in several Histadrut enterprises during the mid-1940s. They were intended both to raise output and to provide a mechanism for participation of employees in management. Soon after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Histadrut adopted the JPCs as a long-term instrument to raise national productivity.

The councils, of which there are now about 400 in all sectors of the economy, consist of equal numbers of workers' representatives and management appointees. Their role is an advisory one to plant management, and they operate under rules agreed to between the Histadrut and the association of (private) employers.

All the efforts of the JPCs have concentrated on increasing productivity through incentive payment systems. That has been a source of strength, but also a major limitation. Strength has flowed from opportunities for increased income for employees and decreased costs for employers. But the focus on incentive payments has led to the neglect of other aspects of decision making related to productivity, such as planning, equipment selection, and training. Nevertheless, most students of labor relations in Israel consider the JPC program to have been a limited success in promoting participation over a narrow but important area of management decisions.

THE PLANT COUNCILS

Unlike collective bargaining and the JPC program, plant councils (and joint management boards) were always confined to enterprises owned by the Histadrut. The experiment began in 1956, covered about 30 plants, and for all practical purposes ended in 1961. The motivation for the program was ideological. The top leaders of the Histadrut became convinced in the early 1950s that Histadrut-owned plants were undergoing a "social and moral deterioration" by neglecting their social purpose of creating a sense of fraternity and community in industrial plants on the model of the Kibbutz.[8] The solution was to be the formation of joint councils, consisting of five to ten elected representatives of workers and two to five appointees of management, which were to meet monthly to discuss and decide all matters pertaining to the enterprise except wages and working conditions, for these were to remain under the jurisdiction of the workers' committees. From the very beginning the councils ran into difficulties, and by 1961 it was clear that they had failed. There was more than one reason for the failure, but the major one was probably the widespread feeling among both managements and workers that the

8. Histadrut leaders in those years took the communal life of the Kibbutz as a model and inspiration for the industrial plants owned by Koor. Koor managers objected to the analogy, claiming that all over the world workers worked as hired labor and were by and large content.

councils were of little relevance to their needs and interests. Basically, workers remained indifferent and managers more or less opposed the whole idea in principle.

THE JOINT MANAGEMENT BOARDS

The current participation program of the Histadrut is based on joint management boards. For the time being, they have been introduced only in some units of the Labor Economy. The rationale for the program does not differ basically from that of the previous participation programs.

Joint management boards were conceived in the late 1950s as a higher level of participation, to be introduced when warranted by future conditions. In the early 1960s, after it became clear that the plant council plan had failed, the Histadrut leadership was faced with a dilemma: whether or not to proceed to the higher stage when the lower one had not succeeded. The decision was eventually made to take the step but to proceed with great care.

Both social and economic factors played a role in the decision. Top leaders of the Histadrut firmly believed that the Labor Economy would not be able to fulfill its historic mission of developing the country and its social mission of building a free workers' community as long as managers viewed workers as hired labor and workers viewed management as the owners.[9] A new program of participation also offered the possibility of introducing a qualitative difference betwen Histadrut and non-Histadrut enterprises.

In 1964 the Histadrut Council endorsed in principle a joint management program, but it was several years before the rules of the program were worked out. The most interesting thing about this process was the compromise concluded between the management groups of the Labor Economy and the ideologues-politicians designated by the Histadrut to administer the new program.

The program envisages participation at two levels: the company (central) level and the plant level. Very little research exists on the first level which includes both the board of directors and the central management board of the large Histadrut enterprises.[10] Some Histadrut top executives believe that participation at that level is most effective and fruitful, but we shall not be able to expand here on participation at this level.

The plant level program provides for the establishment in each plant of a joint management board consisting of the directors of the plant and an equal number of worker representatives and appointees of management.[11] The board is responsible

9. Aharon Becker, *Bahistadrut*, July 1963, p. 7. Becker was then the general secretary of the Histadrut, the highest executive officer.

10. In 1975 workers' representatives were included in the boards of directors in at least 12 of Histadrut's companies.

11. A 1975 survey of 94 members of joint management boards in 23 plants provides some socio-demographic comparisons of workers and managers on these boards. All members are males between the ages of 45 and 50. Most of them were not born in Israel but had lived there on average for 25 years. The average number of years of formal education of the managers (13) is only two years above the average of the workers' representatives (11). Differences between the two groups exist mainly with regard to ethnic origin and occupation. Management appointees are mostly of Western origin (76 percent), whereas workers' representatives are of Middle Eastern (45 percent) and Israeli (17 percent) origin. A. Bar-Haim, "Innovative Managerial Patterns in Israeli Enterprises," first draft (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Work and Welfare Research Institute, 1976), in Hebrew.

for the operation of the enterprise. It decides all issues except working conditions and wages, which continue to be negotiated between the workers' committee and the general manager or his personnel manager.

Information on some of the 30 plants in which the program has been introduced reveals considerable variation in implementation.[12] Three problem areas stand out: (1) Some boards are active and deal with important issues, while others merely have formal meetings and deal with marginal questions. (2) In some cases the workers' committees and the workers' representatives on the boards coordinate their work, while in others a rivalry between the two has emerged which endangers the continuation of the program. There is evidence that the rivalry has considerably abated in the last few years. (3) Lack of communication between the workers' representatives on the joint boards and the rank and file is a common weakness.

The most revolutionary element in the new plan is the encouragement of profit sharing. The issue had been discussed in Histadrut for many years but had been rejected by the managers of Histadrut enterprises for economic reasons and by the politicians for ideological reasons. A breakthrough occurred in the late 1960s when the new joint management plan was being developed. The clinching argument was that profits resulting from participation in management should be shared with the workers. In practice, however, profit sharing, at least in Koor enterprises, has become dissociated from the existence of joint management, and there are now strong indications that it will spread to many enterprises in the Labor Economy.[13] This is so because of widespread belief among managements that profit sharing promotes job satisfaction and employee identification with the plant and the economy.

The most recent development is the declared intention of the government to put employee representatives by law on the boards of directors of the large state-owned enterprises, excluding banks.[14] The Histadrut was most instrumental in the formulation of this proposal. The scheme calls for two elected representatives of the empoyees to serve as part-time members of the board of directors of each enterprise.[15] These directors, who are not to occupy other elective union offices, are to be elected for a three-year period once renewable. Their income is to be the same as before their election, and they will continue to perform their regular work,

12. See the study of "Phoenicia" (Israel Glass Works) in Jay Y. Tabb and Amira Goldfarb, *Workers' Participation in Management: Expectation and Experience* (London: Pergamon Press, 1970), pp. 201–45.

13. Profit sharing is not unique to the Labor Economy. There has also been a trend in the private sector to introduce profit sharing schemes of various kinds.

14. Such representation exists in a dozen Histadrut companies as well as in the Israeli Electrical Corporation. However, it has not been part of the management system of the state-owned enterprises.

15. In 1975 a joint committee of representatives of the Histadrut and the Ministry of Labor as well as social scientists from the universities was established to explore the needs and forms of worker participation in the Israeli economy. It also reviewed measures taken in other countries for the implementation of participation. The major recommendation of the committee was to adopt the representative model at the board of directors level and to implement it through formal regulations. It is doubtful, however, that the Finance Committee of the Knesset (Israeli parliament) will approve the draft regulation in view of recent political developments.

although they are to be given adequate time to perform their duties as members of the board. Top management personnel will not be eligible for election to board membership by the employees. Basically, these are the same conditions under which worker-directors in some Histadrut companies have already been functioning for some time.

PARTICIPATION IN THE SELF-MANAGED ECONOMY

Collective principles in economic life have been part of the Israeli ethos since the first pioneering waves of immigration arrived in the old-new land in the latter part of the past century. These principles have found special expression in the development of the self-managed economy: the cooperatives in the urban areas and the Moshavim and the Kibbutzim in the agricultural areas. Most of them are an integral part of Histadrut's Labor Economy.

More than 90 industrial cooperatives flourish in textiles, printing, glass making, building, and the food industry. The largest cooperatives are Egged and Dan, the two bus transportation services. Both the industrial and service cooperatives are affiliated with Hevrat Ovdim, the economic arm of the Histadrut.[16] Members of cooperatives participate in management through the election of all official bodies, including the management boards. Major problems remain, however, in relation to the existence of hired labor and its integration into the management system. For years the Histadrut has been putting pressure on the cooperatives to accept their hired workers as full members, but this has turned out to be a long and tedious process.

The Moshavim—organized settlements based on family farms—have grown considerably since their beginning in 1921.[17] There are, at present, about 350 with nearly 30,000 farms—6.2 percent of the Jewish population.[18] Each Moshav is organized as a cooperative society for agricultural settlement and constitutes a unit of local government administered by the management of the society. Annually, each Moshav elects its management which comprises a managing committee, a control board, and committees for economic, social, educational, and cultural activities. The major threat to the principle of self-management is the existence of hired labor, especially in the labor-intensive Moshavim which need seasonal help and often utilize unskilled Arab labor from the West Bank.

The Kibbutz is the best known and purest self-managed community and Israel's most original contribution to communal life. There are, at present, nearly 250 Kibbutzim with a population of over 90,000—about 4 percent of the Jewish population. Their impact on the country has always been very profound.[19]

16. For an examination of the ideological basis of the cooperative movement, see Abraham Daniel, "Ideology and Reality in the Cooperative Movement," in Avrech and Giladi, eds., *Labor and Society in Israel*, pp. 120–36.

17. For an examination of the Moshav form, see Dan Giladi, "The Moshav—Changes and Prospects," in ibid., pp. 137–54.

18. The settlers are apportioned land by the National Fund and it remains formally the property of the fund. It can neither be sold nor redivided. When a family leaves the Moshav, the property is purchased by the cooperative and another family is settled in its place.

19. It is impossible to examine here all the characteristics of the Kibbutz community

Self-government and self-management are major institutions of Kibbutz life. The basis of Kibbutz administration is a weekly general meeting of the membership which formulates policy, elects officers, and supervises the working of the community. Affairs of the Kibbutz are conducted by elected committees. At any given time, no less than 50 percent of the adult membership of the Kibbutz serves on the various committees. Through rotation, almost every adult member is drawn into the management process. Not so, however, the many temporary residents (especially young volunteer workers) and the hired laborers and specialists.

A relatively recent development in Kibbutz life has been a kind of industrial revolution. Until several years ago, farming was by far the main source of income. Recently, however, most Kibbutzim have established industries, and their number has grown at a relatively high rate. There are now more than 200 industrial plants employing more than 10,000 persons, and estimates are that each Kibbutz will soon own at least one plant.[20] Of those engaged in "productive" work in the Kibbutz population, about 30 percent work in an industrial plant. In some Kibbutzim, industrial workers already constitute more than 50 percent of the working force, and in many more cases this figure is between 30 and 50 percent. The contribution of industry to the Kibbutz gross income has passed 50 percent.[21]

Behind the industrialization of the Kibbutz is the need to provide older persons and women with suitable jobs; a labor surplus in agriculture due to intensive mechanization, profit considerations, and the aim to raise living standards; and the technological orientation of many second generation Kibbutz members.

Ideally, the functioning of a Kibbutz plant would be based on the same democratic principles governing the operation of the Kibbutz as a whole. The selection of the general manager and major policies would then be made by the general assembly of the Kibbutz, and the internal affairs of the plant would be regulated by the general assembly of workers and elected committees. A recent study of 10 Kibbutz plants indicated, however, that practices varied considerably and that the actual decision-making process conformed to the ideal in only one plant.

As in the other self-managed institutions—the cooperatives and Moshavim—the Achilles heel of the participative structure in many Kibbutz plants is their hired labor. Although the percentage of hired labor varies considerably, it amounts to more than 50 percent in the aggregate. Except for a small group of experts, hired labor is usually unskilled and uneducated. Hired workers are excluded from at least part of the self-management process since they do not participate in the Kibbutz general assembly which has an important decision-making

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and its impact on society. The reader is referred to Haim Darin, *The Other Society* (London: Victor Golancz, 1962); D. Leon, *The Kibbutz: A New Way of Life* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969); and Joseph E. Shatil, "The Kibbutz and Israeli Society," in Avrech and Giladi, eds., *Labor and Society in Israel*, pp. 155–71.

20. Kibbutz plants are usually small. In 1971, 75 percent of them employed fewer than 50 persons and only 15 percent employed more than 100.

21. J. Buber-Agassi, "The Israeli Experience in the Democratization of Work Life," in *Sociology of Work and Occupations*, vol. 1, no. 1 (February 1974), p. 69.

role in relation to the operation of the plant.[22]

CONCLUSIONS

Although Israel is a young state, it has a relatively long tradition of worker participation in management as an expression of industrial democracy. The development of the social structure of Israel, which preceded the establishment of the state, was based to a great extent on innovative economic institutions characterized by cooperative principles. The strong trade union movement, the Kibbutz, the Moshav, the cooperatives, and the Labor Economy are all representative of these principles.

It is a major lesson of the Israeli experience that neither formal ownership nor the adoption of formal programs can determine the outcome of participative schemes. The long and varied experience with worker participation in Histadrut enterprises shows that for a participation program to function effectively a considerable degree of integration between labor and management at the plant level is required. The success of such programs, thus, seems to depend heavily on local conditions, and these are only beginning to be carefully examined. The paucity of empirical knowledge as compared with the abundance of ideological beliefs is not unique to the Israeli situation.

22. The Kibbutz movement does not at all encourage employment of hired labor. In early 1977 the Kibbutz movement exerted strong pressure on one of the Kibbutzim to sell its industrial plant in which 200 out of the 220 workers were hired labor.

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The Soviet Model of Industrial Democracy

By J. L. PORKET

ABSTRACT: Soviet-type Communist systems are organized hierarchically and are highly formalized and bureaucratized. So are their industrial relations systems and schemes of worker participation in management. Between 1953 and 1975, the Soviet Union and the Soviet-controlled countries of Eastern Europe underwent a certain measure of modernization. Nevertheless, their basic nature remained intact. The trade unions continued to be subordinate to the ruling parties, and the main forms of participation by the working people in management continued to be production conferences and socialist emulation. During the same period, the Soviet model of industrial democracy was severely challenged in Poland (1956), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). In addition, Yugoslavia launched a rival model as early as 1950. While spontaneous strikes occurred only occasionally, certain apolitical or non-ideological forms of deviance remained permanent features of the Soviet-type system, ranging from lateness for work and indifferent performance through evasion and violation of formal norms to absenteeism, labor turnover, and pilferage. Although in the mid-1970s the prospect of any far-reaching reforms was bleak, the contradictions inherent to the systems had not disappeared. Consequently, they were by no means free of potential conflict.

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WITHIN a few years of the end of the Second World War, Communist parties took over power in eight East European countries and began to transform the existing political, economic, social, and cultural systems according to the Soviet model. The transformation was characterized by the formalization and bureaucratization of institutions and relations, and hence by a decline in the significance of historically (organically) developed institutions and relations.

As a result of this transformation, the differences between these societies diminished and the similarities increased. However, in 1950 Yugoslavia launched a rival model, and in 1956, at the twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, institutional diversity received an ideological justification, albeit merely a conditional one. Subsequently, greater diversity along national lines did assert itself. Yet, as of 1976 the systems established in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe (since 1961 without Albania) continued to disclose significant similarities. They were variants of a single type. Of course, that observation applies also to the autonomy, structure, and functions of the industrial relations systems.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

From the point of view of participation in and competition for political power, the Soviet-type Communist political system is an authoritarian system controlled and directed by the party. The party itself is controlled and directed from the top by a small group, the Presidium or Politburo. This group constitutes the party elite, has the actual monopoly of political decision making, is neither controlled by nor responsible to the people—including the party members—nor is it restrained by the law.

From the point of view of the scope of political power, this system is totalist. That is to say, the party elite is determined to control and direct all spheres of nonpolitical behavior and opinion as well. Consequently, the political and nonpolitical spheres are not separate, and the distinction between political and nonpolitical behavior and opinion tends to be blurred.

In the early 1970s, as throughout the preceding two decades, power in these countries continued to be ultimately centralized and concentrated in the hands of the respective party elites. Yet, compared with 1953, there existed three major differences.

First, the extent, scope, intensity, and brutality of coercion diminished. The system of coercion became less arbitrary and, thus, less unpredictable, and more regularized and, thus, more predictable. And its principal function shifted from initiation to deterrence and punishment. Simultaneously, greater reliance was placed on material rewards as a basis for obedience, although constant efforts to strengthen obedience based on identification with the party and regime and internalization of official values and norms persevered.

Second, political control and direction of nonpolitical behavior and opinion decreased. More contextual controls were substituted for highly prescriptive ones and, as a result, personal freedoms widened. Nevertheless, despite liberalization, the regimes were still far more totalist than liberal.

Third, pure authoritarianism was superseded by consultative authori-

tarianism. By invitation from the party elite, selected individuals, groups, and social categories were given the opportunity to participate in a consultative capacity in political decision making. Even broader political opportunities, amounting to a species of quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism, opened up in Hungary and to a lesser degree in Poland.

ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

Because of its totalist orientation, the party elite in Soviet-type Communist systems rejects private ownership of the means of production and a pluralistic economy and instead prescribes social ownership of the means of production. Its basic forms are state ownership and cooperative ownership, together with central planning and management of the national economy.

Economic management by directive, relying on binding administrative orders, was introduced in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s and copied in Eastern Europe after the Second World War. On account of its demonstrated drawbacks, attempts were made in the second half of the 1950s and especially during the 1960s to modify or reform it either toward a more indirect form of directive economic management, relying on state-parametric information, or toward non-directive economic management, relying on market-parametric information. In the early 1970s, non-directive economic management went generally out of favor, and its advocacy was banned since it seemed to spell the end of the party elite's control over the economy. It was believed that the application of advanced mathematical methods and computers would modernize central planning and management, enable a more rational allocation and utilization of scarce resources, and stimulate economic growth.

The only exception in the early 1970s was Hungary, where an indirect form of directive economic management with some elements of non-directive economic management was formally launched in January 1968. Nevertheless, the state retained the right to issue administrative orders and did intervene directly in the micro-economic sphere. Moreover, Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (NEM) produced its domestic critics, supported by powerful voices in other Communist countries, and already in 1972 a partial recentralization of economic management took place. In March 1975, the Hungarian party Congress emphasized the need to reassert state and party control in all spheres of life.

As one would expect, central planning and management are organized hierarchically. In the early 1970s, the hierarchy of central planning and management in the various countries consisted of the following levels: the party elite, the government, the State Planning Commission, economic ministries, associations, and individual enterprises. The party elite determined the main lines of economic development. The government and the State Planning Commission transformed these political decisions into statewide economic plans. Economic ministries ensured execution of their portions of the plans by subordinate units. Associations and enterprises executed assigned tasks.

Throughout, the principle of democratic centralism continued to be applied to the economic sphere. This meant that central planning and management were combined with a grant of adequate executive rights

to lower organs and with participation by lower organs in the preparation of decisions made by higher organs. But participation was required to be in accord with entrusted rights and responsibilities and to respect the interests of society as a whole, as defined by the party elite.

The principle of one-man management also remained in force. It meant that one individual, the enterprise director, was in full charge of the day-to-day running of the enterprise, being responsible for it to the superior organ which had appointed him. The only exception was Romania where, in 1968, collective management was adopted.

Just as the party elite does not relinquish control over the economy, so it retains control over the industrial relations system. This system, too, is organized hierarchically. At the macro level, the main actors are the party elite, the government, the trade union leadership, and the working masses. At the enterprise level, the main actors are the enterprise director, the enterprise party committee, the enterprise trade union committee, and the workforce. The operating rules are made unilaterally by the party elite.

MAIN FEATURES OF TRADE UNIONS

In Soviet-type Communist systems, trade unions are a unified mass organization with a nominally voluntary membership, authorized by law to represent both members and nonmembers.[1] Theoretically, they are independent, that is, neither party nor state organizations. Nevertheless, in their constitutions they acknowledge the leading role of the party, and in practice their autonomy is low or, at best, moderate.

Because trade unions are regarded as a unified mass organization, their members are not allowed to split off from existing unions and form new ones, either within or outside the official trade unions. Any other policy would endanger the unity of the official trade unions and eventually even the principle of "one plant—one trade union organization." And in time it would increase the articulation of group interests, conflicts of interest, and popular pressure on enterprise management as well as the regime.

Traditionally, the two main functions assigned to trade unions in Soviet-type Communist systems have been promotion of production and political indoctrination. Another but limited function is the defense of workers' interests. Additional functions include participation in management, supervision of management's observance of labor legislation and health and safety regulations, industrial training, cultural activities, physical training, and the administration of social insurance.

To perform their manifold functions, the trade unions are endowed with extensive rights. First, they have the right to make suggestions. Second, they have the right of prior consultation, without their viewpoints being binding on the competent decision makers. This means, inter alia, the right to participate in the drafting of economic plans at all levels. Third, they have the right of codecision in the sense that certain decisions may come into force only with their consent. At the enterprise level, this applies to the introduction or change of the wage system and of output norms, the setting of the total size of the labor

1. In the Soviet Union in 1973, 97.6 percent of blue-collar and white-collar workers were trade union members. E. A. Ivanov, *Profsoyuzy v politicheskoi sisteme sotsializma* (Moscow, Profizdat, 1974), p. 40.

force, and so on. Fourth, they have the right of supervision over the observance of labor legislation and of health and safety regulations. Fifth, they have a right of decision, but this is confined nearly exclusively to internal trade union matters such as the distribution of enterprise funds allotted for social and cultural purposes. Sixth, they have the right to conclude collective agreements. However, these agreements are not, and under directive economic management cannot be, a result of collective bargaining in the proper sense; both the conclusion and content of agreements are regulated by legal norms and directives laid down by superior organs.

In sum, although in the early 1970s trade unions enjoyed theoretically extensive formal rights, their meaningful assertion was severely circumscribed by the nature of the environment in which they operated. Yet, compared with 1953, some differences did exist. At the societal level, trade unions were given the opportunity to participate in a consultative capacity in political decision making. Greater emphasis was put on their welfare functions. And at the enterprise level, trade unions were allowed to protect the workers, albeit within strictly defined limits.

PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT[2]

Verbally, the party elite is an ardent advocate of mass participation, and every citizen has both a right and a duty to participate in the daily business of society. In the economic sphere, declares the official ideology, the application of the principle of democratic centralism means that central planning and management are combined with participation by the working people in management. Moreover, the objective need to consolidate and incessantly improve central planning and management is coupled with incessant deepening of participation by the working people in management. On the other hand, the party repeatedly warns that industrial democracy cannot be opposed to state guidance.

In practice, the party elite strictly regulates participation in management, as it does participation generally. It requires active and responsible participation but permits only participation organized and controlled from above and rejects spontaneous and uncontrolled participation. Expressed differently, no one is allowed to participate in management without a license, without official sponsorship.

Participation by the working people in management is both indirect (through functionaries and committees of the primary party organization, the trade union organization, the youth organization, and the like) and direct.

INDIRECT PARTICIPATION

As a rule, a primary party organization embraces only a minority of the personnel. Yet, it is conceived as the leading force in the enterprise ensuring the consistent assertion of the party line. Over the years, the officially defined scope of the rights of the primary party organizations and the officially required intensity of their activities have varied. Sometimes they were criticized for laxity and at other times for excessive activism.

In the early seventies, the necessity of enhancing the influence of

2. J. L. Porket, "Participation in Management in Communist Systems in the 1970s," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, vol. 13, no. 3 (November 1975), pp. 371–87.

the primary party organizations was emphasized in the several countries. But the tasks assigned to them were contradictory. While they were expected to supervise enterprise management without substituting for it, simultaneously they were generally required to assist enterprise directors and managers in fulfilling their economic duties.

Although the primary party organizations were to refrain from interfering in the work of enterprise management, in practice they often did interfere. The actual role played by the primary party organization in the enterprise raises, of course, the perennial problem of one-man management versus collective management. The more a primary party organization interferes in management and substitutes for managers, the less the principle of one-man management is implemented in practice.

The same problem inheres to relations between the enterprise management and the enterprise trade union committee. As mentioned above, the latter has the right to receive information, to protest decisions, to make suggestions, to be consulted, to supervise, and to codecide. On top of that, it may even have the right of veto.

Yet, in practice, participation by these committees in management is restricted by the nature of directive economic management, by the content of legal norms, and by their position as an element of a hierarchical structure controlled and directed by the party. All in all, their participation in management actually amounts to participation in administration, not in policy making.

DIRECT PARTICIPATION

The main forms of direct participation are production conferences and socialist emulation. Both are organized and guided by the trade unions.

Production conferences are usually confined to the workshop and departmental levels in order to enlist active involvement of the greatest possible number of workers. At the plant and enterprise levels, general meetings and conferences of the personnel may be convened from time to time. In such cases, however, the agenda tends to consist only of reports prepared in advance, and discussion is either limited or excluded entirely.

Besides production conferences, so-called permanent production conferences can also be found. They were set up in the Soviet Union in 1958 and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1959 as elected trade union organs operating at different levels within the enterprise. Permanent production conferences are to deal with matters concerning technology, production, and labor productivity. According to the GDR Labour Code of 1961, for instance, they were to cooperate in the preparation, fulfillment, and supervision of the enterprise plan; to examine critically the organization of production; to draw attention to shortcomings and help in eliminating them; and to submit proposals with a view to achieving the best possible results at work.

In the past, their performance was often considered unsatisfactory, and they were repeatedly accused of formalism. On the other hand, many an enterprise director saw their main function to be the strengthening of work discipline.

The number of permanent production conferences in the Soviet Union rose from 104,000 in 1959 to 162,000 in 1971, when over 6 million workers

served on them.[3] In the GDR, the number of workers serving on them reached 434,000 by the early seventies.[4]

Socialist emulation assumes various forms, including the movement of socialist work brigades and the movement of innovators (rationalizers, inventors). Although moral as well as material incentives are to be applied in its development, the primary emphasis is on the former, on the mobilization of the workers for increasing labor productivity.

At first sight, socialist emulation seems impressive. Over 80 million Soviet workers took part in it in 1974,[5] and in Czechoslovakian plants more than 80 percent of the personnel in the early 1970s.[6] In the GDR, in 1973, precisely 3,412,291 workers competed for the title of "Collective of Socialist Work," and 26.4 percent of all persons employed in state enterprises were involved in the innovators' movement.[7] Yet, as frequent official complaints of formalism in socialist emulation suggest, its results are less satisfactory.

OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION

Other forms of participation by the working people in management may also exist. For example, in connection with the economic reforms of the 1960s, several countries set up production committees at enterprise level and sometimes at higher levels. Their role was purely advisory and supervisory. In their composition, appointed and ex officio members predominated, while elected representatives of the personnel were in a minority. In the GDR, where they were introduced in 1963 and abolished in 1971, there were 160 of them in the larger enterprises in the mid-1960s, and 3,500 persons served on them.[8]

Collective agreements have already been mentioned. They must be recalled again, though, because they are also regarded as one of the forms of participation.

Whichever forms of participation in management are allowed, the party elite unwaveringly disowns the idea of workers' councils elected by and responsible to all persons employed in the enterprise. In the early 1970s, they were found only in Poland. There they were incorporated in the so-called workers' self-management conferences (composed of the members of the workers' council, the enterprise trade union committee, the enterprise party committee, and committees of some other organizations), their rights were limited, and their activities were often purely formal.

The party elite rejects workers' councils for two reasons. First, being legitimized from below, they would be independent bodies, not elements of a hierarchical structure. Consequently, even under directive economic management they could exert greater pressure on superior organs than the enterprise director, the primary party organization, and the trade union organization are able

3. L. Khitrov, "The Role of Management and Workers in Raising the Efficiency of Soviet Industry," *International Labour Review*, vol. 111, no. 6 (June 1975), pp. 521.

4. *Introducing the GDR*, 2d rev. ed. (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1971), p. 61.

5. *KPSS o profsoyuzakh* (Moscow: Profizdat, 1974), p. xvii.

6. That included over one million workers taking part in the movement of socialist work brigades. Lubomír Procházka, *Strana a společenské organizace*, Nová mysl, vol. 28, no. 2 (1974), pp. 195–206.

7. *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1975*, pp. 66–7.

8. *Introducing the GDR*, p. 61.

to do and, thus, defend more effectively the economic interests of the enterprise. Second, if they were introduced, a significant difference between the Soviet and Yugoslav models of enterprise management and industrial relations would be obliterated.

To conclude, in Soviet-type Communist systems, the theory and practice of participation diverge. In theory, participation is hailed as a significant contribution to socialist democracy, and it is said to be growing incessantly. On the other hand, in practice it is restricted by the nature of directive economic management and the industrial relations system and by the content of legal norms. In some cases, it actually amounts to participation in the implementation of the decisions made, not participation in decision making itself. Expressed differently, it is both highly formalized (that is, regulated by formal norms), and, hence, bureaucratized, and affected by the unpredictable interference of superior organs in the day-to-day running of enterprises.

For the rank and file, participation in management is both direct and indirect. Insofar as it is direct, it mostly means to receive selected information, to protest decisions, to make suggestions, to be consulted, and possibly to supervise, and tends to be confined to operational matters, technical issues, trivia, and routine decisions. Yet, despite its limitations, it may be of importance to the individual worker if through it he can influence his tasks and working conditions in the way he desires.

From the point of view of the distribution and exertion of power within the enterprise, indirect worker participation is of greater significance—that is, through functionaries and committees of the primary party organization, the trade union organization, the youth organization, and the like. However, such participation is not sufficiently responsive to and representative of the rank and file.

DEVIANCE, PROTEST, CONFLICT

Available evidence suggests that not all workers in Soviet-type Communist systems are satisfied with existing industrial relations, working conditions, and material rewards. Their behavior shows it. Responsibility is at least partly attributable to the failure of trade unions to defend and assert the interests of their members; to their display of excessive submissiveness to enterprise management, the state, and the party; and to the absence of internal union democracy.

Given the relatively tight controls on overt protest, working people express discontent by lateness for work, prolonged breaks, indifferent performance, drinking during working hours, working-to-rule, evasion and violation of formal norms, quitting early, malingering, absenteeism, thefts of tools and materials, passivity and non-attendance at obligatory meetings and production conferences, and a high rate of labor turnover.

They do occasionally engage in spontaneous strikes, though these are usually of short duration and confined to sub-units of an enterprise. On at least four occasions, however—Czechoslovakia, 1953; the GDR, 1953; Poland, 1970 and 1976—they expressed themselves through rebellions. And on three occasions—Poland, 1956; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968—they responded by attempting to modify or transform the existing system.

Thus, tensions do exist and conflicts do occur within enterprises. Yet, because the conflicts take place in an environment created and maintained by the party elite, in most cases their objects are merely particular matters, not general ones, and their resolution has to be in conformity with the law and, ultimately, with the party elite's will.

CONCLUSION

Between 1953 and 1975, the Communist systems in Eastern Europe underwent a process of modernization. Nevertheless, they continued to be organized hierarchically and to be highly formalized and bureaucratized.

In contrast to the mid-1960s, the prospect in the mid-1970s of any far-reaching economic and political reforms was bleak. In each of the countries, power continued to be exercised by forces with vested interests in the maintenance of the system. On top of that, any kind of major change depended upon the consent of the Soviet Union.

On the surface, the systems were stable and their regimes and ruling party elites secure, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. But they were characterized by four major contradictions inherent to Soviet-type Communist systems.

One contradiction is between authoritarianism and political pluralism. While the regime is authoritarian and bars factionalism and groupism within the party and political opposition outside it, the formal political culture contains both bureaucratic-elitist and democratic-egalitarian values. In addition, the actual political culture includes political subcultures favoring substantive participation in political decision making and, at least in some of the countries discussed, also political countercultures.

A second contradiction is between centralization and decentralization of the national economy, that is, between central planning and management and the autonomy of enterprises. Although economic efficiency requires the latter, the party elite has obstinately stuck to the former because it is unwilling to lose control over the economy.

Still another contradiction is between professional management and worker participation in management at the enterprise level. In a way, this is evidenced by relations among the enterprise director, the primary party organization, and the trade union organization. But it does not stop there. A number of factors tend to substantiate professional management. On the other hand, many workers desire a kind of participation in management that would be capable of defending and asserting their interests.

The fourth contradiction is between the long-term interests of the national economy and the short-term interests of the workers. The party elite gives priority to investment and social consumption. In contrast, quite a few workers are concerned mainly with their immediate incomes. The material rewards often do not meet their rising expectations even though, paradoxically, the party elite itself has contributed to that very rise in expectations.

At the time of writing (end of 1976), the party elites were able to contain the contradictions so they could not really come into the open. However, more than ever before, consumerism is at present widespread among the population. The average individual concentrates on his material comfort and personal interests and conforms predomin-

antly on the bases of utilitarianism (in order to attain certain specific material rewards) and coercion. Mass loyalties are gained largely through the regime's ability to guarantee job security, to provide stable and growing incomes, and to deliver desired goods and services, as well as through the extent of its noninterference with personal conduct. Consequently, if the party elite were to reduce the population's capabilities abruptly and drastically, for example by lowering the standard of living, while expectations remained the same, the resulting dissatisfaction could potentially lead to an explosive situation, as almost happened in Poland in mid-1976.

Yet, protest that is voiced mainly in a spontaneous and unorganized way would most probably result not in changes of the system but, at best, in a temporary retraction of the unpopular decisions, as shown by the reaction of the Polish leadership. Such actions are not likely to bring about and assure permanent liberalization and democratization of Soviet-type Communist systems.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 431, May 1977

Self-Management in Yugoslavia

By MARIUS J. BROEKMEYER

ABSTRACT: Yugoslav self-management is a complicated and far-reaching system of industrial relations and social organization that began some 25 years ago in a society that was initially still of the Soviet-type. It endeavors to eliminate any domination of nonproducers in the economy and society (the liberation of labor) through a decision-making structure that is neither a compromise nor a mixture of Western-type and Soviet-type industrial relations. The system has been steadily extended to encompass the individual worker, who in the process has ostensibly been acquiring ever more rights. However, in reality the power position of the individual worker has not changed all that much. The political party structures were, and still are, of paramount importance. On behalf of self-management it may be said that it has certainly alleviated the ills usually inherent to industrialization, that it has facilitated the transformation of a predominantly agrarian to an industrial society, and that it has encouraged a certain measure of political democratization. But it has not resolved basic economic differences between the several republics of Yugoslavia, nor has it diminished large-scale unemployment. It is difficult to conclude whether the achievements and shortcomings are attributable to general human failings or whether they are due to specific Yugoslav conditions.

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IN MOST countries the industrial relations system reflects more or less faithfully the state of prevailing political and economic conditions. This truism operates in reverse, as it were, in the case of Yugoslavia where the overall political and social set-up is modeled on the principles of the system of self-management that is supposed to govern relations in industry. Indeed, Yugoslav industrial relations form the very heart of the country's system of government and society.[1]

It is extremely difficult to discuss properly Yugoslav industrial relations in their own right, because to do it well one should take into account other spheres of Yugoslav public and private life as well. That, however, is precluded here for reasons of space. There is also a second difficulty. Because the principles and assumptions underlying the organization of Yugoslav industrial relations—the self-management system—are so closely interwoven with, and have to such a large degree permeated, the total political and social make-up of the country, any criticism of industrial relations is almost automatically interpreted as a criticism of the very foundations of Yugoslav society. On the other hand, certain groups in Western countries are so keenly on the lookout for more humane and ideologically more acceptable patterns of industrial relations that, given their hostility to the existing order in the West and their disillusionment with Soviet-style methods, they tend to accept unconditionally every facet of the Yugoslav system. We shall try to guard against both excessive enthusiasm and unwarranted criticism.

Yugoslavia's philosophy of industrial relations is based on the assumption that neither the state, as in Soviet-type societies, nor the private owners, as in capitalist societies, shall decide how industry is to be run and how production relations are to be arranged, but instead the workers shall manage their own affairs.[2] Included in "their own affairs" are all decisions concerning the way enterprises are to be managed and production is to be organized. With some restrictions and modifications that are due to the specific nature of the services performed, the same holds true for relations in the operation of other institutions, such as the social security, educational, and health care systems.

To achieve this, from an ethical point of view, lofty goal, all personnel employed in enterprises (blue- and white-collar employees alike) elect from their midst a workers council. The council acts as a kind of enterprise parliament, deciding on general policies, appointing specialists to key posts, and supervising the work of the executive organs of the

1. Without being able to go into details here, it should be noted that the development and maturing of self-management occurred in a society characterized by (1) large economically underdeveloped areas; (2) the presence of several different and to some extent competitive nationalities and cultures; (3) a moderate form of one-party dictatorship; (4) a commitment in principle to the operation of a free market, with competition between individual enterprises.

2. There was a sharp discussion some years ago on the question of who is a worker and how should one define the term "working class." Official Yugoslav self-management theoreticians switched at that time to the term "working people." They explained that the term had to be broad enough for the bureaucracy and the politicians to be included in it. Of course, the change was very convenient: attacks on bureaucrats can now be regarded as attacks on the system itself, in the same category as attacks on the workers.

enterprise. A management board and director complete the administrative structure of the enterprise, or at least did so during the earliest phase of Yugoslav industrial relations, the phase of representative democracy.

THE MAIN DIRECTIONS

The Yugoslav system has now been in operation for some 25 years, a span sufficiently long to enable one to draw certain conclusions. In the course of these 25 years, the system developed in three directions, interconnected but distinguishable one from another. First, ever more people in industry became involved in some sort of decision making. Because the workers council was physically unable to oversee all details of administration in the enterprise, many auxiliary commissions and committees were set up to prepare decisions for the workers council. These committees were also at times given executive powers.

Second, the self-management organs assumed more powers by gradually eliminating influences coming from outside the enterprise, for example from government or the ruling party. The acquisition of enterprise autonomy developed parallel with the gradual development of a market economy and fostered the individuality and independence of enterprises.

Third, the system gradually extended to the smaller and smallest enterprise units. In the beginning, certain self-management rights had been given to only two or three of the largest departments in the enterprise, with ultimate power remaining vested in the workers council constituted for the enterprise as a whole. Subsequently, however, self-management rights were also bestowed on what were called economic units, and most recently they have been given to the smallest units for which separate financial accounts are kept and whose production performance can be measured. These subenterprise units are called Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (BOAL). Thus, self-management is henceforth to be performed at the lowest feasible level, and only the powers that cannot be exercised at that level may be wielded at the next higher level. In other words, the enterprise is no longer to be regarded as divided from above into a number of units; instead it is the units at the base—the BOALs—which decide to form an enterprise. This conspicuous development in extending self-managing rights as far downward as possible is in accordance with the philosophy that professes as its goal that every man shall decide, for himself and with his fellow citizens and workers, what is to be his part in industrial and public affairs.

In 1959–1960 the present writer happened to be present in a modern Yugoslav enterprise when the decentralizing movement first got underway. Making due allowance for possible preconceived opinions and for possible windowdressing, he continues to this day to be impressed by the creative forces set free at that time in a process that gave wide decision-making powers to ordinary workers.

RECENT TRENDS

Around 1970, however, when the self-managed enterprise was about to acquire an even more substantial amount of independence and it seemed that the ruling Communist party would limit even further its

supervisory role in favor of the correspondingly increased autonomy of self-managed organizations, the authorities became concerned over the continually growing social and economic differences between different regions, between branches of industry, and between the several enterprises in the same branch. They also expressed worry over the growing influence of so-called technocratic tendencies exhibited by enterprise directors and managers. In support of such concerns, it was pointed out that the percentage of manual workers represented in self-management bodies had been declining precipitously in workers councils, management boards, party committees, and the assemblies of communal, republican, and federal bodies.[3] At about the same time when nationalist forces, especially in Croatia but not only in that republic, gained momentum and popular support after initially having been encouraged by the highest party organs in the country to come to the fore, the Central Committee of the League of Communists suddenly realized that events might take a course contrary to the interests and will of the party. Marshall Tito said at the time that the party had allowed the reins of power to slip from its hands and it needed to restore its influence by first of all reassuming control over personnel policy, that is, the appointment of persons to important posts. Although many Yugoslav and foreign observers had earlier assumed that the power of the party would gradually wither away while self-management bodies would take over, the resulting purge in effect restored the old order. In the process, many politicians, judges, teachers, professors, journalists, enterprise directors, and editors lost their jobs.

In the years immediately after these events, which became years of tightened controls, hardened party policy, restored party powers, and vanishing public criticism, a campaign was launched with a direct bearing on industrial relations. Its slogans were: "The working class must have the decisive voice everywhere" and "A workers' majority in all decision-making bodies." Yet, in fact, the purpose of the campaign was to bring self-management again under the direction of the party. The campaign culminated in the adoption, in November 1976, of a mammoth act (95 pages of small print, containing 671 articles) called the Law on Associated Labor.

Until the adoption of the 1976 act, the self-management rights of Yugoslav workers were restricted to enterprise affairs. They did not extend, for example, to such areas as the financing of education, medical care, and social security. These services were financed centrally by the state out of taxes, although the employees and the users of these service institutions participated in their administration. Yugoslav theoreticians on self-management had long maintained that as long as the financing of social services remained separated from individual workers, the latter were deprived of influence over an important part of their income. The new law stipulates that each enterprise (or part of an enterprise) will negotiate the amount and cost of the services to be provided with the corresponding

3. Left-wing philosophers, sociologists, and students have for years sharply criticized not only the emerging nationalism in the different regions, but also tendencies indicating the increasing influence of the middle class.

self-management bodies of the social service institutions. This arrangement is called the free exchange of labor between the self-management organs of different branches of social activity. Thus, the norm-setting activity of the state and the regulatory influence of state organs are to be replaced in these spheres by self-managing agreements and self-managing compacts resulting from negotiations between self-managing bodies. The way in which enterprise income is formed and distributed, as well as the allocation of personal incomes (wages), will also be determined through such agreements and compacts. Specific prices must also be determined in this way.

It is clear that the new system will require an enormous amount of negotiating, that it will be a very time-consuming process, and that it will necessitate the establishment of numerous committees, commissions, and boards. When we add that each enterprise is legally obliged to draw up an enterprise statute; that each Basic Organization of Associated Labor must draft its own written regulations; that the BOALs are supposed to enter into business relations with other BOALs; and that trade unions, local authorities, and chambers of commerce will also be engaged in the drawing up of social compacts, it is clear that the running of a self-managed society is likely to be a somewhat strenuous affair.

RECRUITMENT

It is, in any event, obvious that such a system requires people willing to serve on all sorts of representative boards and bodies. The length of their term of service is limited by law to one or two years. This limitation is necessary, so it is argued, lest the representatives become too accustomed to the perquisites of their posts and to the powers they exercise. A healthy development of self-management is believed dependent on continuous rotation. This view, of course, presupposes the existence of an adequate number of qualified people, a rather doubtful assumption.

As far as top level posts are concerned, capable representatives to fill them are very scarce. At lower levels, the levels of rank and file workers and employees, people tend to look on their posts in self-management bodies as a burden they must perform, at least after the initial period when the first enthusiasm of sitting on a decision-making board has subsided. (One should not forget that self-management in Yugoslavia was imposed from above.) In any event, it has become a problem to induce people each year or two to accept membership in one of the numerous bodies of self-management. Despite or perhaps because of the rapid turnover, there is also a hard core of committee members who rotate from one self-managing body to another, from party committee to workers council, and from enterprise executive board to trade union committee. It may well be impossible to staff the necessary bodies without these professional self-managers, but their constant presence adds to the feeling of ordinary members that they are not actually making the decisions.

REWARDS

Willingness to participate depends partly on the rewards, but they are few indeed. The sense of cooperating with others in an effort

to reach an agreed goal may be one. An unintended but very real reward is the chance to be promoted because of work performed on some board. But there are also negative rewards. Self-management duties are generally performed after ordinary working hours. The work is not paid. While others may leave for their homes, board members must sit and listen to tedious procedures and monologues that sometimes extend for hours. When unpopular measures must be taken, fellow workers become resentful. Moreover, as the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* wrote on January 7, 1977, of the 4.7 million working people in the country about 3 million hold a second job. People with a second job are not very prone to participate in self-management. Besides, a physical presence at council and board meetings is only one aspect of self-management. Another is the time required to read the materials, to prepare reports, to form opinions. These, too, can be exceedingly time-consuming activities.

EXPERTISE

The making of important decisions in the workers councils and other self-management bodies raises new problems. During the meetings, the specialists, who may be nonmembers of the council, are present. If necessary they are called on to explain the proposals submitted by management. To be sure, the proposals may already have been debated in specialized subcommittees of the workers council, but there, too, the specialists have a very important say. Occasionally a workers council member asks a question. The specialist's answer may be long and not always easily understandable. The evident inequality of the participants in the decision-making process is often a source of frustration, for both sides to be sure: for workers because they must pronounce themselves on problems without always being able to see possible implications, results, or alternatives; for specialists because of the need to explain the same issues over and over again to new self-managers. The frustration of self-managers will, of course, become even greater when a proposal adopted with their support turns out to have been detrimental to the enterprise. The specialists will then seek to shift the responsibility to the workers council by emphasizing that their proposal was officially endorsed.

Some observers of the Yugoslav system maintain that there is an unbridgeable gap between expertise and democracy because the specialists are almost always in a minority when decisions are made by vote. This is especially true in cases where people resist arguments and where diverging interests exist between various work groups, with the result that not every group strives for the same goals.

This point leads to another phenomenon—industrial conflicts and strikes in self-managed enterprises. In the beginning of self-management, it was the official view that strikes could not occur. After some time, however, strikes became more or less accepted as a reality, though an undesirable one. When a strike occurs, it is often directed against the management of the enterprise, including of course the top levels of self-management bodies and possibly also trade union and party leaders. Most strikes last only several hours or a few days. As a rule, the authorities are quick to give in to demands, for a strike hurts the image of self-management as the dominant

institution in society. It also tends to undermine the fiction that the enterprise director has a united workforce behind him.

Self-management notwithstanding, it seems that the actual power structure in Yugoslav enterprises has not changed very much. Time and again Yugoslav and foreign researchers have found that workers still perceive the existing power structure as a descending line which runs from the director through the workers council down to the worker.

Is Yugoslav self-management, then, a fascinating innovation but a serious mistake? That would be jumping to the wrong conclusion, although there are good reasons to believe that the more far-reaching intentions and pretensions of self-management have not been met in practice. In fact, the disjunction between reality and professed goals may even be growing. Nevertheless, self-management should be judged by what it has achieved, and some of its achievements are quite impressive.

In the first place, self-management seemingly responds to some fundamental human needs. At least nowadays, people do want to be informed at an early stage of changes that are likely to affect them, and they do want to be informed on how decisions of vital importance to them are implemented. They are interested in how their "superiors" are chosen, and they want to be asked their opinion about important enterprise matters. One Yugoslav sociologist has put it this way: participation diminishes the meaninglessness of work, although it does not diminish the powerlessness of the worker. Second, self-management has provided a new mechanism for upward social mobility, a very important element in a developing society. Third, self-management has taught many workers at least some rudimentary notions about the structure of the enterprise, the economy, and society as a whole. Fourth, during the period of self-managed industrial relations, considerable parts of Yugoslavia have been industrialized. This transition from an agricultural to a semi-industrial modern society has occurred without severe convulsions. There have been no famines, no bloody clashes between workers and the police, as for example in Poland, and no widespread misery as in so many other countries. On the contrary, Yugoslavia has managed a smoother transition to industrialization than either Western or Eastern Europe experienced. Moreover, the transition took place more rapidly than elsewhere. Finally, the self-management structures have constituted a serviceable instrument for the still unfinished task of democratization. In the past, there was even reason to believe that the economic democracy of self-management would eventually lead to political democracy. But on this point various observers, myself included, went wrong, as the events of the last few years have demonstrated.

There are, of course, also negative sides. Self-management has not been able to prevent the exodus of more than a million Yugoslav workers to look for work in Western Europe, while at home considerable unemployment continues to persist. Nor could industrial relations under self-management prevent the growth of social differentiation, as shown for example by several sociological investigations on housing conditions which point to the existence of social segregation. There are now separate residential quar-

ters for workers and the enterprise elite. Belgrade's elite quarter, Dedinje, has its counterpart in many other Yugoslav towns. Some observers have even argued that self-management, which ties the interests of the worker to his enterprise, tends to break the unity of the working class (if there is such a unity and if it can be broken). The trade unions, generally not held in high esteem by the workers, are either unable or unwilling to compensate for that loss.

It is very difficult to know exactly to what extent self-managed industrial relations are responsible for the positive and negative outcomes. It would certainly be wrong to ascribe only the positive developments to self-management and to attribute the negative ones to isolated instances where self-management did not work. It is equally difficult to determine whether self-management has been impeded by the economic, social, and educational differences among the several Yugoslav republics or whether, on the contrary, these differences actually require a sort of self-management. Even more crucial is the question of whether self-management has been hindered by the existence of a Communist party which, notwithstanding continuous reorganization in its own make-up, maintains an authoritarian line of command. Or is it the very presence of such a party that has enabled self-management to work at all?

One certain lesson may be drawn: it is very dangerous to draw a lesson from the Yugoslav experience, fascinating though the experiment is to observe.

Book Department

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ARTHUR MACY COX. *The Dynamics of Detente: How to End the Arms Race.* Pp. 256. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976. $8.95.

Arthur Cox argues that detente is worthwhile and achievable—despite opposition on both sides. He believes that the arms race is dangerous and wasteful. (Cox estimates that each side can save up to $25 billion per year [p. 96].) According to him ultimate control over the situation lies in Washington: "The arms race will end when the U.S. decides to end it" (p. 202).

Cox admits that persuading the Soviets to cease threatening U.S. security through covert support of revolution will not be easy (p. 217). But he concludes that "the majority opinion of the Moscow leadership favors detente" (p. 224), and that "though the hawks may insist that the ideology calls for continuing support of wars of liberation, they [also] will *probably* conclude in time that the success of the Soviet economy, and perhaps their own political survival, take precedence over adventures in far off lands" (p. 219). [Emphasis added.] He dismisses the possibility of a Soviet military attack on either Western Europe or the United States, arguing that even significantly reduced Western military strength will be a sufficient deterrent for the foreseeable future (p. 213).

To curtail Soviet support for revolution Cox suggests the use of "block trading" by the West. If the Soviets did not cooperate we would refuse to provide them with the technology they badly need (p. 141). The political feasibility of this suggestion on the Western side unfortunately is not really discussed. In addition, he recommends U.S. restraint in developing and deploying new weapon systems, which he believes will generate momentum toward disarmament (pp. 230–31).

Cox presents a thought-provoking but not entirely persuasive argument. He acknowledges that the Soviets see detente differently from the West (p. 222). For one thing, they argue that it promotes wars of national-liberation by restraining American intervention. While Cox's conclusion is that the Soviets can be persuaded to change their behavior if not their rhetoric, there are several factors which might prevent this from happening. For example, the alliance of ideological conservatives, the military, heavy industry and the KGB against detente may prove to be more formidable than Cox assumes. For one thing, any negative influence of these "groupings" cannot be openly criticized in the Soviet Union. In addition, this alliance could be further strengthened in at least three ways not discussed by Cox. First, even extensive trade with the West may not save the Soviet economy, thus encouraging the Kremlin to believe that only

expanding Soviet influence can protect the Soviet system. (Lenin's imperialism turned into socialist imperialism!—to borrow the Chinese phrase.) Refusal to trade with the Soviets, on the other hand, can be expected to promote the argument that the "West cannot be trusted" and that therefore Soviet security requires promoting revolution. Finally, as the Soviet Union approaches strategic parity with the U.S. and as Washington is "restrained from intervening against the national-liberation movement," the Soviet leadership may be tempted to take advantage of the "favorable shift in the correlation of forces" to actively support the flow of history—as they did after the first sputnik in 1957. It should be remembered in this connection that Moscow has not been in such a seemingly favorable position before and that Soviet leaders have "theoretical" reasons for believing that they will be more successful in using their new strength than the capitalist U.S. at the height of its power.

While Cox may believe that "the Soviet wave of the future is dead" (p. 214), the current Soviet leadership probably does not. If this is the case, then only a major change in leadership is likely to result in the type of detente and subsequent arms reduction that Cox desires. In the meantime unilateral U.S. action of the type recommended by the author could encourage Soviet leaders to take actions, such as in Angola, that might lead to disaster for both sides—as nearly happened during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. At the very least, increased tensions could bring on a new Cold War.

One final point. Cox asserts that "those Americans who know the most about Soviet affairs are also strong supporters of detente." In this group he includes George Kennan, W. Averell Harriman and Marshal Shulman (pp. 168–69). He does not mention Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes or Foy Kohler. All three of these men—and others—qualify as knowledgeable, and each of them would disagree with Cox on major points.

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JOHN GIMBEL. *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*. Pp. viii, 344. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. $15.00.

Since the end of World War II the subject of United States-Soviet relations has ignited an impressive accumulation of monographs and as additional records become available it is certain the historical profession will have still further studies served up to it. Among the efforts of several scholars has been the desire to examine and clarify certain mileposts in the United States as a contributing factor to the polarization of Soviet-United States relations to this most recent effort by Professor John Gimbel of Humboldt State University which explores the role of France in the onset of the armed truce which has so dominated the lives of the generation of the 1950s.

Professor Gimbel is no newcomer to this aspect of historical investigation. *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* follows his *Marburg, 1945–1952: A German Community Under American Occupation* and also his *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949*. It is on the foundation of these two earlier studies that Professor Gimbel has drawn supporting evidence to correlate with fresh material in this most unique, and neo-revisionist, explanation of the conceptualization of the basic Western weaponry of the "Cold War"—the Marshall Plan.

It is the author's contention that the accepted versions of the onset of the freeze in Russian-American relations, on both sides of the debate, need reassessment. He maintains that neither Russia nor the United States deserves the indictment for the collapse of four-power occupation of Germany but rather the truculence of France brought on perhaps by anxiety. And while this stands as a departure in itself, no less is the author's contention that the Marshall Plan, while successful in most ways, began as a scratch pad scheme that mushroomed in scope as well as administration with multiple causative forces contributing to it. It most definitely, so says the author, "was not a plan conceived by long-range

planners as a response to the Soviet Union or as an element in the cold war." It was, so the author's investigation would support, an attempt to intertwine the singular economic resurrection of Germany into a broader scheme for the economic recovery of the Continent, in particular the Western powers. But it was never the sophisticated, comprehensive design for a rejuvenated and possible united Europe as its mystique would suggest. It was, as Professor Gimbel satisfactorily illustrates, "a series of pragmatic bureaucratic decisions, maneuvers, compromises, and actions," replete with social, political, economic and strategic ingredients. It became more in the minds of those who supported it, or contributed to it, than existed in the germ of the idea at the start, and therein rests the value of this work apart from the originality of the author's thesis: ". . . Myths and Realities" as the author states, need reworking and reflection. All too often what lingers is the assumption rather than the fact and a book of this type can have the worth of a historical alarm clock—it alerts and arouses.

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LEON GORDENKER. *International Aid and National Decisions: Development Programs in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia*. Pp. 190. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $13.00.

While the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, and associated UN agencies increasingly generate "programmatic declarations" on UN Development Decades, World Food Plans, and New International Economic Orders to equalize economic opportunity, Leon Gordenker assesses the end results of three projects. Working from interviews done in 1966–68, he analyzes negotiations in the countries, and with New York (UNDP) and Rome (FAO) headquarters on a Zambia game park, and on Tanzanian and Malawi river development projects. Central to his assessment of UN influence is the role of the UNDP Resident Representative as the senior UN official in each country, and as presumably the UN coordinator. Painting a largely negative picture of the influence of UN "doctrine" and of the UNDP Country "Rep" specificially, he attributes the shortcomings to factors such as: lack of external financial leverage; lack of the UNDP Country Rep's individual status as an economist; multiplicity of donors and advisors (UN agencies, IBRD with its formidable finances, ECA, Ford, for example). As a result, he says that the UNDP Representative was limited largely to administrative management and response to requests. He knew little about UN global doctrine; and his country counterparts were not interested.

Since 1966–68, Western GNP, "trickle-down" development models have been downgraded. A new generation of African planners is planning for Africans; is beginning to plan from the "bottom up," on the expressed needs of the "poor majority" is balancing human needs with production economics. Gordenker cites a very early, and major, example of independence in this new direction of development: Tanzania's rejection of the UN/IBRD "investment pay-off" doctrine in favor of its own Arusha doctrine in its valley development program. Yet in this logical move toward "states' rights," so to speak, global issues of population, environment, and the like, still need to be reconciled with country development programs.

Among the entrees to "marry" international and national doctrines are:

1. *Aid in Building the Political Base for "Doctrinal Change"*—The UN and other bodies can offer *welcome* cooperation to countries in areas such as the orientation of decision-makers, and the education of the public, in building the political base for the country's own and the global issues.

2. *International Years and Conferences*—Gordenker cites participation in international conferences as a bridge

between national and international leaders—and philosophies. The UN Years, and associated and unassociated country, regional, and international conferences on population, technology, and other subjects, offer an increasingly important potential in blending national and international development philosophy.

3. *Incentives*—It seems safe to assume future international revenue generation—and grants, shared revenue, and loans to countries—will be linked with global issues; but, hopefully, with latitude for the "Tanzanias" to develop their individual models.

4. *Organizational Development*—Gordenker proposes "organizational behavior theory" as another tool to facilitate UN/country, and in-country, adoption of development "doctrine." The National Training Laboratories for Applied Behavioral Science offer useful experience in that direction.

As for the UNDP Country "rep," or any other coordinator, the personality, background, and influence of the individual will always be a factor. But more important than his eminence as an economist will be his abilities, his resources, in the role of catalyst and facilitator, and his knowledge of "organizational development" and of the processes of "change." As the UNDP moves to recover from four years of a catastrophically abortive "management reform," as it operates under the fresh competition and independence among UN agencies and world regions, these qualifications will become increasingly critical.

Somewhat "dated" though it is, Gordenker's analysis still offers a useful "Gray's Anatomy" of the international-national development bureaucracy—and its pathology.

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BARUCH A. HAZEN. *Soviet Propaganda: A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict.* Pp. iii, 293. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. 1976. $12.95.

For a work designated as a case study this book takes a long time to get to the case. It is only in the fifth of seven chapters (page 144 of 282 pages of text) that the author turns to Soviet propaganda on the Middle East conflict. The first half of the book takes up two other subjects: propaganda in general and the whole Soviet propaganda operation in particular. The volume, then, is really three longish essays on separate but related topics, and it will be treated as such in this review. Chapters 1 and 2 amount to an abstract and theoretical examination of propaganda as a process. The analysis literally teems with jargon, for example, "inputs," "absorption screen," personality screen" and the like, and the exhaustive attempt of the author to define the term propaganda seems to this reviewer unnecessary.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine the whole Soviet propaganda effort, including both the regular propaganda apparatus as well as "impregnational propaganda," which appears to mean Soviet films, exhibits, sports teams, performing arts and the like, which "concentrate on building up a positive image of the Soviet Union." The author describes this as "drilling pro-Soviet holes in the audience's absorption screen or, more probably . . . turning that screen pro-Soviet." As these quotations suggest, the analysis in part two is still freighted with jargon and unnecessary theoretical discussion. This section of the book contains much interesting information about Soviet propaganda organs such as TASS, Novosti, radio and television. In many ways, however, these chapters resemble parts of a reference work rather than a monograph. Chapter 3 is full of tables and other listings of Soviet publications having foreign propaganda purposes, foreign language radio broadcast schedules, and like material. Very few readers will be willing or able to absorb this material, while the interested specialist is likely to want to go back to the original sources.

Part 3 is the case study of "Soviet operational propaganda and the Middle East conflict." This is the best part of the book. Although the author does not hide

his biases (he is a professor at Bar-Ilan University in Israel), he demonstrates enormous knowledge of the subject as well as a good grasp of the subtleties of Soviet propaganda. He details the early (1948) Soviet sympathy with the new Israeli state and the development of improved Soviet-Arab relations in the context of discussing various issues in the Middle East conflict. Even here, however, the author sometimes loses sight of his main focus as, for example, in a section on Jewish life in the USSR. This is an interesting topic to be sure, but hardly of great relevance to the Middle East conflict.

Professor Hazen concludes by questioning the general effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. He believes that it suffers from serious shortcomings. His reasons for this conclusion seem sensible, but for a variety of reasons his book did not develop the foundation for such statements nearly as well as it might have.

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EVAN LUARD. *Types of International Society.* Pp. viii, 389. New York: The Free Press, 1976. $14.95.

The central thesis of this book is that "international relations are best examined within the framework of a study of international societies" (p. 375). This "sociological approach," it is claimed, "corresponds more closely than most other approaches to the *reality* of international relationships" (p. 362), is more comprehensive than other approaches, provides greater scope for "intangible factors," and helps "to apply the *comparative* method in a specific way to the study of international relations" (p. 363). The approach is in fact as much historical as sociological. Certain "key factors in international society" are described within seven "international societies," which flourished at time periods ranging from 771 B.C. to 1974.

Within this framework the treatment is rather conventional and quite repetitive. The "key factors in international society" that are selected for special examination are ideology, elites, motives, means, stratification, structure, roles, norms, and institutions. A separate chapter is devoted to each of these factors. The seven "international societies" are analyzed in each chapter with reference to each factor. The societies are the Chinese multistate system (771–221 B.C.), the Greek city-states (600–338 B.C.), the age of dynasties (1300–1559), the age of religions (1550–1648), the age of sovereignty (1648–1789), the age of nationalism (1789–1914), and the age of ideology (1914–1974).

In the next to last chapter Professor Luard considers five so-called "future international societies," which he labels "the transnational society," "the international society," "the sphere of influence society," "a world of regions," and "the rich-poor society." The treatment is very general and imprecise, and has little value, even for students of "futurology." The final chapter, on "The Nature of International Society," is even more general. It therefore seems to be anticlimactic after a chapter on "Future International Societies."

Professor Luard is a competent scholar, whose *Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968) is well known to students of international relations. Apparently he felt impelled to write this more general and much less rigorous book to provide a reminder of the continuing relevance of historical and sociological approaches as needed supplements to more quantitative and less comprehensive a-historical studies. In this post-behavioral era one wonders whether such a reminder is any longer needed. If so, this lengthy and repetitive extended essay should provide a useful antidote to less humanistic and less comprehensive approaches.

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GIOVANNI SARTORI. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis.* Vol. I. Pp. xiii, 370. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $32.50. Paperbound, $10.95.

Sartori, formerly of the University of Florence and now Professor of Political Science at Stanford, has set a standard by which years of comparative research on political parties are likely to be measured. *Parties and Party Systems* is an effort to bring order to a rapidly growing, global body of information about parties and elections and to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive theory of politics.

The book is in two parts, the first on the origin and rationale of parties, the second and larger on party systems. Another more theoretical volume is promised on party types, organization, and functions, and on the social and cultural contexts of parties and the influence of electoral systems. Sartori's broad purpose is to identify different kinds of parties and party systems and to explain the forces at work in and around them.

He builds slowly, in early chapters defining his units of analysis—including the party as "any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office." Next he develops a classification of party systems: one party, hegemonic party, predominant party, two party, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism, and atomized. The reader who follows the gradual unfolding of cast and clues with patience will be rewarded in the final chapters with the coalescence of the threads of argument.

The literature is reviewed thoroughly and critically. Maurice Duverger, who worked on a theory of parties a quarter of a century ago, in the absence of abundant data, is felt in some degree to have raised impediments to the study of parties. Similarly, V. O. Key and others are faulted for having regarded the Solid South as a one-party rather than a predominant party area, and more generally for failing to respect the discontinuity between competitive and noncompetitive systems.

Sartori is also critical of students of multi-party systems who neglect the distinction between limited and extreme pluralism—the one with centripetal competition among governing-oriented parties, the other with antisystem parties, polarization, and a tendency to break down. Ultimately he extends the Hotelling-Downs model of centripetal party competition to illuminate this distinction, settling both empirically and logically on about five "relevant" parties as the line dividing stable and unstable multi-party systems.

Parties and Party Systems sparkles with ideas. It should be read by all serious students of political parties.

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RICHARD VEATCH. *Canada and the League of Nations.* Pp. xi, 224. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975. $15.00.

This long over-due survey of Canada's participation in the deliberations of the League of Nations will be welcomed by all informed observers of Canadian affairs—and most especially by those of us who will no longer have to piece together, for ourselves and our students, the record from several partial accounts. If Professor Veatch's meticulous mining of several hitherto unused or unavailable primary sources has added little of substance to what the specialist has known for some time, his great service has been to draw the record together in a very readable form and to remove, in a convincing manner, some of the nagging doubts which persisted from having access only to non-classified materials. At the cost of some repetition, he has provided the less informed observer with a very useful summary of the functioning and problems of the domestic political system during the period in which his major story unfolds.

Canada sought full membership in the League not because of a sense of commitment to the Wilsonian ideal of collective

security but rather because she saw rightly that the prestige of League membership, together with the legal implications associated with it, would strengthen her efforts to win a degree of independence from Britain. It would be false to suggest that Canada wanted to pursue an entirely independent foreign policy—unless "independence" is used in a narrowly legalistic sense. What she wanted was to be free from any semblance of being automatically bound by British imperial decisions. On the other hand, she did not want to substitute a League commitment for a British commitment or to deny herself the opportunity to influence and benefit from British policy. So even as she secured from the Big Three at Paris approval for League membership, she began her fight against being bound by the automatic sanctions (as she saw them) in the proposed League Covenant. Wilson's "heart" of the Covenant, Article 10, was an anathema for Canada—she fought unsuccessfully for its deletion at Paris and for its deletion or amendment through three Assemblies and under two governments. Even though the letter of the Article was not changed, the spirit of collective security was much weakened by Canada's efforts, which are so well documented by Professor Veatch. Yet it would be an exaggeration to conclude that Canada was responsible in any major way for the eventual failure of collective security—without universality of membership and most especially with the American rejection of Wilson's League, collective security was dead from the very beginning.

Thus it is not surprising, as Professor Veatch confirms, that no serious consideration was given by the League to collective sanctions against Japan in 1931. What is surprising, however, is the implication in his otherwise excellent account of Canada's role in the League charade during Italy's rape of Ethiopia that collective sanctions could have worked. While he is careful to avoid exaggerating the negative influence of the "Riddell incident," his omission of any reference to the first Hoare-Laval "agreement" of September 1935 (which we have known about since 1936) tends to imply that Britain and France might have been more effective had Canada under Mackenzie King not backed away from initiatives taken by Riddell without prior authorization from Ottawa. Britain and France had no intention of either applying total economic sanctions or of backing them with the threat of military sanctions. Canada's role was perhaps indefensible, but certainly not influential.

Canada did attempt to make some positive contributions to the work of the League on such matters as disarmament, the protection of minorities and the development of international conciliation. Nevertheless, Professor Veatch's conclusion that her impact was primarily negative is not unfair. What would be a distortion of history would be to see Canada's negative impact in isolation from the forces which rendered the League ineffective almost from the beginning.

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WILLIAM WALLACE. *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain.* Pp. vii, 320. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976. $22.50.

Quite different from the long-standing preoccupation of American scholars with the formal and informal institutions and with the process of foreign policy-making, there has been a noticeable void of similar undertakings in Britain. Only within the last decade has there been a change in this situation marked by the publication of a few interesting studies dealing with British foreign policy. David Vital's *The Making of British Foreign Policy* is probably the outstanding example.

However, the first comprehensive treatment of this subject matter, both in terms of the policy-making process and the administrative apparatus, is the work of William Wallace, a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and lecturer in government at the University of Manchester.

The two primary objectives pursued by the author are:

The first is to uncover and describe the process through which foreign policy is made. It will be argued that foreign policy-making is as deeply affected by the domestic political environment as by international constraints, and that an understanding of this political environment is necessary to any full understanding of the evolution of British foreign policy. The second is to explore the extent to which the traditional boundaries between foreign and domestic policy have been undermined by the increasing interdependence of the developed countries of the North Atlantic area—to ask whether it is still possible to distinguish any separate and discrete field of policy which we can label 'foreign', or whether it would now be more accurate to talk about an international dimension which touches most important areas of domestic policy (p. vii).

There is no doubt in this reviewer's mind that the author fully accomplishes the tasks he had set for himself. His reference to the fact that he does not claim to present an exhaustive study especially with his treatment of British involvement in world affairs certainly does not apply to his primary objectives. He deals with them competently as he does with selected problem areas in the form of case studies.

In order to obtain the material for his analysis and evaluation of the "Whitehall Machinery," concentrating on the structure and process of foreign policy-making during the period from 1969 to 1972, the author made extensive use of available government publications, House of Commons reports, memoirs, and newspaper coverage. He also interviewed several hundred people including officials in almost every Department in Whitehall and in several overseas missions, Members of Parliament, former ministers, and representatives of interest groups. Interestingly enough, Mr. Wallace pointed at the great difficulties he encountered as a result of "the secrecy which pervades the whole machinery of government" (p. viii).

His findings include the recognition that the lower and middle levels of the administrative machinery which deal primarily with routine matters of varying significance, the Whitehall machinery operates well. The great shortcomings are at the higher level where the "questioning of the assumptions underlying foreign policy has successfully been suppressed" (p. 274) and where alternative policies have been denied and decisions once taken rarely ever have been reexamined. He also regrets the lack of clear public presentations of foreign policy alternatives which could serve to educate public opinion and ensure a wider debate of the issues at hand especially in recognition of the diminishing boundaries between foreign and domestic policies.

In his conclusion the author quotes David Vital who considers one of the main problems of the British situation:

That by and large there is nothing in the British political system, unlike that of the United States, for example, which imposes upon a British Government the need to take into serious account views and information which have not emerged from within the formal machinery established for the administration of foreign affairs and subject, ultimately, to its control (p. 276).

Mr. Wallace's study greatly contributes to a better understanding of the foreign policy process in Britain and it might even encourage leaders of political parties not only to espouse needed changes while in opposition but also when in possession of political power.

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ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

DELIA DAVIN. *Woman-Work: Women and the Party in Revolutionary China.* Pp. x, 244. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. $10.95.

The main value of this meticulous study of Women-Work in China lies in two areas: it is probably the most detailed description of any type of social change that has occurred in "mysterious" China in the 1930 to 1950 period. Some data are given for the 1960s al-

though less information was apparently available in that decade. It enables an important second step—that of making a rigorous comparative study of the effect of induced as compared to normal or less regimented change in women's position in rapidly changing traditional societies. For much the same problems have been faced by women in other industrializing countries with long historical traditions, such as India, which, when it acquired its independence, attempted to handle them in a more democratic, persuasive way.

The author defines Woman-Work as being equivalent to the Chinese term "funü gongzuo" which "covers all sorts of activities among women, including mobilizing them for revolutionary struggle, production, literacy and hygiene campaigns, social reform, and so on." The book is divided into an Introduction which describes the position of Chinese women in early times followed by chapters on Women's Organizations, Marriage and the Family, Women in the Countryside, Women in the Towns and an impressive Bibliography of some 147 books and pamphlets in Chinese, 47 articles in Chinese-language periodicals, 125 books on the Chinese and other families in Western languages, and 18 articles in Western-language periodicals.

In view of the three-week-tour journalistic accounts that provide most of our scant knowledge of China the author's qualifications for writing this study are impressive. She taught for two years in a Peking college and in 1975 returned for a year to work as translator at the Foreign Language Press. In between she lectured in economics and social history and did research in Leeds, Tokyo, Hong-kong and Paris.

Non-communists are apt to regard communist governments as well-oiled machines marching steadily towards clearly defined goals. The author dispels this view in her description of the Chinese government's contradictory policies over time towards women. To the young intellectual leaders the emancipation of women was an important goal of the revolution and their views were supported by the practical need for women's labor in areas which would assist the war efforts. For the book covers the period of the Jiangxi Soviet and the anti-Japanese and Civil wars. And so the women were induced to work in the textile and industrial factories, on the railways and become teachers, doctors, health workers and so on. But after many women had painfully accommodated to their new roles over the years, often against bitter opposition from the men, they found that the tide had turned and they were faced with just as strong government pressures to return to their homes. Thus the position of women fluctuated from time to time, much as it has done in other countries under less authoritarian governments.

As usual in studies about women, the Chinese men are rather left out of the picture. But we can imagine the depth of their feelings when we are told, for example, that their traditional authority was sometimes reversed to such an extent that the powerful women's associations could even arrange beatings for husbands who ill-treated their wives. It would seem possible that the men suffered more in accommodating to the new patterns than the women, as it is easier to go "up" in the power hierarchy than "down."

The book tells a great deal about the various women's associations and the important role of the Women's Federation—a government sponsored organization which grew to be the binding national women's organization and managed to be effective in promoting and easing change at the grass-root as well as the national levels.

This is undoubtedly a very important study, even though sociologists may feel that it cries out for a theoretical framework which would make these momentous changes in women's position more meaningful especially, as has been said, in view of similar problems of change in other countries. Now, however, with the assistance of this competent study, someone can begin this second task.

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WARREN DEAN. *Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820–1920.* Pp. xv, 234. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. $11.50.

Between 1850 and 1930, in the heydey of free trade, Brazil discovered its aptitude for coffee production and proceeded to exploit it, to the limit of its resources and possibly beyond. Coffee was the catalyst that hastened the transformation of Brazil from an archipelago of autonomous, export enclaves into an integrating, economic system. But while coffee's reign is the watershed dividing colonial from modern Brazil, the coffee boom has remained an historiographic wasteland, poor in both monographic studies and interpretive works.

Dean's book is first of all a well-researched and skillfully written revisionist account of the evolution of the relations between masters, slaves, and farm laborers during the expansion of coffee planting in São Paulo. It begins with the expulsion of the aboriginal population, which left their numbers "decimated" and their culture "shattered." All too briefly thereafter, Rio Claro was a frontier Arcadia which attracted "people who sought a refuge from the oppressiveness of colonial rule." But despite its suitability for European farming techniques and its temporary freedom from the restraints of settled society, smallholding did not develop. Colonial authorities strengthened planter hegemony by distributing large land grants to affluent planters, their poor relations, and the rising young men who married their daughters.

Just as the colonial authorities preferred planters to smallholders, planters preferred slave to free labor. Economic consideration as well as racial attitudes weighed heavily in their choice. "Their plantations were less attractive to the rural propertyless population than the alternative of squatting on still unclaimed land, because the plantations were no more productive than swidden farming. . . ." Unwilling to offer additional incentives to the free *caboclo*, they chose instead to form a slave labor force. The non-economic elements of their decision are documented in a definitive account of Senator Vergueiro's famed, but ill-fated trial of free, immigrant labor. Dean concludes that although free labor was economically viable, the immigrant's rejection of fixed-wage, indenture contracts and semi-servile status proved its undoing. Rather than meet the laborer's demands for better wages and decent treatment, planters persisted in their use of "higher-cost slave labor."

Several tenets of Brazilian historical mythology come under Dean's critical scrutiny. It is widely believed, for example, that under the weight of its moral, political, and practical liabilities, slavery fell to a non-violent wave of national revulsion. But whatever influence the abolition movement and anti-slavery sentiment had on the national scene—and Dean seems strangely reticent on those subjects—"the slave population, not the planters . .. . brought ruin to the system of forced labor by refusing to participate in it."

Without doubt, Dean's book will have a major impact upon Brazilian studies. It contributes to a relatively uncrowded area, maintains high intellectual and literary standards, and is original, challenging, and skillfully constructed and sedulously researched. To this favorable judgement, one must, in fairness, add that flaws in the logic of some of its hypotheses and inadequacies in its documentation, greatly reduce its persuasiveness. Some assertions seem downright dubious. The "luxuriant," semi-deciduous forest may have appeared mild and temperate in comparison to its surroundings; from a European standpoint it was among the best agricultural resources of tropical South America. But direct translation of contemporary European, mixed, peasant smallholding, to the São Paulo plateau would have been far more difficult than Dean suggests. To explain the failure of free labor to develop midway through the nineteenth century, Dean alleges that swidden farming was as productive as coffee planting. This was most unlikely, if for no other reason than that plantations occupied the best land and the most convenient locations.

Other arguments seem incomplete

and tendentious. Different accounts of Brazilian abolition differ in the role that they accord to various forces and groups. But none, that I know of, entirely discounts the role of the abolition movement and of anti-slavery sentiment. Likewise, what Dean cites as strong evidence that the Brazilian economy, per capita, did not grow before abolition, is merely a model of the relation between money supply and national income that was employed just one other time, and then in the United States. Overall, it is not analytic virtuosity but Dean's close and subtle reading and telling citation of primary sources, and strong, mordantly ironic and often witty narrative style that provide the principal support for the study's hypotheses.

Dean's study draws much of its strength from its distinction between economic growth and improvements of the general welfare. It is with the rigorous application of this principle to the economic history of coffee that many will disagree. Dean forcefully states his case when he writes that "Rio Claro exhibits the futility of confusing private profitability with the advancement of a society." Others, who are more impressed or more distressed with the rarity of sustained economic growth and with the burdens that stagnation imposes upon *every* member of society, are less discriminating. Just division of the costs and the benefits of economic growth, and far-sighted, unselfish elite concern with the general welfare are, to put it mildly, scarce qualities in *any* country's history. Perhaps, it is only the achievement of a minimum standard of affluence that permits the search for the good life to successfully compete with the obsessive pursuit of material goods.

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WILLIAM J. DUIKER. *The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941*. Pp. 313. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $15.00.

Drawing on French archival materials recently opened to scholars, Duiker elaborates the historical record of Vietnam early this century. In lucid prose he integrates with his narrative not only political biographies of Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh, and Ho Chi Minh, but also analyses of why two earlier phases of nationalism failed and the third succeeded. The resulting book is attractive and persuasive.

Particularly useful is Duiker's account of the endemic disunity among nationalists of various persuasions, a disability which repeatedly proved fatal until overcome by the Viet Minh at a relatively late date. Prior to that time protonationalism led by scholar-gentry was characterized by learned debate and schismatic intrigue and gallant but futile armed uprisings against French rule. The urban nationalists who succeeded them were divided among Francophiles, reformers, radicals, and Marxists, with little common ground between them.

The non-Communist nationalists did not prevail not only because of disunity but also because the religio-cultural symbols that linked elites with peasants in Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia were absent in Vietnam after the erosion of Confucianism by French education and culture, the author argues enticingly but with insufficient elaboration.

The gap was bridged organizationally by the Indochina Communist Party. It was the ability of the Party leaders to learn from past disasters such as the Nghe-Tinh Soviets, to transcend their bourgeois origins, and to subordinate their Communist doctrines pragmatically to those of nationalism that allowed the Viet Minh to emerge predominant in 1945.

Even so, it took the Japanese occupation to create the necessary conditions for eventual Communist victory, as Chalmers Johnson has shown for China, a point Duiker passes over rather too lightly.

Finally the author offers the thesis that the Communists were authentic Vietnamese nationalists who used Marxist and Leninist doctrines and Comintern and Kuomintang support as means to pursue their ends. They were not an alien element but rather heirs of the scholar-gentry proto-nationalists both

by family line and by patriotic conviction. The policies of the present generation of leaders seem to bear out Duiker's judgement.

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J. P. JAIN. *After Mao What?* Pp. xiv, 276. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976. $13.75.

The future of Chinese leadership after the death of Mao Tse-tung is presently a subject of lively interest and speculation among China specialists. Dr. Jagdish Prasad Jain's *After Mao What?* attempts to answer this question by identifying various group rivalries which might play significant roles in the coming Chinese leadership.

The publication of such an undertaking could not have been more timely. On the other hand, Dr. Jain is especially unfortunate to have had his principal candidates for leadership at least temporarily excluded from consideration. Yeh Chien-ying at the age of 78 is already semi-retired and cannot be a serious contender for the vital leadership China will need. The other two principals are Teng Hsiao-ping and Chang Chun-chiao. Teng, after being named seniormost Vice-Premier and Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army has been purged from leadership ranks. More recently Chang Chun-chiao, second-ranking Vice-Premier and Director of the Army's General Political Department has been arrested for plotting usurpation of power. These men were leaders of the most important rival political factions in China: Chang Chun-chiao in the Chiang Ching (Mao's widow) radical faction; and Teng Hsiao-ping, a leader of the moderates.

Dr. Jain has written a very short book (144 pages of text) to which has been added 105 pages of appendices, tables and charts. Although most of the book is taken up with discussion relating to the Army, Jain concludes that the Army is not "an independent entity or a clearly distinguishable . . . group struggling for power and/or top leadership positions . . ." (p. 120). He goes on to say that the Army has not developed an institutional position, and thus is not a contender for leadership. Other prospects deemed unlikely in *After Mao What?* are: (1) establishment of military dictatorship, (2) dictatorship of the Party apparatus, or (3) resurgence of warlordism or regionalism. Dr. Jain also discounts the likelihood of a de-Maoism movement reminiscent of deStalinization, or a period of anarchism such as seen during the Cultural Revolution.

The eventual conclusion of the book is that: "the moderates and radicals . . . would try to avoid serious conflicts and adopt decisions by consensus and compromise" (p. 132). At the present writing such a conclusion would appear rather hopeless, but perhaps in the long run Dr. Jain may be vindicated.

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WAYNE S. KIYOSAKI. *North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945–1975.* Pp. v, 133. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. $16.50.

Dr. Kiyosaki, presently with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, has written a compact analysis of North Korea's attempt to chart its own course in foreign affairs. Although the book does pay some attention to the role played by the United States and Japan, the author's principal concern is North Korea's relationship with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The story is a familiar one. President Kim Il-song, ushered into power by Stalin in 1945, consolidates power in North Korea and asserts independence. When the Sino-Soviet dispute intensifies, he attempts to restore bloc solidarity, but soon is compelled to side with the Chinese. After Khrushchev's fall, Kim moves to the middle and incurs the wrath of the Chinese. Then the North Korean leader takes the radical path until the Soviet-American and Sino-American detente leads him to follow a more moderate course. All these events are described and analyzed in a brisk manner. Dr.

Kiyosaki writes succinctly and at times eloquently.

Those familiar with the literature in the field will find very little in this work that is new. Occasionally, one may also find his assertions unconvincing. But even the specialists will find some of his conclusions refreshing. For example, the author concludes that excessive bellicosity on the part of North Korea "alarmed the Socialist countries as much as many of the other countries" (p. 112) and that the North Korean actions "helped to accelerate the trend toward detente among the great powers" (p. 113).

General readers, on the other hand, will find the short volume informative. But they may wish that the discussion was not as compressed and that some of the incidents and terms were better explained.

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MARTIN LOWENKOPF. *Politics in Liberia: The Conservative Road to Development*. Pp. 237. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976. $9.95.

Martin Lowenkopf, formerly a research analyst in the Department of State and thereafter an academic political scientist, has written an important book. The volume is important because of the debates and study of the last decade concerning Liberia's unique modernization process; and it is important because of the high competence of this particular blend of sociology, economics, and history.

Lowenkopf argues that in a conservative pattern of modernization, economic development may precede and require the evolution of modern political values and institutions, rather than vice versa. Thus Liberia's modernization has been a process of political adaptation to social changes both incident and consequent to economic development brought by foreign investment. Under the benign authoritarianism of President William V. S. Tubman, who held office from 1944 to 1972 (and who retained power of signature over every government check for more than $100), Liberia welcomed foreign capital in its own "Open Door" policy, experienced real growth though with maldistribution of income, and advanced toward nationalism, all without the revolutionary instability which has accompanied such development elsewhere in Africa and the former colonial world. The great question: Can Liberia be a model for third world states seeking some alternative to socialist or democratic patterns of nationalist, modernizing development? Despite Lowenkopf's competent and interesting treatment of Liberian development, his suggestion that Liberia could be such a model is less than convincing. This observation, one must hasten to add, is an assessment, not a condemnation; for comparative development studies pose extraordinary challenge and provoke wide dissensus. Regrettably, the book is difficult to read because of over-elevated diction, really prosy excesses, as when the author wrote "retrospective determinism" and meant a variety of hindsight (p. 45), and "parastatal" for semi-official (p. 75).

One element of Liberia's experience seems clearly relevant to today's international economic context: Liberia welcomed foreign investment, and did so without forfeiting its sovereign competence. With the West afflicted by an as yet incurable economic malaise, it may be dangerous for the capital-poor, would-be developing nations to threaten or harass potential sources of development capital. It will be some time yet before internationally-administered development agencies supersede the function of private foreign investors, and that time may be critical to the economic well-being of all concerned in such transactions.

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E. K. LUMLEY. *Forgotten Mandate: A British District Officer in Tanganyika*. Pp. vii, 178. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1976. $12.00.

This is not a scholarly study but a testimonial. Apart from three short chap-

ters on the role of the District Officer, Indirect Rule and an evaluation of the role and the success of British Administration in Tanganyika, the contents tell us of the experiences of the author from 1923 to 1944. He served successively in Tanga, Kibondo, Bugufi, Lindi, Turundu, Korogwe, Mbulu, Lindi, Ulanga and Bukoba never staying in a single post for more than two and a half years. These are not full memoirs but selections intended to remind many people how colonialism actually functioned (p. 9). The materials derive from the author's diary.

Studies of Tanganyika or parts of the colony exist for this period and this study has no genuine revelations to report, although the author met some well known figures of the period such as chief Towegale of the Bena or Francis Luamgira at Bukoba. The specialist for one or the other area where Lumley was stationed will perhaps find some unknown or little known facts but the value of the book does not lie there. The absence of an index is therefore not as irritating as it might seem. More vexing are misprints such as Batinda for Bahinda and others.

This is the story of a career and a somewhat average career at that, since it suffered two setbacks as a result of a confrontation with a Provincial Commissioner and with "the Government," the central administration in Dar es Salaam. The value of this work is the District Officer's point of view and vignettes about his career. We see him organizing famine relief, building roads and ferries, raising taxes, trying court cases, dealing with Native Authorities and in one way or another trying to promote economic development for the sake of the people and for the sake of the Treasury, moving from one post to another, from one set of problems to a fresh set. We see the man going home forfeiting three weeks off-duty pay to see the Oval test match; we see him returning, never knowing where he will be posted nor in which capacity. After he had just married he found out that he was posted at Kiberege (Ulanga) which had the reputation of a "penal settlement" for D.C.'s. The cricket match is a purely insular trait but most of the others were shared by colonial officers everywhere, down to the conviction that there were "penal settlements" for Officers who were not to be promoted but should serve out their time.

Moreover, working from his diaries, Lumley has preserved the opinions current in the administration during this period. The condensed version about Indirect Rule (chapter two) repeats most of the stereotypes and it will set many a tooth on edge. We meet the African "not far removed from the savage background of his forbears" (p. 19) and the usual prejudices about careless and irresponsible people and leaders. The D.C.'s knew that their advice to the Native Authorities "was tantamount to an order" (p. 18), but still saw a great difference between their indirect rule and the German rule, as they were told about it, where *akida* were appointed to administer.

But the concerns for local welfare also come through as does the fact that often the District Officer was the scapegoat if policies from above were not successfully carried out. It is a revealing comment that the D.C. took a heavy rap and more than once suffered loss of promotion—an all important consideration in this career—as a result of the dishonesty of a Native Authority for which he was responsible. The mixture of altruism or the sense of mission and the claims of a career to be made is striking in this account.

Yes, this is a very useful book. It focuses on the execution of colonial policy by a class of administrators which has not been studied yet. And in its way it leaves us with vivid images of a period unknown to most Tanzanians and the younger scholars. As it is a typical career in many ways, with a typical officer doing typical things, believing typical prejudices (including the one about the sterner methods in the colony next door) and with typical aspirations it is a welcome addition to the reading lists of students.

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MASASHI NISHIHARA. *The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951–1966.* Monograph of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. Pp. v, 244. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976. $12.00. Paperbound, $7.50.

RAUL S. MANGLAPUS. *Japan in Southeast Asia: Collision Course.* Pp. v, 151. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976. $3.75.

Both of these publications give us an account of Japan's phenomenal rise to economic power with its political consequences. Relying on primary documentation and extensive interviews, these volumes provide a Japanese and a Southeast Asian perspective of Japan's role in Southeast Asia.

Nishihara focuses on the relationship between Japan and Indonesia from the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 to the rise of Soeharto in 1965–66, dealing first with the protracted war reparations negotiations (1951–57). Japan, at first, did not take these seriously, which is not surprising given the initial Indonesian claim for $17.5 billion. As negotiations proceeded, Japan began to give a flexible interpretation to the Peace Treaty's concept of reparations to be paid in "services" by including payment in capital goods. The December 1957 agreement contained, in effect, a $400 million grant and an additional $400 million in loans and investments. Reparation payments stimulated Japanese domestic production and increased Japanese exports to Indonesia (p. 88).

Nishihara intertwines the main theme with a recording of informal, non-governmental efforts. Spokesmen for the "Peace Lobby" (those interested in normalizing Japanese-Indonesian relations) were Japanese with wartime experience in Indonesia, those Indonesians with whom they had developed "comradely friendships," and Japanese industrialists aware of Japanese opportunities in Indonesia—referred to by some as a "sort of second Manchuria" (pp. 211–12). The subsequent "Reparation Lobbies" developed these contacts to assure a piece of the pie for themselves. This generated "an informal decision-making system in which those with political authority or influence had dominance over the selection of reparation projects and distribution of the funds" (p. 121), including lucrative contracts for the Japanese businessman who introduced Soekarno to the cabaret girl who became Dewi Sri Soekarno.

Nishihara's conclusion that Japan's increasing dominance over the Indonesian economy, might well aggravate Indonesia's "subordinate nation-complex" (p. 217), leads conveniently into the Manglapus publication. Manglapus, former Philippines Under-Secretary and Secretary of Foreign Affairs and a Senator from 1961 to 1967, is fascinated and worried by Japan's incredible economic growth. This leads him into a discussion of Japanese social organization, its "constructive tribalism," the importance of the "household group" in all Japanese activities (pp. 25–34), and the *oyabun* ("parent")—*kobun* ("child") relationship, all of which causes a "vertical division of labor" and, when applied to Southeast Asia, places it in the *kobun* position.

Two metaphors Manglapus uses frequently are: "bicycle overinvestment" (Japanese capital must keep pushing in order not to fall) and "The Tokyo Express," a monorail locomotive on a collision course. Neither of the metaphors is particularly helpful, although Manglapus ties them in with his notions of "performance pressure," "relentless dynamism," and "a growth-oriented development strategy which commits Southeast Asia to an ever-increasing and more irrevocable dependence" (p. 114). The Tokyo Express ran into two collisions in 1973–74: the vicious riots accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Bangkok and Jakarta.

In surveying the problem, Manglapus lays out various options, discarding most as impractical or unlikely: a "change from within" Japan, either by a change of government or the legalization of the "Guidelines for Investment in Developing Countries" drafted in mid-1973; and Southeast Asian "counter-

vailing power" either by the one oil "giant," Pertamina, or by ASEAN. He also discusses Japan's possible reactions to a (unlikely) radical shift in Southeast Asian development strategy.

Readers may not agree with all of Manglapus' facts and assertions, but it seems hard to deny that "Japan's dynamism and vulnerability" constitute "a rare and explosive combination." Or that continued Japanese penetration and investment will create increasing dependency, which is bound to lead to increased resentment. Finally, Nishihara has given us enough information on informal, non-governmental activities to make Manglapus' point of "eagerness to pay" and his expectation of "intensified corruption" another explosive issue.

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LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR. *Army Politics in Cuba, 1898–1958*. Pp. xvi, 240. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976. $9.95.

The disintegration of the Cuban army prior to and immediately after the flight of Batista on January 1, 1959 removed what might have been a powerful obstacle to the implementation of revolutionary policies by Fidel Castro. Why in the Cuban case was the fall of a government accompanied by the disbandment of the armed forces when in other Latin American countries governments have come and gone while the armed forces have remained intact?

Army Politics in Cuba, 1898–1958 by Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern Florida, does not provide the definitive answer to the question. It does, however, offer several good insights into the problem. Like other Latin American militaries, the Cuban armed forces became highly politicized as a result of the efforts of Cuban politicians to offset their lack of popular support through the creation of an army personally loyal to them. Professional standards for promotion were replaced by political criteria, producing a serious lack of continuity within the military establishment. Despite their increasing weakness as an institution, however, the armed forces were strong relative to the fragmented political parties, and beginning in the 1930s, they began playing an ever more overt role in Cuban politics.

Up to this point Cuba looks like many of its Latin American neighbors. What distinguishes the Cuban situation is the role of the United States. The Cuban military early recognized that its power in Cuba depended upon its ability to preserve a facade of political stability within the country. Once it became apparent that the armed forces were primarily responding to the interests of a foreign power, the little legitimacy they had within Cuba evaporated. The Castro-led insurgency ultimately convinced the United States that the Cuban military could not keep order. The ensuing withdrawal of United States' support, combined with the absence of popular backing for the army within Cuba, caused the armed forces to disintegrate.

Pérez's book, which is mainly descriptive and chronologically organized, does not draw comparisons with other Latin American countries. Nor does the author spend more than a page or two examining the Cuban experience in the light of the considerable literature that exists on civil-military relations in Latin America and the Third World. Nevertheless, *Army Politics in Cuba*, which draws heavily upon collections of personal papers and memoirs, public documents and State Department records, constitutes a valuable contribution to the literature. It is the first full-length scholarly study in English of the development of the Cuban military and merits reading by those persons seeking to understand the complexity of the process that led to the Cuban Revolution.

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ABRAHAM ASHKENASI. *Modern German Nationalism*. Pp. v, 222. New York: Halsted Press, 1976. $12.50.

Professor Ashkenasi's monograph is a concise analysis of nationalism's past and prospects in twentieth century Germany. Nationalism's virulent and destructive past in Germany, most especially during the twelve year National Socialist period, gives great significance to the question of its future prospects for Germany and the world. Ashkenasi's book discusses the complex origins, development, crisis period, and contemporary nature of the nationalist ideology in Germany. The book's excellent first chapter on nationalism in world history in the modern period places the German example in its proper historical, conceptual, and social settings. Although the book's emphasis is on the period after World War II, one chapter out of the total of seven chapters analyzes the historical development of nationalism in nineteenth and twentieth century Germany.

The core of the book concentrates on German nationalism after 1945, with special emphasis on bulwarks of contemporary German nationalism such as organized nationalist groupings, the Christian Social Union, the *Bundeswehr*, and conservative German newspapers. Ashkenasi places a great deal of emphasis on the role of public opinion and public political attitudes. Accordingly, he has made extensive use of public opinion polls, statistics, electoral results, and newspapers and periodicals. He concludes that a movement like National Socialism can't materialize in contemporary Germany. It is fairly certain that neither social conflict nor regalvanization of extremist conservative social groups could fan the flames of extremist nationalism in modern Germany. However, severe international or economic crisis could inflame passions which existing political parties and powerful conservative social groups could exploit. Germany's past and her central economic and political role in Europe give Ashkenasi reason to be cautious about his rather optimistic general assessment of Germany's future.

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ROY DOUGLAS. *Land, People & Politics: A History of the Land Question in the United Kingdom, 1878–1952*. Pp. 239. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. $14.95.

The vexatious land problem in Ireland during the Parnell era is a well known and widely studied historical phenomenon, but, as this useful study demonstrates, the problem had much broader geographical and chronological ramifications. Douglas, a lecturer at the University of Surrey who previously authored the well-accepted *History of the Liberal Party, 1895–1970*, draws on a truly impressive array of manuscript and printed sources in presenting his thesis.

Essentially, he argues the land problem was a continuous and central thread woven through the fabric of British social, economic, and political life in the period he covers. Particularly revealing are his excursions into the social manifestations of land as a peculiar kind of property. A great deal of social turmoil grew out of rack rents, differences over fixity of tenure, urbanization, land redistribution, and the like. These disturbances in turn gave rise to recurrent legislative efforts aimed at land reform and the alleviation of human distress associated with land usage. Another consideration implicit throughout the book, although the author surprisingly ignores its timeliness, is the manner in which land use affects society at large. With today's ever-growing environmental consciousness, it would seem to this reviewer that more comparison might have been made between the evolution of the land problem in Britain and those which confront much of the world today.

However, this is essentially criticism

of what the author might have said, and when one considers the book itself, it can only be accorded an overall favorable evaluation. This is a solid work which ties many apparently disparate elements into a skillful narrative. Douglas has a shrewd appreciation of the manner in which economic realities and political necessities mesh, and he convincingly demonstrates that, at least as far as land is concerned, the end result is of great social importance. All students of modern Britain will find material of interest in this work, and not the least of its merits is the manner in which it challenges traditional interpretations and approaches to the land problem. The debate this work will stimulate will certainly, in the end, result in a fuller understanding of all facets of the land problem.

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LEONARD D. GERSON. *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia*. Pp. 347. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1976. $15.00.

Lord Acton's observation that power corrupts has become a cliche and is accepted as conventional wisdom, but Professor Gerson's recent addition to the already substantial literature on the Soviet secret police forces one to reconsider the proposition. One can ask whether the Cheka was corrupt when it ruthlessly and without pity executed and imprisoned untold numbers of "enemies of the people," or was it faithfully fulfilling its role as the sword of the revolution. While Professor Gerson does not address this question explicitly, he does provide us with about all the information currently available in the public domain concerning the secret police. The author writes with vigor but has not organized his work well, and consequently it loses some of the impact a more sharply focused treatment would have had. The work is neither wholly chronological nor topical in its organization, but falls somewhere between the two, placing considerable burden upon the reader. Yet one cannot read this book without feeling the power of the subject. The preservation of Bolshevik power was the prime task of the Cheka, and the implication of Professor Gerson's work is that it did its job well, whether the cost in human lives was as few as 12,000 or as many as half a million. In the process, an instrument for future state control was perfected, and with the death of Lenin it gravitated to Stalin, materially assisting his drive for power.

If one accepts the logic of terror and if one notes that the enemies of the regime were many and real, the conduct of the Cheka in its defense of the new Soviet state becomes consistent and comprehensible. Felix Dzerzhinsky, the creator of the Cheka and its chief during its first nine years is portrayed by the author as a selfless, ascetic revolutionary, whose values and practices accorded closely with those of Lenin, although the Cheka clearly was an embarrassment to other highranking Bolshevik leaders. While Professor Gerson notes that Chekists at the provincial level were occasionally abnormally attached to the more sordid aspects of their duties, the impression of high-mindedness lingers.

The Cheka possessed almost no check upon its powers, being subject only to the will of the Politburo. It successfully avoided interference from the courts and from all guarantees of law and judicial procedure. Its police powers down to 1923 (when it became the GPU or political police) were comprehensive, and sentences were both administrative and summary. The raw power of the Cheka may not have been corruptive in the sense of Lord Acton's observation, but it certainly raises questions about the limits of police powers, even when those who exercise them are convinced that their cause is of overriding importance. One can only wish that Professor Gerson had reflected more upon the implications of his exposition and had made explicit some of these implications.

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EDWARD L. MORSE. *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France.* Pp. xiv, 336. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. $14.50.

In this provocative study the author has taken a novel approach to French foreign policy under the Fifth Republic. Instead of focusing on the unique elements of Gaullist foreign policy, notably its anachronistic and even quixotic nationalism, he has chosen the French example as a model to exemplify a generalized condition of foreign policy in the contemporary world. The contradiction between self-assertive independence and the exigencies of interdependence is singled out as characteristic of all highly modernized states, not only of France. Modernization itself, he notes, has paradoxically brought about increasing interdependence among nations and a simultaneous reinforcement of nationalism, with no transnational political organization available as a substitute for the nation-state.

The study presents itself in two parts. The first is a theoretical examination of the conduct of foreign policy in modernized societies, the second a detailed case analysis of France from 1958 to 1969 during the eleven years of Charles de Gaulle's presidency. Among other matters, Morse examines de Gaulle's efforts to overcome the tension between foreign and domestic affairs, the obstacles provided by foreign economic policy ("low policy") which compelled de Gaulle to climb down from some of his loftier ambitious heights, and the use of crisis management and crisis manipulation, especially in the Common Market, as an integral part of his foreign policy. He analyzes the constant pull between welfare and warfare, the tension between the quest for defense autonomy and the dilemma of insufficient resources, the unsuccessful campaign to reform the international monetary system, and such manifestations of crisis diplomacy as French pressures in the Common Market. At the same time, mindful of his larger theme, he presses the thesis that the interplay between nationalistic objectives and the constraints imposed by international interdependence was not characteristic of France alone, the trenchant nationalistic rhetoric of de Gaulle merely crystallizing the more general problem of such constraints elsewhere. Despite the extraordinary efforts of de Gaulle, interdependence served to thwart national autonomy. The central focus of the General's reshaping of politics was the effort to seek independence from the electorate as a prerequisite for maneuverability abroad, to recapture an independence from domestic politics somewhat in the "monarchic tradition" so that one could be free to take surprise initiatives. Like other political leaders, he discovered the domestic limitations on his external goals. In the end, the demands for welfare and social services, dramatized in the events of May–June 1968, undermined his efforts; and currency crises, including the devaluation precipitated by the events of May–June 1968, frustrated his position on monetary reform as well as his program for an independent nuclear force. To provide a political apparatus that would guarantee permanence and continuity in foreign policy was de Gaulle's goal, and indeed his chief legacy to his successors in the Fifth Republic, yet even he could not overcome the interrelatedness of foreign and domestic affairs in modern society. The central feature of international politics remained for de Gaulle as for others the "dual reality of transnational interdependence and national sovereignty."

Whether or not the theoretical framework of this volume will satisfy everyone, or whether or not the Gaullist experience in coping with interdependence is the most appropriate case study for the tensions facing modernized societies, the study illuminates many aspects of the Fifth Republic—its economic planning, its military programs, its activities in the EEC. Some readers may resist the author's conclusions out of the conviction that de Gaulle was a unique political phenomenon, transcending ordinary political leaders in his national self-assertiveness. Some readers will wonder, too, whether the

interdependence of the modern world is as new as the author deems it to be, and whether de Gaulle's "monarchic" tradition may not have been "Jacobin" as well. In any event, this interesting and astute study will be read with profit at both the theoretical and historical level.

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H. GORDON SKILLING. *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*. Pp. xvi, 924. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $45.00. Paperbound, $15.00.

The Prague Spring of 1968 was the high season of Czechoslovakia's brief history. Not only was the non-communist world admiring of the brave attempt "to give socialism a human face" but so too were party members inside and outside the East bloc as well as the communist governments of Rumania and Yugoslavia. The invasion of the five 'brother nations' that put an end to the Prague reforms was as shocking to Czechoslovakia as it was to the West but as a move of sheer power it seemed wholly successful. The reformers were thrown out to be replaced by orthodox, Moscow party-liners who have remained in control. The author however, as is evident in his title more than in his guarded text, seems inclined to take an optimistic view of the Czechoslovakian revolution and its possible future. The title suggests that the Prague Spring may well, one day, be renewed, that the invasion and subsequent repressions consumed the harvest not the roots. The text (page 851) says questions on its future both in Czechoslovakia and the Communist imperium defy an answer.

The past however, and how and why Czechoslovakian communism took the course it did is thoroughly documented in this exhaustive account of the personalities and political forces at work. Mr. Skilling has examined all the records available to him through interviews, party files, memoirs, newspaper accounts—everything that has been written about the period—and he has as well a long, first-hand knowledge of the country and its divided people. And the latter, as the polls he cites indicate, wanted what the leaders were talking about, a liberated socialism which a large portion of the electorate thought should be led by the Communist party although a considerable majority rejected both a one-party system and a return to a pre-1948 polity.

The book is obviously the product of formidable industry but its structure produces a certain stagnation in the flow of events. For example the circumstances of Secretary Novotný's removal from office are described in pages 161–179, on page 201 a meeting calls for his resignation and then, hundreds of pages later (pages 453 and 571) we are back again, in other contexts, in the time of his ouster. Since a book of this scope and detail is not in any event likely to be read as narrative history, these are doubtless minor defects; the materials are certainly all there—almost every page has its quotations—and the events are described with accuracy and good sense to provide the reader with everything he might need to make his own judgments.

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FRANK B. TIPTON, JR. *Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during the Nineteenth Century*. Pp. xiii, 270. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1976. $22.00.

Economic history has increasingly demanded attention alongside the more traditional political, diplomatic and military genres. A major focus—especially in the history of western societies during the last two centuries—is the problem of industrialization or modernization. It is tempting to perceive this process as a generally uniform phenomenon, if not for western civilization as a whole, then at least for individual nations. Such an approach is both convenient in providing

accepted units and conforms very roughly to economic realities. Since it can, however, mislead in implying homogeneity within national aggregates, a regional approach supplies a necessary corrective. All too frequently such regional studies suffer from myopia and do not relate local characteristics to national developments. In offering a synthetic and comparative treatment of German regional development during the late nineteenth century, Tipton not only alleviates this deficiency in the German case but also provides a model for studies of other developing economies.

The book is well conceived, exhaustively researched, clearly organized, and straight-forwardly written. It manages the rare feat of acknowledging the historian's concern for the particular and unfamiliarity with economic theory while satisfying the economist's demand for theoretical framework and quantification. Concentrating the massive data base very largely in tables, statistical appendix and notes, Tipton keeps the text admirably brief (less than half the book). Within a chronological arrangement, the study is organized topically and specific details of individual regions are related to other cases and the national aggregate.

The most striking features of German modernization are regional disparities and differing rates of development. Measured by a specialization index indicating divergence from the national aggregate, industrial development caused increased differences among regions as the 19th century progressed. As a result there emerged the now familiar patterns of emigration from rural to urban areas and differentiation between developed and backward economies. These developments occur at different rates: East Prussia and Saxony emerge by mid-century as the prototypical agricultural and industrial societies (respectively), followed in the next half century by the Ruhr.

While possibilities for development are limited by material factors, the idiosyncracies of regional development are profoundly influenced by social and political factors. Economic developments forced traditional elites to resist or adjust to change. In East Prussia the large landowners had virtually insured against industrialization by mid-century, whereas the Saxon government was encouraging it as part of a drive for political centralization, but in southern and western Germany the rivalry between central and local bureaucracies retarded industrial development until mid-century. The role of non-economic factors is nowhere as clear as in the development of railroads which were "the major cause of the dichotomy between backward and advanced districts" since " 'self-feeding' growth at the favored centers was purchased at the expense of 'emptying' and progressive stagnation for what rapidly became the agricultural hinterland." Yet the location of railroads was always "a political decision" and "not a natural phenomenon at all, but a very human creation . . . being responsive to the push of political muscle first and the pull of marginal cost only second, if at all." Regional divergences reinforced other divisions within German society which together produced an increasingly tense and explosive mix by the eve of World War I. Thus the effects of industrialization were divergent, if not indeed contradictory: while integrative in encouraging national consciousness and culture, it also was disintegrative in producing divergent tendencies in different areas.

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ALEXANDER VUCINICH. *Social Thought in Tsarist Russia: The Quest for a General Science of Society, 1861–1917.* Pp. ix, 294. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. $15.50.

This erudite work is a very useful and instructive introduction to the role of representative members of the Russian intelligentsia in molding and shaping public opinion in Russia. It stresses the impact on their studies of western intellectuals from the abolition of serfdom in

Tsarist Russia (1861) to the October (Bolshevik) Revolution (1917). There is no reciprocal evidence of an impact by the Russian intelligentsia on the works of western intellectuals during the period in question. Strictly speaking, Vucinich provides for the first time, to my knowledge, a comprehensive and scientific definition of subjective and objective sociology in all its ramifications, through both a "Russian prism" and a western interpretation.

Although the terms *intelligentsia* and *intellectuals* are used synonymously here, in Tsarist Russia the intelligentsia did not embrace all intellectuals. The Russian intelligentsia, as such, a product of the nobility, clergy and military distinction, represented no party or profession, but rather the conscience of the people. Many twentieth-century intellectuals, who have claimed to speak for the masses (populism), actually represented political parties—in the case of the Bolsheviks, one party, the Communist Party. These intellectuals were materialists rather than idealists. Actually, it was the Bolshevik intellectuals who put an end to the leading role of the idealistic Russian intelligentsia.

This work helps to explain why F. M. Dostoyevskii, the giant of nineteenth-century Russian literature, elevated Jesus Christ above everything, even above *truth*. The impression is given that every leading contributor among the cultured intelligentsia dealt with in this book—including P. L. Lavrov, N. K. Mikhailovskii, B. A. Kistiakovskii, M. M. Kovalevskii and A. A. Bogdanov—sought to ameliorate the plight of the *narod*. Some advocated celestial (religious) means, others terrestrial (secular) to achieve their common goal. It became evident to V. S. Solovyov, whose lectures strongly influenced Dostoyevskii, that neither theology nor ideology alone could satisfactorily solve human and social problems. Thus Dostoyevskii arrived at the conclusion that we must have both religion and science, especially as regards the Russian people (p. 104). Since Christ personified both the deity (theology) and man (ideology), world problems could be solved, according to him, only by applying the teaching of Russian Orthodox Christianity.

Professor Vucinich writes intelligently and clearly. His book is a solid, meaty contribution on a very important subject—interesting and valuable.

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EUGEN WEBER. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. Pp. 615. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. $20.00.

France's delayed entry into the modern world and the persistence of local characteristics have both perplexed and intrigued historians. *Peasants into Frenchmen* by Eugen Weber tackles this controversial issue and concludes that the crucial transformation occurred between 1870 and 1914. He argues that the spread of roads and railroads gradually undermined the isolation of rural communes and exposed them to modernizing forces. The fragmentation and local idiosyncrasies of 1870 had yielded to national unity. Local dialects and illiteracy gradually gave way to a national tongue and a reading public. New industry and skills invaded formerly isolated regions to weaken traditional modes of life and labor. Weber thus views the early Third Republic as France's transition to modernity.

In the first of three sections, Weber analyzes France's characteristics before 1870. Much of rural France, and particularly the less developed southwestern portions, still lived at bare subsistence standards. Semi-barbarians occupied a rural wilderness in which local solidarity and regional autonomy reinforced a dislike of outsiders. Mistrust confronted all strangers; even governmental agents were viewed as alien intrusions. Old systems of coinage and measurement resisted standardization or replacement by the franc and metric system. Even the French language had to compete with a multiplicity of local dialects. A population whose habitats were miserable and food supplies lim-

ited felt little sense of national unity. On the eve of the Third Republic, France's sizable rural population still lived in an uncivilized state of poverty, superstition, and local fragmentation.

Into this self-contained world moved the agencies of change which would fundamentally alter peasant society. Weber's second part focuses on those forces, foremost among which were the new roads and railroads envisaged by the Freycinet Plan and laws of the early 1880s. Although the major roads and railbeds had been laid earlier, strategic concerns had motivated their layout. Not until the 1880s were the rural roads and branch line railways built which would pull the isolated countryside out of its autarky and into a market economy. Second only to road building in transforming the peasantry was the contemporaneous introduction of compulsory, free schooling. France's expanding bureaucracy needed trained and educated civil servants. Peasants learned because education offered material rewards. Other subsidiary agents of change also contributed their part: migration advanced literacy; military service proved an agency for acculturation; a large artisanate transmitted national values to the rural world as did participation in the practice of politics; and the declining role of the church facilitated acceptance of modern ideas. Thus, numerous forces undermined rural isolation and exposed the French peasantry to national influences.

Weber's last section explores the effects of change on the rural situation. This part of the book is rather disappointing since Weber focuses on such minor phenomena as the declining role of rowdy festivals, charivari forms of justice, folk wisdom, music and dance rather than returning to the major issues raised in Part I. He might have spelled out the impact of change on problems of poverty, justice, language and civilization to reinforce his important conclusion that roads, schools and military service fundamentally altered the countryside and incorporated rural France into a modern, unified nation. Although Weber leaves certain issues insufficiently developed, his massive, well-documented study is a major contribution to the literature on French social history.

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UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

PHILIP S. BENJAMIN. *The Philadelphia Quakers in the Industrial Age, 1865–1920.* Pp. ix, 301. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1976. $12.50.

All Americans suffered extraordinary stresses in the fifty years following the Civil War as the nation responded to industrialism and mass urbanization. But few were so severely strained as the Philadelphia Quakers. Traditionally they had tried to remain apart from the larger society, members of an island community seeking to perserve its cultural uniqueness and sectarian spiritualism. By World War I, however, the Friends had lost much of their cultural exclusiveness. They found themselves in positions of business leadership and deeply involved in the political and moral issues of the time. Moreover, their own ranks had been fractured by splinter groups such as the Hicksites, Gurneyites, and Wilburites, contending units formed in reaction to the stresses of the new urban life.

The late Philip Benjamin, professor of history at Temple University, has captured the central dilemma of the Philadelphia Quakers as they emerged from the pre-industrial society. Using a sample of some 710 Quakers and the records of five Friends Meetings of Philadelphia, he applied sound social scientific methods to develop a profile which demonstrates the social condition of the Quakers, their influence in the community, and the shifting condition of their sect. Benjamin identifies essentially the same conflicts for the Quakers

of Philadelphia in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era that Frederick Tolles and Gary B. Nash had already found for the Quakers of the colonial era. In both times the Friends' attempts to remain apart from the growing society were frustrated as they found themselves increasingly a part of the socioeconomic elite unable to preserve their "unworldliness." Benjamin's Quakers criticized the capitalist excesses of their age but often found themselves among the city's captains of industry and commerce. They were never entirely at ease participating in the political and social reforms of the time, but many became active in the temperance movement and in efforts to clean up corruption in Philadelphia politics. And like their colonial predecessors, some were thought to have an inordinate passion for education and the arts.

Benjamin builds a convincing case that the Philadelphia Quakers maintained their "quietism" fairly well until the turn of the century. Even social feminism and women's suffrage, contrary to the traditional view, were not championed by the Quakers until the 1910s. It was in that decade, also, that they marshalled their spiritual resources to promote militant organizations for the rights of blacks and struggled energetically for pacifism during the World War. The Philadelphia Quakers had emerged from an exclusive, conservative community into a progressive body of civil libertarians actively supporting programs of social change.

Historians of modern America have rarely taken an interest in the Quakers except as pacifist leaders. Benjamin's study has corrected that by placing the Philadelphia Quakers into the larger context of the total American scene. He has woven them skillfully into the history of their city, and he has proven in the process that good religious history can be combined with sound urban history.

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ALEXANDER DECONDE. *This Affair of Louisiana*. Pp. x, 325. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976. $12.50.

The thesis of this book is that the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 was a logical consequence of an earlier Anglo-American and American expansionism and set the pattern for other expansionist activities by the United States in the nineteenth century. The thesis is neither new nor very important, and the chapters that bear heaviest on this interpretation are the weakest ones in the book. Large use of expressions such as "aggressive people," "the lust for lands," "imperial desires," "implicit coveting of Louisiana," "limitless territorial ambitions," "ruthless land hunger," and "despoiling of Indians" (pp. 34–37, 243), when applied to Americans only, suggests that Spaniards and Frenchmen, by contrast, were generous and altruistic in their New World ventures and that they came by their empires innocently. As such, the book is one of many works on different phases of American foreign policy that are tilted against the United States, almost as though this were a requirement for securing approving nods from publishers' readers of manuscripts.

As for abstract right in empire-building in America, whether by Spaniards, Frenchmen, Englishmen, or Americans, a strong case can be built against them all. But in the New World, no less than in the Old, abstract right did not govern; and so aborigines were dispossessed in one way or another and empire-builders used dubious arguments to justify their actions, not only against Indians but also against each other. As for Americans, it must be said that they conducted themselves in accordance with standards which, as Mr. DeConde correctly observes, they had inherited from England, and which were the standards obtaining in international diplomacy of their day. Had they not done so, the United States could not have been born, or having been born, could not have lived as a nation. Insofar

as there could be any "right" to expansionism in America, perhaps it belonged more nearly in the United States, a strong and rising nation in North America, than to nations on the other side of the Atlantic whose destinies were not so vitally linked with this hemisphere.

The heart of Mr. DeConde's book consists of chapters dealing with the immediate background and the consummation of the Louisiana Purchase. These chapters are well done and one is carried along by the high drama they describe. But the interpretative chapters, as noted, are slanted and detract from what is otherwise a useful synthesis of literature on the Louisiana acquisition.

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JEANNE GUILLEMIN. *Urban Renegades: The Cultural Strategy of American Indians*. Pp. viii, 336. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. $10.95.

NIELS WINTHER BRAROE. *Indian and White: Self-Image and Interaction in a Canadian Plains Community*. Pp. viii, 205. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975. $8.50.

These books describe how two bands of Indians faced alien and tacitly hostile cultures, and survived. They neither withdrew into isolation nor wholly assimilated, the first because they could not, the second because they would not. Rather, they *adapted*, and their culture with them. The process is a fascinating testimony to the resilience of culture, related to both cases by perceptive and sensitive social scientists. Both books should be included in the standard bibliographies of the subject, and read together.

There are problems. "*Urban Renegrades*," for instance, is a misleading title. Its subjects, the Micmacs, are not renegade in the city. Boston and their shuttle migrations between Boston and Nova Scotia have become an integral part of Micmac culture. Indeed, author Guillemin emphasizes that the Micmacs are part of the fully one-third of United States and Canadian Indians who are effectively urban people. And she insists in Vine Deloria's phrasing that if we are to understand Indians, we must transcend the stereotype of a "food-gathering, berry-picking, semi-nomadic, fire-worshipping, high-plains-and-mountain-dwelling, horse-riding, canoe-toting, bread-using, pottery-making, ribbon-coveting, wickiup-sheltered people." The trouble is that for all the protestations, there is a sense in the text (and surely in the title) that Professor Guillemin feels that the Micmacs ought to be and would be happy, better-off, and better "down home," quite for the sake of the wickiups, fire-grilled salmon, and Manitou.

This may be unfair to what is on the whole an excellent and illuminating inquiry. Whatever her sentiments may be (and she devotes one chapter of six to scrutinizing them), Professor Guillemin deftly summarizes the history of the Micmacs, the nature of their tribal organization, their mores, values, mode of relationship with each other, and economy. While the temptations of jargon are sometimes too sweet ("An individual may theoretically interact with anyone and the frequency, purpose, and quality of interaction, and the number of people interacted with can vary by choice" [p. 70]), the author typically writes with a clarity and verve that her senior colleagues might well admire.

Niels Braroe does too. In *Indian and White*, he describes another Canadian community, a small band of Crees who live on a tiny western plains reserve. Unlike the Micmacs, who leave their ancestral home in order to earn their living, the Crees gain their sustenance in "Short Grass," working casually for white ranchers, cutting fence posts for sale, and collecting government stipends as reservation residents. Their travelling, also considerable, is for cultural purposes, to attend Sun Dances during

the summer, for example, or to visit other Cree communities. This reverse image of the Micmac pattern takes on more meaning in light of Professor Braroe's theme—that the Short Grass Cree are constantly confronted by the problem of preserving spiritual self in the face of the local white society's definition of them as "profane persons"—and one method of thus accommodating is to conceal attributes defined as "Indian."

Like Guillemin, Braroe ably establishes historical context, clearly defines his problem and resolves it with thorough reference to the large and often contradictory anthropological literature. Also as in *Urban Renegades*, however, and less happily, a sort of primitivist sentimentalism creeps into the text and the effect, however distant from the author's intention, is downright patronizing. Thus, Professor Braroe describes the attempt of two Cree brothers to found a herd of cattle, and even instances of Indians swearing off alcohol almost sadly. They are described as attempts "to win a place with whites" (p. 122). Again, when "most indians . . . voice a desire to be self-supporting, to own land and cattle," it is "as their white neighbors do." Band members are judging "their own behavior by white standards" (p. 172). Surely there is nothing intrinsically Caucasian, Canadian, Bourgeois, or Anti-Indian about preferring a full stomach to privation. Surely there are other merits to abstaining from alcohol than confounding a social stereotype.

But it would not do to conclude on this note. The foible is hardly an ethnological monopoly. And within ethnology, there are few who will not profit from reading this book.

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CORNELIUS J. JAENEN. *Friend and Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Cultural Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Pp. 207. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $12.50.

LOUISE K. BARNETT. *The Ignoble Savage: American Literary Racism, 1790–1890*. Contributions in American Studies, No. 18. Pp. xii, 220. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $13.95.

These two studies, despite their differences in subject and period, attempt to expose the racism underlying white attitudes towards Native Americans. Jaenen feels these attitudes have distorted our histories while Barnett finds they have distorted our literature.

Jaenen, who is concerned with the French-Indian contact situation, begins with a chapter on French views of the Indian's humanity, descent from Adam, and ranking in the order of nature, before exploring various attempts by the French to integrate the Indian into French-Canadian culture. For the security of New France, the French implemented a policy of forced Indian acculturation pursued through missionization, education, and resettlement of the Indians. In all three areas, according to Jaenen, the French were frustrated in their goals by their misunderstanding of the complex Indian cultures which functioned as an integral part of their environment. In the end, Native American cultures changed, but this change was due more to disease and alcohol than to any French policy.

Although Jaenen blames French racism and cultural differences for the French failure to assimilate the Indians, he does not adequately discuss the economic goals of the colony that conflicted with the governmental goals. Seasonal nomads were essential to the fur trade and it was not in the traders' interest to make Indians sedentary. Although the government theoretically pushed for the settlement of the Indians, given the economic reality of New France, it did so only half-heartedly.

Jaenen's study goes far towards bringing together not only the French side of the story, but also the ethnohistorical

material that has often been neglected. A basic weakness of the book, however, lies in Jaenen's generalizations about "Amerindian culture" when in reality he is dealing with many different Native American cultures.

In *The Ignoble Savage*, Barnett studies literary racism in a singularly American literary genre, the frontier romance of the first half of the nineteenth century. The "Indian as devil" stereotype which dominated the colonial captivity narrative from the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries persisted in the frontier romance which flowered after 1820 under the influence of English romanticism in general and Scott's Waverley novels in particular. Largely limited to the psychological archetypes of heroes and villains, the frontier romance portrayed only the pre-Columbian Indian as a noble savage. Once in contact with white culture, Indians became aggressive "evil savages" who continued to degenerate as white culture triumphed.

According to Barnett, frontier romances were functional to the New Nation. They justified white expansion, since while the reader might feel sympathy for the Indian's loss of land, less guilt would be generated if the Indian could be portrayed as a "persecuter of whites." Romances also offered proof of racial superiority by demonstrating that in both physical and mental endowment Indians were inferior to whites. Finally, the frontier romance served the cause of nationalism by offering the Indian as a symbol of nature, to be sacrificed at the altar of civilization. Slaying the Indian, the "serpent in the New World garden," became for Americans a patriotic duty, "a rite of passage from which they emerged a new people."

Although Barnett presents a penetrating examination of racist views in a literary genre, she does not adequately account for the structural changes in the genre at the end of the eighteenth century and again in the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, she does not consider historical factors, other than nationalism, in her treatment of racist attitudes in literature.

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LAWRENCE J. KORB. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years.* Pp. vii, 210. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. $10.95.

In the spate of writings about the American military system that has poured forth since 1945 little attention was paid to one of the most significant bodies in that system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Most of these studies were concerned with the whole range of the military establishment, and it is the complaint of Professor Lawrence Korb that they treated the JCS "only peripherally." Korb thinks that the agency deserves separate and special treatment. The JCS is one of the "most controversial" and one of the "least understood" institutions in the American political system, he writes. His book should help to redress the balance.

Korb begins his study with an "overview" of the JCS today, outlining the organizational structure of the agency and describing its functions. In discussing the latter role he properly emphasizes a fact that is probably not generally realized, that the Chiefs are "divorced from the operational realm," that they do not have "any command authority of their own." But he hastens to add that in every war or military crisis, because of their nearness to the seat of power in Washington, they have exercised a strong influence in the operational area.

Following his overview, Korb discusses the men who have served on the JCS since its creation by executive order in World War II and its legal incorporation in 1947, providing a sketch of each individual. In a critical vein he describes the selection process and concludes that it produces narrowly edu-

cated and "combat-oriented line officers" who usually have not been able to rise above the "parochial interests" of their particular service. This devotion to their service controls what the Chiefs do in what Korb calls "the battle of the Potomac," the conflict to get the biggest slice of the military budget. It is this competition, not consideration of national policy, that determines military policy, Korb claims.

The section of the book that will interest most readers is the one dealing with the "operational role" of the JCS in the Korean and Vietnam wars. In the former conflict the Chiefs supported the decision to intervene although they believed that Korea was of slight strategic importance to the United States; they accepted the dictum of the civilian authorities that Communist aggression had to be contained. They also supported President Truman in removing General MacArthur in what Korb calls their "finest hour." Their hour in Vietnam he characterizes in uniformly critical terms. They helped to provoke the aggressive American reaction to the North and they insisted on ever escalating the conflict, he charges. In their demands they went beyond the thinking of most of the civilian authorities. Korb pushes his condemnation to extreme lengths in suggesting, in a strange hindsight observation, that the Chiefs should have resigned en masse in 1965 and thus forced a halt to the war.

Korb thinks that the JCS still contains areas of "continuing weakness." The members allow themselves to be "intimidated" by political leaders into supporting policies they should oppose, and they are not sufficiently innovative in the policy process. But he sees hope in the future. The present Chiefs, he believes, are "possibly the most well-rounded group" ever to sit on the agency, and they should be able to provide the leadership needed in today's world. Professor Korb has provided us with a challenging book; it may not be always right but it is well worth reading.

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DAVID ALLAN LEVINE. *Internal Combustion: The Races in Detroit, 1915–1925*. Contributions in Afro-American and African Studies, No. 24. Pp. xii, 222. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $13.50.

This short book, full of valuable insights, is a contribution to understanding the history and interrelationships of Progressives, urbanization, and white ethnic groups, as well as black Americans. It focuses on the chain of developments in Detroit between 1915 and 1925 which culminated in the racial violence of 1925 and the Ossian Sweet case.

In the early years of this century Detroit was undergoing changes at a pace so rapid that existing institutions failed to cope with them. Population growth, which made it the fastest growing city in the United States, was made up largely of European immigrants and blacks from the South. By 1915, 74 percent of the population was either foreign-born or of foreign parentage. A black population of less than 7,000 in 1910 grew to 80,000 by 1925. The author says that his study "is an example of this change and a demonstration of how one city tried to organize and direct its members in answering the call of progress" (p. 9).

Much of Detroit's growth was due to the phenomenal growth of the automobile industry. Levine includes a fascinating synopsis of how Henry Ford's promise of wage of $5 a day lured would-be workers and aggravated some urban problems, while at the same time the "Ford Sociological Department" engaged in a program of "Americanization" and moral uplift among Ford employees.

Detroit was regarded as a model of Progressive reform, a city with an unusually large number of civic-minded business and industrial leaders. The Employer's Association of Detroit, the most powerful group in the city supported Americanization programs for foreigners and supported the Urban League, but its on-going mission was to perpetuate the open shop. The Board of Commerce had as its slogan "Every

industrial employee a home owner," but the desperate housing situation for blacks was the major reason for the explosions of the 1920s. There was an Urban League, which dissident blacks said was the only channel through which blacks could reach the white power structure. The League tried to find jobs for black newcomers, a disproportionate percentage of which were for female domestics. For black men there were "nigger" jobs which whites would not take. Yet in the face of these conditions the League used some of its resources to promote the Detroit Dress Well Club in an effort to improve the image of black migrants in the white mind.

The lesson of this book is the tragic inadequacy and superficiality of the efforts of the Progressives, business and industrial leadership, and social agencies. The author suggests a parallel between the situation in the 1920s and 1967.

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ROLAND J. LIEBERT. *Disintegration and Political Action: The Changing Functions of City Government in America.* Pp. ix, 223. New York: Academic Press, 1976. $12.00.

This study, based on the relevant data of 676 cities with a 1960 population of at least 25,000, is concerned with the scope, in a functional sense, of city government in the United States. A central finding of Professor Liebert is that the most important predictor of the functional scope of any one municipality is its age; that is, when it first realized a population of 25,000. On the whole, the author notes that older cities are more multifunctional and exhibit a politics of accessibility, while newer municipalities deliver a somewhat restricted scope of services and are characterized by a decision-making process dominated by experts.

Several interesting observations are set forth by Professor Liebert. He notes that the range of services provided by municipalities varies considerably. For instance, only about one-quarter of the total sample of cities are responsible for primary and secondary education (in most communities this is the province of the school board); while, almost ninety percent provide parks and recreation services. Further, he carefully analyzes the impact of historical factors on structuring local delivery systems.

Students of urban government identified with the "consolidationist approach" will not welcome the findings set forth for, as the author demonstrates, the relative limited functional scope of the newer city governments and the consequent importance of special purpose governmental units, most prominently special districts and authorities, mean increasing governmental fragmentation in the metropolis. At least implicitly, Professor Liebert negatively views this development as well; what he fails to note is that there is a good deal of horizontal cooperation in the metropolis engendered by local units and councils of governments.

This is a good study carried out with rigor; it provides a *meaningful* contribution to the study of local government and politics. However, I wish Professor Liebert had devoted more attention to the impact of federal and state policies in structuring the functional activity of local government.

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SPARK M. MATSUNAGA and PING CHEN. *Rulemakers of the House.* Pp. 208. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976. $7.95.

U.S. Representative Spark M. Matsunaga and Professor Ping Chen present a critical study of the House Rules Committee. Matsunaga, as a participant and observer of the Rules Committee for the past ten years, provides the reader with first hand knowledge and experience of the formal and informal actions of the Rules Committee. The authors' purpose is to demonstrate ". . . that the historical role of the Rules Committee

is one of searching for a balance between its own goals and those of House Leadership" (p. xi). The authors studied the Rules Committee for a twenty-year period (1957–1976), interviewed fifty-nine House Members over a four-year period (1970–1974), interviewed three former chairmen of the Rules Committee, and interviewed chairmen of other House committees and Rules staff members.

Their study begins by examining the role of the Rules Committee. The committee is viewed as an instrument or arm of House leadership by both House Republicans and Democrats. Furthermore, over two-thirds of the Democrats interviewed agreed that the Democratic committee members had to be loyal to the party platform. Less than one-third of the Republicans interviewed agreed that their party committee members had to be loyal. Both parties agreed that the Rules Committee must attempt to satisfy House expectations and leadership.

The authors examine and critically analyze the powers and functions of the Rules Committee (Chapter 2). Through the use of these powers and functions, the authors describe how the committee (1) exercises substantive control over legislation, (2) establishes regulations for debate, (3) determines when to yield to House leadership, (4) forces a bill to the floor, and (5) settles other committees' jurisdictional disputes.

Chapters Three, Four and Five discuss sanctions against the Rules Committee, recruitment, and goals of the Rules Committee members, respectively. Sanctions are imposed by House membership if their expectations are not fulfilled by the Rules Committee. The recruitment of members on the Rules Committee is determined by tangible and intangible qualifications, regional and state expectations, candidate expectations and candidate nonexpectations. Once a member of the committee, members have goals they wish to accomplish. These may be prestige and influence, constituency and re-election benefits, and the like.

Chapters Six and Seven focus on the role of the Rules Committee chairmen and the decision-making behavior of committee members, respectively. The tenure of three former chairmen is examined (1955–1974) and divided into five periods based on each chairman's reputation. The identification of each period was determined by the relationship that existed between the Rules Committee chairman and House leadership and other committee members. The authors performed special studies to analyze committee member behavior in decision-making. Consistency studies were used to analyze the 'divided vote' from the 85th–93rd Congresses. The Rice Index of Cohesion was utilized to determine the party voting patterns of the Rules Committee members. Federal District Outlay studies were used to analyze the relationship between constituency interests and the voting behavior of committee members.

The authors conclude that (1) the history of the committee has been one of accommodation between leadership and independence and (2) committee survival is dependent upon the majority of the House approving its decisions. The authors furnish several tables to support their analyses and claims throughout their work. Three appendices provide useful information to the reader.

In sum, the authors' work represents a significant contribution to the literature in the field. The book will appeal to those scholars, students, and observers who have either a special or general interest in the legislative process.

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WILLIAM HOWARD MOORE. *The Kefauver Committee and the Politics of Crime, 1950–1952.* Pp. xii, 269. Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 1974. $12.00.

HUMBERT S. NELLI. *The Business of Crime.* Pp. xiii, 314. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. $12.95.

The great American success story has many variants, and some of the most

impressive began in Europe with immigrant boys making their ways through Ellis Island to discover that there was, indeed, gold on the pavements of the New York streets and beyond. Fame and fortune was the lot of relatively few, and the many found that there were barriers of prejudice, language, and the solidarity of the older settlers in the way of achieving even a modest competence. These twice-told tales are cherished elements of the melting pot myth; they nourish our claim to a new and vital culture.

They also have a gothic parody. Among the huddled masses who made their way to our shores were thousands from the tormented southern provinces of Italy. The most exploited and poorly governed people of western Europe, they brought with them traditions of hard work and hostility to authority. Poverty, disorder and the sense of exploitation had driven many southern Italians into criminal activity. Whatever the truth may be about the Mafia in this country—and that is not settled in either of the books under review here—it was an authentic subculture in Sicily for generations before the first Sicilians arrived in our cities. It is not surprising that its vocabulary, at least, has been institutionalized here, even if substantial doubts persist about the links between criminal organizations in the old country and the new. What is certainly true is that a great many southern Italians found a criminal opportunity structure easily accessible. Preying at first on each other with the terrifying imagery and violence of *la mano nera*—The Black Hand—they eventually discovered that prostitution, gambling and, with the arrival of Prohibition, the traffic in liquor combined to offer opportunities in enterpreneurial crime which rivaled and outstripped those conventional opportunities that attracted their law-abiding contemporaries. Outside the controls which function for conventional commerce, they used violence of the most extreme variety in place of take-over bids and manipulation of the stock and commodity markets to advance their interests. Their contribution to our cultural traditions is ineradicable. Our fascination with organized crime has already created a folk literature of fiction and non-fiction which rival the *Elder Edda* or the *Song of Roland*.

Maybe through such epics as Mario Puzo's *The Godfather* we will have achieved all the understanding we will ever have of the Italian contributions to organized crime. Certainly the passing parade which Dr. Nelli hustles through his pages does no more than numb the understanding. He has relied almost entirely on newspaper sources to pull his history together, and evidently has been unwilling to edit out any of the bloody engagements, the ugly triumphs, or the front page horrors which he has culled from the microfilms. Photographs of half-forgotten unworthies glower at the reader throughout the book, and the effect is like a wax museum. It is all very unfortunate. Nelli appears to have the equipment and the research for a book which will put the Italian share of organized crime in the larger context of Italian-American history. He has told us far more than we need to know or can absorb about the chronology and the dynasties of entrepreneurial crime, but enlightenment does not come with the abundant documentation.

For Dr. Moore the task was different. Obviously a conscientious historian with an awareness of the responsibilities of his discipline to assist the reader in an understanding of the past, he has relied on the mass of reports of the Kefauver Committee's hearings, the newspaper reports of the time, and the growing literature of organized crime. He found it impossible to assemble an oral history out of the Kefauver Committee members or its staff; these principals are all dead.

What he has been able to give us is a competent account of the Committee's origins, the conduct of its investigation and its findings. He concludes that the whole episode was a good show, an effective advancement for the career of its ambitious principal, Senator Kefauver, but a failure in either bringing out the truth about organized crime or in promoting effective legislation for its

control. But like Dr. Nelli, Moore is unable to winnow the masses of detail which he accumulated, with the result that the reader has the same sense of a parade of half-forgotten names from the fifties, an era which is already slipping into the unreality of the archives. His conclusions are true enough but their significance is not demonstrated by their consequences. A specialist in the history of the fifties will find Dr. Moore's monograph a useful account of an important episode in the political history of the times. For an understanding of its significance he will have to think for himself.

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REXFORD G. TUGWELL. *The Compromising of the Constitution: Early Departures*. Pp. iv, 188. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976. $8.95.

Rexford G. Tugwell has had a long, varied, and distinguished career in academic and public life—most notably perhaps as a member of Franklin Roosevelt's brain trust. Currently he is a Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The theme he reiterates in this essay is that the Federal Constitution, adequate for the time it was written and the result, in part, of compromises relevant to the politics of the framers, has become in many respects obsolete. Later Americans living under conditions markedly different from those of the late eighteenth century are governed under a document more mystical than real, whose provisions, if taken literally, are hopelessly outdated. The Constitution does not specifically say government may undertake to relieve the ills plaguing an industrial society or to promote health and education, or to control the nation's economic condition. Such actions can be justified only by implication, and are subject to varieties of interpretations. Consequently we do not know what we can or cannot do when action becomes imperative. In Tugwell's mind the fault lies in the failure of the framers of the Constitution to provide an efficient amending process. In lieu of this defect the original meaning of the Constitution has been altered by the executive, congress, and especially by the Supreme Court. Whatever the framers had in mind regarding the judicial power, Tugwell argues, they could not have expected that the justices would rewrite the Constitution. For this purpose they specifically provided for two methods of amendment. What they did not foresee was that one would be extremely difficult and the other practically impossible. Inasmuch as they did not include the word "interpretation" among the powers granted to the judiciary, they obviously expected that alterations would be made only by amendment. While the Supreme Court had, in fact, no discernible mandate it was to engage in an immense enlargement of the original meaning of the Constitution. But as a product of judicial interpretation the Constitution has become more and more ambiguous, a fundamental law Americans could not understand or rely upon, but only revere. Other branches of government were also to swell their own jurisdictions. Adapting Cardozo's locution he charges that administrative law "when it exceeds the limits of legislatively directed regulation, is implication run riot" (p. 159). Some persons who have recently been placed in an impossible predicament by the doublethink, *Catch-22* requirements laid down by HEW might agree with Tugwell, and deplore the failure of Congress to insist that its agencies adhere to, rather than violate the intention of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet the political process for a nation as large as the United States and composed of so many diverse elements often produces a situation in which only bills vague enough and subject to varied interpretations will win the support of enough diverse interests groups to provide a majority for enactment.

Tugwell as a minimum seems to be

calling for a new procedure for amending the constitution. But in referring to the audacity of the men who in 1787 abandoned the Articles of Confederation and started anew, he remarks: "Such boldness, regarded as admirable in 1787, would be equally admirable at the Constitution's bicentennial" (p. 172). But is the problem one that can be solved by a new constitution? Does our predicament stem from a constitution unclear as to whether government may act? It has been a long time since the Court struck down NRA. Has the constitutionality of recent federal programs even been challenged? Our dilemma may be that there is no consensus as to what our problems are, and little agreement as to appropriate solutions. Can we presume that a new constitution, no matter how detailed or specific its text may be, will allow resolution of differences political in nature? Will not protagonists continue to differ and to subject even such a constitution to varieties of interpretation?

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SOCIOLOGY

MARGARET ADAMS. *Single Blessedness: Observations on the Single Status in Married Society.* Pp. v, 264. New York: Basic Books, 1976. $12.50.

"Capitalist imperialism (or neocolonial capitalism)," according to the author, is the ultimate villain responsible for the deprecated, ambiguous lot of single persons, especially single women, in contemporary society. Proceeding from Marxist and feminist premises, the author has plenty of blame left for psychiatrists, who represent singleness "as psychopathic and indicative of narcissism, neurotic withdrawal from intimate relationships, and a schizoid personality."

The author is a social worker who has read widely, theorizes ably at both the psyohological and sociological levels, and whose writing contains a pungency based on her resentment of the stereotype of the single woman. The data of her study derive principally from depth interviews with twenty-seven people. She concentrated on women but does include material from interviews with men.

The author's sociological analysis leads her to speculate that "the single status begins to receive respect and support at the stage of social development when maintaining population growth is of less immediate importance than . . . expanding economic productivity. . . ." At another point her speculations include the possibility that "the dinosaurlike institution of marriage as understood today may subside into obsolescence as the need for population control turns the family into a redundant, if not actually antisocial, system."

After considering "psychology's persuasive assaults" on, and its "anathematizing proscription" of, singleness, the author develops the argument that singleness calls for "psychological autonomy," and that although the single state implies a "predictable loneliness," it does not preclude the possibility of emotional investment and commitment. Indeed, she asserts that the single life is laden with opportunities for varied social relationships and concludes that this freedom, in contrast to the rigidity of familial roles, fosters a capacity for abstract ideas and intellectual interests and a greater readiness for experimentation among the single.

This reviewer sympathizes with the author's complaints about the labeling of the single woman but is dubious about the Marxist supporting argument. Singleness has been a deviant status in pre-industrial as well as in "capitalist-imperialist" societies, and it seems probable that Engels was wrong in believing that women enjoyed a universally higher status before the onset of industrialization. It is reasonable to argue that the family's importance might be expected to dwindle with the growth of concern about overpopulation. What has been going on for decades is a decline in the birth rate and an increase in the emphasis on the family as a source of emotional support and

gratification although the mounting divorce rate and the declining marriage rate can be construed as evidence that the family has numerous failures in fulfilling the affectional function. Finally, it seems possible that the decline in the birth rate may generate such alarm that the family will suddenly find new honor.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with most of the argument of this book, one comes away with the refreshing feeling of having encountered a stimulating thinker and a cogent writer.

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SHIMON AWERBUCH and WILLIAM A. WALLACE. *Policy Evaluation for Community Development: Decision Tools for Local Government*. Pp. v, 286. New York: Praeger, 1976. $22.50.

The appearance of this new monograph in the Praeger Special Studies Series should be noted by two intersecting audiences in the urban studies field. First, it will be of interest to those urban generalists who wish to follow from a certain distance research trends in the urban community planning profession and, second, it will be of interest to planning professionals with a specific interest in what is going on in the area of computer simulations and models. This reviewer, an urban sociologist, is reviewing the book taking the role of the former audience, which is probably greater among the readers of *The Annals*.

Three early chapters of the book in the course of about 50 pages are a descriptive history of urban planning trends from the Colonial period to the present or the "New Planning"—that is when the large computers entered the picture. There is really nothing new by way of fact or interpretation in these chapters. It is the familiar story of the dominance of economic considerations, the market mechanism, and the singularity of profit motive as the guiding hands in American urban development and land-use planning. These factors were to some degree modified of course with the advent of the planning profession in the middle of this century.

The early chapters are really a lead-in for the core of the book, which is the exposition of several rather technical and *ad hoc* computer models. In the author's own words, "The purpose of this research is not to prescribe the best community development plan for a municipality but, rather, to describe techniques that can help the local policymaker evaluate the fiscal and socioeconomic impact of community development alternatives on the municipality." It is a disjointed feature of the book that the historical chapters discuss planning trends for the largest cities of the country while the ensuing technical chapters, developing the evaluation and decision impact model, probably of necessity are addressed to planning problems in the *smaller* communities of the nation—in one application to a town of 1,500. The book has three appendices and 58 tables, figures and exhibits.

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SHERBURNE F. COOK. *The Conflict Between the California Indian and White Civilization*. Pp. xi, 522. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $24.75.

Between 1940 and 1943, Sherburne F. Cook published six essays which appeared as Volumes 17, 18, and 21–24 of the *Ibero-Americana* series. In this labor of love, Cook, a distinguished animal biologist, turned to the field of history and studied the effects Spanish and American invaders had on the California Indians during the century after 1770. The essays that emerged from this research were truly major contributions to Native American historiography—a field receiving only scant attention before 1945. In 1976, the essays, long out of print, remain works of fundamental importance in California anthropology

and history, and their reemergence is both welcomed and appreciated.

The essays are of unequal length and importance. The two that should be read, and studied, and contemplated are included here as Parts One and Three: "The Indian Versus the Spanish Mission" and "The American Invasion, 1848–1870."

In the former essay, Cook not only discusses carefully the intended goal of Franciscan missionaries but, more important, he shows the effect their efforts at assimilation had on Native Americans. Reviewing an enormous amount of historical data, he shows clearly the misery endured by Indians wrenched away from a life of freedom and forced to live in a foreign environment (missions) together with Spaniards dedicated to destroying their heritage and spirit. Cook leaves no stone unturned as he examines population declines, fugitivism, rebellion, and the destruction wrought by disease (especially syphilis), poor sanitation, change of climate, and much more. He also offers important data on twenty-seven Indian tribes—most of which have disappeared—that inhabited California and numbered 133,550 when the Spanish came.

However, despite the destructive effect of Spanish rule and the ultimate failure of their efforts, Cook rightly contends, in "The American Invasion, 1848–1870," that Spaniards were kind and thoughtful compared with the interlopers from the United States who followed them. Americans did not force natives to live in missions; they simply took the Indians' habitat and made it their own, forcing Indians to endure a new environment in their own homeland. California natives "were subjected not to invasion but to inundation" (p. 256), Cook maintains; and they suffered more—far more—as a result. Even though Spaniards considered Indians inferior, they at least believed natives could be saved and uplifted by conversion; Americans were interested only in material goods—land, gold, silver—and considered Indians temporary obstructions to be destroyed along the bloody road to material success. Spaniards forced natives to be a part of their society; Americans rigidly excluded them from admission. Cook and subsequent researchers have concluded that the impact of American settlement was three times as destructive to natives as that of Spanish predecessors.

Unfortunately, although this volume honors Cook's essays and rescues them from contemporary obscurity, it does not honor Cook himself. The anonymous editor could have enhanced the work by including an introductory essay on the life of Sherburne Cook and emphasizing why and how he got interested in California Indians. It would also have been fitting to show clearly the importance of Cook's work today, and not leave to reviewers the task of paying proper tribute to this scientist who labored long and hard in a field which then attracted only a few scholars and their students to these topics whose importance is second to none in this nation's history.

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SAMUEL C. HEILMAN. *Synagogue Life: A Study in Symbolic Interaction.* Pp. xii, 306. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. $12.95.

Professor Heilman has presented us with a most interesting and lively description of the purposes, the activities and the functions of the synagogue in terms of a sociological analysis from the perspective of interactional symbolism. He has very prudently admitted in his chapter "Final Words" that he has not presented a "full view" of the synagogue (p. 262) because such a view demands a variety of perspectives. On the other hand, this sociological view cannot be exclusive, as can be seen, for example, by his psychological analysis of the "joking" that goes on in the synagogue. Even the religious dimension inevitably creeps into his analysis. He wisely points out that for a person to be in the "shule" (a yiddish expression

meaning synagogue) could be a combination of prayer, study and "sociability." He has attempted to portray the synagogue as a dynamic institution —a task in which he has eminently succeeded. Commendable are his well chosen quotations at the beginning of each chapter, his painstaking first chapter of "Backgrounds, Beginnings and Definitions" and his efficient summary called "Final Words." The Glossary, Footnotes and Bibliography are indeed quite useful.

While the term "symbolic interaction" is normally interpreted to apply to human beings that interact with each other through some contact and thus produce a behavior modification, Heilman maintains that the activities themselves as social forces interact with each other. An example of this phenomenon is what he calls the "interaction between liturgical and social in common prayer." To this extent, gossip becomes an activity which affects even the activity of prayer, and not always in the negative sense. His analysis of the types of gossip and joking as a form of "social obligation" makes for a lively and even amusing piece of reading. While these two activities are technically forbidden and looked down upon by the laws of synagogue decorum, as a social expression they have managed to play a significant role in the social dimension of the synagogue. Heilman has capably analyzed even the chanting, group singing and religious study that go on in the synagogue as interactional activities of great value. It also appears in his study that synagogue activity is not restricted to the four walls of the synagogue structure.

A review must present some constructive criticism. In this light I would have liked to see the author analyze how the interaction involved in synagogue activity is different from other institutional systems of interaction. There surely must be something unique about each social system. Also, some of his statements seem questionable. For example, saying that the prayer book is enhanced • in its sanctity by contact with the Torah Scroll or that Tzizith (fringes) gain their sanctity by contact with the Torah Scroll is indeed not accurate. It is also not completely accurate to state that inspiration is diluted when using "other's words" or praying in public. If anything, these characteristics often add inspiration to prayer. Also, his analysis of the role of women in prayer is slightly misleading. Private prayer for a woman is not a privilege which she may assume. It is an obligation, the same as it is for a man. Women's expression of "Jewishness" at home and with family does not entirely preclude time for public gathering and prayer. Women are obligated to hear the Megillah reading for example, to take part in the Seder as well as other religious obligations.

All in all, we are indebted to Professor Heilman for presenting us with this dynamic and well written study which will interest both scholar and layman..

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MARTIN E. MARTY. *A Nation of Behavers*. Pp. 239. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1976. $8.95.

Religion has already served as a means of social demarkation for Americans. This is to say that through their religious identities, Americans tend to differentiate among themselves. Though early settlers were limited to few denominations, demographic changes, migrations and dissent caused a multiplication of faiths and factions. Nevertheless, scholars attempting to understand American religious life (as well as theologians and laymen hoping to make sense of it) have tended to use the same restrictive categories that have epitomized older, more established churches.

It is to "map" the terrain of religious life in contemporary America that Martin Marty, Professor of Christian History at the University of Chicago, presents us with *A Nation of Behavers*. More an essay than a book, it is the author's opinion that the most .effective

way to understand American Religion is through the behavior it engenders. Actions, rather than creeds, allow denominations to be differentiated from each other.

Marty examines the two most common approaches to the same issue, theological comparison and institutional analysis, and finds them wanting. Theology, he claims, is often apologetic and beside the point. It may serve to cover more salient differences between sects, such as geography and social status. To be a Congregationalist, wealthy and from Connecticut is largely one and the same.

Equally, institutional forms assumed by religious groups have become too similar to allow satisfying differentiation for their members. Organizational lines have steadily blurred. Even splinter fractions copy many of the very structures they found so repugnant in their parent body. In Marty's words: ". . . the suggestions that spirit-people could transcend institutionalism are denied by discussions of ministerial pensions . . . in Pentacostal newspapers" (p. 112).

The inadequacies of these forms of social boundary-setting came to the fore in the wake of the "identity incident" of the sixties and early seventies. Now, belonging and identifying in experiential and emotional terms outflank theological discussions or organizational forms. Congregants seek religious practices that put cognitive distance between them and others. It is thereby that they establish a positive and visible anchor to set themselves in society. This identity may be all the more important to the extent that it offers to its adherent a distinctive social location.

It is within this context that Marty analyzes the successes and failures of several religious manifestations. These include: Mainline Religion, Evangelicalism, Pentacostalism, the occult, ethnic religion and civil religion. In each case he rather pessimistically decides that new and creative religious identities will either fade in time or join the mainstream. He implies that deviations from the mainstream are often responses to outside, secular forces. Thus: "Mainline churches suffer in times of cultural crisis and disintegration, when they receive blame for what goes wrong in society but are by-passed when people look for new ways to achieve social identity" (p. 71).

Marty's work is intelligently, almost pleasantly written. He is obviously at home with his material which is well-organized and direct. Yet there are some problems of a conceptual nature.

It may be, for example, that his work is time-bound. If, as he implies, the pendulum is swinging back toward the mainstream—and most deviating sects are so condemned—then his "identity incident" may be little more than a passing phase. Adherents, either on their own or through their churches, will ultimately return to the theological or institutional base that Marty dismisses. No doubt the base to which they return will have been changed, as well, in the process—but it will be the "mainline" nonetheless.

In addition, Marty is unclear as to cause and effect. At times it seems that religious groups engender certain social behaviors while at times it seems that those of similar social behavior seek out given religious sects. It may also be that the two are mutually reinforcing, and/or caused by some third, unknown, factor. The author never clarifies his thoughts in this area but simply employs these approaches indiscriminately as they suit his purpose.

Nevertheless, these weaknesses should not divert one from the value of the book. Professor Marty has argued convincingly for a non-theological, non-institutional understanding of American religion. What he says is literate and well-worth reading.

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NOEL PARRY and JOSE PARRY. *The Rise of the Medical Profession.* Pp. 282. New York: International Publications, 1976. $17.50.

Sorokin's classic study of American social mobility (1927) suggests that

individual hereditary transmission occurs within the professions of higher social honor and privilege which require intensive intellectual work and provide long term stability. The Parrys do not restrict explanation of all social mobility to the habits and background of the individual. They explore historically the maneuvers and consequences of a professional group's impact on the social standing of all its members. They regard the sociologists' lack of interest in group mobility as a blindness extending from the lack of concern with the middle class which, according to Marxist theory is to be absorbed by the proletariat, and the middle class's own preoccupation with individual striving and success. As a core element of the middle class, the authors view the professions as the vehicles of collective social mobility.

After providing the theoretical structure for a discussion of professions and social class in the first half of the book, a case study of the development of the medical profession in Britain is offered. The choice of both profession and country demonstrates the authors' wisdom in selecting a genuine and very provocative test of their thesis. Charles Newman's study of medical education in the nineteenth century is heavily relied on for historical data and assessment which ensures a reliable basis for the discussion. The views of medical leaders, economic changes, the growth of hospitals and state supported medical care systems have offered difficult challenges to the maintenance of the medical profession's monopoly up to the present. By keeping its membership limited and precise, with the roles of those with differing educations and duties separated by rank, fees and respect, the medical profession has retained its prestige as a group in which all its members share.

The Poor Law and successive legislated reforms which provided funds to support medical treatment for more citizens offered the greatest challenge to the profession which had exercised control over its members by restricting the number of highly qualified and salaried physicians. Medical graduates found more opportunities to advance through service in the state supported medical systems, hospitals and private health insurance programs. Nevertheless, the almost inherent mechanism of a profession to ensure its members status within the middle class has continued to adjust to these unexpected and unwanted opportunities for growth and enlargement of its membership.

Since the authors do not accept the usual constraints of the historian not to comment on future possibilities, and after all this is the criterion of a good sociological analysis, several alternative forecasts for the next stage of development of the medical profession are discussed. The radical view of Illich (1973) in which medicine is simplified or as he phrases it: "The time has come to take the syringe out of the hand of the doctor, as the pen was taken out of the hand of the scribe during the reformation in Europe," (p. 252) is rejected for the moderate view that all members of society will actively participate in health preservation.

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PAUL E. PETERSON. *School Politics Chicago Style*. Pp. xi, 304. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1976. $15.00.

Some social science research appears to be facts in search of explanatory theory, some theory in search of facts. This study of school politics in Chicago appears to be factually overwhelming but theoretically still in quest of a theory to manage the facts. Professor Peterson has dedicated a large portion of his academic career to a thorough collection of data surrounding school board politics in Mayor Daley's Chicago. He has sought to impose upon the data what he calls "pluralist and ideological bargaining models" as well as "unitary" and "rational" models. The facts are pressed through the models and, unsur-

prisingly, every model has a meaning all its own.

The array of facts on teacher union politics, the meticulous detail concerning board members, internal factions on the school board—all these are provided in rich supply. There is a judicious use of interviews and spicy quotations to enliven the material and sharpen the issues. Statistical data and charts are used modestly to illustrate and supplement the presentation.

A few surprises are produced: Mayor Daley did not control the school board, even though he made all the appointments; elites do not dominate key decisions; interest groups seem relatively weak. Yet these points are not emphasized or developed by the author who is much more inclined to test out his models. Unfortunately, the model testing leads to inconclusive results, depending upon the model employed, as Professor Peterson admits.

The subject of school politics has attracted a number of social scientists who seem to find it in a miniature version of the political system. Professor Peterson does not find that close a connection between general municipal politics and school board politics. Instead, school board politics, even in America's most bossed city, are regarded as relatively autonomous. The separation of schools from ordinary politics seems to be fairly complete, on the evidence provided. Yet we have no comparative frame of reference. In most big cities school board politics are related to partisan and machine politics, at least indirectly. If those linkages are few in Chicago and if Mayor Daley was merely a pluralist bargainer in an autonomous universe which contained strong reform influence we should know more about how this happened in Chicago as compared to other big cities. The concentration of the research upon Chicago is intense, but this limits the value of the book for the understanding of school politics in general.

Bridging the gap between the educationists and the political scientists is a worthy enterprise. The attempt to introduce a more sophisticated methodology into school politics research is commendable. The balanced approach to sensitive issues such as school desegregation, collective bargaining and decentralization is refreshing, but the final and concluding chapter is simply not justified by the facts and models marshalled in this book. We cannot draw conclusions about educational policy-making in central cities based solely on the Chicago example.

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INO ROSSI, ed. *The Unconscious in Culture: The Structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss in Perspective*. Pp. ix, 487. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1974. $6.95.

This lengthy volume of essays is an attempt to analyze and assess the theoretical and substantive contributions of Claude Lévi-Strauss and his structuralist method to contemporary social scientific thought. It is not a comprehensive or systematic discussion of Lévi-Strauss' work as a whole, but rather an attempt to deal in depth and from a variety of theoretical points of view with certain of the more crucial analytical and methodological issues arising out of his work. The essays, for the most part, have been contributed by scholars within the anthropological profession, and much of the emphasis is on the usefulness of Lévi-Strauss' approach for the analysis of the kinds of data anthropologists typically engage themselves with.

The book is divided into three main sections, each of which is introduced by a brief essay by the editor outlining the major issues to be discussed and anticipating the central points to be raised by each author. The first section is devoted to the theoretical foundations of Levi-Strauss' structuralism and to some of its historical antecedents, particularly within the field of linguistics. The major essays in this section are by the editor himself, with, additional commentaries by George Mounin and

Marshall Durbin (on linguistic theory and structuralism) and Jacques Maquet (on structuralism and the analysis of myth).

The second section, entitled "Structuralism in Ethnography," has as its purpose "to offer a variety of ethnographic reactions to Lévi-Strauss' method to illustrate its peculiarities and strengthen its procedures." The section is balanced between criticism from those whom Rossi terms the "empirical anthropologists" (represented by Alice Kasakoff and John Adams dealing with Lévi-Strauss' analysis of kinship and myth, respectively, among an American Indian tribe with whom both have done field research), and support from anthropologists who find his methodology useful and stimulating as it is applied to their field data. In this latter group are Ross Crumrine and Barbara Macklin (with a joint paper) and Shin-pyo Kang. Finally in this section essays by Eric Schwimmer and Jan Pouwer suggest ways in which the structuralist method can be strengthened, illustrating their views with discussions of ethonographic materials with which they are personally familiar.

The third and final segment of this volume is the longest. It is a collection of essays in which structuralism is viewed critically from a variety of other epistemological and methodological perspectives within the social sciences. The contributions of Anthony Wilden, Stanley Diamond and Lawrence Krader may be characterized as predominantly critical in tone, while Yvan Simonis and Lawrence Rosen provide more favorable assessments in their comparisons of Lévi-Strauss' approach with those of other major contemporary theoreticians.

It is not possible in a brief review to discuss in any detail the various arguments put forward in this volume, nor is it appropriate to single out any one from among a large group of high-quality contributions. From the point of view of the general reader, it should perhaps be pointed out that this book is in no way an introduction to the work of Lévi-Strauss. Its major contribution is to the large and ever-increasing body of specialized literature on and within the structuralist school, and can best be appreciated by those already familiar with Lévi-Strauss' work and thought.

For the reader with an interest in further examination of some of the issues raised in these essays, and for those as well who would like some guidance into the literature on and by Lévi-Strauss and into the structuralist literature in general, Rossi's useful bibliographical resource note will be appreciated. It includes not only a basic bibliography of the writings of Lévi-Strauss himself, but, more important, an annotated description of the available literature on him and on structuralism, divided according to topic.

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GERALD STUDDERT-KENNEDY. *Evidence and Explanation in Social Science.* Pp. 246. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. $20.25.

"An interdisciplinary approach" has as its focus a study of abstract theory building and the implementation of those theoretical frames to particular cases, and simultaneously, the building of theoretical abstractions which might emerge from the implementation of abstract theory. It is a circular process. The author selected several theoretical and methodological frames and sought to analyze those through particular cases. The cases are described in some detail, and are interspersed with comments, analyses and evaluations. They range from A. R. Radcliff-Brown's approach, E. E. Evans-Pritchard work, V. W. Turner's process to T. Kuhn's "Paradigms," H. Simon's "Decision Making," Mary Douglas' comments (to mention a few). There are evaluations from some theorists themselves about each other and the author's on evaluations about all.

Gerald Studdert-Kennedy (the author) locates the cases, theories and the participants under the several headings of: Equilibrium and Historical Change,

Versions of Structure, Scientific Inquiry, Statistical Models and Social Structures, Causes and Structure . . . Levels of Theory . . . ; and, the Disciplines of Economics, Psychology, Social Anthropology, Administration, Political Science, Sociology, Politics and History are used to illustrate the interdisciplinary nature of his own work.

Professor Studdert-Kennedy does not seek to build for himself a theoretical underpinning. However, he does share his epistemological orientation and implicit assumptions about the world of theory building. His epistemological abstract frame is a constant theme threading throughout as he talks about generalities and specifics. Consequently, one does not have to guess about his process, but may have questions about how that process is utilized.

This is a complex book, but the complexity is made understandable by its orderly arrangement. It contains so much, promises a great deal, attempts to integrate many kinds of theories, simultaneously makes fine distinctions between one method and another, and the author goes from one level of abstraction to another in order to demonstrate the relationship between general and specific interdisciplinary approaches. In regard to the latter, he said, "There may be other less acceptable reasons for increasing compartmentalization in the social sciences. It may have undesirable consequences which need to be offset by promoting interdisciplinary research and encouraging students to study for joint degrees." The suggestion does not deal with the epistemology necessary to bring about change. At best, interdisciplinary degrees at the macroscopic level are an expedient. Where they study is not as important as what. We need to know merely the things which connect at a basic level. It is virtually impossible to get into a theory of theories unless this is done.

While his chapter on "Causes and Structure" did not quite live up to its prior billing, some very powerful and impressive statements were made which are right on target. He advises the social scientists, that no matter what level one is abstracting, he must focus on the central epistemological problem of causation in order to set in motion transformative relations. He, however, reduces the power of the statement by later stating that it is not necessary to relapse into the assumption of an impenetrable global functionalism, for data can be analyzed statistically and comparatively. This approach, in my judgment, does not lead us to an understanding of causation. And, to my amazement he chose economic theory as a prototype to illustrate this point, and the advancement of social science theory, as if economic theory and epistemology were not at two different levels of abstraction unless, of course, he has reference to G. L. S. Shackle's book entitled *Epistemics and Economics* (a fellow Englishman). But, even Shackle was hard put to blend the two levels in a mutative and transformative sense. Although, he began with the proposition that it was necessary to have knowledge about the theory of the origin of political economy, nature and the human predicament.

This book was a massive attempt, achieving a modicum of success. His attempt at moving from abstract theory to specific cases within a large framework is to be commended. And, this book has traces of genius and brilliance especially in the areas of substantive knowledge and expression. But it lacks consistent depth. This is from the point of view of a person in Public Affairs. The social anthropologists may have different feelings. Overall, Studdert-Kennedy's effort is the same as many in the social sciences: to make the social scientist a better theoretician and practitioner by moving beyond the scientific method and establishing the basis for a separate and unique theoretical process. On the basis of that effort I commend this book to the reading public, plus the cases are interesting and engaging.

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ECONOMICS

MARION CLAWSON. *Forests For Whom and For What?* Pp. v, 175. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. $11.95.

The most elemental statement one can make about the human race is that it confronts a natural environment in order to fashion that natural endowment so that it may derive an economic sustenance which enables it to subsist and, if possible, produce a surplus so that it may live in the grandest style compatible with *existing* technical knowledge. From the most primitive existence known to man to our most modern technical marvels, this is the human condition. One may be awed by nature but never cowed by it. Always man has successfully conquered his environment by dint of the application of his wit. This, in fact, is the unique endowment of man that separates him from other animals—his intelligence which enables him to create tools (technology) so that the natural environment can more effectively be harnessed to meet his unsatiable desires.

This is the answer to the query posed in the title of a most interesting book by Marion Clawson, *Forests For Whom and For What?* Moral philosophizing aside, my answer is that they are for man to fashion a technological system which enables him to produce at a minimum his means of subsistence and once that problem is resolved, then a surplus. This is not to say that is the way I would like it to be. But my ethical desires and esthetic preferences are not the turf on which this ballgame is played.

Clawson adroitly takes us through the thicket of public policy as it relates to forests so we are able to see the forest as well as the trees. His initial point of departure is one of economic efficiency, but he does not neglect the esthetic or ethical criteria in the course of his analysis. For this we should be grateful. Nor should we ignore our gratitude for having the issues of forest policy succinctly stated in a comprehensive discourse on the problem.

The one glaring weakness in the book is the absence of an historical context—and I mean an historical context as long as the life of some of the trees in the forest that Clawson is talking about. Failing this, the reader is left rootless in trying to assess both the desirability of the programs Clawson offers as well as the probability for their success.

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ELCHANAN COHN and STEPHEN D. MILLMAN. *Input-Output Analysis in Public Education.* Pp. vii, 135. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975. No price.

Input-Output Analysis in Public Education concerns the flow of resources through public school systems and explanations of student performance partly based on variables manipulable in decision making. American educational institutions continue to find themselves in a financial crunch, leading to a search for efficiency models with an emphasis upon "value added" (p. 7). The underlying assumption of this study is that possibilities exist to reduce input costs without reducing the quality of educational output.

The first four chapters provide an overview of the concept of input-output analysis as related to educational institutions and a survey of literature concerning the educational production function. This production process is explored in chapters five and six for a sample of Pennsylvania secondary schools; the Pennsylvania Plan is detailed; and a simultaneous equations analysis is presented for dealing with a broad range of educational outcomes. In chapter seven, the well-known canonical correlation technique is used to construct a single index combining diverse outputs. The final chapter contains a brief discussion of mathematical programming as an alternative tool for educational input-output analysis.

The style is too detailed and technical for a survey and too concise and unsystematic for a text. However, in a

readable way the authors adeptly weave the common thread of optimal input and output through many different areas of mathematical programming and statistics.

The reader will recognize the importance of rigorous management techniques to assist decision makers in allocating scarce resources. Perhaps the greatest value of the book lies in the authors' shared insight. Particularly in discussions of regression analysis, the authors emphasize using mathematical manipulation and statistical inferences to approximate input and output parameters. Clearly, this insight is useful; unfortunately, it is less clear whether the author's finesse is transferable to the educational field in real practice.

This important book has a potentially significant influence, particularly for doctoral students interested in educational planning, research, and simulation techniques. The authors accomplished their stated purpose. While the reviewers might quibble with choices of data and variables, we feel that the authors have made intelligent selections. We heartily recommend this book for its intended audience of students and statisticians, especially since competitive books comparable in coverage and level of presentation do not seem to exist. Specialists will find this book worthwhile for its 131 references.

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ALAN DAWLEY. *Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn.* Pp. viii, 301. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $17.50.

The emergence recently of a "new social history" reflects a distinct dissatisfaction with traditional historical research methodology—relying primarily on the papers of prominent individuals, public documents, newspapers. Focusing principally on the local level, relying on local manuscript collections and census tracts, these predominantly younger historians have sought to analyze more scientifically important historical questions. Alan Dawley's study of Lynn (Massachusetts) shoemakers falls within this school. In this monograph, Professor Dawley attempts to assess (1) the impact of industrialization on community and economic relations within one locale, (2) the process by which a village artisan was transformed into a capitalist urban industrial economy, and (3) why increasing social and economic divisions did not result in a radicalized, class conscious politics.

Intensively researched, *Class and Community* provides insights into the social, economic, and political life of an industrializing society. Professor Dawley details the role of capital in effecting industrialization and how an artisan household economy became an industrial economy based first on central shops and then on factories. He further describes the impact of these economic changes on communal and individual relations—the rise of the city, increasing class and social divisions, the professionalization of politics and services.

The study's narrative is disjointed; the reader is often confronted by a mass of information not wholly mastered by the author. Nor is there a clear sense of chronology—as to when these changes occurred and how they affected individuals and community over time. Professor Dawley also fails to develop clearly the relationship between economic and political/community change. When he does, his interpretations are distinctly impressionistic. Impressively challenging the conclusions of the Commons school and the traditional interpretations that geographic and occupational mobility and the opportunities for property accumulation precluded the development of class consciousness, for example, Dawley concludes that political democracy constituted the controlling "safety valve"—that is, it defused radical protest and contributed to a pluralist, interest group politics. Ironically, Dawley's study indirectly highlights the "new social" history's limited contribution as a more scientific

approach to the study of history. The reader acquires no definite sense as to how values were formed or transformed, the changing or static basis for power and influence, and the author's major conclusions about the "safety valve" role of political democracy and the Equal Rights tradition are not based on evidence derived from census, newspaper, or manuscript sources.

If unevenly written and developed, this is nonetheless an important addition to the growing literature on 19th century urban, labor, and social history.

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ROBERT G. KEITH. *Conquest and Agrarian Change: The Emergence of the Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast.* Pp. vii, 176. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $17.50.

In recent years there has been a burgeoning of interest in a set of topics relating particularly to the Third World, but also in part to Europe and Japan: peasantry, modernization, economic development, and colonialism. All the social sciences and several branches of history are now very much engaged. New journals have recently been started to accommodate this growing interest, such as *The Journal of Peasant Studies* and *African Economic History*. A remarkable number of excellent books have appeared which treat several of these topics simultaneously, books such as T. C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan*, C. Geertz, *Agricultural Involution*, G. Wright, *Rural Revolution in France*, B. Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, L. B. Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain*, F. Chevalier, *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico*, T. S. Epstein, *Economic Development and Social Change in South India*, and I. Adelman and C. T. Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*.

Robert Keith's *Conquest and Agrarian Change: The Emergence of the Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast* is another of these good books, clearly written, intelligently organized, very informative, and based largely on primary sources; it also makes virtuous use of anthropological writing (Leach, Geertz, Rowe, Murra, and others). The book is solid historical description and analysis, free from the archaeologist's vice of compulsive guessing, free from the Marxian's vice of making strong analytical assertions without giving factual evidence to support the interpretation, and free from the "formalist's" vice of regarding early, pre-industrial economies as being merely minor variants of twentieth-century industrial capitalism, to be described in the supply and demand language of elementary economics (for examples, see H. K. Schneider, *Economic Man, The Anthropology of Economics*, A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*, and D. North and R. Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World*).

After giving a sketch of some of what is known about (1) Indian "Coastal Society before the Spanish Conquest," in successive chapters Keith describes (2) "The Encomienda System," (3) "The Beginnings of Commercial Agriculture," (4) "The Age of the Gentleman-Farmer," and (5) "The Consolidation of the Hacienda System." The book ends with a seven page "Conclusion" comparing early colonial coastal Peru with other parts of Spanish America and summarizing the main reasons (explained throughout the book) for the emergence of haciendas:

> The hacienda system [of relatively large plantations and agricultural estates] developed on the Peruvian coast in response to social and economic changes which took place during the century after the conquest. Of these changes, three were of primary importance: (1) the growth of the Spanish population . . . ; (2) the rapid decline of the Indian population in the disastrous epidemics of the sixteenth century, and later as a result of pressures generated by economic development; (3) the rise of agrarian markets to supply the needs of a sizeable Spanish urban population (p. 130).

Some minor quibbles: I would have preferred Keith to write a much longer book (his text is only 136 pages) so as to give us additional chapters on interesting matters only touched lightly in passing: the organization and employment of black slaves; an account of how much of what kinds of exports there were early on and an explanation of why there was so little foreign trade (an important reason, surely, why commercial agriculture developed so slowly); organizational and economic details on what is known about how the pre-conquest political systems controlled irrigation, and on the first haciendas established, particularly the manorial haciendas. Finally, although the book is very clearly written and agreeably free from highfalutin terminology, throughout Keith calls what the Spaniards extracted from the Indians "tribute," "surplus," and "exploitation," very treacherous terms, the latter two especially being condemnations of what one does not like rather than descriptions of what exactly was paid out and received back by the Indians. (Are the obligatory payments made today by Soviet collective farmers to their Government also "surplus" and "exploitation"? If not, why not?) It is better to describe these payments and receipts in detail than to label them (see, for example, pp. 28, 39, 65, 130–136, where the terms "surplus" and "exploitation" are used uncritically, that is, without explaining what they mean and without explaining why the use of these terms is justified).

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PETER H. ROSSI and KATHARINE C. LYALL. *Reforming Public Welfare: A Critique of the Negative Income Tax Experiment.* Pp. 208. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. $10.00.

The idea of trying out particular social programs on an experimental basis before they are enacted into law has a compelling logic. Indeed, this has long been advocated by academicians believing in the "policy relevance" of social science, by politicians clamoring for scientific backing for their actions as well as by the taxpayer who sees the folkwisdom in such a common sense approach. But until the publication of Rossi and Lyall's *Reforming Public Welfare*, which evaluates the final project reports of the New Jersey–Pennsylvania Income Maintenance Experiment, there has been little knowledge of what happens when the experimental approach is actually attempted.

The idea of a negative income tax (NIT) as a replacement for the existing welfare system has attracted enormous interest since the federal government became poverty conscious in the 1960s. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) turned to two groups, Mathematica, Inc. and the Institute For Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, to conduct a 7.6 million trial of a variety of NIT plans over a three year period in four communities and to determine whether income maintenance would lead to reduced work effort on the part of recipient groups. As perhaps one of the "firsts" in policy related empirical social research, the NIT experience suggests many of the hazards and the potential payoffs for approaches of this kind.

Rossi and Lyall present a detailed critique of the experiment—its scope and design, the conduct of the field investigation, the findings and an analysis of some of the politics in carrying out the research. Although these authors laud the boldness of the experiment, on balance they see the project as seriously flawed. NIT was so narrowly conceived and designed that it produced only frustratingly inconclusive findings about labor supply questions; moreover, the measurement techniques and the data base were so defective that it is impossible to extrapolate these findings to the universe of the poor who would be the likely object of welfare reform.

Although these authors are critical of

the experimenters for being so limited, particularly for ignoring many social dimensions of the welfare problem and becoming obsessed with economic variables, I would say that this critique is also quite limited. Political constraints probably had as much if not more to do with the results of this experiment than anything else. Swift answers about only work response patterns were demanded by politicians in need of ammunition for the welfare reform issue in the late 60s; willing economists, prepared to ignore many of the social aspects of work patterns, dominated the experiment. They gave shaky and premature testimonial support to proreform forces in OEO and in Congress, eventually casting doubt on the scientific integrity of the whole project.

Although Rossi and Lyall see these events and report them casually, they never consider them systematically or suggest any conclusions about why and how key political forces were so determinative in shaping the results. This book is valuable for those concerned with the techniques for carrying out an experimental design, but the larger questions which experimental policy research raises remain to be answered elsewhere.

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ARNOLD R. WEBER. *In Pursuit of Price Stability: The Wage-Price Freeze of 1971*. Pp. xiv, 137. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973. $5.95.

By introducing the wage-price freeze of 1971, the Nixon administration took the step of improving direct, enforceable controls on wages, prices, and rents under economic conditions not significantly distorted by war. Phase I—a ninety-day freeze on wages and prices—constituted the first step in a series of controls that moved through Phases II and III and into Phase IV. These policy steps, especially Phase I, enjoyed considerable public support. For some commentators it represented a proper exercise of power by the government to check inflation. For others, it was a dangerous intervention that threatened market efficiency of free institutions.

This book, written by one of the advisors who served as the first Executive Director of the Cost of Living Council, recounts the development of the policies and strategies. It also tells the story of the improvised administrative organization, manned entirely by members from other governmental agencies. Especially illuminating is the discussion about the formulation of national economic policies in general and income policies in particular. And because the wage-price freeze of 1971 represented American loss of innocence in the use of peacetime controls, it is useful to review the lessons of the experience. Reaction to future temptation will be determined by whether the episode is remembered with pain or pleasure.

The strategy was to "talk tough but walk softly." To be sure, the freeze was carried out without attempting to "manage" the economy in any systematic way. Yet one must remember that the success of the freeze was facilitated by the fact that it was imposed on a cool economy marked by considerable slack in the labor force and industrial capacity. The record shows that by the end of 1971, the upward march of consumer prices at an annual rate of 4 percent suddenly slowed down to a rate of 1.6 percent. Wholesale prices, which had been rising at a rate of 4.9 percent, declined slightly. The U.S. balance of payments improved. The employment picture brightened. The experience reinforced a contention that governmental interventions can restrain wage and price increases temporarily, although the moderation tends to be greater on wages than on prices.

Notwithstanding the valuable contributions of the book, this reviewer remains skeptical about the whole undertaking. The author concludes that "the primary objectives of a freeze are to buy time to permit the development of more substantial economic policies [and the experiment] of 1971 fulfilled these objectives for the Nixon adminis-

tration" (pp. 129–130). But, I submit, they did so only in the short run and at the cost of substantial damage in the long run. The policies of 1971 did nothing to remove the institutionalized constraints eroding the micro and macro supply functions but only further reinforced them. Consequently, the unprecedented coexistence of inflation and unemployment during the subsequent years had some of their stimulus in the shock of 1971.

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